Pakistan and the Emergence of Islamic Militancy in Afghanistan

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Preface

This study examines the role of Pakistan in facilitating the growth of Islamic militancy in contemporary Afghanistan. It analyses the Pakistani elite's policies in relation to Afghanistan from a politico-historical perspective.

Pakistan's interaction with Afghanistan was to an extent influenced and fashioned by the historical legacy of pre-1947 Afghan-British Indian relations. This legacy laid the basis for the development of an acrimonious bilateral relationship between the two states after 1947, which was complicated by the Cold War power politics. In this connection, the study addresses the Pakistani role in supporting the anti-Soviet Islamist groups in Afghanistan during the 1980s. Included within this discussion is an examination of how Pakistani assistance to the Afghan Islamists led to the development of cross-border economic, social and political linkages between the two countries. The analysis focuses on the emergence of religious identity politics in Pakistan under the Zia regime (1977–1988) that strengthened the religious and ethnic commonalties between Sunni Islamists in Pakistan and Afghanistan. In effect, this process assisted Pakistan in becoming the leading external power in post-Cold War Afghan politics.

The study explores how Pakistani involvement with the Afghan Islamists became integrated with the Pakistani elites' post-Cold War strategic agenda. This is analysed by taking into account the nature of the Pakistani polity and the foremost role of the Pakistani military in policy formulation. Particular attention is given to the interrelationship between the changes in the geopolitics of the Southwest and South Asian regions with the security policies of the Pakistani decision-making elite.

The central theme of the study is that security concerns played a pivotal role in Pakistan's attempt to create a client state in Afghanistan in order to enhance Pakistan's wider economic and political influence in the region. These concerns, essentially premised on the calculations of *Realpolitik*, became a vital factor behind Islamabad's support for the Taliban militia in post-Soviet Afghanistan.

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It would have been difficult to complete this study without the assistance of various individuals and institutions over the last six years for which I am grateful. I am thankful to the Pakistani, Afghan and Indian officials and personalities who consented to being interviewed between 1999 and 2000. The wishes of those who preferred to remain anonymous have been respected, and those who did not are cited in the notes.

The task of writing an objective study of the contemporary Pakistan-Afghanistan relationship is particularly onerous. In this regard, many friends and colleagues have assisted in the completion of this work for which I am particularly thankful. I am especially grateful to my colleagues at the *Centre for Arab and Islamic Studies* (CAIS) of the Australian National University (ANU), Canberra for their support, which enabled me to complete this study.

Finally, I extend my sincere thanks to Kirstin Howgate and Donna Hamer of Ashgate Publishing Limited for their assistance during all stages of the publication of this work.

Note on Transliteration

In this study, a simplified system of transliteration has been adopted. Urdu, Arabic and Persian words that are cited in the text do not include diacritical marks. This is done in order to make the text less encumbered. Thus, organizations like the *Jam 'Iyatul 'Ulamā'-I Islam* would simply be *Jamiat-i-Ulama-i-Islam*. Moreover, well known terms such as Jihad, Nizam, Taliban, Sharia appear as they are, that is, in their by now standard anglicised forms.

Personal names of famous personalities like Ayatollah Khomeini, Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto, Ayub Khan, Zia-ul-Haq, Muhammad Zahir, Najibullah and so on, are rendered according to their established familiar pattern in the English language. Wherever the transliteration of a directly quoted source differs from the one used here, the variations have been respected.

Abbreviations

AIML	All India Muslim League
CENTO	Central Treaty Organization (Dissolved 1979)
CIA	Central Intelligence Agency (US)
COAS	Chief of Army Staff
ECO	Economic Cooperation Organization
FCR	Frontier Crimes Regulation
GHQ	General Headquarters
HI (Hekmatyar)	Hizb-i-Islami (Hekmatyar)
HI (Khalis)	Hizb-i-Islami (Khalis)
HMG	Her Majesty's Government
ISAF	International Security Assistance Force (Afghanistan)
ISI	Interservices Intelligence (Pakistan)
JeM	Jaish-e-Muhammad (Pakistan)
JIA	Jamiat-i-Islami-i-Afghanistan (Islamic Party of Afghanistan)
JI	Jamaat-i-Islami (Pakistan)
JUH	Jamiat-i-Ulama-i-Hind (India)
JUI (F)	Jamiat-i-Ulama-i-Islam (Fazalur Rahman faction)
JUI (S)	Jamiat-i-Ulama-i-Islam (Samiul Haq faction)
JUP	Jamiat-i-Ulama-i-Pakistan
LeJ	Lashkar-e-Jhangvi (also spelt Lashkar-i-Jhangvi)
LeT	Lashkar-e-Tayyiba (also spelt Lashkar-i-Tayyiba)
ML	Muslim League
NIFA	National Islamic Front of Afghanistan
NWFP	North-West Frontier Province
PDPA	Peoples Democratic Party of Afghanistan
PPP	Pakistan Peoples Party
SEATO	South East Asia Treaty Organisation (Dissolved 1977)
SSP	Sepah-i-Sahaba Pakistan
TNFJ	Tehrik-i-Nifaz-i-Fiqh-i-Jafaria
TJP	Tehrik-i-Jafaria Pakistan
UIFSA	United Islamic Front for the Salvation of Afghanistan

Maps

SOUTH ASIA



Map No. 4140 Rev. 3 UNITED NATIONS
January 2004

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PAKISTAN
Line Of Control as promulgated in the 1972 SIMLA Agreement
The boundaries and names shown and the designations used on this map do not imply official endorsement or acceptance by the United Nations.
Dotted line represents approximately the Line of Control in Jammu and Kashmir agreed upon by India and Pakistan. The final status of Jammu and Kashmir has not yet been agreed upon by the parties.
AFGHANISTAN
TURKMENISTAN
UZBEKISTAN
TAJIKISTAN
CHINA
INDIA
ISLAMIC REPUBLIC OF IRAN
ARABIAN SEA
BALOCHISTAN
SIND
PUNJAB
Kashmir
NORTH-WEST FRONTIER
FED. CAPITAL TERRITORY, ISLAMABAD
FED. ADMIN. TRIBAL AREAS
Islamabad
Rawalpindi
Peshawar
Kabul
Karachi
Lahore
Quetta
Multan
Faisalabad
Gujranwala
Sialkot
Amritsar
Ludhiana
Chandigarh
Patiala
Bhatinda
Delhi
New Delhi
Jaipur
Ajmer
Jodhpur
Udaipur
Bikaner
Ratangarh
Jaisalmer
Barmer
Palanpur
Bhuj
Jamnagar
Rajkot
Bhavnagar
Diu
Ahmadabad
Hyderabad
Sukkur
Shikarpur
Larkana
Jacobabad
Rahimyar Khan
Dera Ghazi Khan
Shujaabad
Jhang Sadr
Dera Ismail Khan
Bannu
Tank
Mardan
Muzaffarabad
Barotu
Kohat
Chitral
Gilgit
Skardu
Leh
Srinagar
Anantnag
Rajauri
Kathgodam
Haldwani
Moradabad
Meerut
Ambala
Kurukshetra
Sahiwal
Bahawalpur
Sibi
Chaman
Zhob
Loralai
Quetta
Kandahar
Lashkar Gah
Zaranj
Dalbandin
Nok Kundi
Surab
Panjgur
Gwadar
Jiwani
Pasni
Ormara
Bela
Hoshab
Nawabshaw
Sanghar
Mirpur Khas
Thatta
Karachi
Khuzdar
Qal'eh-ye Now
Bamian
Chaghcharan
Kowt-e Ashqow
Jalalabad
Chankar
Parachinar
Ghazni
Gardeyz
Shindand
Farah
Delaram
Tarin Kowt
Lashkar Gah
Zaranj
Kandahar
Herat
Mary
Kerki
Termiz
Dushanbe
Qarshi
Feyzabad
Khorugh
Kulob
Qurghonteppa
Sheberghan
Mazar-e Sharif
Taloqan
Kunduz
Baghlan
Samangan
Meymaneh
Dowshi
Turbat
Panjgur
Dadu
Moro
Jaisalmer
Ramgarh
Rahimyar Khan
Shikarpur
Sukkur
Larkana
Jacobabad
Khuzdar
Surab
Dalbandin
Nok Kundi
Sibi
Chaman
Zhob
Loralai
Dera Ghazi Khan
Shujaabad
Jhang Sadr
Dera Ismail Khan
Bannu
Tank
Mardan
Muzaffarabad
Barotu
Kohat
Chitral
Gilgit
Skardu
Leh
Srinagar
Anantnag
Rajauri
Kathgodam
Haldwani
Moradabad
Meerut
Ambala
Kurukshetra
Sahiwal
Bahawalpur
Multan
Faisalabad
Gujranwala
Sialkot
Amritsar
Ludhiana
Chandigarh
Patiala
Bhatinda
Delhi
New Delhi
Jaipur
Ajmer
Jodhpur
Udaipur
Bikaner
Ratangarh
Jaisalmer
Barmer
Palanpur
Bhuj
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Diu
Ahmadabad
Hyderabad
Sukkur
Shikarpur
Larkana
Jacobabad
Rahimyar Khan



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

Department of Public Information

Introduction

The emergence of the Islamic fundamentalist Taliban[1] militia in Afghanistan, in the 1990s, added a new dimension to the post-Cold War security concerns of nearly all states contiguous to that strife-torn country. The ethnically-Pashtun-dominated Taliban were alleged to be involved in supporting militant Islamic groups from Chechnya to Kashmir. The Taliban variety of Sunni Islamic activism gave incentive to violent groups seeking to overthrow the secular regimes of the former Soviet Central Asian states of Uzbekistan, Tajikistan and Kyrgyzstan. In Afghanistan's east, China suspected the Taliban of backing Uighur separatists in its northwestern province of Xinjiang. In South Asia, India charged the Taliban with supporting Muslim militants in the Indian administered state of Jammu and Kashmir. Afghanistan's western neighbour, Iran perceived the Taliban as an anti-Shiite sectarian threat to its brand of revolutionary Islam. Most importantly, both the United States and Russia accused the Taliban of backing anti-American and anti-Russian Islamic militants during the late 1990s. The Taliban's involvement in supporting militant Islamism came to a head with the terrorist attacks against the United States on 11 September 2001. The attacks propelled Washington to punish the Taliban for harbouring and collaborating with the Saudi dissident Osama Bin Laden's Al Qaeda organization. This organization was held responsible by the US for instigating these attacks. Subsequently, the US launched Operation *Enduring Freedom* in October 2001 and in a swift and well coordinated campaign succeeded in removing the Taliban regime and severely disrupting the Al Qaeda terrorist network.

The Taliban example inflamed Sunni extremism in Afghanistan and made that country a focal point for religiously inspired terrorism and violence that had repercussions not only on the regional states but also on the wider international arena. Significantly, the example of the Taliban sparked Sunni militancy within Pakistan itself – a state which was regarded as the virtual creator and mentor of the Taliban. It, therefore, becomes appropriate to investigate the causes for Afghanistan's transformation into a fractious war ravaged entity run by a rigid and obscurantist religious militia at the advent of the twenty first century. A study of Afghanistan's slide into Islamic extremism is also further necessitated by that country's geostrategic location at the nexus of the Middle East, South Asia and Central Asia.

The history of Afghanistan over the last two centuries reflects continuous interplay between domestic political forces and external actors, whose intervention has ranged from intellectual and politico-economic influences to physical occupation. This study represents an attempt to examine the factors that were responsible for the coming to power of the Taliban in Afghanistan. In this connection, it traces Pakistan's security policies vis-à-vis Afghanistan during the

Cold War era that eventually led Pakistan to become the dominant player in Afghan politics by the early 1990s. The central purpose of the study is, therefore, to examine Afghan political developments as influenced by Pakistan – a major regional state with the longest border with Afghanistan. It concentrates on primarily analysing the cross-border influences that led to the rise of the Taliban phenomenon from the vantage point of the Pakistani power elite.

The consolidation of the Taliban regime over large parts of Afghanistan increased cross-border Islamist activity in adjoining states. This development increased the level of domestic disruptions in the socially and politically fragile states of Southwest and Central Asia, already riven with ethno-national and sectarian conflicts.

Research Methodology for the Study

An exercise in contemporary political analysis may often be hampered by limited information and by changes in perspective that the passage of time, new events and fresh revelations produce. This study centres on a still continuing crisis, which raises the problem of constantly keeping it up to date with the ever-changing events. This problem can be substantially overcome by presenting the study's interpretations and the narrative in a historical perspective.

The foremost reason for grounding the study in a historical methodological perspective is that Pakistan's involvement in Afghanistan is itself a product of historical circumstances. The present day Pakistan–Afghanistan nexus can be seen as a continuation of centuries old political, religious and cultural interaction between the areas that now constitute Pakistan and Afghanistan. A historical inquiry, in such a situation, can discern patterns in the evolution of political events and determine whether these patterns have a recurring theme in history. In this context, scholars like Hedley Bull have strongly advocated a research agenda for the study of world politics based on historical methodology as opposed to a total reliance on a 'scientific' approach derived from behavioural methods.[2] The predictive powers of theoretical perspectives in the natural sciences come into question more often than not. Thomas Kuhn has observed in his work *The Structure of Scientific Revolutions* that in the natural sciences established paradigms are undermined by the emergence of new theories after a passage of time.[3] In the social sciences, it is even more difficult to retain a paradigm in its original form due to the ever-changing nature of human societies. An investigation built upon a solid historical account can, as noted by John Lewis Gaddis, provide a 'bridge' between the 'scientific' and the 'historical' approach.[4]

A methodology that largely relies on historical evidence is termed by International Relations scholars as the traditional or the 'classical' approach. The classical approach rejects the view that there can be one correct or valid scientific analysis of international politics. The principal elements of the classical approach are: identifying and ordering the central questions; clarifying the concepts; investigating the historical evidence; and formulating a coherent argument. In short, the aim is to grasp the substantive topic on its own terms. Foreign policies, for example, are intrinsically complicated activities and cannot be comprehended by applying a single paradigm. According to Hedley Bull, the use of history enables the scholar to understand the particular characteristics of a state.[5] In this sense, the classical approach which 'derives from philosophy, history and law, and that is characterised above all by explicit reliance upon judgement and by the assumptions based on strict standards of verification and proof' can lead to sound analysis of international politics.[6]

Due to the multifaceted Pakistan–Afghanistan relationship, which is an outcome of specific historical circumstances, the methodological foundations of this study are built on the traditional or classical approach. By applying this method, as observed by Max Weber, we can more readily ascertain the main factors of an event from an 'infinity of causal factors' involved.[7] This methodology also allows us to study what E.H. Carr has termed the underlying 'social process' that is the essential ingredient of any historical process.[8]

Pakistan–Afghanistan Relationship: Towards a Conceptual Framework

The conceptual starting point of this study will fall into the broader tradition of political realism; that is, that states struggle for power and security in an anarchical environment. From Thucydides to Morgenthau, realists have stressed that material interests, the dominance of the strong over the weak, and an anarchic international relations environment, have guided states to formulate their external policies.[9] The realist approach to international politics focuses attention on the importance of power in the relations between states. Classical realists delve into human nature and do not discount the influence of internal characteristics particular to a state on its foreign policy but power and the desire to dominate remain the paramount theme. In contrast, the neorealists tend to stress the impact of the structure of international relations systems on the behaviour of states.[10] The structure of the system, particularly the relative distribution of power, is the focus here. In fact, neorealism has not been overly concerned with the internal characteristics of a state. It tends to regard the state as a 'black box' and as such pays scant attention to what is in the 'black box'. The nature of the state is less important as the structure compels it to act in certain ways. Thus, the structure determines the actions of states. It emphasises that states are rational actors which at a minimum aspire to preserve their existence and which at a maximum seek a position of dominance. Furthermore, realism and its offshoot, neorealism regard foreign policy agenda of states as being dominated by national security imperatives that overshadow most legal, emotional and moralistic concerns.

The foreign policy outlook and behaviour of Pakistan is motivated by a persistent effort to seek power and security in a competitive and insecure region. Moreover, changes in international politics and balance of power amongst states have had a profound impact on Pakistan's external relations. As a result, Pakistani perceptions regarding inter-state relations are shaped by a combination of realist assumptions that are influenced by the changing dynamics of the global and regional power structure.

The evolution of Pakistan's foreign policy has been substantially affected by the course of its historically adversarial relationship with India. The demise of British

imperialism ushered in an era of decolonisation in Asia. In 1947, Britain partitioned, and then granted independence to, India. The partition created two states, the predominantly Hindu India and the Muslim majority state of Pakistan. As a result of the hasty, religiously inspired partition process, Pakistan inherited major territorial disputes with India. The Pakistani political elite generally viewed India as a hostile state bent upon the destruction of Pakistan. This suspicion and animosity led Pakistan to fight three wars with India, particularly over the Himalayan state of Kashmir, which is claimed by both countries, until the present.[11] Thus, since its inception, Pakistan's decision makers gave primacy to security concerns in their external relations in view of the perceived threats from India. In fact, this led both India and Pakistan to constantly increase their military preparedness in a bid to outdo each other, thereby creating a 'security dilemma', which complicated the security environment of South Asia.[12]

At independence, Pakistan also inherited another territorial dispute with its smaller Muslim neighbour to the northwest, Afghanistan, which added to the Pakistani decision makers' security paranoia. The Afghan dispute with Pakistan had its origins in the international boundaries imposed on the region during the heyday of the British raj in the late nineteenth century. Since 1919, all Afghan governments have refused to recognise the Durand Line – the border between British India and Afghanistan – as final. The Afghans have claimed that the Pakistani North West Frontier Province (referred as 'Pashtunistan' by the Afghans) with a large Pashtun ethnic majority was formerly part of Afghanistan.[13] Most Afghan governments dominated by Durrani Pashtuns encouraged the nationalist aspirations of Pakistani Pashtuns, which adversely affected Pakistan–Afghanistan ties from the very beginning in 1947.[14]

The imagined or real threats to Pakistan's integrity as a state gave rise to the primacy of security concerns in the state's internal and external policies. This led to and facilitated the growth of a large military establishment, which over a short period became the most powerful and dominant political institution in the country. Pakistan's external policies have ultimately been greatly influenced by the particular nature of its decision-making apparatus. The military has been a formidable actor in the political process since the late 1950s. Subsequently, policy making in the realm of external and internal security has been the domain of the Pakistani military, with the civil bureaucracy playing the role of a junior partner. Even in the period 1988–1999, despite the façade of democratic rule, the military continued to be the pre-eminent player in the formulation of Pakistan's overall security policy. Both the Peoples Party administration of Benazir Bhutto (December 1988 to August 1990, second term, October 1993 to November 1996) and the Muslim League administration of Muhammad Nawaz Sharif (November 1990 to April 1993, second term, February 1997 to October 1999) had to contend with the ultimately dominant role of the powerful military establishment on matters pertaining to national security.

What emerges is that the concept of security has been central to understanding the Pakistan–Afghanistan relationship. Traditionally, 'security' was the security of the state, when it was threatened by the military power of other states and defended by the military power of the state itself. The principal dimension of security still essentially continues to revolve around the maintenance of a state's existence and territorial integrity. In the present era, however, security relates not only to the state's

desire to survive but also to its goal of thwarting any internal or external threat to its existence and core national values. Consequently, for the purposes of this study, the term 'security' will also encompass ideational, cultural and economic factors that impinge on security. In this connection, Barry Buzan's sectoral approach to security seems more applicable in the Pakistan–Afghanistan context. Buzan notes that:

> The security of human collectivities is affected by factors in five major sectors: military, political, economic societal and environmental ... these five sectors do not operate in isolation from each other. Each defines a focal point within the security problematique, and a way of ordering priorities, but all are woven together in a strong web of linkages.[15]

Hence, this multifaceted approach has the useful feature of incorporating the military dimension of security with other factors and by doing so, it broadens the scope of the analysis.

The Pakistani elites' approach to security, especially in the context of the territorial threats from Afghanistan and India, revolved around military threats and the fear of subversion directed by these states to foster secessionist movements. These threats not only posed a danger to the territorial integrity of the country but also challenged the existence of the regimes in power and undermined the legitimising ideology of the state. In this sense, the military, social and political dimensions of security became interlinked in the formulation of Pakistan's external policy and, in turn, affected the behaviour of the states neighbouring Pakistan. The elements of threat/fear and amity/hatred felt between Pakistan and India paved the way for the evolution of a South Asian 'security complex' centred on the rivalry between these two states but geopolitical imperatives compelled the induction of neighbouring states such as Afghanistan and even Iran into the operational dynamics of this security complex.[16] Therefore, the theoretical insights of this study, thus, derive in part from this notion of 'security complexes'. A security complex, according to Buzan, is defined as:

> a group of states whose primary security concerns link together sufficiently closely that their national securities cannot realistically be considered apart from one another. Security complexes tend to be durable, but they are neither permanent nor internally rigid.[17]

The concept of security complexes, drawn from the postulates of realist theory, elucidates a comprehensive approach in dealing with regional security systems where states perceive a high level of threat from each other. Based on his definition of a security complex, Buzan had earlier identified the South Asian security complex as a subsystem consisting primarily of India and Pakistan. This subsystem is linked to the Gulf subsystem (consisting of Iran, Iraq, Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, Oman, Qatar, The United Arab Emirates, and Bahrain) of the larger Middle East super-complex.[18] In this classification, Afghanistan provided a buffer between the Middle Eastern super-complex and its Gulf and South Asian subsystems.[19]

In the post-Cold War era, Afghanistan clearly lost its 'buffer' role between the Middle Eastern super security complex and the South Asian subsystem. In essence, Pakistan's backing for the Taliban had resulted in the virtual integration of

Afghanistan into the South Asian security subsystem centred on the India–Pakistan rivalry. By drawing on Buzan's theories, one can study the Pakistan–Afghanistan relationship within a three level framework, that is, at the local state level, the regional level and at the larger global level. In doing so, it is possible to take insights from the neorealist structural theory that focuses attention on the influence of the international system on states and on the outcomes of inter-state relations. At the same time, this also enables us to analyse Pakistan's Afghanistan policy within the historical context of the Cold War geopolitics that was based on the intense US–Soviet global rivalry that developed in the aftermath of the Second World War.

However, this study endeavours to refrain from completely applying uncritical realist paradigms and related security concepts to Third World states such as Pakistan and Afghanistan which exist in an area whose peoples have had very long and multidimensional political, cultural, religious and social ties over the ages. In this connection, it is pertinent to emphasise that most mainstream International Relations paradigms do not fully capture the dynamic of Third World state behaviour. These paradigms have an increasingly diminished applicability in analysing states with traditional societies where religious, cultural and ethnic factors play a significant role in influencing a state's external relations. In addition, the grand theories of International Relations tend to ignore the often-complex motivations, the myths, the logical underpinnings or the historical backgrounds of Third World state evolution and interaction. In the words of Donald Puchala, 'International Relations is so obsessed with power politics that it ignores the strength of cultural and ideational explanations of Third World behaviour.'[20] Moreover, some scholars are also critical of the US policy responses to the post-Cold War conflicts in the Third World. For instances, Jim George demonstrates that American policy ignores the complex cultural, social and historic particularities of these crises and continues to be dominated by a 'commitment to a simplistic grand theory of International relations honed during the Cold War and not seriously reflected upon since then'.[21]

Nevertheless, despite its shortcomings, Realism and the related sub field of Security Studies, provide useful tools for studying international affairs. It is also clear, however, that Realism alone cannot explain the whole range of factors involved in Third World interstate behaviour. Hans J. Morgenthau's classic assumption of realist theory that 'International politics, like all other politics, is a struggle for power ... statesmen think and act in terms of interest defined as power' needs to be modified, particularly, in the case of Third World circumstances.[22] Constructivism is one theoretical paradigm that has recently been popularised in terms of filling the gap in realist theory as regards the impact of domestic sources on a state's foreign policy. Constructivist theory emphasises that the social world is a human construction. It gives importance to the cultural–institutional aspects that influence a state's orientation.[23] Thus, according to Constructivists, a state's behaviour is shaped by elite beliefs, collective norms and social identities.[24] The domestically derived ideational factors weigh heavily on the conduct of foreign policy. In short, as Walt has observed, Constructivism regards 'the interests and identities of states as a highly malleable product of specific historical process'.[25]

Constructivism can give an insight into the internal characteristics of a state and the idealistic factors that compel it to behave in a certain manner. Even realist

scholars suggest the importance of cultural and idealistic attributes on a state's behaviour. In this regard, Colin S. Gray claims that: 'cultures comprise the persisting socially transmitted ideas, attitudes, traditions, habits of mind and preferred methods of operations that are more or less specific to a particular geographically based security community that had a unique historical experience.'[26] In this respect, it can be argued that the elements of Pakistan's security culture bear the imprint of the British colonial legacy and this also has had a profound influence on the Pakistan–Afghanistan relationship in the post-1947 period.

The internal developments of a state cannot be separated from its external policies. Edward Azar and Chung-in Moon observe, 'Domestic factors such as legitimacy, integration, ideology, and power capacity play an equally important role in shaping the national security posture. Security challenges in many parts of the Third World are of endogenous rather than exogenous origin.'[27] In this context, it can be asserted that Pakistan's involvement in Afghanistan in the late 1970s was directly related to the policies of the military junta, which had seized power in July 1977. The military regime's internal weakness and political isolation was a reason for its support of the anti-Soviet Islamist opposition in Afghanistan. In doing so, the military regime led by General Zia-ul-Haq aimed at revitalising US interest in Pakistan and, thereby, gaining international legitimacy. Besides, by backing the Islamists in Afghanistan the military could gain support with the domestic Islamic groups that could bolster its unpopular image at home. In short, regime security became associated with national security in Pakistan's Afghan policy during the late 1970s.

Threats to security are those that affect the existence of the state's institutional and territorial structures, or the elites who rule them. Scholars such as Mohammed Ayoob have rightly argued that Third World governing elites are preoccupied, if not obsessed, by concern for security of the regime and state.[28] Ayoob believes that: 'any formulation that does not make security its centrepiece will inadequately explain Third World state behaviour, domestically and internationally.'[29] Thus, the internal dynamics of security are 'of paramount importance to the totality of Third World states' security calculus'.[30] In this context, it could be claimed that the interplay between Pakistan's domestic insecurity and Afghan claims on its territory essentially motivated the Pakistani elites to devise a counter strategy towards Afghanistan from the mid 1970s.

It can be inferred from this discussion that the realist paradigm is a useful starting point for the study of Pakistan–Afghanistan relationship, in the sense that it comprehensively articulates the security problem in international relations. Furthermore, many major actors in international politics (including Third World states) portray behaviour consistent with this paradigm. Even so, the realist explanation is found lacking in explaining the cultural, religious and social factors that impinge on a Third World state's foreign policy. For this reason, any analysis and explanation of post-Cold War politics should be modified from inputs provided by other conceptual frameworks. Michael C. Desch's assertion is correct when he writes that:

> In indeterminate structural environments, where states have many optimal choices, realist theories ought to have little trouble according culture, or any other domestic variable, a greater independent role in explaining state behaviour.[31]

Thus, an open-ended approach built upon realist foundations can offer a credible basis for an analytical study of Pakistan's role in the Afghan tragedy. In this connection, Alagappa rightly notes that 'rather than engaging in a sterile argument as to which theory is better, a more productive exercise will be to recognize and deploy the strength of contending theories to enhance the understanding of international politics'.[32]

Some General Concepts with Regard to Islamic Movements used in this Study

This study addresses Pakistan's policy towards Afghanistan from a mainly security oriented perspective. Pakistan's encouragement for dissident Afghan Islamists in the 1970s, as noted earlier, was a part of its overall counter strategy which aimed at defusing Afghanistan's decades old irredentist claims on the Pakistani North West Frontier Province (NWFP). In the words of a senior Pakistani General, Islamabad wanted Kabul 'to realise that covert activity was a double edged weapon'. This meant that Pakistan could respond in kind to Afghanistan's backing of Pakistani Pashtun nationalists.[33] Finally, Pakistan got the opportunity to counter Afghanistan's 'Pashtunistan' threat with the advent of a pro-Soviet regime in Kabul in April 1978. The Pakistani plans for covertly supporting the anti-Communist Afghan Islamists, which at that time were still in an embryonic stage, could now get the blessing of the United States as well. It was this policy of backing Afghan Islamists that eventually would result in the emergence of the Taliban style 'neo-fundamentalism' in the 1990s.

The Taliban phenomenon is distinct from contemporary Islamic movements that regard Islam as a political ideology. Instead, the Taliban are closer to what Olivier Roy terms 'neo-fundamentalist' Islamic groups that mushroomed in the Islamic world during the 1980s.[34] In this regard, Roy writes that Islamic neo-fundamentalism concerns itself with implementing Muslim law:

> the *Sharia*, without inventing new political forms, which means that it is condemned to serving as a mere cover for a political logic that eludes it – a logic in which we ultimately find the traditional ethnic, tribal, or communal divisions, ever ready to change their discourse of legitimation, hidden beneath the new social categories and regimes.[35]

It is also necessary to distinguish the Taliban's rise to prominence from what is usually referred as Islamic revivalism, resurgence or reassertion. Revivalist or resurgent Islamic movements were generally oriented towards the reaffirmation of identity and values as a reaction to implanted foreign ideologies and westernised culturally aloof elites in Muslim countries. Moreover, the Islamic revivalist movements in the Muslim world during the 1940s were generally led by leaders whose founders were educated in the Western tradition, or at least they had some grasp of political modernity. Men like Hassan al-Banna (1906–1949) and Sayyid Qutb (1906–1966), belonging to the Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood Movement, are among the better-known examples of such a trend.[36] Similarly, in South Asia, Syed Abul Ala-Mawdudi's *Jamaat-i-Islami* also exhibited a plan for social action incorporating elements of modernity in its Islamic political discourse.[37] Mawdudi's political thought had significant influence on Sunni Islamist groups from Afghanistan to Egypt in the 1960s and 1970s. However, the Islamic neo-fundamentalism of the 1980s, particularly in countries like Pakistan and Afghanistan, reflects the growth and increasing influence of semi-educated 'Islamic' zealots who want to re-establish the *Sharia* (Islamic Law) in the literal sense. The neo-fundamentalists' distorted and narrow worldview, infused with sectarian biases, contrasted sharply with the broader, mainly non-sectarian and intellectually stimulating Islamic vision of the earlier Muslim political parties.

The Taliban's emergence was certainly a manifestation of traditional neo-fundamentalist Islam. Significantly, this phenomenon arose largely because of the patronage provided by the Pakistani state. It was a development that contrasted with the emergence of Islamic movements in Syria, Iraq, Egypt, Algeria and pre-1979 Iran, where the state stood in opposition to any manifestation of political Islamism. Therefore, the rise of the Taliban cannot be understood without analysing the role of the Pakistani military and religious groups, whose support was critical in the creation of this militant faction in post-Soviet Afghanistan. The 'Talibanisation' of Afghanistan is, therefore, enmeshed with security policies of the Pakistani military–bureaucratic establishment.

This study seeks to produce a systematic and analytical politico-historical examination of causal factors behind the Pakistani ruling elite's policy of intervening in Afghanistan's domestic affairs in the Cold War and post-Cold War eras. It aims to trace the evolution of Pakistani policy towards Afghanistan, the regional constraints and political perceptions that influenced the policy processes in Pakistan. It stresses the consistency of Pakistan's policy towards Afghanistan since the establishment of the Pakistani state. In this respect, this work is different from earlier works on the Pakistan–Afghanistan interaction that have tended to study a particular period or an issue related to this subject through bi-polar Cold War lenses.

Source Material

The sources for this study vary with the subject and the period. There are well-documented memoirs, secondary sources, press coverage and polemical literature that parties to the Afghan conflict have produced over the years. However, information and works on post-Cold War Pakistan–Afghanistan interaction are scantily documented. In Pakistan, neither the Foreign Ministry nor the military establishment release confidential documents to researchers. Moreover, most Pakistani involvement in the Afghan crisis during the last three decades has been covert, which has resulted in the difficulty of obtaining reliable data and information.

Some primary source material for this study is, to an extent, based on the information supplied by the participants involved in the Pakistan–Afghanistan problem. In this regard, the wishes of those who preferred to remain anonymous have been respected. The Pakistani military's activities in Afghanistan have been clandestine and officially denied by the government. Information on the Pakistani role has, therefore, been obtained from media reports, personal interviews and from Pakistani and foreign journals.

Organization of the Book

This study is organised in the following way: The first chapter gives an historical overview of Afghanistan's relationship with the Indian subcontinent from the Mughal period to the creation of Pakistan in August, 1947. It focuses on the nineteenth century geostrategic rivalry between Great Britain and Russia (the so-called 'Great Game') that left a legacy of contested frontiers in the region that profoundly influenced Pakistan–Afghanistan interaction in the post-colonial period.

The second chapter deals with Pakistan–Afghanistan relations between 1947 and 1978. It explores the factors that conditioned Pakistan's unhappy relations with Afghanistan. In this connection, the chapter concentrates on the 'Pashtunistan' issue that became the basis for the acrimonious relationship between the two states. Finally, this chapter discusses how the unique nature of the Pakistani state affected that country's external relations.

Chapters three and four are related to each other in the sense that they discuss the crucial changes in Pakistan's Afghan policy brought about by the military regime headed by General Zia-ul-Haq in the period 1978–1988. Chapter three provides a broader picture of Islamabad's policy towards the pro-Soviet Afghan government from the April 1978 coup in Kabul to the Soviet intervention in December 1979. More significantly, it analyses the reasons for the Zia regime's decision to covertly support the dissident groups opposed to the Afghan government from 1978 onwards. The influence of Pakistan's domestic political conditions on its Afghan policy is also elaborated here. Chapter four outlines the continuity in Pakistan's Afghan policy after General Zia's exit from the political stage in August 1988. Moreover, it explores Afghanistan's linkage with Pakistan's regional geo-strategic policy in view of the easing of US–Soviet tensions in 1988. This chapter also covers the Geneva Accord signed by Pakistan and the Afghan government, which paved the way for Soviet troop withdrawal from Afghanistan in February 1989. It focuses on the changes in United States policy towards Afghanistan and Pakistan in a changing international political environment. The chapter concludes with an examination of Pakistani policy towards Afghanistan in the aftermath of the collapse of the Soviet Union in December 1991.

Chapter five discusses Pakistan's approach towards the Islamic State of Afghanistan established after the fall of the Najibullah administration in April 1992. This chapter provides an analysis of the internecine conflict that broke out between the various religious and ethnic militias in Afghanistan after the ouster of Najibullah. In this connection, the chapter focuses on Pakistan's role in the intensification of the Afghan civil war in the immediate post-Soviet period. It also discusses the Pakistani involvement in backing the Taliban militia against the Rabbani administration (1992–1996). The chapter studies this development within the context of international and regional developments.

Chapter six examines Pakistan's involvement in fostering the growth of the Taliban during 1996–2001. Islamabad's policy of supporting the Taliban is viewed in the wider context of the Pakistani decision makers' goal of gaining access to the Central Asian Republics. The chapter studies the complex triangular interaction between the Taliban, Pakistan and the United States. In this regard, it also discusses the United States policy of 'containment' pursued against Iran and its relationship with the evolving Pakistan–Afghanistan nexus. The increasingly symbiotic relationship between the Taliban, some Pakistani religious groups and the Pakistani military establishment is elaborated. The chapter ends with the changes in Pakistan's policy vis-à-vis Taliban in the aftermath of September 11, 2001. The conclusion of the study contains a brief overview of the increasingly entangled Pakistan–Afghanistan relationship.

Notes

1 *Talib* is an Arabic word for a person seeking something. It is derived from the word *Talab*, meaning desire, for instance, a desire for knowledge. In Pashto, the word *Taliban* is the plural of *Talib*. A *Talib* is generally a student studying in a madrassa or religious seminary in Pakistan and Afghanistan.

2 See Hedley Bull, 'International Theory: The Case for a Classical Approach', in K. Knorr and J.N. Rosenau (eds), *Contending Approaches to International Politics*, Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1969, pp.20–38.
Behaviouralism emphasises that social sciences are not fundamentally different from the natural sciences. It concentrates on explaining social phenomenon by using quantitative methods that are used in the natural sciences.

3 T.S. Kuhn, *The Structure of Scientific Revolutions*, Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1970.

4 John Lewis Gaddis, 'History, Science and the Study of International Relations', in Ngaire Woods (ed), *Explaining International Relations Since 1945*, London: Oxford University Press, 1996, p.45.

5 See Hedley Bull, Op.Cit, pp.20–38; and Hedley Bull, 'International Relations as an Academic Pursuit', *Australian Outlook*, Vol.26, 1972, pp.251–262.

6 Hedley Bull, 'International Theory: The Case for a Classical Approach' in K. Knorr and J.N. Rosenau (ed), p.20.

7 Max Weber, 'Objective Possibility and Causation in Historical Experience' in Edward A. Shils and Henry A. Fine (Trans), *The Methodology of Social Sciences*, New York: Free Press, 1949, p.169.

8 E.H. Carr, What is History? London: Penguin, 1964, p.55.

9 See P.J. Rhodes, *Thucydides: History of the Peloponnesian War*, Bristol: Bristol Classical Press, 1989; Hans Morgenthau, *Politics Among Nations: The Struggle for Power and Peace*, New York: Knopf, 1962.

10 Kenneth Waltz, *Theory of International Politics*, New York: Addison-Wesley, 1979.

11 For a detailed examination of the contentious issues involved in the India–Pakistan relationship see S.M. Burke, *Pakistan's Foreign Policy: An Historical Analysis*, Karachi: Oxford University Press, 1993; also G.W. Choudary, *Pakistan's Relations with India*, 1947–1966, London: Pall Mall Press, 1968. A perceptive analysis of the impact of the Cold War on South Asia is in Robert J. McMahon, *The Cold War on the Periphery: The US, India and Pakistan*, New York: Columbia University Press, 1994.

12 'Security Dilemma' is a situation where one state's attempts to increase its own power is perceived by the other state as threatening and, therefore, this state is forced to increase its power as well. This behaviour reduces overall security for both these states in the long term. For a classic exposition of the 'Security Dilemma' see John Hertz, 'Idealist Internationalism and the Security Dilemma', *World Politics*, Vol.20 No.2, January 1950, pp.234–260.

13 Many scholarly studies on the Pashto speaking peoples generally continue the Indian practice of referring to this ethnic group as 'Pathan'. However, Pathan is, in fact, a

corruption of the name by which this ethnic group is known to the individuals that identify themselves as part of this ethnicity. This work will use the term by which the ethnic group calls itself, that is, Pashtun. Generally, the term Pashtun is used in local Pashto dialect by Pashtuns living in southern Afghanistan and adjoining regions of southern NWFP. The northern regions of NWFP and corresponding contiguous provinces of Afghanistan use the term 'Pakhtun'. In this study, the southern term 'Pashtun' is used to denote all Pashto speaking Afghans residing in Afghanistan and Pakistan.

14 See L. Dupree, *Afghanistan*, New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1980; L.B. Poullada and Leilla B. Poullada, *The Kingdom of Afghanistan and the United States: 1828–1973*, Omaha: University of Nebraska Press, 1995.
15 Barry Buzan, *People, States and Fear: An Agenda for International Security Studies in the Post-Cold War Era*, Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner, 1991, p.192.
16 Barry Buzan, *People, States and Fear*, p.190.
17 Ibid., p.190.
18 See Barry Buzan and Gowher Rizvi (eds), *South Asian Insecurity and the Great Powers*, London: Macmillan, 1986, Chapter 1, pp.10–11.
19 Ibid., p.10.
20 Donald J. Puchala, 'Third World Thinking and Contemporary International Relations', in Stephanie G. Neumann (ed), *International Relations Theory and the Third World*, London: Macmillan, 1998.
21 Jim George, *Discourses of Global Politics: A Critical (Re) Introduction to International Relations*, Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner, 1994, p.8.
22 Hans J. Morgenthau, *Politics Among Nations*, 4th ed, New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1967, p.5.
23 Ronald L. Jepperson, Alexander Wendt, and Peter J. Katzenstein, 'Norms, Identity and Culture in National Security', in Peter Katzenstein (ed), *The Culture of National Security: Norms and Identity in World Politics*, New York: Columbia University Press, 1996.
24 See Alexander Wendt, *Social Theory of International Politics*, London: Cambridge University Press, 1999.
25 Stephen M. Walt, 'International Relations: One World, Many Theories', *Foreign Policy*, Spring 1998, pp.40–41.
26 Colin S. Gray, *Modern Strategy*, London: Oxford University Press (OUP), 1999, p.131.
27 Edward E. Azar and Chung-in-Moon, 'Rethinking Third World National Security', in Edward E. Azar and Chung-in-Moon (eds), *National Security in the Third World: The Management of Internal and External Threats*, London: Edward Elgar, 1988, p.12.
28 Mohammed Ayoob, *The Third World Security Predicament*, Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner 1995, Chapter 5.
29 Mohammed Ayoob, *The Third World Security Predicament*, p.191.
30 Ibid, pp.40–41.
31 Michael C. Desch, 'Culture Clash: Assessing the Importance of Ideas in Security Studies', *International Security*, Vol.23, No.1. Summer 1998, p.168.
32 Muthiah Alagappa, 'Rethinking Security: A Critical Review and Appraisal of the Debate', in Muthiah Alagappa (ed), *Asian Security Practice: Material and Ideational Influences*, Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1998, p.62.
33 K.M. Arif, *Working with Zia: Pakistan's Power Politics 1977–1988*, Karachi: Oxford University Press, 1995, p.190.
34 Olivier Roy, *The Future of Political Islam*, Cambridge, Mass: Harvard University Press, 1994, Chapter 5 and 6.
35 Ibid, p.ix.

36 See William E. Shepard, *Sayyid Qutb and Islamic Activism: A Translation and Critical Analysis of Social Justice in Islam*, Lieden: E.J. Brill, 1996; N. Ayubi, *Five Tracts of Hasan al-Banna: A Selection from the Majmu'at Rasai'l al-Imam al-Shahid al-Banna*, (translation Charles Wendell), Berkeley: University of California Press, 1978.
37 See Seyyed Vali Reza Nasr, *Mawdudi and the Making of Islamic Revivalism*, London: Oxford University Press, 1996; Charles J. Adams, 'The Ideology of Mawlana Mawdudi', in Donald E. Smith (ed), *South Asian Politics and Religion*, Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1966.

Chapter 1

The Pakistan–Afghanistan Relationship in a Historical Perspective

The primary objective of this chapter is to examine the historical relationship between the regions that form contemporary Pakistan and Afghanistan. In this context, it gives a sketch of the Indian subcontinent's interaction with Afghanistan from the pre-colonial era to the creation of Pakistan. The territory which today comprises Afghanistan has since time immemorial been the meeting place of three civilizational centres of Asia: Indian, Persian and Central Asian. The southern and eastern parts of Afghanistan for thousands of years have had links with northern India. The arid mountainous tracts controlled by the Pashtun tribes on the present day Pakistan–Afghanistan border have historically served as the major trade and invasion routes from Central Asia to India.

Afghanistan's pivotal geographical location, lying at the crossroads of great Asian civilizations, has had a profound influence on the course of this country's complex history. The presence of a wide diversity of races and languages in modern Afghanistan is an indication of the fact that the country has always been a melting pot of divergent cultures. Moreover, its crucial position as the gateway to India has greatly affected Afghanistan's political evolution. It is worth quoting India's first Prime Minister Jawaharlal Nehru (1889–1964) that 'Afghan history is almost part of India's history: indeed, for long Afghanistan was part of India'.[1]

It is beyond the scope of this chapter to provide a complete review of India–Afghanistan ties. What this chapter hopes to accomplish is to give an overview of India's relationship with Afghanistan from the era of Islam's ascendancy in the region to the time of partition in 1947. The chapter focuses on the nineteenth century geostrategic rivalry between Britain and Russia – the so-called 'Great Game'– that played an important role in facilitating the establishment of Afghanistan as a 'buffer' state separating two colonial empires. It also briefly examines how Britain's concern for the security of its Indian empire led to the drawing of an artificial frontier between India and Afghanistan that basically served British strategic considerations. This artificially constructed border would become an important cause of bitterness and sour relations between Pakistan and Afghanistan in the post-colonial period.

India's Ties with Afghanistan Before the Advent of European Imperialism

The mountain ranges and passes that crisscross the Pakistan–Afghanistan border have been the main access route to the Indian plains for centuries. The two important topographical barriers, the Hindukush Range and the Indus River, have acted as an

obstacle to any invader from Central Asia. As Kemp and Harkavy observe: 'From the nineteenth century Afghan wars to the modern Kashmir dispute, the mountains have been factors in the political and military conflicts' in this region.[2] The subsidiary ranges of the Hindukush that straddle the Pakistan–Afghanistan border area contain the main passes that connect the Indian subcontinent with Afghanistan and Central Asia.[3] It was from these passes and routes that countless invaders approached India and in the process moulded the linguistic, cultural and religious character of the contemporary Pakistan–Afghanistan region.

The territories of Pakistan and Afghanistan in ancient times were part of the great empires of the Persians, Greeks, Mauryas and Kushans. Invasions, foreign rule and tribal movements across borders have given this region a rich cultural heritage. The Achaemenian empire under Darius (c 521–485 BC) held suzerainty over the area extending from Amu Darya (classically, the Oxus) to the banks of the Indus. Later, Alexander the Great's conquest of Kabul Valley (c 327 BC) and Pakistan's North West Frontier Province (NWFP) resulted in the growth of Hellenistic cultural influences in this area that lasted for centuries. The Greek historian Herodotus noted the presence of the forerunners of modern Pashtuns in eastern Afghanistan at that time. According to Herodotus there were Indians in the: 'Caspatyrus country of Pactycia, who in their mode of life resemble the Bactrians. These are the most warlike of the Indian tribes.'[4] Paktia is an Afghan province bordering Pakistan. The Greek rule left an enduring imprint on most of the regions, which are now part of Afghanistan and northern Pakistan. These include Herat (ancient Aria), Balkh (a southern portion of Bactria), Hazarajat (Sattagydia), Kandahar (Arachosia), Peshawar valley and Swat (Gandhara).

Alexander's death in 323 BC resulted in the dismemberment of his Asian possessions. The Hellenistic satrapies in India and Afghanistan came under the rule of various Greek warlords.[5] At about the same time, the rise of the powerful Buddhist Mauryan dynasty in northern India was challenging the Greek influence in this area. Under the great Mauryan monarch Asoka (c 265–238 BC), southeastern Afghanistan and northern India became part of the Mauryan Empire. However, Mauryan rule in these regions was threatened by renewed Greek forays into Afghanistan and India from their bases in Bactria.[6] These incursions severely weakened Mauryan hold over Kabul and adjoining territories. A fresh influx of Aryan tribes overran Afghanistan and northern India in around 119 BC. These tribes, known as the Scythians (or Sakas), were able to establish their control from Bactria to the Indus.[7] The advent of the Scythians erased the last vestiges of Greek influence from Afghanistan and India. For a brief period, Scythian rule was replaced in this region by that of the Parthians, who had occupied eastern Iran by early first century BC.[8]

Towards the middle of the first century BC, bands of nomadic tribes from Central Asia, called Yueh-chi by the Chinese, invaded Bactria. One of the sub-divisions of Yeuh-chi clans, the Kushans, gained supremacy and formed a dynasty that was to dominate territories from the Hindu Kush to the Indus for nearly four centuries.[9] In AD 425 a fresh wave of Central Asian peoples, the Hephthalites, or White Huns, destroyed the Kushan Empire.[10] From sixth century AD to the middle of the eighth century AD, Afghanistan and contiguous areas of northern India (Pakistan) were ruled by Sassanian Persia, a coalition of Central Asian Turkic tribes and various Indian dynasties in succession.[11]

In the course of ninth century, Islamic armies expanded into Afghanistan and brought Balkh and other regions in Transoxiana within the fold of Islam under the Tahirid dynasty of Khorasan. In Southeastern Afghanistan, they encountered the principalities of Zamindawar (modern Kandahar), Zabulistan (Upper Helmand Valley) and Kabul.[12] Indigenous rulers of mixed Kushan-Hephthalite-Turkic origins ruled these principalities that believed in idolatrous cults derived from Hinduism and Buddhism. From 643, the Arabs led numerous armed Islamic incursions in the region of Zamindawar, Zabulistan and Kabul but the local rulers effectively resisted these attacks.[13] Notwithstanding the ethnic origins of the rulers of southern and eastern Afghanistan, it remains a fact that the region was steeped in Buddhism and associated faiths at the time of the Muslim Arab sorties.[14] In this respect, the Arabs regarded the territories of Zamindawar, Zabulistan and Kabul as the 'frontier of Al Hind' (India) in a cultural and political sense.[15] The famous Arab traveller and historian, Al Beruni, had called the ninth century Kings of eastern Afghanistan and its environs 'Hindu Shahi'.[16] In 870, a general, Yakub ibn Layath, belonging to the Saffarid dynasty that had replaced the Tahirids, was eventually successful in occupying Kabul.[17] Under the Saffarids, the message of Islam was widely propagated in eastern Afghanistan including the Kabul and Ghazni regions.[18] The Saffarid dynasty declined in power at the beginning of tenth century and another dynasty, with strong Iranian influences, the Samanids, gained control of Afghanistan.

The Samanid rule extended from Bukhara to northern and central Afghanistan. Under this dynasty there was a revival of Persian culture. The poets Rudaki and Daqiqi gave impetus to the renaissance of Persian language. It was during this period that Turkic slave converts to Islam, who were employed in the Samanid army started to gain political power. In 961, a Turkic slave, Alptegin, rebelled against the Samanid monarch and established an independent dynasty centred at Ghazni in eastern Afghanistan.[19] This Ghaznavid dynasty was destined to form the first Islamic empire in Southwestern Asia, comprising northern India, Afghanistan, eastern Iran and parts of present day Uzbekistan and Tajikistan. Alptegin's successor, Sebuktegin, consolidated the Ghaznavid conquests in Afghanistan. However, it was Sebuktegin's son, Mahmud, who finally extinguished the remnants of Hindu and Buddhist influences in that area, by overthrowing Kabul's last Hindu ruler belonging to the Sahi dynasty in 1013.[20] Mahmud led seventeen expeditions into India from his base in Ghazni.[21] An enduring impact of Mahmud's invasions of present day Pakistan and northern India was the establishment of Sunni Muslim ascendancy in that part of the world. In this regard, C.E. Bosworth notes that the Ghaznavid Sultan's attacks on India were also motivated by the 'spirit of Muslim Jihad'.[22] The Muslim historians of the Ghaznavid period frequently referred to the warlike tribes living on the present Pakistan–Afghanistan border as 'Afghans'.[23] These tribes frequently harassed the Ghaznavid armies passing through the mountainous tracts of eastern Afghanistan.

By the middle of the twelfth century, the Ghaznavids came under severe challenge from Turkic generals belonging to the mountainous country of Ghor in western Afghanistan. Ala-ud-Din Husain of the Shansabani dynasty of Ghor burned Ghazni in 1152. Later, in 1192, the Ghorid Sultan, Muizz-ud-Din Muhammad b. Sam, successfully invaded India and defeated a confederation of Hindu princes at Tarain.

This victory consolidated Muslim rule in India for the next six hundred years. In this regard, S.A.A. Rizvi explains: 'the victory at Tarain was a watershed in Indian history. It marked the beginning of Muslim Turkic rule in India proper. Previously this had been confined to the Punjab and Sind'.[24] One of Muiz-ud-Din's Turkish slave generals, Qutb-ud-Din Aybeg consolidated his master's conquests in northern India up to Delhi after the Sultan's death in 1206. Qutb-ud-Din Aybeg is regarded as the first of a long line of sultans that reigned over what Indian historians referred as the 'Delhi Sultanate', which lasted from 1210 to around 1400.

A near anarchic period started to dawn in the regions between the Amu (Oxus) and the Indus rivers during the thirteenth and the fourteenth centuries with the onset of the Mongol invasions under Genghis Khan. The Mongols captured Herat and swept eastwards towards the plains of the Punjab by 1221.[25] Throughout the thirteenth century, Genghis Khan's successors held sway intermittently over an area extending from Armenia to the banks of the Indus River. Under Mongol tutelage, the Kurt dynasty, based at Herat, ruled the greater part of western Afghanistan for nearly two hundred years. The Mongol occupation of Afghanistan and eastern Iran also brought an exodus of refugees from these areas into northern India. Moreover, in this turbulent era the Indian borderlands adjoining Afghanistan repeatedly changed hands between the Mongol attackers and the rulers of the Delhi Sultanate belonging to the Turkic–Afghan ethnic groups.[26] In the latter part of the fourteenth century, Timur (c 1336–1401), a Turko–Mongol tribal chief ended the rule of the Kurt dynasty in Herat and extended his suzerainty over Kabul, Kandahar, Ghazni and Kunduz. In 1398, Timur invaded India from Kabul and occupied Delhi.[27] Timur's incursion into northern India dealt a fatal blow to the already much weakened Delhi Sultanate, at that time ruled by the Turkic Tughluq dynasty.

The advent of the fifteenth century saw increased instability in northern India. Timur's attacks had exposed the military weakness of the Delhi Sultanate. Furthermore, internecine conflicts and palace intrigues amongst the Turkic, Afghan and Persian nobility had paved the way for the disintegration of the Sultanate by 1412. Provincial governors had started to become autonomous and in this context Sirhindi claims, 'the amirs and maliks of the empire were independent sovereigns and would appropriate the revenue and the produce themselves'.[28] During the period 1414–1526 two petty feudal dynasties, the Sayyid (1414–1451) and the Lodi (1451–1526), maintained a rather tenuous hold over the area between Kabul, which was still under a Timurid administration, and Delhi.[29] The Sayyids, who traced their descent from the Prophet Muhammad, recruited numerous Afghans in their army. It was during the Sayyids' reign at Delhi that Afghans, belonging mainly to the Pashtun Ghilzai tribe, started to wield their political influence at the court. The Afghan military officers fought with rival sides during the chaotic period at the end of the Delhi Sultanate. Finally, in the 1470s, the Afghan Lodi clan of the Ghilzai tribe established itself as the rulers of Delhi.[30] In the period between the late fifteenth and early sixteenth centuries, the Pashtun tribes inhabiting southeastern Afghanistan and contiguous areas that are now in Pakistan began to emerge from their isolated mountain habitats. These Pashtun tribesmen are said to have harassed and robbed Timur's armies on the way to Delhi.[31] The Pashtun tribes' fierce resistance to Timur and previously to the Mongols and Turks gained them a reputation of being very independent and at times barbaric.

In the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries Afghanistan came under the influence of the two great Muslim empires of the time namely: Safavid Iran and Mughal India. The Mughals and the Iranians were often engaged in a bitter rivalry to control the regions that now are part of Afghanistan. From Babur's capture of Delhi in 1526 to the collapse of the Mughal empire in the first quarter of the eighteenth century, the Mughal rulers of India sought to extend their influence over Afghanistan, either for territorial aggrandisement or to block the historical invasion routes into the Indian subcontinent across the Hindukush and the Sulaiman Ranges.[32] For the Mughals, who hailed from the Ferghana Valley of modern day Uzbekistan, the control of Kabul also meant retaining an access to their former ancestral homelands.

Throughout most of the Mughal period eastern and southern Afghanistan remained within Delhi's ambit. However, the Mughals failed to bring Badakhshan and the mainly Turko–Uzbek regions of Afghanistan, which today form the northern provinces of Takhar, Kunduz, Balkh, Badakhshan, Jowzjan, Samangan and Baghlan into their empire. In fact, the power of the Mughal emperors remained restricted to the south of the Hindukush even at the time of the Mughal Empire's greatest expansion under Jalal-ud-Din Muhammad Akbar (1556–1605).[33] In this period, the Uzbek Shabanids contested for supremacy over northern Afghanistan with the Safavids and the Mughals, whose power in this particular region never remained unchallenged.

The struggle for control of southern Afghanistan, particularly the city of Kandahar, was an important feature of the Mughal-Iranian relationship in the seventeenth century. The Mughals regarded their hold of Kandahar as vital for the security of their Indian possessions. Besides its strategic importance, Kandahar was a major trade centre lying on the caravan routes linking Central Asia, Iran and India. These considerations later also became a key element of Britain's imperial policy concerning this region. From the north of Herat, an invader from Iran or Central Asia could easily enter the Kabul valley via Kandahar and then proceed towards India.

The Mughals retained Kabul as long as the dynasty remained in power, while the possession of Kandahar was bitterly fought over with the Iranians. In this connection, Riazul Islam says that 'for the Mughals, the Kabul–Ghazni–Kandahar line represented a strategic and logical frontier, beyond Kabul and Khaibar there was no natural line of defence. Moreover, the possession of Qandahar made it easier to control the Afghan and Baluch tribes'.[34] For the Safavids, acquisition of Kandahar meant curtailing Mughal access to Central Asia and thereby thwarting the chances of a possible united Sunni Central Asian–Mughal alliance against Shiite Iran.

The Pashtun tribes of eastern and southern Afghanistan continued to steadily increase in numbers and influence during the Mughal era. By the middle of the seventeenth century, the Abdali and the Ghilzai tribes had settled in the more fertile lands of Kandahar, Zamindawar and the Arghandab valley.[35] Moreover, this period also saw the emergence of nascent Pashtun self-awareness, as evident in the poetry of the celebrated Pashtun Poet, Khushal Khan Khattak (1613–1689). According to Gregorian, Khushal Khan 'endeavoured to inspire the tribes to defend their independence against Mughal encroachments and strive towards political unity'.[36] At the same time, the Pashtun inhabited areas witnessed the development of Islamic messianic movements like the *Roshaniyya* ('Illuminati') sect.[37] Bayazid Ansari, a Pashtun of the Wazir tribe, founded the *Roshaniyya* mystical cum political

movement in the late sixteenth century. This strongly anti-Mughal *Roshaniyya* movement preached a life of poverty, fasting and remembrance of God.[38] The *Roshaniyyas* at one time succeeded in controlling the road between Kabul and Peshawar. Nevertheless, the superior Mughal army was eventually able to crush this sect by the 1620s. During its heyday the *Roshaniyya* movement had gained adherents amongst the Orakzai, Afridi, Bangash and the Yusafzai Pashtun tribes residing on the Indian-Afghan frontier.

The Mughals held a tenuous grip over eastern Afghanistan, even at the height of their rule. The provinces of Kabul and Kandahar acted as a 'transition zone between Iranian and Indian culture hosting a mosaic of ethno-linguistic groups'.[39] The Pashtun tribes continued to maintain practical independence from Delhi and were often much of a headache to the Mughal rulers. Delhi paid subsidies and bribes to various Pashtun tribal chiefs to keep the Kabul–Peshawar route open.[40] The Mughals deliberately encouraged tribal dissent in order to keep the tribes divided, thus stalling the possibility of a united struggle against them.

With the death of Aurangzeb (1658–1707), the fabric of the Mughal Empire began to disintegrate. One by one, several outlying Provinces of this vast empire stretching from Bengal to Kabul began to declare their independence from Delhi. Despite this trend Kabul and Ghazni remained under nominal Mughal suzerainty till the late 1730s. In Kandahar, however, a chieftain of the Ghilzai tribe, Mir Wais, began a revolt against Persian rule.[41] At about the same time a section of the Abdali tribe, the Sadozais, succeeded in overthrowing Iranian control in Herat. By 1720, most of southern and western Afghanistan had overthrown Iranian tutelage. In 1722, Mir Mahmud, a son of Mir Wais, conquered Isfahan and thereby virtually brought to an end the tottering Safavid dynasty itself. The Ghilzais, however, had overextended themselves and soon lost not only their Iranian conquests but also Kandahar to the Iranian General Nadir Khan of the Turkic Afshar tribe.

Nadir had put himself at the head of a broad movement to liberate Iran from the Ghilzai Afghans. In 1736, he crowned himself as the Shah of Iran. After gaining a grip on power, Nadir Shah led the Iranian army to capture Kandahar, the centre of Ghilzai power, in 1738. From Kandahar, Nadir's forces moved towards Kabul, which was still under a Mughal governor. Kabul fell to the Iranians in June 1738 thus ending almost two centuries of Mughal (Indian) rule over that city. The Iranians had justified their venture into Kabul on the grounds that they were pursuing Ghilzai tribesmen who had earlier fled to this Mughal province.[42] The takeover of Kabul by the Iranians once again threatened the security of India, as this city could now be used for staging an attack on the subcontinent. The fragility of the decadent Mughal court at Delhi encouraged Nadir Shah to invade the Mughal capital in the spring of 1739. The Iranians looted and plundered Delhi and then retreated back to the Iranian plateau through Afghan territory.

During Iranian occupation of western Afghanistan Nadir Shah had favoured the Pashtun Abdali tribe.[43] The Abdalis served in the Iranian army and their young chief, Ahmad Khan, of the Sadozai clan, rose to a high position in Nadir's bodyguard contingent. In 1747, Nadir Shah was assassinated by his bodyguards, which resulted in the erosion of Iranian influence in western Afghanistan. This event enabled Ahmad Khan to seize the royal treasury and proceed to Kandahar, where he had himself elected as the ruler or Shah of the Pashtun tribes by a *Loya Jirga* or assembly

of tribal chiefs, Ulama and heads of the Sufi orders.[44] By this action, Ahmad Shah brought into existence an identifiable Afghan entity for the first time in history. Ahmad Shah made Kandahar his capital and took the title of *Durr-i-Durran* (Pearl of Pearls), which caused his tribe (the Abdalis) henceforth to be known as Durranis.

The infant Afghan state adopted a mixture of Mughal and Iranian administrative patterns. But, unlike the authoritarian Iranian and Mughal court practices, the Afghan monarchy was substantially influenced by the tribal democratic mores of the Pashtun society and culture. Most significantly, the Shah had to consult the council of tribal *sardars* or chiefs on important matters concerning the state, which limited the Afghan monarch's power.[45] In short, the foundations of the Afghan state were based on a loose tribal-feudal arrangement that predisposed it towards a tendency to break down in times of crisis.[46] Ahmad Shah's enthronement as the first king of Afghanistan in 1747 coincided with the virtual collapse of Mughal authority in North-West India (Pakistan) and eastern Afghanistan. Nadir Shah's sack of Delhi had already struck a deathblow to the once powerful Mughals.[47] The corresponding expansion of the British East India Company in southeastern India was accentuating the disintegration of the remaining portions of the Mughal Empire. The impotence of the Mughal central government enabled the Sikhs of the Punjab, the Marathas in western India and other groups in this multi-racial empire to successfully defy Delhi's authority.

The Afghan Pashtun tribes had formed an independent tribal confederacy under the leadership of Ahmad Shah Durrani on the debris of the Mughal and Safavid empires. The Sardars belonging to the Sadozai clan of the Popalzai sub-tribe of the Abdali tribal union held the dominant position in the new state. Ahmad Shah was not merely a strong, semi-nomadic Afghan chieftain intent on carving out an autonomous state for the Pashtuns but he planned conquest of adjoining lands aimed at or serving the purpose of unifying the principal Afghan tribes under his control. In the pursuit of his objectives, Ahmad Shah invaded India several times. He extended the boundaries of his domain by rapidly conquering Kabul and Peshawar in 1748. By the mid 1750s, Ahmad Shah had annexed the Punjab, Kashmir, Sind, Baluchistan, Balkh, Badakhshan and parts of Iranian Khorasan.[48] In January 1761 Ahmad Shah invaded India for the sixth time and decisively crushed a combination of Hindu Maratha forces commanded by Sadsheo Bhao at the battlefield of Panipat near Delhi. Ahmad Shah's incursion into India now was encouraged by the renowned Sunni Indian Muslim cleric Shah Waliullah Dehilivi.[49] Shah Waliullah (died 1762) primarily sought Ahmad Shah's intervention as a means to stem the ascendancy of the Marathas that threatened the already fragmented Muslim rule in the Indian subcontinent. However, instead of restoring Muslim power, Ahmad Shah's defeat of the anti-British Marathas inadvertently paved the way for the East India Company to strengthen its hold on all of central and southern India. Nearer to his Afghan homeland, Ahmad Shah also proved incapable of preventing the growth of Sikh power over the Punjab and in 1765, the Afghans had to abandon Lahore, the provincial capital.

In 1773 Ahmad Shah died and was succeeded by his son Timur Shah. During Timur's reign major regions of northern India including Kashmir, Peshawar and Multan remained within the fold of the Durrani empire. Timur, however, was unable to retain Baluchistan, Badakhshan and parts of northern Afghanistan. Ahmad Shah

had not left behind a viable administrative structure to maintain an integrated empire. His numerous conquests had kept the tribes content as long as the booty from the conquered lands kept coming. In this connection, Shahrani observes that the Durrani Empire 'was more of a confederation of many Pashtun and non-Pashtun tribes and Khanates than a centralized Kingdom'.[50] The tribal element owed their loyalty to the personal charisma and authority of Ahmad Shah. This was reinforced by treaties, marriages and kinship ties established by the Durrani monarch with the various tribes. Politically, the Durrani/Abdali tribal aristocracy retained all the important positions of power in the government. Ahmad Shah based his state on the Sunni *Hanafi* School of law in which the *sharia* was applied in a flexible manner. He paid great attention to the Ulama and other clergy in order to give his rule religious legitimacy.[51]

Timur's demise in 1793 exacerbated the centrifugal trend in the Durrani realm. The empire was gradually being transformed into a conglomerate of independent and rival principalities, each centred around an urban centre such as Kabul, Peshawar, Ghazni, Kandahar and Herat. After a period of palace intrigues and bloodletting, one of Timur's sons, Zaman Shah was finally able to gain control of Kabul. At this juncture the British had already begun to establish their dominion over India, while Czarist Russia was expanding south in the direction of the Central Asian khanates bordering Afghanistan. These two great imperial powers were going to play a key role in the formation of Afghanistan as a nation-state in the course of the nineteenth century.

The 'Great Game' and Afghanistan in the Nineteenth Century

On the eve of the nineteenth century, Afghanistan was an ethnic mosaic dominated by the Pashtun tribes belonging to the southern and eastern parts of the country. Durrani ruled Afghanistan also encompassed diverse non-Pashtun ethnic groups. Uzbeks and Tajiks inhabited the northern regions. In central Afghanistan the Shiite Hazaras of Mongol origin were preponderant. A mixture of Persian-speaking population belonging to the Tajik, Farsiwan, Turkmen and Pashtun groups inhabited the area of western Afghanistan centred on Herat. Territorially, the Pashtun tribes could be divided into three broad categories: (1) the Pashtun tribes of eastern Afghanistan. The prominent groups amongst them were the Afridi, Khattak, Orakzai, Bangash, Wazir, Mahsud, Mohmand, Mangal and the Shiite Turi; (2) the tribes inhabiting southwestern Afghanistan were mainly of Durrani (Abdali) and Ghilzai extraction and; (3) the mainly Yusufzai inhabitants of the Peshawar plains and the valleys in the east.[52]

Politically, Afghanistan entered the nineteenth century as a disunited, tribal-feudal entity riven with ethnic and religious fissures. The period beginning with the rule of Zaman Shah (1793–1801) signified a fundamental change in the relationship between India and Afghanistan. The empire built by Ahmad Shah had shrunk and the outer provinces had become autonomous. In the north, Durrani influence at Balkh had almost eroded; independent local rulers ruled Baluchistan and Sind; and in the Punjab the Sikhs were in the process of forming an independent Kingdom. With the decline of the Durrani empire, family feuds were leading towards fragmentation of

the Pashtun regions, including the Abdali heartlands. Zaman Shah faced constant hostility from his brothers Mahmud at Herat and Shuja-ul-Mulk at Peshawar. Despite these problems, the Afghan potentate rather foolishly pursued the goal of reviving Ahmad Shah's Indian conquests and posing as a champion of Islam against the Sikhs and the Marathas.[53] In fact, it was Zaman Shah's desire to invade India that brought him into collision with the British, who by this time had established themselves as the supreme power in northern India.

The British, like many previous rulers of the subcontinent encountered the age-old problem of securing their dominions from possible invasion through the mountain passes linking India with Afghanistan and Central Asia. According to J.L. Lee, it was the British who popularised the name 'Afghanistan' by presupposing that a unified homogeneous state had existed in the region since 1747.[54] For the British officials and scholars the term Pashtun or Pakhtun was to become synonymous with the category Afghan and Afghanistan.[55] This perception seems plausible, as the British encountered the Pashtuns as rulers of Kabul along with the numerous tribes belonging to this ethnic group, which resided in the trans-Indus regions of India.

In 1798, the British Governor-General, Lord Wellesley was seriously concerned by the threat of an Afghan attack on northern India, presumably aimed at restoring the Mughal dynasty. In this regard, the British authorities at Calcutta feared that Napoleonic France might incite Zaman Shah to launch his invasion and the realisation of this eventuality could undermine Britain's hold on its newly acquired colonies in India. This apprehension of French involvement with Zaman Shah became a major factor in the British efforts to seek an alliance with Qajar Iran. Wellesley sent his envoy, Mehdi Ali Khan, to ascertain the Iranian Shah's attitude towards an Anglo-Iranian treaty against Zaman Shah. The Qajar ruler, Fath Ali Shah, was induced to maintain pressure on the Afghans by threatening Khorasan and Herat. This was the first move on the part of Britain to bring 'Persia into the orbit of Indian foreign policy.'[56] In 1801, Wellesley sent another mission to Tehran under John Malcolm to negotiate a defence treaty with the Shah. Through an alliance with Iran, Britain desired to preclude any potential attempt by Zaman Shah to attack India. Furthermore, by raising the spectre of a looming Afghan invasion, the East India Company justified further annexation of territory in northern India. Edward Ingram notes that by parading the threat of Zaman Shah, Wellesley enhanced British influence in Oudh, a strong Muslim principality south of Delhi.[57]

The strategies devised by the British to counter any perceived invasion of India were related, to a certain extent, to problems of maintaining balance of Power in Europe.[58] Malcolm Yapp, for one, writes that: 'the concerns of British foreign policy were mainly in Europe and Indian strategies were viewed in the light of that pre-occupation; the attention of those directly responsible for the security of British India on the other hand, were focused within India itself'.[59] Moreover, Yapp asserts that domestic determinants and self-interest of British Indian officials to get ahead also played an important role in the expansion of the British Empire.[60] As a matter of fact, Iran, Afghanistan and North-western India (the area which is now Pakistan) became an integrated component of the international system of the nineteenth century presided over by the major powers of Europe. Thus, European politics directly affected the colonial policies of Britain, France and Russia in Asia.[61] The so-called 'Great Game', the term used to describe the nineteenth century

Russian–British rivalry for dominance in Central Asia, Afghanistan and Iran, had already begun in the late eighteenth century with the British schemes for bringing Iran into their fold against a French backed Afghanistan.[62] The Anglo–Iranian alliance resulting from Malcolm's mission brought the British into the affairs of Central Asia and Afghanistan for the first time.

In Afghanistan, Zaman Shah's brother Mahmud removed him from the throne in 1800. Mahmud himself was forced to flee from Kabul by Zaman's full brother Shuja-ul-Mulk in 1803. However, he again regained Kabul in 1807 and Shuja-ul-Mulk was compelled to leave for Peshawar. While the Sadozais were engaged in fratricidal conflict, the Muhammadzai clan of the Barakzai sub-tribe of the Durranis had emerged as a politically powerful force and had become the main rival of the Sadozais. In 1818, leading members of the Muhammadzai clan successfully overthrew Mahmud.[63] Mahmud fled Kabul to Herat, where his family ruled up until 1842. In 1826 Dost Muhammad, a prominent Muhammadzai Sardar, was finally able to defeat his rival brothers for possession of Kabul and assumed control of that city. The Muhammadzai clan dominated the politics of Afghanistan until 1973, with the exception of a brief period between 1839 and 1842.[64]

The internecine Afghan tribal conflicts and family feuds during the first quarter of the nineteenth century led to the dismemberment of the Afghan empire built by Ahmad Shah Durrani. Offensive policies pursued by the Qajars resulted in the loss of western Khorasan and posed a threat to Herat. In the north of the Hindukush the Uzbek region gradually came under the influence of the Amir of Bukhara. In the south, Kalat (in Baluchistan) became independent. In the Punjab, the Sikh leader, Ranjit Singh, who was a former Durrani Governor at Lahore, succeeded in occupying Multan in 1818, Kashmir in 1819 and Derajat in 1821.

British relations with the newly emerging states in the Punjab, Kabul (under Dost Muhammad) and Sind underwent a dramatic change in the period 1800-1826. Russia's advances in the Caucasus and Central Asia were now increasingly being perceived as a threat to Britain's Indian Empire. The incorporation of Georgia, a territory over which Iran exercised nominal suzerainty, by Russia in 1800 soured Tehran's ties with St.Petersburg. Iran had sought British assistance against Russia over this issue but London failed to oblige, insisting that the Anglo–Iranian Treaty was targeted only against a French threat. This affront made Iran seek France's help in its war with Russia. In 1807, a treaty was signed between the two states.[65] However, the Treaty of Tilsit between France and Russia, also concluded in 1807, blunted the edge of the Franco-Persian alliance significantly. After Tilsit, Iran tried again to reengage the British in its anti-Russian strategy. In 1814 a definitive treaty was signed between Britain and Iran in which the British undertook to assist financially and militarily the Qajar Government against any hostile European power. Despite the existence of the Anglo–Iranian pact, Iran's disastrous conflicts with Russia, which forced it to accept humiliating treaties with St. Petersburg, convinced Tehran of Britain's lack of commitment in safeguarding the territorial integrity and independence of Iran in accordance with its treaty obligations.[66]

By the late 1820s, the British had already arrived at the conclusion that Iran could not serve as a suitable ally for the defence of British India against Russia owing to that country's internal disarray and persistent defeats at the hands of the Russians. The possibility of finding an alternative to Iran had motivated the British to send

missions to Kabul in the early 1800s.[67] Lord Minto, the British Governor-General, sent the first mission to Kabul in 1808 to ascertain the state of affairs in that city and the neighbouring regions. The mission, headed by Mountstuart Elphinstone, was part of Minto's frontier policy of meeting any perceived threat to India beyond the Indus.[68] When Elphinstone arrived in Peshawar, Shah Shuja-ul-Mulk was facing increased opposition from his brother Mahmud. However, Elphinstone was able to conclude a treaty with Shuja in which the ruler of Kabul committed himself to prevent the passage of French and Iranian troops on their way to India.[69] Shuja needed British assistance against his enemies, particularly Mahmud. But the treaty between Shuja and Elphinstone carried very little weight as Mahmud defeated Shuja's forces in 1809. Shuja sought British protection and was settled in Ludhiana in the eastern Punjab on a British pension.

In the British strategic perception, Punjab had assumed great importance by the end of the first quarter of the nineteenth century. In 1809, Britain negotiated an alliance with the Sikh Maharaja of the Punjab, Ranjit Singh. The Anglo–Sikh concordat allowed the British the right of passage for their army through the Punjab in case of foreign aggression. The British policy with regard to the defence of India now became increasingly based upon balancing the competing rivalries and conflicting ambitions of regional potentates and fractious states. The Sikhs wanted to expand their influence up to Peshawar while Iran harboured designs on the re-conquest of Herat. In this situation, the British Indian officialdom had to follow a flexible policy that maximized East India Company's interests. Britain's alliances and agreements with the principalities on the Indian borderlands were made in the light of London and Calcutta's preoccupation with India's security.

In the course of the 1820s, the Muhammadzai clan of the Barakzais headed by Dost Muhammad had entrenched itself at Kabul. Dost Muhammad had appointed his brothers as governors of Peshawar, Kashmir and Kandahar. Only Herat remained in the possession of the Sadozai Prince Mahmud and his son Kamran. In spite of Dost Muhammad's achievement in replacing the Sadozais from power, he could not resist Sikh encroachment on traditional Afghan territory west of the Indus. By late 1820, the Afghan governor in Kashmir had also become a Sikh vassal. In 1834, Peshawar fell to the Sikhs. The loss of Peshawar was a bitter blow for the Afghans and it would become a source of friction in Afghanistan's relations with British India.

The rise of Sikh influence in Northwestern India in the 1820s engendered an upsurge of Islamic militancy aimed at countering this resurgent non-Muslim power. In the North-West Frontier of India, a revivalist Islamic movement led by Sayyid Ahmad Barelvi gained much prominence amongst the eastern Pashtuns of Peshawar and Swat. Sayyid Ahmad hailed from a Muslim family of Oudh (in present day Uttar Pradesh). He was inspired by the teaching of the Sunni savant Shah Waliullah Dehilivi and his son Shah Abdul Aziz, who desired the revival of orthodox Sunni Islam in the wake of the disintegration of the Mughal Empire. Shah Waliullah's teachings were influenced by the 'Wahhabi' doctrines preached by Muhammad ibn Abdul Wahhab in Arabia.[70] Sayyid Ahmad's movement emphasised the significance of *Jihad*, or holy war, as an instrument to be used against non-Muslim domination.

In 1826, Sayyid Ahmad began his campaign by inciting the Pashtun tribes along the then Indian–Afghan frontier. He was able to rout a Sikh force near Akora Khattak south of Peshawar in November of the same year.[71] After this victory, Sayyid Ahmad

declared himself *Amir-ul-Muminin* (commander of the faithful), a title assumed by the caliphs. However, the Pashtun tribes soon became disaffected with Sayyid Ahmad's zealous Islamic reformism. Moreover, the Barakzai governor of Peshawar, Sultan Muhammad, a brother of Dost Muhammad, was not well disposed towards Sayyid Ahmad's fundamentalist brand of Islam. In 1831, a Sikh army under Sher Singh successfully trapped Sayyid Ahmad and his Wahhabi disciples near Balakot, northeast of Peshawar, and crushed them after a fierce battle. Sayyid Ahmad's followers attributed his death at the hands of the Sikhs to the treachery of the Pashtun tribes.[72] It is suspected by some Indian scholars that the Wahhabi movement was given covert encouragement by the British in their objective of undermining the Sikh hold over the Punjab, although the Sikhs at this juncture were nominal allies of the East India Company.[73] The 'Wahhabi' insurrection did, however, check Sikh expansionism on the Indian frontier.

In Iran, the Qajar regime had to come to terms with Russia after the Treaty of Turkmanchay in 1828, which ceded the Iranian Caucasian provinces to St.Petersburg. This was an indication to the British that Iran was gradually being turned into a vassal of Russia. These geopolitical changes enhanced the importance of Afghanistan in British eyes as a first line of defence against a perceived Russian invasion of India. In this context, the British devised a 'forward policy' in Northwestern India that aimed at pushing the boundaries of their Empire as far westward and northward as physically possible in order to acquire a 'scientific' frontier strong enough to protect India. For this purpose, Afghanistan, Baluchistan, Sind and eastern Iran assumed a special status for India's security. In fact, the British defence strategy in North-West India would acquire different names such as 'masterly inactivity', 'closed border' and 'stationary' policy according to the requirements of the circumstances. 'Masterly inactivity' was, as the name suggests, opposed to the 'forward policy' that sought further acquisition of territory and influence. On the other hand, the 'stationary' and 'closed border' policies emphasised the need for consolidation of British rule in the areas already held by the colonial government.

The British activated their forward policy towards the trans-Indus Afghan regions for the first time in the late 1830s. By this time, Dost Muhammad had made himself the *Amir* of Kabul and most of southwestern Afghanistan after repulsing Shah Shuja-ul-Mulk's attempt to regain his throne with British and Sikh backing in 1833.[74] Furthermore, Dost Muhammad wanted to regain control of Peshawar from the Sikhs.[75] In western Afghanistan, Iran renewed its efforts in 1836-37 to establish itself at Herat with Russia's help. In the cis-Indus region, Ranjit Singh was expanding his influence southwards and was coveting the city of Shikarpur, ruled by the Shiite Talpur Amirs of Sind. At this point, Lord Auckland became the Governor-General of India.* Auckland, a known Russophobe, was under instructions from the committee of Directors of the East India Company to reach an agreement with Dost Muhammad so that Afghanistan remained out of Russian orbit. It was stressed by the committee that forging an alliance with Dost Muhammad would 'prevent the extension of Persian dominion in that quarter or to raise a timely barrier against impending encroachments of Russian influence'.[76]

*The post of Viceroy of India was not created until 1858.

The western Afghan city of Herat figured prominently in the British imperial geo-strategic calculations regarding Indian defence. Herat, the 'gateway' to India, dominated the easiest approach to Afghanistan from the west by way of the road between Mashhad and Kandahar along which several of India's invaders had come. By the 1830s, Britain had redoubled its efforts to bring this region within the ambit of British influence.[77] In 1837, the Iranian monarch Muhammad Mirza sent an Iranian army to Herat determined to occupy the city. A contingent of Russian army personnel accompanied the Iranian forces. Iran's attempt to seize Herat was also partly motivated by a desire to pacify the often-mutinous populace of eastern Iran and deprive them of Herat's support and at the same time end the claims of Afghan rulers to the Iranian province of Sistan bordering southwestern Afghanistan.[78] While the Iranian army was besieging Herat, at Kabul a Russian officer, Captain Vitkovich, brought a message from the Czar to Dost Muhammad that emphasised the need for relations between Kabul and St. Petersburg. Dost Muhammad was already disappointed by Britain's negative response to his claims on Peshawar, hence the Russian envoy was given due respect at the court of Kabul. This brought matters to a climax. British Indian administration brought into action a scheme to overthrow Dost Muhammad and replace him with the pro-British Sadozai prince Shuja-ul-Mulk.

In November 1838, a combined British and Sikh force bolstered by a contingent of Afghan troops under Shuja-ul-Mulk set out to restore the Sadozai Shah in Kabul. Earlier, Shuja-ul-Mulk had signed a treaty that bound him to deal with any foreign power only with the consent of the British. This was in accordance with the British Foreign Secretary, Lord Palmerston's objective of maintaining North-West India and the Afghan regions under British tutelage so as to forestall an aggressive Russian-Iranian move. Palmerston had categorically stated to a Director of the East India Company: 'Afghanistan must be ours or Russia's'.[79] By the end of 1838, strong British diplomatic representations to Russia and despatch of troops to the Iranian Kharak Island in the Persian Gulf forced Iran to withdraw from Herat.

The British were able to install Shuja-ul-Mulk on the throne of Kabul in August 1839. Dost Muhammad surrendered to the British occupying forces the following year. However, it became apparent to some segments of the Afghan populace that Shah Shuja was a British puppet and the real ruler of Kabul was William McNaughton,* the British representative to the Court. Rebellions amongst the Pashtun tribes broke out all over eastern and southern Afghanistan. The Hotak and the Ghilzai tribes broke communications between British forces in Kandahar and Kabul. Malcolm Yapp maintains that British administrative intrusions in local disputes and factional rivalries exacerbated Afghan opposition to the foreign occupation.[80] The Ulama and other clergymen raised the banner of *Jihad* against the British. They refused to read the *Khutba* or sermon in the mosques in the name of Shah Shuja, alleging that the Shah was not independent and served non-Muslim interest.[81] The sustained opposition encountered by the British led to the realisation in London that the plan of retaining a pro-British regime in Kabul backed by British arms would not be successful. In January 1842, the British government ordered a retreat from Kabul. Afghan hostility had compelled the British to withdraw. In

*He spelt his name 'MacNaghten'.

addition, the new Governor-General of India, Lord Ellenborough, who had replaced Lord Auckland, also ordered British forces at Kandahar and Jalalabad to be withdrawn, but allowed them to leave via Kabul, where they hanged the Mayor and several officials and destroyed the Great Bazaar. Shortly after the British had left Afghan territory, Shah Shuja was murdered and his Sadozai family members fled Afghanistan to the safety of India.

The First Anglo–Afghan war (1839–1842) has been a much-researched topic of Afghan history and it is not the purpose of this study to analyse an event already covered comprehensively.[82] Only the ramifications of Britain's inability to impose a client regime in Kabul will be analysed here. The hasty and disastrous departure of the British left southern and eastern Afghanistan in chaos.[83] In order to restore a semblance of government in Afghanistan, the British, in a complete reversal of their previous policy, sent Dost Muhammad, who was in exile in India, back to Kabul. It was felt by Calcutta that Dost Muhammad was the only Afghan ruler astute enough to establish a workable government. In this regard, the British authorities recognized that Dost Muhammad required their assistance to extend his control over northern Afghanistan that was still run by native non-Pashtun potentates often aligned with the Khanates of Central Asia. In this sense, J.L. Lee notes that the decision to allow Dost Muhammad to return to Kabul was a recognition that the 'Afghan Amir's interests in Central Asia were essentially the same' as that of the British.[84] The British had for more than two decades vied for influence in Central Asia for political and commercial reasons. Most of the British officials regarded the indigenous rulers of the Central Asian Khanates of Bukhara, Khiva and Kokand as inept and an obstacle to British strategic goals.[85] In supporting Dost Muhammad's expansion northwards, Britain's leverage in Central Asia could be enhanced.

With the conclusion of the First Anglo–Afghan war, Britain got the opportunity to extend its rule over the cis-Indus regions of the Punjab and Sind. In 1843, Britain mounted a campaign against the Amirs of Sind and subsequently annexed this area. Burki and Qureshi are of the opinion that the annexation of Sind was done to 'restore British prestige and demonstrate that they were still invincible'[86] despite the Afghan debacle. The assertive British stance was aided by the internal political developments in the region. In the Punjab, the death of Ranjit Singh in 1839 initiated a war of succession between his sons. This gave the British the chance to defeat the disunited Sikh forces in a series of battles that resulted in the collapse of Sikh rule. In March 1849, the Governor General, Lord Dalhousie, formally annexed the Punjab to the British Indian Empire.[87] The Sikh province of Kashmir was detached from the Punjab and sold to a British ally, Raja Gulab Singh. The sale of a predominantly Muslim region to a Hindu prince sowed the seeds of the future Kashmir dispute that would create animosity between India and Pakistan a century later.

The inclusion of the Punjab in the British Empire brought the trans-Indus Pashtun areas including Peshawar under Calcutta's control. To a great measure, the relative ease with which Britain established itself in the Pashtun inhabited areas of Northwestern India was an outcome of Dost Mohammad's collaboration with British India.[88] The British pursued a policy of 'masterly inactivity' towards the Afghan Amir and consented to his expansionist policy of incorporating the Uzbek, Turkmen and Tajik areas north of the Hindukush into his Kingdom. This stance allowed Calcutta to bring stability to the Pashtun tribal belt lying between Kabul and the

Indus River. Herbert Edwardes, the Commissioner of Peshawar, along with the Governor-General, Lord Dalhousie, advocated a conciliatory policy towards Dost Muhammad in order to keep the Russians and the Iranians at bay. Dost Muhammad, too, wanted cordial relations with the British. In the words of Sir W. Kerr Fraser-Tytler 'the Amir, who had learned much from his Indian exile of British ways and British power, was disposed to forget the past, if the British would do the same, and ally himself with them as a counter to Russian pressure and Persian assertions of paramountcy'.[89]

Dost Muhammad's desire to befriend Britain induced him to send his son, Ghulam Haidar to Peshawar in February 1855 to sign a treaty of friendship with British India. The treaty bound Dost Muhammad to be 'the friend of the friends and enemy of the enemies of the Honourable East India Company'.[90] In return, the British accepted all the territories of Afghanistan in possession of Dost Muhammad at that time as his. While remaining silent on Afghan claims to Peshawar, Ghulam Haidar raised the issue of bringing northern Afghanistan and its Turko-Mongol 'Chingizid' rulers into the Afghan polity with the British. These areas were believed to be susceptible to Russian and Bukharan overtures. This apprehension spurred the British to give their tacit consent to Afghan expansion towards the Amu Darya. In the words of J.L. Lee 'Britain thus compensated the Amir for the loss of Peshawar, allowing him a free hand beyond the HinduKush'.[91]

The regions north of the Hindukush, which were referred to by the British officials as 'Afghan Turkistan', comprise the modern Afghan provinces of Faryab, Jowzjan, Balkh, Samangan, Qunduz and Baghlan. On the west 'Afghan Turkistan' is bounded by the Murghab River and on the north by the Amu Darya. The southern boundaries of this region connect with the HinduKush Mountains north of Bamiyan. The region of Badakhshan joins Afghan Turkistan in the east. These Provinces were and still are dominated by Uzbeks, Tajiks and a sprinkling of Turkmen tribes. Tajiks predominate in the adjoining areas of Badakhshan. 'Mountain' Tajiks of Shiite Ismaili persuasion and some Kirghiz nomads inhabit the district of Ishkashim in Badakhshan near the Wakhan strip.[92] Prior to the rise of Ahmad Shah Durrani 'Afghan Turkistan' and Badakhshan were autonomous under native rule. During Ahmad Shah Durrani's rule these regions had accepted nominal Afghan suzerainty. However, with the death of Ahmad Shah 'Afghan Turkistan' again reverted to an autonomous status.

Dost Muhammad's alliance with the British facilitated the establishment of Kabul's authority over most of central and northern Afghanistan. In 1843, the Shiite areas of Bihsud and Bamiyan inhabited by the Mongoloid Hazara ethnic group were incorporated in the Afghan state. In 1848, Balkh was occupied. By the late 1850s nearly all of Afghan Turkistan had been brought under Kabul's, albeit nominal, rule.[93] The British Commissioner at Peshawar, Herbert Edwardes, showed great enthusiasm about Dost Muhammad's occupation of the northern parts of Afghanistan. According to Edwardes the Afghan control of Turkistan was beneficial to Britain, as 'we can never feel much pity for the flesh dealing Toorkistan, let it fall to whom it may. As a question of politics the more the Afghans take the less there will be for either Russia or Persia'.[94] As a matter of fact, the British Indian agent at Kabul informed Calcutta that Dost Muhammad had acknowledged that his conquests in the north were on 'behalf of the English' and 'for the Sirkar Company'.[95]

In the period between 1855 and 1860, Dost Muhammad got further opportunity to extend his rule to Herat and Kandahar as result of new Iranian attempts to take over Herat. In Herat, Saiyid Muhammad had replaced his father, Yar Muhammad, as the ruler of the city. Most importantly, Saiyid Muhammad sought Iranian support to counter Dost Muhammad's goal of occupying Herat. In 1855, a pro-Iranian Sadozai prince, Muhammad Yusuf, overthrew Saiyid Muhammad. Yusuf also allied himself with Iran in order to keep Dost Muhammad from invading Herat. In these circumstances, Anglo-Iranian relations deteriorated as Iranian forces moved towards Herat in November 1856. However, swift British diplomatic and military moves in the Persian Gulf dissuaded the Iranians from taking Herat. In the meantime, this crisis allowed Dost Muhammad to attack and capture Kandahar in late 1855 where his half brother Kohendil Khan had died. Dost Muhammad's seizure of Kandahar was approved by Britain with the Prime Minister, Lord Palmerston saying that Afghanistan 'is now the true bulwark of British India'.[96] Finally, shortly before his death in 1863, Dost Muhammad succeeded in incorporating Herat within his domain with Britain's nod of approval.[97]

Amir Dost Muhammad proved true to his treaty obligations right up to the end of his life. March 1857 heralded the start of the Indian Mutiny, when the Hindu and Muslim sepoys of the East India Company revolted against the British.[98] The Mutiny compelled Britain to withdraw military units from the North-West Frontier and the Punjab and send them to suppress the revolt in the United Provinces (Uttar Pradesh) and Bengal. The Pashtun Ulama pressured Dost Muhammad to start a Jihad against the much shaken British by assisting fellow Muslims in India. Nevertheless, Dost Muhammad refrained from taking advantage of the situation and declined to give any aid to the rebellious populace in the North-West Frontier and the rest of India. This enabled the British authorities to muster the support of loyal Punjabi Muslim and Sikh forces to oppose the anti-British coalition composed of both Hindus and Muslims.[99] Dost Muhammad's cooperative attitude was appreciated by the British. Major H.B. Lumsden, a frontier official, admitted that had it not been for the treaty with the Afghan Amir there could have been an 'embarrassment at Peshawar and along the Frontier' during the turbulent months of 1857.[100]

By the early 1860s Britain's policy of supporting Dost Muhammad had paid off. A pliant but weak Afghan state had evolved on India's North-West Frontier. The Anglo-Afghan treaty of 1857 provided an annual subsidy of 10,000 Pounds to the Amir and his government.[101] Moreover, the Amir's armed forces were amply supplied with British arms and ammunition. The development of a master-client relationship with Kabul in the late 1850s enabled Britain to conduct a policy of non-interference in Afghanistan's domestic affairs as long as British interests were not directly affected. Lord Canning, the British Governor-General from 1856 to 1862, strongly believed in cultivating a friendly and subservient Afghanistan. Canning, in one of his reports to London, observed that he did not see any danger to British India in the consolidation of the Afghan nation, as a 'united and strong' Afghanistan would act like 'a compact barrier to our front. By encouraging this as far as lies in our power ... we have a better chance of extending our influence across the breadth of Afghanistan up to Herat'.[102]

In the aftermath of the Indian Mutiny, the British government assumed direct control of India by ending the rule of the East India Company. Lord Canning's

successor, Lord Lawrence (Viceroy, 1863–1869) continued his predecessor's policy of building a pro-British Afghan state while avoiding meddling in internecine Afghan quarrels by adhering to a policy of 'masterly inactivity'.[103] Dost Muhammad died in 1863. His death plunged Afghanistan into a bitter civil war as his sons fought each other for the throne of Kabul. However, by 1868 Dost Muhammad's younger son Shir Ali had defeated his rival elder brother Afzal Khan and established himself as the Amir of Afghanistan. During this period, Russia had accelerated its advance in Central Asia. By the beginning of 1864, Russians had reached the borders of the Khanates of Bukhara, Khokand and Khiva. Tashkent was annexed in 1865 and a new province of Russian Turkistan came into being. These Russian moves had prompted the British to strengthen Shir Ali's flimsy rule. In 1869, Shir Ali visited India at the invitation of Lord Mayo, the new Viceroy. The conference held at Ambala in the Punjab did not satisfy Shir Ali, as he could not obtain any definite promise of British support in the event of a foreign attack on his country. Shir Ali was further alienated from the British by the Viceroy's request for the release from imprisonment of Muhammad Yakub – the Afghan Amir's son.

The British and Russian officials, in spite of their rivalry over Afghanistan, continued to engage in diplomatic exchanges regarding their colonial interests in Central Asia and Afghanistan. The British Foreign Secretary, Lord Clarendon, even advocated that some agreed 'neutral' zone be created in Central Asia separating the British and Russian empires. The Russian Foreign Minister, Prince Gorchakov, in an attempt to conciliate Britain, agreed in principle that Afghanistan would be 'outside the sphere of our {Russian} interests and political influence'.[104] In 1873, Britain and Russia had recognised the Amu Darya as the Afghan state's northern boundary.[105]

In Britain, the general elections of 1874 brought a conservative government to power led by Benjamin Disraeli. Lord Salisbury, the new Secretary of State for India, differed with the Viceroy, Lord Northbrook over the Government of India's policy of 'masterly inactivity' with regard to Afghanistan and its Amir. Salisbury was apprehensive that Russia, despite its previous understanding with Britain concerning Afghanistan, might try to expand its influence at Kabul. Most significantly, Shir Ali had been corresponding with General von Kaufmann, the Governor General of Russian Turkistan. The Amir had apparently been angered by Britain's lack of interest in providing him a security commitment. The Anglo–Afghan relations were strained by British arbitration in favour of Iran during the Iran–Afghanistan border de-limitation in 1873–1874. By 1877, Shir Ali's ties with British India reached their lowest level with the inauguration of Lord Lytton's viceroyalty. In the same year, the British further aroused the Amir's suspicions when the Government of India refused to accept Afghan claims on the predominantly Pashtun trans-Indus districts of Dir, Swat, Chitral and Bajaur (presently all the four districts are in the Pakistani North West Frontier Province).[106]

By the middle of 1878, a Russian mission headed by General Stoletov made its way to Kabul to negotiate a treaty with Amir Shir Ali. Lord Lytton, who was known for his anti-Russian proclivities, saw in the Russian manoeuvre a threat to the security of British India's Northwestern Frontier. The British Viceroy despatched a mission to Kabul to inform the Amir that he had to break 'all communication' with the Russians immediately.[107] The British mission was not allowed to enter Afghan territory at the Khyber Pass. The Afghan refusal to entertain a British mission gave

Lord Lytton the pretext to proclaim war against Afghanistan on 21 November 1878. British Indian forces moved into Afghanistan in a three-pronged attack. A force led by General Brown crossed the Afghan frontier and proceeded up the Khyber at Ali Masjid. A second force moved under General Roberts from the Kurram valley and a third one from Quetta towards Kandahar. With the start of 1879 most of southern and eastern Afghanistan was in British hands. Shir Ali fled from Kabul and died near Balkh in February 1879 having failed to secure Russian assistance. Shir Ali's son Muhammad Yakub was released from prison by the British and installed as the Amir of Afghanistan.

In May 1879, Yakub was forced to sign the Treaty of Gandamak. This treaty deprived Afghanistan for the first time of its position, earlier agreed upon by the British, as a 'buffer state'. The treaty vested in the British government the control of Afghanistan's external affairs. Its ruler was no longer an independent prince. His position, as Singhal notes became 'somewhat analogous to that of Indian princes'[108] The Treaty of Gandamak gave Britain control of Pishin and Sibi in Baluchistan. In the North-West Frontier, the Kurram valley also came under British administration. In return, the Amir of Afghanistan was granted an increased annual subsidy along with a supply of arms and ammunition.

Lord Lytton sought to permanently dismember Afghanistan during the Second Anglo-Afghan War. It was thought that the creation of two or three smaller entities in the Afghan region run by 'friendly' rulers would solve the recurrent crises in Afghanistan that posed a constant security problem for British India. In this regard, Lytton favoured the establishment of a western Afghan Kingdom that included Kandahar, Herat, Balkh and even Merv.[109] However, the murder of the British Resident, Louis Cavagnari, at Kabul in September 1879 and a massacre of British officials by Afghans opposed to the foreign occupation led to fresh armed conflicts between the British and an increasingly hostile Afghan population, led by traditional Pashtun tribal leaders and Ulama. The British were forced to send the ineffectual Muhammad Yakub to exile in India and at the same time they redoubled their efforts to partition Afghanistan. They succeeded in separating Kandahar from Kabul and appointed a puppet ruler, Shir Ali, as the *Wali* or regent of that southern Afghan city. But, there still remained the problem of finding a pro-British ruler for Kabul. Moreover, in spite of Britain's best efforts to stabilise the situation in Afghanistan, it faced continued opposition from the Pashtun tribes and Ulama during this period of Afghan history.

While the British colonial policy makers in London and Calcutta were pondering over how to withdraw from the Afghan quagmire with Britain's influence remaining intact in that country, the arrival of Abd al-Rahman Khan inside Afghanistan in March 1880 introduced a new dimension to Afghanistan's fluctuating political fortunes. Sardar Abd al-Rahman Khan was a son of Afzal Khan, the rival brother of the late Amir Shir Ali. He had spent the last fifteen years in exile in Russian Turkistan after the defeat of his father by Shir Ali. Abd al-Rahman Khan openly called for a *Jihad* against the British invaders, while secretly initiating correspondence with the senior British official at Kabul, Lepel Griffin, for securing the throne of Afghanistan. The British realised that Abd al-Rahman Khan could offer a solution to the dilemma they confronted over the appointment of an Afghan Amir acceptable to the Afghan people and also 'friendly towards Her Majesty's

Government'.[110] On 20 July 1880, Abd al-Rahman Khan was elected Amir by a *Loya Jirga* (national tribal assembly) consisting mainly of Pashtun tribes.[111] Earlier, the British representative, Leppel Griffin, had concluded an agreement with Abd al-Rahman Khan in which the Government of India gave an assurance that it would not oppose Abd al-Rahman Khan's re-integration of Herat and and the then British-administered Kandahar into his rule.[112] After this agreement, the British were able to withdraw their forces from Afghanistan. The Griffin-Abd al-Rahman agreement specifically maintained that the future control of Afghanistan's foreign relations would remain with the British.

After consolidating his power, Between 1881 and 1888, Abd al-Rahman proceeded with skilful political manoeuvring, backed up by often-brutal military campaigns, to pacify the non-Pashtun groups: Shiite Hazaras, Uzbeks, Tajiks and others located in northern and central Afghanistan. He transferred thousands of Pashtun Ghilzai tribesmen to the north in order to firmly integrate that region with the Afghan state. The British encouraged this policy of 'Afghanisation' of non-Pashtun areas, as it could weaken northern Afghanistan's links with Russian Turkistan.[113] British tutelage bolstered Abd al-Rahman's bid to construct a Pashtun-dominated centralised state in Afghanistan. Britain's support for Abd al-Rahman was, in the 1880s, almost a repeat of its previous policy of assisting Abd al-Rahman's grandfather Dost Muhammad in the 1850s to build a pro-British Afghan state. To legitimise his rule the Amir tried to portray himself as the upholder of Sunni *Hanafi* Islam. In the pursuance of this objective, the religious establishment was brought under state control and heterodox Islamic sects repressed.[114]

In Central Asia, Russia had advanced beyond Merv by 1885 and reached Turkmen inhabited areas considered to be under Afghan suzerainty. At Panjdeh oasis, south of Merv, Afghan and Russian troops clashed in March 1885. This event hastened Russia and Britain's ongoing negotiations concerning the de-limitation of Afghanistan's borders with Russian-administered Central Asia. The final settlement of Afghanistan's frontier with Russian Turkistan was done through boundary commissions comprising British and Russian officers. In this connection, a series of protocols were signed between Russia and Britain at London in 1885; at Khamiab in 1886; at St. Petersburg in 1887 and at Chehel Dukhtaran in 1893 that fixed Afghanistan's northern borders. Throughout these negotiations and the subsequent agreements that followed Afghan representatives were not present. The Amir was simply informed of the decisions taken by the imperial powers. Singhal comments that the Amir 'was rendered a helpless spectator, though it was his country's boundaries which were being delimited'.[115]

British India and Afghanistan, 1890–1947

Abd al-Rahman's acceptance of Britain's control of his country's external relations turned Afghanistan into a virtual British protectorate. This was the price the Muhammadzai Sardar paid for becoming the Amir of Afghanistan in 1880. Internally, Britain refrained from interfering in Abd al-Rahman's dictatorial and violent rule that suppressed all Pashtun and non-Pashtun opposition with equal cruelty. The token social and economic reforms instituted by Abd al-Rahman proved

inadequate in bringing out Afghanistan from its perennial backwardness and isolation.[116]

In the 1880s, Britain had again reinitiated a 'forward policy' in North-West India geared towards stabilizing its frontier with Afghanistan. The installation of Abd al-Rahman had made this task easier, with the Amir being dependent on British military and financial assistance. By the late 1870s, Britain had already brought Baluchistan formally within its Indian Empire through a Treaty with the Khan of Kalat. The region's principal city, Quetta, had become host to a large British garrison. In the context of Afghanistan, the British policy was to construct a 'buffer' state reliant on British power.

Mathison defines a buffer state as a 'small independent state lying between two larger rival states (or blocs)'.[117] In the period 1880 to 1921, Afghanistan was not a sovereign buffer state but it functioned rather like an internally autonomous protectorate linked with British India. Russia had come to accept that Afghanistan lay in the British sphere of influence after the end of the second Anglo–Afghan war in 1880.[118]

The southern and eastern borders of Afghanistan were demarcated in 1893. In November 1893, Sir Mortimer Durand, the Foreign Secretary of British India, persuaded the Amir of Afghanistan, Abd al-Rahman, to sign an agreement delineating the border of Afghanistan with India along an irregular 2,430 kilometre line running from the Pamirs in the north to Koh-i-Malik Siah at the trijunction with Iran and British Baluchistan in the inhospitable land south of the Helmand Valley. This Indian–Afghan border delineated by Sir Mortimer Durand became commonly known as the 'Durand Line'. The Durand agreement confirmed British sovereignty over the Pashtun tribal regions in the North-West Frontier that were hitherto claimed by all Afghan Amirs since the time of Dost Muhammad. This bifurcation of Pashtun tribal regions that were historically associated with Afghanistan would create a major Pashtun irredentist problem for Afghanistan and Pakistan in the post-colonial era.

In the last two decades of the nineteenth century, Britain had strengthened its rule in the 'settled' Pashtun districts of Peshawar, Kohat, Bannu and Dera Ismail Khan in the North-West Frontier across the Indus River. For the British Indian administrators, the true frontier was not coterminous with the limits of territory actually administered by the Government of India. Between the settled districts of the North-West Frontier and the Afghan border were the tribal areas encompassing numerous Pashtun tribes.[119] The British had included this tribal zone of North-West Frontier within their administrative control by the early 1890s. This tribal belt served as an additional 'buffer' between British India and Afghanistan. Ainslee T. Embree writes that this was a 'zone regarded as under territorial control of the Government of India, but where the law and administrative forms, especially system of taxation was not applied. This was the "frontier of separation"'[120] In this zone, the tribal chieftains continued customary forms of government based on *Pashtunwali*, the Pashtun code of honour, without the interference of the Government of India. The Pashtunwali is as much a tribal law as a code of honour. The key elements of this code include norms governing revenge (*badal*), hospitality (*melmastia*), and sanctuary (*nanawati*). The Pashtunwali was the dominant code for the Pashtun tribes and sub-tribes spread across both sides of the Durand Line.[121]

The Pashtun social structure is considered by many anthropologists as based on 'segmentary lineage' and patrilineal kinship, where cooperation often takes place only against external threat.[122] This societal structure, permeated with agnatic rivalry (*tarburwali*) and internecine feuds, proved susceptible to Mughal and later British machinations that encouraged inter and intra-tribal divisions in order to destroy 'whatever chance there might have been of national spirit among the tribesmen'.[123]

The British, like their predecessors, exploited the complexities of Pashtun tribalism and devised an intricate system of tribal management that ranged from giving the tribes internal autonomy in the conduct of their affairs to a proportionate use of punitive measures against the rebellious tribes, bringing about compliance.[124] The punishments were based on the notion of collective tribal responsibility. The tribe had to pay in terms of confiscation of land or destruction of their homes. However, during most of the British period, the colonial authorities relied upon cultivating the tribal chiefs, the *Khans* and *Maliks*, to act as mediators between them and the tribes.[125] In order to keep the peace and influence, the British paid subsidies to these tribal chieftains. They also raised local militias officered by the British Indian Army to maintain security in the several tribal agencies that had been created in this strategic region. Moreover, the colonial authorities refrained from directly intervening in the tribal areas bordering Afghanistan unless the need arose.

However, Britain had to occasionally contend with the Afghan Amir's attempts to extend his influence with the tribes, despite his government being itself in receipt of a subsidy. The Afghan attempts were generally not extremely effective as the Amir's overtures were outmatched by tough British administrative measures against the tribes, which were sweetened with financial inducements.[126] Moreover, the Pashtun tribes realised their importance in the power game between the Amir and Britain and were not passive spectators, more than often switching their loyalty to the highest bidder.

The Durand agreement of 1893 formalised the British control of Pashtun tribal areas of the North-West Frontier with a weak Amir of Afghanistan. Abd al-Rahman reluctantly agreed to relinquish Afghan claims to nearly all the bordering regions that the British had decided were to be part of Indian territory. In a bitter letter to Lord Lansdowne, the Viceroy, Abd al-Rahman complained that the Durand agreement would cause many problems for India in the future. He wrote that if these tribes are separated from:

> My dominions, they will neither be of any use to you nor to me, you will always be engaged in fighting and troubles with them, and they will always go on plundering ... in your cutting away from me these frontier tribes who are people of my nationality and religion, you ... will make me weak and my weakness is injurious to your government.[127]

However, the Amir's acceptance of the British imposed Indian–Afghan border demarcation was amply rewarded. His subsidy was increased from 1.2 Million Rupees to 1.8 Million Rupees. The Government of India not only undertook to raise no objections to the Amir's purchase of arms and ammunition, but offered assistance to facilitate this task.[128]

The Durand Line, in fact, divided the Pashtun tribes and failed to bring stability to the frontier. It was illogical from the point of view of ethnicity, strategy and

geography. According to Sir W. Kerr Fraser-Tytler 'it cuts across main basins of the Indus watershed, it splits a nation into two'.[129] The creation of the Durand Line made the Pashtun tribes a pawn between the Amir of Afghanistan and Britain. The Amir continued to maintain his contacts with the tribes on the other side of the Line and attempted to incite the tribes into action whenever the need arose. The Durand Line antagonised the Frontier tribes against British rule and the British had to constantly placate them, either with use of force or bribery.[130] The British could neither abandon the Frontier nor occupy the tribal belt and thus found themselves, for the most part, engaged in interminable conflicts, termed as 'small wars' by the War Office, with the tribes. Winston Churchill, who had served in the 1897 Malakand campaign, acknowledged that the Pashtun tribes regarded the consolidation of the Frontier with Afghanistan as a menace to their independence.[131]

A direct consequence of the forward policy in North-West India was the formation of the North West Frontier Province (NWFP) by the Viceroy, Lord Curzon in 1901. This was one of his first administrative acts as Viceroy targeted to improve the relationship of the Pashtun tribes with British India. The establishment of the North-West Frontier Province removed from the provincial government of the Punjab the responsibility of administering the largely Pashtun areas west of the Indus and north of Baluchistan.

The North-West Frontier Province consisted of five settled districts of Hazara, Peshawar, Bannu, Kohat and Dera Ismail Khan and lying between these districts was the tribal belt running along the Durand Line. In this tribal belt the British devised a unique system of special agencies for dealing with the tribes. The first agency to be created was the Khyber Agency in 1879. The Kurram Agency was established in 1892 and in 1895 the North Waziristan, South Waziristan and Malakand Agencies were formed. A British Political Agent (PA) administered each agency. For the maintenance of law and order, a militia was recruited from the local tribesmen. The militias came under the overall command of the Frontier Constabulary, headed by a senior British Indian Army officer. Special sets of laws were made for these agencies known as the Frontier Crimes Regulations (FCR). The FCR are still in use in Pakistan's tribal areas with some minor amendments.

In October 1901, Amir Abd al-Rahman Khan died. He had not objected to Lord Curzon's decision regarding the creation of the North West Frontier Province, despite having a problematic relationship with the supercilious Viceroy.[132] Abd al-Rahman's eldest son, Habibullah, succeeded his father without opposition, an unparalleled achievement in Afghanistan's political history since the period of Timur Shah. The British government hoped that Habibullah, like his father, would continue to honour all the agreements entered into with Britain during Abd al-Rahman's reign. Keeping in view these objectives, the Foreign Secretary of British India, Sir Louis Dane, visited Kabul in 1904. After lengthy negotiations by the haughty British official with Habibullah, a treaty was signed between the Afghan Amir and the Government of India, in which it was reaffirmed that the external relations of Afghanistan would continue to remain under British control. The subsidy to the Amir continued and the ruler of Afghanistan, for the first time, was acknowledged as an 'independent King of Afghanistan and dependencies'.[133] This new treaty with Habibullah, however, signalled the retention of Afghanistan by the British as the 'buffer' against possible Russian encroachments towards the Indian subcontinent.

The maintenance of an isolated and underdeveloped Afghanistan, ruled by a subservient Amir, became a fundamental principle of British-Indian security policy. Sir Arthur Balfour clearly saw a strategic advantage in Afghanistan's backwardness. According to Balfour, 'so long as it (Afghanistan) possesses few roads and no railways, it will be impossible for Russia to make effective use of her numerical superiority at any point immediately vital to the Empire'.[134]

In 1907, Anglo–Russian relations improved due to the changes in the global balance of power. In fact, Britain now came to see Germany, not Russia or France, as its principal rival in the world.[135] This change brought about an understanding between Russia and Britain over their colonies in Asia that led to the signing of a convention between the British and the Russian governments on 31 August 1907, which formally recognised Afghanistan's status within Britain's sphere of influence in Asia. Russia agreed that her political relations with Afghanistan would be conducted through an intermediary of the British Government.[136] The Anglo-Russian convention confirmed Afghanistan's role as a buffer between British India and Russia. The Amir's government at Kabul was not informed of this convention indicating Afghanistan's dependent status.

The onset of World War I enhanced Afghanistan's importance for Britain. Germany, and its wartime ally, Ottoman Turkey, tried to take advantage of the anti-British sentiments in Afghanistan and the tribal belt to undermine British authority in North West India. In India large sections of the Muslim population regarded the Turkish Sultan as the leader of the Islamic world. He was considered the *khalifa* or the Caliph of all Sunni Muslims. Leading Muslims and intellectuals believed in the notion of the caliphate and Ottoman Turkey represented a continuation of the caliphate system. Turkey was seen as the only surviving Muslim empire and Islam's 'last hope'.[137] A wide spectrum of Muslim intelligentsia, ranging from Islamic modernists of the Mohammedan Anglo-Oriental (MAO) College, Aligarh to the conservative Sunni Ulama of Deoband saw in the Ottoman Empire a symbol of pan-Islamic brotherhood. Turkey's declaration of war against Britain sparked bitter antagonism towards the British amongst Indian Muslims. Some Ulama of the Deoband madrassa even spearheaded pan-Islamic plots to challenge British rule by inciting the Pashtun tribes, with the help of Turkey and Afghanistan.[138] The Amir, however, kept to his treaty obligations with Britain and remained neutral. He discouraged the Pashtun tribes on the Indian-Afghan frontier from initiating anti-British subversive activities.

Afghanistan's neutrality during World War I provoked widespread resentment towards Habibullah's regime amongst the Afghan nationalists and the religious groups represented by the traditional Ulama. Habibullah's own brother, Nasrullah Khan was suspected of being supportive of the anti-British faction at the court.[139] In February 1919, Habibullah was assassinated on a hunting trip outside Kabul. A report prepared by the Political Department of the Government of India stated that his murder might be due to the 'fidelity of the late ruler to the British connection'.[140] Habibullah was succeeded by his younger son, Amanullah Khan, despite opposition from his elder brother and uncle. Amanullah was a representative of a new generation of Afghan nationalists who envisioned an independent and modern future for their country. These 'Young Afghans' wanted to bring about political, social and economic reforms that could usher in progress for their underdeveloped nation. After

attaining power, Amanullah set out to put the 'Young Afghans' agenda into practice. However, only a small elitist group spearheaded by Mahmud Beg Tarzi, a close confidant of Amanullah, was committed to the ideal of a modern Afghanistan and to its ruler's rather nebulous programme for realizing that ideal.

Amanullah's goal of achieving a modern and fully sovereign Afghanistan was given impetus by the dramatic international political changes resulting from World War I. In Russia, the Bolshevik revolution of 1917 had ushered in the collapse of the Czarist monarchy and replaced it with a fervently anti-imperialist Marxist regime in Moscow led by Vladimir Lenin. In India itself there was a great upsurge of anti-British sentiment. Nationalist Indian politicians were pressing the British Government to grant self-government to India. Large sections of Indian Muslims were denouncing Britain for its complicity in the dissolution of the Ottoman Empire. Leading Muslim clergy and intelligentsia had formed the Khilafat Conference to agitate for the retention of the Ottoman Empire. The Muslims of India were anguished at the conquest of Jerusalem by Christian powers and perturbed at the announcement of the Balfour Declaration (November 1917) that promised a Jewish state in Palestine.[141] These developments affecting the Islamic world were seen by some Indian Muslims as disastrous for Islam. By the summer of 1920, thousands of Indian Muslims hailing from the NWFP, Punjab and the United Provinces had migrated to Afghanistan in protest over British culpability in the destruction of the Ottoman Empire. This *Hijrat* (migration) to Afghanistan was approved by several Ulama as in accordance with Islamic *Sharia*.[142] Amir Amanullah initially welcomed the *Hijrat* to Afghanistan. He regarded this as an opportunity that could be utilised in furthering his goal of achieving complete independence from Britain.

World War I had imposed substantial financial and military costs on Britain, which it was finding hard to sustain. The dismal effects of World War I created an atmosphere ripe for upheaval within the British Empire. The rise in Indian nationalism, coupled with Russia's surge towards Communism, motivated the Amanullah regime to confront the British Government. On 17 April 1919, two months after becoming the Amir of Afghanistan, Amanullah declared that the Government of Afghanistan should be 'internally and externally independent and free'.[143] To fulfil his desire of achieving an independent Afghanistan, Amanullah declared war on the British by the end of April, thus initiating the Third Anglo–Afghan War. He had timed his action to synchronise with the Indian nationalist and Khilafat agitation in India. The attempted Afghan foray across the Durand Line proved to be a military fiasco and made Amanullah sue for an armistice on 28 May 1919. Nonetheless, the Third Anglo–Afghan War turned out to be a political victory for the Afghans, and on 8 August 1919, an exhausted British government, faced with disaffection in India, conceded full sovereignty to Afghanistan by the Treaty of Rawalpindi. This treaty accepted Afghanistan's right to conduct relations with foreign powers without qualification. On the other hand, the Afghans reluctantly agreed to accept the Durand Line as the Afghan–Indian frontier.

Amanullah was shrewd enough to realise the tremendous changes that had taken place to Afghanistan's north. The Bolshevik regime advocated the renunciation of former imperial treaties and protocols. The Bolsheviks' anti-imperialist zeal strengthened Amanullah's position in relation to Britain. The Bolsheviks openly supported the independence of Asian nations under colonial rule. In fact, before the

conclusion of the Third Anglo–Afghan War, Lenin had recognised Afghan sovereignty and expressed the desire to exchange Ambassadors. In return, Amanullah addressed the 'Honourable President of the Great Russian Republic' and expressed interest in cultivating political relations between the two states.[144] Lenin's diplomacy of wooing Asian states and assisting anti-colonial national liberation movements scored a success when on 22 February 1921, Afghanistan concluded its first Treaty of Friendship with the Russian Soviet Federated Socialist Republic (RSFSR). The cordial evolution of Afghan–Russian ties in the period 1919–1921, despite Amanullah's pan-Islamic leanings, indicated that Afghanistan could obtain Moscow's backing against Britain if the need arose. This fear of a pro-Russian Afghanistan loomed large in the mind of British policy makers in London and New Delhi.[145] In order to maintain their influence in Afghanistan and counter Soviet moves in the region, Britain signed a Treaty of Friendship with Afghanistan on 22 November 1921. The Treaty paved the way for establishment of normal diplomatic relations between Britain and Afghanistan. The Afghan demands for the return of territories lost to Britain were rejected and the Treaty vaguely alluded to the British and Afghan governments' respective interests on the Frontier.[146] Although Amanullah had secured his country's independence, Britain continued to consider Afghanistan as within its 'sphere of political influence'.[147]

The Anglo–Afghan Treaty of 1921 did not remove Britain's apprehensions about Amanullah's radical domestic and foreign policy postures. Amanullah, like his contemporaries Reza Shah (1925–1941) in Iran and Mustafa Kemal 'Ataturk' (1923–1938) in Turkey, envisaged rapid social, economic and political reforms for his tribal nation. The reforms included: rights for women; free elections for a parliament; Turkish style changes in dress; limited plans for developing light industry; the formation of a national bank; and development of a roads and communication network. The clergy were stopped from receiving religious education in India, particularly at the 'Wahhabi' Deoband madrassa.[148] But the Amanullah regime's reformist plans were violently resisted by the clergy, as these reforms, if implemented, could have effectively destroyed the privileges and power of the traditional *Mullah* and the tribal chieftains. Apart from opposition from the clergy, the tribal chieftains and from elements in the army, the Amanullah regime was being undermined by covert British assistance to anti-Amanullah tribes near the Durand Line. In 1924, a tribal revolt broke out amongst the Pashtun Mangal tribe in the Khost region close to the Waziristan Agency on the Durand Line. Soviet and Afghan officials blamed the British for inciting this rebellion.[149] In this regard, the American Ambassador to Pakistan, Avra Warren, writing to the US Secretary of State in 1951 cited information provided by Colonel Shah, a former Pakistan Ambassador to Kabul, that the British had, in fact, utilised the services of the trans-Durand tribes in 'overthrowing the Amanullah regime and establishing the present dynasty' as rulers of Afghanistan.[150]

In 1929, the Amanullah regime collapsed in the face of widespread tribal insurrections. For a brief period, Kabul was run by *Bacha-i-Saqao* (literally, 'son of a water-carrier'), a Tajik rebel who even crowned himself as King.[151] Under *Bacha-i-Saqao*'s rule virtual anarchy reigned in Kabul and other parts of the country. The downfall of Amanullah had created a power vacuum in Afghanistan, which seriously threatened more than a century-old British policy of retaining that country

as a friendly buffer between India and Russia. Interestingly, *Bacha-i-Saqao*'s approach towards Britain turned out to be more anti-British when compared to Amanullah's. Moreover, the Soviets were also alarmed at Bacha's penchant for Islamic orthodoxy that could fuel Islamic activism amongst the Muslims of Soviet Central Asia. In these circumstances, the British gave support to a former Afghan Army general, Nadir Khan, in his bid to oust *Bacha-i-Saqao* from power.[152] Nadir Khan belonged to the influential *Musahiban* family, which descended from the Muhammadzai Peshawar Sardars related to Dost Muhammad.

With the aid of the Pashtun tribesmen belonging to Wazir, Mohmand, Mangal and Jadran tribes largely located on the Durand Line, Nadir Khan was able to occupy Kabul on 10 October 1929. *Bacha* surrendered himself to Nadir and was subsequently executed to appease the southern Pashtun tribes.[153] Nadir Khan was declared Shah by a *Loya Jirga* of mainly Pashtun tribes on October 17, 1929. *Bacha-i-Saqao*'s Tajik ethnicity and inept rule had created the conditions for the Pashtun tribes to rally behind Nadir Shah. The Pashtuns who had dominated Afghanistan's politics and government since 1747 considered the rule of an illiterate non-Pashtun an anathema and this feeling further assisted Nadir to establish his authority in Kabul with relative ease.[154] In geopolitical terms, Nadir Shah's assumption of power was very significant as it once again brought a regime in Kabul that was well disposed towards Britain and which could maintain Afghanistan's buffer state status. Nadir Shah's assassination in November 1933 and the succession of his 19-year-old son, Muhammad Zahir Shah, to the throne did not fundamentally alter Afghanistan's external policies. The effective power resided with Zahir Shah's uncles, namely Muhammad Hashim Khan (Prime Minister, 1933–1946), Shah Mahmud (Minister of Defence) and Shah Wali. They ruled Afghanistan as a family enterprise. Domestically, a policy of gradual social and economic development was revived. Relations with Britain continued to be cooperative and consequently, the Afghan Government showed hesitation in supporting the anti-British Pashtun insurrections in the NWFP.[155]

During the 1930s, the Indian independence movement had gained momentum. The nationalist Congress Party and the All India Muslim League, representing a large segment of India's Muslim minority, were demanding Britain's withdrawal from the subcontinent. Elements of Pashtun peasantry, intelligentsia and lower middle classes of North West Frontier Province supported the non-violent method of anti-British agitation carried out by the leading figure of Indian nationalism, Mahatma Gandhi (1869–1948). Gandhi's emphasis on non-violent political activism inspired Abdul Ghaffar Khan, an Utmanzai Pashtun from the NWFP, to form a Pashtun non-violent movement, *Anjuman-i-Islah-i-Afaghana* (Society for the reformation of the Afghans) in 1921. This movement, which later became known as the *Khudai Khidmatgaran*, or the 'Servants of God', initially focused on the uplift of the Pashtun masses through progressive social reform like the spread of education, promotion of basic health services and raising the status of women.[156] The British authorities' hostility to Ghaffar Khan's socialist orientation and anti-feudal platform led the *Khudai Khidmatgaran* to side with the Congress Party's struggle for home rule.

The *Khudai Khidmatgaran* were often labelled 'Red Shirts' for their clothes rubbed in red brick dust. Abdul Ghaffar Khan's diatribes against British imperialism led him to spend a total of almost 15 years in British Indian jails. The British regarded him as a 'fanatic, bitterly anti-British Pathan' in league with the Soviets.[157] The Muslim League also opposed Ghaffar Khan for his pro-Congress policies. Many in the League actively sought British support for the formation of a separate Muslim state in North-West India but Ghaffar Khan's resistance to the British acted as an obstacle to the attainment of that objective.[158] In fact, Ghaffar Khan's disillusionment with the Muslim League's policies in the 1940s led him to demand self-determination for NWFP and its Pashtun inhabitants. According to Ghaffar Khan, if India had to be partitioned then the Pashtuns should be given a choice to join Afghanistan or form their own entity, 'Pashtunistan'. To an extent, Ghaffar Khan and the Pashtun nationalists of NWFP floated the idea of Pashtunistan in the first place from the early 1940s.[159] For these Pashtun nationalists the imperatives of common ethnicity overrode the elusive bonds of religion on which the Muslim League would base the future state of Pakistan. Significantly, the Pashtunistan idea was adopted by the Afghan government and was effectively used against Pakistan after 1947 in an effort to undermine the Durand Line.

By 1939, the rise of Nazi Germany and its Axis partners Italy and Japan had altered the global balance of power. Britain now had to safeguard its Empire from possible threats emanating from the Soviet Union as well as the Axis powers. Germany had successfully established a foothold on the borders of British India by becoming an important source of financial and technical assistance to Afghanistan. The Afghan elite regarded Germany as a disinterested benign country without any colonial ambitions and, therefore, its assistance was greatly appreciated. In the period preceding World War II, Germany and Italy attempted to create dissension in India through Afghanistan. The Germans were believed to be involved in fomenting tribal uprisings on the Durand Line. They also made plans to install the former King Amanullah in Kabul in place of the pro-British Musahiban family.[160] Yet the German efforts to align Afghanistan with the Axis powers remained futile as Prime Minister Muhammad Hashim Khan persisted in keeping close relations with Britain.

The commencement of World War II in September 1939 enhanced Britain's fears regarding Soviet expansionism in the direction of Afghanistan. The German–Soviet non-aggression pact of 1939 had increased British suspicions concerning Soviet intentions towards Afghanistan. Afghanistan was still seen by London as British India's first line of defence. A joint memorandum by the two secretaries of State for Foreign Affairs and India underlined that: 'the preservation of the independence and integrity of Afghanistan as a buffer state between Russia and India must be regarded as essential to the defence of India and the Empire'.[161] Britain's fears about Soviet aggression against Afghanistan led to some British officials concocting bizarre schemes for sending guerrillas from Afghan territory to sabotage the Soviet rail network in Central Asia as a means of forestalling Russia's perceived invasion, while the War Office recommended that in the event of an attack, Kabul should be occupied by British forces.[162] Notwithstanding the alleged Russian designs on Afghanistan, Germany's invasion of the Soviet Union on 22 June 1941 removed Kabul and London's apprehension of a Soviet attack. Under pressure from Britain and the United States, the Afghan Government expelled all German and Axis nationals from Afghanistan in October 1941. This ended Afghanistan's brief flirtation with Nazi Germany.

The War years between 1939 and 1945 were critical for India's political destiny. It was in this period that the Congress Party redoubled its efforts to end British colonial rule in the subcontinent. Of greater political significance was the demand by the All India Muslim League for a separate Muslim state in North-West India, which meant the partition of British India. These political developments were shaking the foundations of Britain's Indian Empire. In this atmosphere, Afghanistan maintained its distance from India's political turmoil. It even abstained from overtly endorsing Ghaffar Khan's Pashtun nationalism.

The conclusion of World War II heralded great political transformations in Asia. It had become clear that a bankrupt and war weary Britain would in the near future relinquish its control over the subcontinent. The Labour government led by Prime Minister Clement Attlee unequivocally stated this after his election victory in June 1945. In the period 1945–1946, intense political negotiations proceeded between the Congress and the Muslim League under British supervision for the formation of a post-independence government that could represent the interests of the Hindus and Muslims within a united India. The British, however, were not ill disposed towards the Muslim League's insistence on the creation of an Islamic state called 'Pakistan' from the Muslim majority regions of Northwestern India.[163] The Muslim League had endorsed British war aims and had opposed the Congress's 'Quit India' movement launched in 1942. In this connection, Moon writes that Jinnah's request that the 'British should give Muslims their own bit of country, however small it may be' was not rejected out of hand.[164]

On 3 June 1947, the British Government presented the partition plan after the failure of the Congress and Muslim League to come to any agreement regarding a future system of government that could retain India's unity. In the North-West Frontier, Ghaffar Khan tried to persuade the Congress and the British authorities that the partition proposals should be amended to include provisions for a free Pathan state.[165] The Congress had substantial appeal in the NWFP. The Congress and its *Khudai Khidmatgaran* allies had been elected to power in the NWFP after the provincial elections of 1946. The Congress ministry was under the Chief Ministership of Dr. Khan Sahib, a younger brother of Abdul Ghaffar Khan. Despite this, the Muslim League denounced Ghaffar Khan's proposals and rejected his views as not representative of the NWFP's Pashtun majority. The British maintained that since there was no provision for an independent state other than India and Pakistan under the Indian Independence Act of 1947, the choice had to be made between the two. Consequently, the British held a referendum in the NWFP in July 1947 to ascertain the preference of the province's population as to whether they would join India or Pakistan. The referendum was boycotted by the Congress and Ghaffar Khan's *Khudai Khidmatgars* as it did not include the option for Pashtun state or 'Pashtunistan' along with those for India and Pakistan. The turnout for the referendum, which was conducted under the supervision of the British Indian Army, was quite low but a majority of those who voted cast their vote in favour of Pakistan. The Congress and Ghaffar Khan accused the British authorities of rigging the vote in favour of Pakistan. Almost five decades after this event, recent research has verified, to an extent, the authenticity of Ghaffar Khan's claims about the dishonest means used in the 1947 NWFP referendum.[166]

During 1945–46, the rising tide of Pashtun nationalism in the North-West Frontier had aroused Afghanistan's interest in the post-colonial status of this region. The Muhammadzai ruling elite visualised that Britain's vacation of the North West Frontier might give Afghanistan a chance to re-establish its traditional links with these former Afghan territories. In Kabul, it was considered that the cessation of British rule could realise the long held Afghan ambition of bringing the Frontier tribes within Afghanistan's suzerainty. In fact, Afghan officials had been pressing the British to openly explain their policy for post-independence North West Frontier Province since 1946. Afghanistan disputed the legitimacy of the July 1947 referendum held by the British in the NWFP. It demanded that the NWFP be offered two additional options, either union with Afghanistan or the setting up of a separate Pashtun state (Pashtunistan) as advocated by Ghaffar Khan. The Afghan Government also knew the geostrategic importance of an NWFP aligned with Afghanistan. Prime Minister, Muhammad Hashim Khan stated that the 'Frontier Province should join Afghanistan so that the latter can get an outlet to the sea'.[167] In their endeavour to achieve their demands regarding the NWFP, the Afghans even tried to enlist United States' support. However, the American Minister at Kabul suggested that the Afghans should discuss the matter with the Viceroy![168] The British Government stressed that the future Pakistan Government would be 'heir' to the obligations arising out of the treaties made by Britain with Afghanistan.[169] In any case, Afghanistan insisted that it could no longer regard the Anglo–Afghan Treaty of 1921 'as valid after the transfer of power by His Majesty's Government in India'.[170]

In the course of 1947, the Afghan Government continued to pressurise the British for negotiations on the Frontier issue. The British, however, were adamant that the Durand Line would be the future international border between Afghanistan and Pakistan. The British military establishment emphasised the need for the retention of this border as vital for the security of the Indian subcontinent. General Frank Messervy, who later became the first Commander-in Chief of the Pakistan Army, pointed out to the Joint Defence Council meeting presided over by the Viceroy, Lord Mountbatten, that the 'Pakistan Government should make it clear to Afghanistan that there is no question of any readjustment of the boundary now or in the future'.[171] Moreover, the British Chiefs of Staff Committee (COS) had suggested that West Pakistan should remain in the British Commonwealth. In the emerging Cold War atmosphere, the British military perceived that Pakistan could provide 'important strategic facilities, the port of Karachi, airbases and the support of Moslem manpower' in any conflict that threatened British interests in the Middle East and South Asia.[172] The need for including the 'loyal people' of Pakistan in the British Commonwealth was deemed essential for Britain's strategic concerns in that period.[173]

The strategic importance of Pakistan in Britain's global outlook far outweighed the irritating Afghan claims on the North-West Frontier. The British considered the Afghan territorial claims as 'awkward', for which 'evasive' replies had to be given to the Afghan Government.[174] The Governor of the NWFP, Sir Olaf Caroe, a noted authority on the Pashtuns, was very sceptical about the viability of a Pashtun state and Afghanistan's backing for it. He noted rather patronisingly:

> Pathanistan (*sic*) cannot subsist financially or otherwise on its own legs. The weakness is that the Pathans have hitherto been too divided among themselves to set up a stable state,

and where they have ruled they have ruled as conquerors of alien populations. They themselves had always been in a state of anarchy right through history until we came and put them in order. (Afghanistan is not really a Pathan state at all.)[175]

Caroe, during his tenure as Governor of the NWFP, remained hostile to the Congress Ministry led by Dr. Khan Sahib.

On 14 August 1947, colonial rule over the Indian subcontinent ended with the creation of two separate states of India (Bharat) and Pakistan, carved out of Britain's Indian Empire. The newly formed Government of Pakistan took control of the administration of the formerly British Indian provinces of Sind and NWFP. The Punjab had been partitioned and West Punjab, with its capital at Lahore, became the largest province of West Pakistan in terms of population. Baluchistan with its princely states of Kalat, Las Bela, Makran and Kharan also became part of West Pakistan. In the east, the mainly Muslim eastern portion of Bengal and a part of Assam became the province of East Pakistan. In October 1947, Pakistan and India were involved in a war over the disputed region of Kashmir. By November 1947, the western and northern portions of Kashmir, which included the regions of Gilgit and Baltistan bordering China, had been incorporated with the Pakistani state.

In the NWFP, Pakistan inherited the frontier tribal belt along with smaller princely states of Dir, Amb, Swat and Chitral. Immediately after independence, the Congress Ministry was dismissed by the Governor, Sir George Cunningham on the advice of Pakistan's first Governor General, Mohammad Ali Jinnah. The Frontier Congress and the *Khudai Khidmatgaran*, who had opposed the Pakistan Movement, saw this step as 'unconstitutional and a severe blow to democracy'.[176] The Afghan Government challenged the legality of NWFP's incorporation into the state of Pakistan. Its representative to the United Nations declared in September 1947 that his country did not recognize the NWFP as part of Pakistan and voted against Pakistan's membership in this organization. The Afghan representative, Abdul Husain Khan Aziz, pointed out:

This unhappy circumstance is due to the fact that we cannot recognize the North West Frontier Province as part of Pakistan so long as the people of the North West Frontier Province have not been given an opportunity free from any kind of influence – and I repeat, free from any kind of influence – to determine for themselves whether they wish to be independent or become part of Pakistan.[177]

The establishment of Pakistan acted as a catalyst for reviving century old Afghan demands for the restoration of the territories lost to Britain during the colonial period. Notably, the Pashtun nationalist activism in the NWFP that revolved around the theme of common ethnic bonds between the Pashtuns of Afghanistan and North-West India, gave an additional push to the Afghan stand on the revision of the Durand Line in the years preceding the partition of India. Afghanistan's policy towards the eastern Pashtuns residing in the NWFP was, on the whole, in accordance with Ghaffar Khan's aims for Pashtun self-determination. However, repeated Afghan requests for negotiation concerning the status of the North-West Frontier during 1946–1947 were ignored by Britain. Britain's lack of sympathy for the Afghan position assisted Pakistan in gaining firm control of the NWFP after 14 August 1947. The British authorities made sure that the Pashtun areas were merged

with Pakistan, so as to avoid any kind of active Pashtun irredentism, which would have been fatal for the fragile Pakistani State. But in doing so, Britain also bequeathed to Pakistan the unresolved Frontier issue that had plagued its relations with Afghanistan since the early nineteenth century.

Britain's desire to defend the frontiers of its empire in India along the Central Asian geopolitical fault line, the region comprising Afghanistan, led to the creation of artificial boundaries dividing tribes and ethnic groups. These frontiers that were drawn to primarily serve Anglo–Russian imperial security interests became a major cause of political tension, insecurity and regional polarisation in the post-colonial period. In this regard, the Pakistan–Afghanistan dispute concerning the NWFP was a classic legacy of the imperial 'Great Game' played by Britain and Russia in South-Central Asia in the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries.

Notes

1 Jawaharlal Nehru, *Glimpses of World History*, New York: John Day, 1960, p.214.
2 Geoffrey Kemp and Robert E. Harkavy, *Strategic Geography and the Changing Middle East*, Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, Washington DC: Brookings Institution Press, 1997, p.18.
3 The Khyber Pass is the most famous and is located on the road leading from Kabul to Peshawar. Invaders entering India have also used other less well known passes, now in Pakistan's North West Frontier Province (NWFP), like the Kurram, Tochi and Gomal, which are inhabited by local Pashtun tribes. Another important pass located in Baluchistan, the Bolan, is on the highway that connects the southern Afghan city of Kandahar to Quetta (capital of Pakistani Baluchistan) and then to the Indus valley.
4 Herodotus. *The Histories*, London: Penguin Classics, 1958, pp.207–208.
5 Seleucus Nikator, a cavalry commander in Alexander's army, held sway over the eastern parts of Afghanistan for a certain period. The Seleucid dynasty and other Greco-Bacterian rulers were able to retain hold over considerable portions of Afghanistan and influence regional politics for nearly two centuries. For a detailed examination of this era see Henry Rawlinson, *Bactria: The History of a Forgotten People*, London, 1912 and Sir Percy Sykes, *History of Afghanistan*, vol 1, London: Macmillan, 1940.
6 See W.W. Tarn, *The Greeks in Bactria and India*, London, 1920.
7 The ancient region of Bactria included parts of present-day northern Afghanistan, Uzbekistan and Tajikistan.
8 In 1935, the Iranian monarch, Reza Shah, changed the name of the country from Persia to Iran. Persia was the conventional European designation of Iran. The Iranians, however, had long called their country Iran.
9 Sir Percy Sykes, *History of Afghanistan*, vol 1, London: Macmillan, 1940, pp.118–123. The Kushan empire under Kaniska I (c AD 78–144) included Afghanistan, Kashmir and northern Punjab, with capitals at Kapisa (near Kabul) and Purushupara (Peshawar). The Kushans propagated the Mahayana form of Buddhism to as far as China over the landroutes of Central Asia.
10 C.E. Bosworth, 'Notes on the pre-Ghaznavaid History of Afghanistan', *Islamic Quarterly*, Vol.IX, 1965, p.15. According to Bosworth, the Hephthalites may have been ethnically Turkic but their leadership was Indo-European.
11 See Andre Wink, *Al Hind: The Making of the Indo-Islamic World, Early Medieval India and the Expansion of Islam 7th–11th Centuries*, Vol.1, London: Oxford University Press,

1990, p.115; and H.A.R. Gibb, *The Arab Conquests in Central Asia*, New York, 1923, pp.3–11.

12 R.C. Majumdar, 'The Arab Invasion of India', *Dacca University Supplement*, No.XV, 1931, pp.5–7.

13 Andre Wink, *Al Hind: The Making of the Indo-Islamic World*, Vol.1, London: Oxford University Press, 1990, p.121.

14 Al Baladhuri, *Kitab Futuh Al-Buldan*, Part II, trans. from Arabic by Francis C. Murgotten and Phillip K. Hitti, New York: Columbia University Press, 1918, p.147.

15 Andre Wink, Op. Cit, Chapter IV.

16 E.C. Sachau, *Al Beruni's India*, Vol.II, London: Trusnor & Company, 1888, pp.10–13.

17 Yakub ibn Layath was a local from Sistan and a Muslim convert. Originally, he had served as a field commander of a militia paid for by the Tahirids to fight the Kharjite heretics.

18 See Olaf Caroe, *The Pathans, 550 B.C–A.D 1957*, London: Macmillan, 1958, p.108.

19 W.K. Fraser Tytler, *Afghanistan: A Study of Political Developments in Central and Southern Asia* (Second Edition), London: Oxford University Press, 1953, p.24.

20 Sir Percy Sykes, *History of Afghanistan*, Vol.1, p.189.

21 M. Nazim, *The life and times of Sultan Mahmud of Ghazna*, Cambridge, 1931,Chapter 8. In the course of these conquests, Mahmud is known to have acquired vast amounts of gold and precious jewels looted from Hindu temples of India.

22 Clifford Edmund Bosworth, *The Latter Ghaznavids: Splendour and Decay. The Dynasty in Afghanistan and Northern India 1040–1186*, Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 1977, p.8.

23 Clifford Edmund Bosworth, *The Latter Ghaznavids: Splendour and Decay. The Dynasty in Afghanistan and Northern India, 1040–1186*, p.13. The first incontrovertible reference to the Afghans is in 'Hudud-al-Alam' a Persian–Arabic geographical compendium of the tenth century. See *Hudud-al-Alam* (Regions of the World): *A Persian Geography, 372 AH–982 AD* (translations and explanation by V. Minorsky, with preface by V.V. Barthold, translation from Russian) London: Luzac, 1937.

24 S.A.A. Rizvi, *The Wonder that was India: A Survey of the History and Culture of The Indian Subcontinent from the coming of the Muslims to the British Conquest 1200–1700*, London: Sidgewick and Jackson, 1987, p.20.

25 See Peter Jackson, 'Jalal-al-Din, the Mongols and the Khwarazmian Conquest of the Punjab and Sind', *Iran*, Vol.28, 1990, p.48.

26 See Peter Jackson, *The Delhi Sultanate: A Political and Military History*, London: Cambridge University Press, Chapters 6 and 7.

27 John E. Woods, 'The Rise of Timurid historiography', *Journal of Near Eastern Studies*, 46, part 2, 1987, pp.81–108.

28 Sirhindi, Yahya b. Ahmad, *Tarikh-i-Mubarak Shahi*, ed. S.M. Hidayat Husain, Calcutta: *Bibliotheca Indica*, 1931, pp.160–161.

29 Peter Jackson, *The Delhi Sultanate*, Op. Cit, p.321.

30 See Iqtidar Husain Siddiqi, *Some Aspects of Afghan Despotism in India*, Aligarh: Aligarh University Press, Chapters 1 and 2 also P. Sykes, *History of Afghanistan*, Vol.1, p.288.

31 James. W. Spain, 'Political Problems of a Border land' in Ainslee T. Embree (ed), *Pakistan's Western Borderlands: Transformation of a Political Order*, New Delhi: Vikas, 1977, p.4.

32 *Memoirs of Zehir-ed-din Mohammad Babar, Emperor of Hindustan*. Tr. J. Leyden and W. Erskine, London, 1926, pp.137–138. Babur's son Humayun was forced to abandon Delhi in 1543 by the Sur Afghan Chieftain Sher Shah. However, Humayun was able to recapture the Indian capital with the assistance of the Iranian Shah Tahmasp in 1555.

33 See J.L. Lee, *The Ancient Supremacy: Bukhara, Afghanistan and the Battle for Balkh, 1731–1901*, Leiden: E.J. Brill, 1996, pp.50–51. Only during Akbar's grandson Shihab-ud-Din Shahjahan's reign (1628–58) were the Mughals successful in occupying Balkh in 1646. This Mughal intrusion into Balkh was a short-lived affair due to the stiff resistance of local inhabitants, coupled with constant Uzbek raids from across the Amu Darya that compelled the Mughals to withdraw from this region in 1647.

34 Riazul Islam, *Indo-Persian Relations: A Study of the Political and Diplomatic Relations Between the Mughal Empire and Iran*, Karachi: Iranian Cultural Foundation, 1970, pp.176–77.

35 Sir Percy Sykes, *History of Afghanistan*, Vol.1, p.325.

36 See Vartan Gregorian, *The Emergence of Modern Afghanistan: Political Reform and Modernization, 1880–1946*, Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1969, p.43.

37 Olaf Caroe, *The Pathans, 550 B.C.–A.D. 1957*, p.200.

38 See Joseph Arlinghaus, 'Varieties of Islamic Expression in the Mughal Province of Kabul in the 16th Century', in Anna Libera Dallapiccula and Stephanie Zingal-Ave Lallement (eds), *Islam and the Indian Regions*, Vol.1, Stuttgart: Franz Steiner Verlag, 1993.

39 Ibid., p.7.

40 Sir Percy Sykes, *History of Afghanistan*. Vol.1, p.267. See also V. Gregorian, *Emergence of Modern Afghanistan*, Chapter 2 and 3.

41 Kandahar had remained under Iranian control since its recapture from the Mughals in 1649.

42 See Peter Avery, 'Nadir Shah and the Afsharid Legacy', in 'From Nadir Shah to the Islamic Republic', *Cambridge History of Iran*, Vol.7, London: Cambridge University Press, 1991.

43 The Abdalis originally hailed from Kandahar. Herat had come under the Abdali tutelage when Abdullah Khan Sadozai captured the city in 1716.

44 A number of Sufi mystical orders had considerable hold over large sections of Afghan population. These orders centred on the veneration of *pirs* (spiritual teachers). In Afghanistan, the two most prominent orders are the Qadiriyya and the Naqshbandiyya.

45 The nascent Afghan state was a tribal confederacy formed by a strong leader. Richard Tapper clarifies the distinction between tribe and confederacy by observing that the tribe is 'a localized group in which kinship is the dominant idiom of organization, and whose members consider themselves culturally distinct (in terms of customs, dialect or language, and origins); tribes are usually politically unified, though not necessarily under a central leader'. A confederacy, in contrast, is more 'heterogeneous in terms of culture, presumed origins and class composition, yet is politically unified, usually under a central authority'. See Richard Tapper, 'Introduction', in R. Tapper (ed), *The Conflict of Tribe and State in Iran and Afghanistan*, New York: St.Martins Press, 1983, p.9.

46 Vartan Gregorian, *Emergence of Afghanistan*, Chapter 2. For a detailed analysis of Pashtun society, see Akbar.S.Ahmad, *Pakhtun Economy and Society: Traditional Structure and Economic Development in a Tribal Society*, London: Routledge, 1980.

47 An excellent survey of this period in Indian History is in Andrea Hintze, *The Mughal Empire and Its Decline: An Interpretation of the Sources of Social Power*, Aldershot: Ashgate, 1997.

48 See Ganda Singh, *Ahmad Shah Durrani: Father of Modren Afghanistan*, Bombay: Asia Publishing House, 1959, Chapters IV to XII.

49 A discussion of this issue is in Aziz Ahmad, 'Le mouvement des Mujahidin dans l'Inde au XIXe siecle', *Orient* No 15, 1960 and also in Aziz Ahmad. *Studies in Islamic Culture in the Indian Environment*, London: Oxford University Press, 1964.

50 M. Nazif Shahrani, 'State Building and Social Fragmentation in Afghanistan: A Historical Perspective', in Ali Banuazizi and Myron Weiner (eds), *The State, Religion and Ethnic Politics: Afghanistan, Iran and Pakistan*, Syracuse: Syracuse University Press, 1986, p.31.
51 See M. Nazif Shahrani, 'State Building and Social fragmentation in Afghanistan: A Historical Perspective', pp.33–38.
52 See Sir Olaf Caroe, *The Pathans, 550 B.C.–A.D. 1957*, pp.xiii–xxii.
53 Mountstuart Elphinstone, *An Account of the Kingdom of Cabul and Its Dependencies in Persia, Tartary and India*, London, 1815, pp.199. (Reprint), two Vols, Karachi: Oxford University Press, 1972.
54 See J.L. Lee, *The Ancient Supremacy*, pp.xvi–xx.
55 In Hindi and Urdu, the word Pathan is the derivative of the term Pashtun and Pakhtun. Before 1800, the name 'Afghanistan' had not been used to cover the area, which now comprises modern Afghanistan. Generally, the Afghan regions were considered to be the southern and eastern Pashtun-dominated areas that included Kabul and Kandahar. For details see M.M.S. Farhang, *Afghanistan Dar Panj Qarn-e-Akhir (Afghanistan in the last five centuries)* Vols.1–3, Qom, Iran: Isma'iliyan Publishers, 1992.
56 Rose L. Greaves, *Persia and the Defence of India: 1829–1884, A Study in the Foreign Policy of the Third Marquis of Salisbury*, London: The Athlone Press, 1959, p.22.
57 Edward Ingram, *In Defence of British India: Great Britain in the Middle East, 1775–1842*, London: Frank Cass, 1984, pp.78–91.
58 L. Carl Brown, 'Two Views of Middle East', *International History Review*, Vol.IV, 1982. p.446.
59 Malcolm Edward Yapp, *Strategies of British India: Britain. Persia and Afghanistan 1798–1850*, Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1980, p.19.
60 Ibid, pp.2–18.
61 Paul. Schroeder, 'The 19th Century International System: Changes in Structure', *World Politics*, Vol.39, No 7, October 1986, pp.1–26.
62 Edward Ingram, *The Beginning of the Great Game in Asia 1828–1834*, London: Oxford University Press, 1979.
63 An in-depth study of Afghanistan under Dost Muhammad is in Christine Noelle, *State and Tribe in Nineteenth Century Afghanistan: The Reign of Amir Dost Muhammad Khan 1826–1863*, London: Curzon Press, 1997.
64 After the fall of the Amanullah regime, the Tajik potentate, Bacha-i-Saqao held tenuous hold over Kabul from January 17, 1929 to October 13, 1929. However, Bacha's regime was not granted recognition by any foreign power.
65 Edward Ingram, *The Beginning of the Great Game in Asia, 1828–1834*, pp.130–131.
66 Edward Ingram, 'The Rules of the Game: A Commentary on the Defence of British India, 1798–1829', *Journal of Inperial and Commonwealth History*, III, 1974–75, pp.257–279.
67 See P. Sykes, *A History of Afghanistan*, Vol.II, p.63.
68 S.R. Bakshi, 'Elphinstones Mission to Kabul', *Journal of Indian History*, Vol.XIV, 1967, pp.605–613.
69 See Mountstuart Elphinstone, *An Account of the Kingdom of Caboul*, Vol.2 (reprint) Karachi, 1972, pp.300–350.
70 In the latter part of the nineteenth century, a *madrassa* (religious school) was established at Deoband in Saharanpur district of the British Indian United Provinces, which largely taught an interpretation of Islam based on the teachings of Shah Waliullah.The Deoband Movement, had a scripturalist interpretation of Islam and was opposed to Sufi and Shiite practices. The *Deobandis* became the chief rival of the Barelvi School of Ulama originally hailing from the district of Bareilly also in the United Provinces of India. The *Barelvis* strongly upheld the traditional Sufi practices which included seeking intercession at shrines. This was an anathema to the Wahhabi-influenced Deobandis. Deoband was to play a prominent role in fostering Sunni Islamic revivalism in India, Pakistan and Afghanistan in the twentieth century.

71 There is now a large Deobandi Madrassa at Akora Khattak run by the Jamiat-i-Ulema-i-Islam (Sami-ul Haq faction). The JUI had recruited thousands of Madrassa students to fight alongside the Taliban militia in the Afghan civil war. For a detailed study of the Deoband Movement see Barbara Metcalf, *Islamic Revival in British India: Deoband, 1860–1900*, Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1980.
72 See T.A. Nizami, *Muslim Political Thought and Activity*, Aligarh, 1969, Chapter 4.
73 See Asghar H. Bilgrami, *Afghanistan and British India, 1793–1907: A Study in Foreign Relations*, New Delhi: Sterling Publishers, 1972, p.57. See also *Al Furqan, Ismail Shaheed Number*, Registrar of Newspapers (1849–1859), New Delhi: National Archives of India.
74 Henry. M. Durand, The *First Afghan War and Its Causes*, London: Longman's, 1879.
75 Penderal Moon, *British Conquest and Dominion of India*, London: Duckham, 1981, p.501.
76 See Vincent Smith (ed.), *Oxford History of India*, 3rd edition, London: Oxford University Press, 1958, p.59.
77 The British administration at Calcutta during the early 1800s had sent many of its ablest officers to probe this region even before the threat of Russia had arisen. Men like Arthur Connolly, Alexander Burnes and George Forrester were the pioneers of Britain's 'forward policy' in Afghanistan and Central Asia. They studied the political situation of the area and assessed the chances for Britain to gain a foothold in these hitherto uncharted lands.
78 The region of eastern Iran and western Afghanistan is also known as Khorasan.
79 Palmerston to Hobhouse, 29 October 1838, *Broughton MSS*, 46915, British Library.
80 See Malcolm E. Yapp, *Strategies of British India*, p.314.
81 J.P. Ferrier, *History of Afghanistan*, London, 1858, p.332.
82 See Henry. M. Durand, Op. Cit; Sir Percy Sykes, *History of Afghanistan*; and Sir W. Kerr Fraser-Tytler, *Afghanistan: A Study of Political Developments in Central and South Asia*.
83 The retreating British–Indian Army was annihilated by Pashtun tribesmen at the Kabul-Khurd pass near the city of Jalalabad on the Kabul-Peshawar route. Only one man reached Jalalabad. The only other survivors were hostages taken earlier.
84 J.L. Lee, *Ancient Supremacy*, p.184.
85 See Lieutenant Eldred Pottinger, *Memoir on the Country Between Herat and Kabuol, the Paropamisian Mountains and the Amoo*, 1839, ESL: L/P&S/5/145, No 7 (Black) Encl 20.
86 See S.M. Burke and Salahuddin Qureshi, *The British Raj in India: A Historical Account*, Karachi: Oxford University Press, 1995, pp.24–25.
87 J.S. Grewal, *The Sikhs of the Punjab, New Cambridge History of India vol II.3*, London: Cambridge University Press, 1990, pp.128–127.
88 J.L. Lee, *The Ancient Supremacy*, Chapter six.
89 Sir W Kerr Fraser-Tytler, *Afghanistan: A Study of Political Developments in Central and South Asia*, Oxford, 1953, p.123.
90 Ibid. p.123; and for details see *A Collection of Treaties, Engagements and Sanads Relating to India and Neighbouring Countries*. Compiled by Charles U. Aitchison. 5th ed. Calcutta, 1929–33. 14 vols, Vols.XI–XIII.
91 J.L. Lee, *Ancient Supremacy*, p.243.
92 See Nazif. M. Shahrani, 'The Kirghiz Khans: Styles and Substance of Traditional Local Leadership in Central Asia', *Central Asian Survey*, Vol.5, No. 314, 1986, pp.255–271.

93 See Syed Qasim Reshtia, *Between Two Giants: Political History of Afghanistan in the Nineteenth Century (Translation of Afghanistan Dar Qarn-i-Nuzdah)*, Peshawar, 1990, p.201.
94 Edwardes to Temple, 6 September 1855. *ESL (Enclosures and Secret Letters from India), L/P&S/5*, and India Office Library: Public Records Office Also in J.L. Lee, Op. Cit., p.242.
95 Newsletter from Ghulam Haidar, 27 September 1855, *ESL: 226, Folios: 813–4 in* J.L. Lee, Op. Cit., p.243.
96 Quoted by J.B. Kelly, *Britain and the Persian Gulf, 1795–1880*, London, 1968, p.464.
97 See D.C. Champagne. *The Afghan–Iranian Conflict over Herat Province and European Intervention, 1796–1863*. A Ph.D. Diss, Ann Arbor: University of Michigan, 1981, p.448.
98 Some modern historians in India and Pakistan refer to this event as the 'Indian War of Independence'!
99 See Sir Penderal Moon, *British Conquest and Dominion of India*, pp.668–669.
100 Quoted in A.H. Bilgrami, *Afghanistan and British India*, p.124.
101 Sir Percy Sykes, *History of Afghanistan*, Vol.2, London: Macmillan, 1940, p.66.
102 Quoted in G.J. Alder, 'The Key to India? Britain and the Herat Problem, 1830–1863', *Middle Eastern Studies*, Vol.x, 1974, pp.190–195.
103 See D.P. Singhal, *India and Afghanistan, 1876–1907: A Study in Diplomatic Relations*, St. Lucia: University of Queensland Press, 1963, p.8.
104 Quoted in Gerald Morgan, *Anglo-Russian Rivalry in Central Asia: 1810–1885*, London: Frank Cass, 1981, pp.127–128.
105 See J.L. Lee, *Ancient Supremacy*, p.333.
106 See D.N. Wilbur, *Afghanistan, Its People, Its Society, Its Culture*, New Haven, 1962, p.178.
107 Quoted from Ira Klein, 'Who made the Second Afghan War?', *Journal of Asian History*, Vol.7, 1973, p.105.
108 D.P. Singhal, *India and Afghanistan, 1876–1901: A Study in Diplomatic Relations*, p.45.
109 Abdul Samad Ghaus, *The Fall of Afghanistan: An Insider's Account*, London: Pergamon-Brassey's, 1988, p.7.
110 See J.L. Lee, *Ancient Supremacy*, p.397.
111 See M. Kakar, *Afghanistan: A Study in Internal Political Developments*, Kabul, 1971, pp.50–51.
112 Herat was still held by Ayub Khan, a brother of the exiled Amir Muhammad Yakub. The British especially wanted Ayub Khan ousted from that city as his forces had inflicted a defeat on the British Army at Maiwand near Kandahar in July 1880. Moreover, the British desire to see Ayub Khan removed was also directly linked to their future political goals in Afghanistan. General Roberts had lifted Ayub's siege of Kandahar, then had defeated him in a battle west of there, thus giving the British enough saving of face to leave Afghanistan. They wanted Ayub out because they backed Abd al-Rahman as a more 'reliable' opponent of Russia and Iran.
113 See J.L. Lee, *Ancient Supremacy*, pp.476–471.
114 Abd al-Rahman particularly regarded the doctrines of *Wahhabism* as repugnant to Islam. The Wahhabis were even accused of blasphemy and wrongfully interpreting the concepts and verses from the Quran. Apart from Wahhabism, Shiite Islam was also regarded with disdain and officially repressed. An perceptive survey of the relationship of Islam with the state is in Ashraf Ghani, 'Islam and State Building in a Tribal Society: Afghanistan, 1880–1901', *Modern Asian Studies*, Vol.29, No.2, 1978, pp.269–284.

115 See D.P. Singhal. Op. Cit, p.124.
116 See Vartan Gregorian, *The Emergence of Modern Afghanistan*, Chapter 5.
117 See T. Mathison, *The Functions of Small States in the Strategies of Great Powers*, Oslo: Scandinavian Universities Press, 1981, p.24.
118 In an attempt to build an imperial regional security arrangement, the Russian colonial authorities in Turkestan even suggested the disarming of the Afghan and Muslim population of all states intervening between British India and Russian possessions of Central Asia and division of these territories between the two powers. See W. Habberton, *Anglo-Russian Relations Concerning Afghanistan, 1837–1907*, Chicago: University of Illinois Press, 1937, p.39.
119 The northernmost portion of the Durand Line commenced from Chitral where the Indian, Chinese and Russian empires met. On the Afghan side of the border most of the population was non-Muslim but by 1900 it had been converted to Islam by Abd al-Rahman's integrationist policies, and the area was renamed Nuristan. The Durand Line runs south from Chitral through Dir to Bajuar from where the Pashtun tribal belt starts. From Bajaur to South Wazirstan, the Pashtun tribal belt separates Afghanistan from the settled trans-Indus districts.
120 See Ainslee T. Embree, 'Pakistan's Imperial Legacy', in Ainslee T. Embree (ed), *Pakistan's Western Borderlands: The Transformation of A Political Order*, New Delhi: Vikas Publishing House, 1977, p.27.
121 Richard Tapper regards the Pashtuns as an ethnic group divided into several large, relatively homogeneous 'confederacies' such as Mohmand, Ghilzais, Durrainis, etc. They can be regarded as confederacies primarily due to the large number of people they contain. Tapper uses the term tribe for sub-divisions of these confederacies. For example, the Ghilzai are divided into Hotak, Tokhi, Nasir, Taraki, Kharoti, Andar and Sulaimankhel tribes. R. Tapper (ed), *The Conflict of Tribe and State*, pp.9–10.
122 See Charles Lindholm, *Frontier Perspectives: Essays in Comparative Anthropology*, Karachi: OUP, 1996. Lineage and segmentation should not be confused. According to Evans-Pritchard segmentary model is based on the idea that 'each segment is itself segmented and there is opposition between its parts. The members of any segment unite for war against adjacent segments of the same order and unite with these adjacent segments against larger sections'. E.E. Evans-Pritchard, *The Nuer*, Oxford, 1940, p.142.
123 G.W. Spain, *The Pathan Borderland*, The Hague: Mouten and Co, 1963, p.34.
124 A detailed discussion of the nature of British polices in the tribal regions bordering Afghanistan is in Hugh Beattie, *Imperial Frontier: Tribe and State in Waziristan*, London: Curzon, 2002.
125 See Robert Warburton, *Eighteen Years in the Khyber*, London: John Murray, 1900. Warburton, as Political Agent in the Khyber Agency (1882–1896), presided over the so-called 'Khyber System' that relied on non-interference with the tribes as long as the security of communications and British suzerainty was not challenged.
126 Hugh Beattie, *The Imperial Frontier: Tribe and State in Waziristan*, pp.148–150 and pp.157–158.
127 Sultan Muhammad Khan (ed), *Life of Abdur Rahman Khan, Amir of Afghanistan*, Vol.II, London, 1901, pp.157–158.
128 C.H. Phillips, *The Evolution of India and Pakistan, 1858–1947*, London: Oxford University Press, 1962, pp.663–664.
129 Sir W. Kerr Fraser-Tytler, *Afghanistan: A Study in Political Developments in Central and Southern Asia*, pp.188–189.
130 On certain occasions, like the Frontier uprising of 1897–98 that spread from the

Malakand agency to Waziristan, Britain had to deploy thousands of troops to bring order in the region. The tribal *mullahs* or clergymen were particularly blamed by the British as the principal instigators of rebellion on the Frontier.

131 See Winston Spencer Churchill, *The Story of the Malakand Field Force; An Episode of Frontier War*, 2nd edition, London: Longmans, 1901, p.309. According to Churchill, the intermittent guerrilla campaign waged by the Pashtun tribes on the Frontier that resulted in long periods of 'war and distrust', was an 'inevitable first consequence' of the forward policy.

132 D.P. Singhal, *India and Afghanistan: A Study in Diplomatic Relations*, pp.165–166.

133 P. Sykes, *A History of Afghanistan*, Vol.II, p.222.

134 Quoted in R.G. Thomas, 'The Crisis in Afghanistan and South Asian Security', *Journal of Strategic Studies*, Vol.4, No.9, December 1981, pp.418–419.

135 Russia's defeat by Japan in the 1905 Russo–Japanese War had turned Czar Nicholas II's attention back to Europe and he then realised, as the British and French already had, that Germany's growing military strength was dangerous. Consequently, the Russian elite increasingly perceived Germany as a threat to Russia and Britain than either did to the other.

136 'Convention Signed on August 31, 1907, between Great Britain and Russia, Containing Arrangements on the Subjects of Persia, Afghanistan and Thibet', *American Journal of International Law*, Vol.1, Issue 4, Supplement: Official Documents, Oct. 1907, pp.398–406.

137 See M. Nadeem Qureshi, *Pan-Islam in British Indian Politics: A Study of the Khilafat Movement, 1918–1924*, Leiden: E.J. Brill, 1999.

138 In 1915, Mawlana Mahmood-ul-Hasan, a prominent cleric of Deoband sent Ubaidullah Sindhi to Kabul to organise an anti-British uprising in India. Sindhi tried to establish contacts with anti-British Indian revolutionaries and the Turkish–German mission in Kabul. A German mission led by Oskar Von Niedermayer had been sent to Afghanistan to seek Afghan assistance for the Central Powers. Turkish military officers under Kazim Bey assisted the Niedermayer mission. This mission planned to organise a revolt against British rule in North-West India. However, the activities of Ubaidullah Sindhi, the Indian revolutionaries and the German–Turkish mission did not achieve anything substantial as the Amir Habibullah refused to give his blessing to any anti-British activity emanating from Afghan territory. See Ludwig Adamec, *Afghanistan, 1900–1923: A Diplomatic History*, Berkeley: University of California Press, 1967, pp.83–107.

139 Ludwig Adamec, *Afghanistan 1900–1923*, pp.108–114.

140 See *'The Afghan Situation'*. National Archives of India, Political Department, I-O A177, May 1919.

141 M. Nadeem Qureshi, *Pan-Islam in British Indian Politics*, pp.85–90.

142 M. Nadeem Qureshi, *Pan-Islam in British Indian Politics*, p.175.

143 *British White Paper* regarding hostilities with Afghanistan, 1919, No.2, New Delhi: National Archives of India.

144 Vartan Gregorian, *The Emergence of Modern Afghanistan*, pp.231–232.

145 The Capital of British India was transferred from Calcutta to New Delhi in 1912.

146 See Ludwig Adamec. *Afghanistan 1900–1923*, pp.165–166.

147 *Foreign Relations of the United States 1921*, Vol.1, US Government Printing Office 1936, p.258.

148 See Vartan Gregorian, Op.Cit, p.261.

149 Arnold Fletcher, *Afghanistan: Highway of Conquest*, Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1965, pp.206–207 and *Izvestia*, 20 April 1924.

150 See *Foreign Relations of the United States, 1951*, Vol.VI, South Asia, Washington D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1978, pp.1961–1962. Telegram (689.90D/4-1851) from the Ambassador in Pakistan (Warren) to the Secretary of State, 18 April 1951.

151 Some Soviets authorities claimed that *Bacha-i-Saqao* was a British puppet and was involved with the anti-Soviet *Basmachi* activists in Central Asia. For more details see Vartan Gregorian, *The Emergence of Modern Afghanistan: Politics of Reform and Modernization, 1880–1946*, Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1969, pp.278–285.

152 Nadir Khan had been in exile in France. Previously, he had served as Afghan Ambassador to France before being removed by Amanullah over political differences.

153 See Vartan Gregorian. *The Emergence of Modern Afghanistan*, p.286.

154 For perceptive analysis of Pashtun hegemony over other ethnic groups see Sayed Askar Mousavi, *The Hazaras of Afghanistan: An Historical, Cultural, Economic and Political Study*, London: Curzon Press, 1998.

155 Besides the rise of the *Khudai Khidmatgaran*, the British confronted several tribal revolts in the tribal belt of the NWFP in the 1930s. In 1936, Mirza Ali Khan, a Tori Khel Wazir, popularly known as the Faqir of Ipi, started an armed anti-British *Jihad* in Waziristan, ostensibly over a petty religious matter. Thousands of Wazirs and other Pashtun tribesmen inflicted substantial casualties on the British Indian Army. The Faqir of Ipi frequently crossed the Durand Line into Afghanistan to seek volunteers for his *Jihad*. At the official level, the Afghan Government's attitude towards the Faqir of Ipi remained reserved. In a note to London, the British Ambassador to Afghanistan wrote, 'the Afghan Government went to considerable lengths to restrain their tribesmen' from joining the Faqir's revolt. Note by Sir W.K. Fraser-Tytler, 12 July 1937-IOR/4/PS/123232 quoted from S. Iftikhar Hussain, *Some Major Pukhtoon Tribes Along The Pak-Afghan Border*, Peshawar: Area Study Centre, University of Peshawar, 2000, p.130.

156 For an incisive analysis of the pre-partition politics of the North West Frontier Province see Syed Wiqar Ali Shah, *Ethnicity, Islam and Nationalism: Muslim Politics in the North West Frontier Province, 1937–47*, Karachi: Oxford University Press, 2000.

157 William Barton, India's *North West Frontier*, J. Murray, London, 1939, p.164.

158 See Wiqar Ali Shah's, *Ethnicity, Islam and Nationalism*, for the Muslim League's pro-British policies in the NWFP.

159 For an excellent commentary on Ghaffar Khan's politics and ideals see Mukulika Banerjee, *The Pathan Unarmed: Opposition and Memory in the North West Frontier*, London: Oxford University Press, 2000; See also Raja Anwar, *The Tragedy of Afghanistan: A First Hand Account*, London: Verso, 1988, pp.30–34.

160 See James W. Spain, *The Pathan Borderland*, The Hague: Mouton & Company, 1963.

161 See British Cabinet Papers, Public Records Office (PRO). CAB 65: WP (39) 1. British War Office had made comprehensive plans to defend India at the Afghan frontier during the inter-war years. For a detailed account of British policy in that period see B. Prasad, *Defence of India: Policy and Plans. Official History of the Indian Armed Forces in the Second World War 1939–45*, New Delhi, 1963.

162 See Milan Hauner, 'The Soviet Threat to Afghanistan and India 1938–1940', *Modern Asian Studies*, Vol.15, No.2, 1981, pp.287–309.

163 The name Pakistan was derived from the letters denoting the names of the North-Western provinces of India – P for Punjab; A for Afghan (or NWFP); K for Kashmir; I for nothing; S for Sind and TAN for the last syllable for Baluchistan. See *Record of Interview between Rear-Admiral Viscount Mountbatten of Burma and Mr Jinnah and Mr Liaqat Ali Khan. Mountbatten Papers. Viceroy's Interview No. 140.* 17 May. 1947 in *The Transfer of Power 1942–47*, Nicholas Mansergh and Penderal Moon (eds.), vol.XII, London: HMPO, 1981, p.180.

164 Sir Penderal Moon, *The British Conquest and Dominion of India*, p.1087.
165 See S. Rittenberg. *Ethnicity, Nationalism and the Pakhtuns: The Independence Movement in India's North West Frontier Province, 1901–1947*, Durham, NC: University of North Carolina Press, 1988.
166 See Sayed Wiqar Ali Shah, *Ethnicity, Islam and Nationalism: Muslim Politics in the NWFP, 1937–47*, pp.217–227.
167 *Statesman*, New Delhi, January 22, 1947.
168 See footnote in *Government of India, External Affairs and Commonwealth Relations Department to Secretary of State*. Telegram, *L/P&S/12/1812:f 291*, New Delhi 16 July 1947. Also in *Transfer of Power*, Vol.XII, p.200.
169 *Minutes of Viceroy's Twentieth Miscellaneous Meeting. R/3/166: ff 24–7 in Constitutional Relations Between Britain and India: The Transfer of Power 1942–7*, Nicholas Mansergh and Penderal Moon (eds.), Vol.XII, London, 1981, p.263.
170 *Mr Bevin to Sir G. Squire (Kabul). L/P&S/12/1812: f 209*. 5 August 1947.
171 *Viceroy's Personal Report No. 16 L/PO/6/123: ff 224–41*. 8 August 1947.
172 *Chiefs of Staff Committee, C.O.S (47) 62nd Meeting. L/WS/1/1030: ff 5–12*. 12 May 1947.
173 Ibid.
174 *India and Burma Committee Paper I.B. (47) 39. L/P&J/10/78: ff 18–19*. Future Relations Between India and Adjacent Countries, Memorandum by the Secretary of State for India. India Office, 22 March 1947.
175 *Sir O. Caroe (North West Frontier Province) to Sir J. Colville (Extract). L/P&J/224: f 45*. 22 May 1947.
176 Sayid Wiqar Ali Shah, *Ethnicity, Islam and Nationalism*, pp.228–231.
177 *Official Records of the Plenary Meetings of the U.N. General Assembly*, Ninety-Second Plenary Meeting of the UN General Assembly, 30 September 1947. New York: United Nations, 1948.

Chapter 2

Pakistan–Afghanistan Ties, 1947–1977

The creation of Pakistan resulted in igniting bitter territorial disputes between this state and its immediate neighbours to the east and the northwest that is, India and Afghanistan respectively. In the case of India, Pakistan had vehemently opposed the inclusion of the Muslim majority State of Jammu and Kashmir with India after partition. Pakistan's rejection of Kashmir's accession to the Indian Union became the cause of the first India–Pakistan military conflict in October 1947. Pakistan also had other minor territorial claims against India along their 2914 kilometre long common border. The Kashmir issue, however, would become, and remains, one of the main causes of friction between these two major states of South Asia. In the northwest, Afghan claims to the territories east of the Durand Line and support for Pashtun nationalism soured Pakistan's relations with Afghanistan from the very start of nationhood. This exacerbated Pakistan's acute sense of insecurity at birth.

Pakistan's dispute with Muslim Afghanistan over the largely Pashtun-inhabited North West Frontier Province not only adversely affected regional security but also challenged the ideological foundations of the Pakistani state. Pakistan's political elite saw Islam as the main rationale behind the establishment of a Muslim majority state in the Indian subcontinent. The mainly Western-educated Pakistani elite, influenced by a modernist interpretation of Islam, regarded Afghanistan's demands for Pashtun self-determination in the North West Frontier Province as a threat to the integrity of the fragile state comprising an ethnically heterogeneous population. Islam was the slogan on which the Pakistani national identity was to be based. The acceptance of Afghan demands, which were primarily based on ethnic, linguistic and cultural considerations, concerning the North West Frontier Province, would have amounted to abandoning the very basis of Pakistani nationhood.

This chapter examines the course of Pakistan–Afghanistan relations from 1947 to 1977. Most significantly, the chapter evaluates how the 'Pashtunistan' issue became a factor in enabling the Soviet Union and the United States to enhance their influence in the region. The chapter also analyses how the unique nature of the Pakistani state influenced the evolution of the Pakistan–Afghanistan relationship Lastly, it examines the impact of the Bhutto regime's policies on Pakistan–Afghanistan interaction after the secession of East Pakistan in 1971.

The Nature of the Pakistani State

Ever since the establishment of Pakistan there has been a continuous debate regarding the role of Islam in the process of nation building. Islam was used as an effective slogan for political mobilisation by the leading Muslim organization of pre-partition India, the Muslim League, to achieve its goal of attaining a separate state

for the Muslims of British India. The Muslim League's demand for the partition of the Indian subcontinent was based on the rather nebulous 'two-nations theory'.[1] The two-nations theory emphasised that the Muslims and Hindus represented two separate and distinct nations in India. The liberal, modernist segment of India's Muslim political elite, which dominated the Muslim League, became an ardent advocate of this idea. The Muslim League's demand for a separate Muslim state in India was eventually constructed on this notion.

However, the League's conception of a separate state for Indian Muslims was far removed from the ideas of an Islamic state perceived by the Indian Ulama represented in all-India parties like the traditionalist *Jamiat-i-Ulama-i-Hind* (The Society of the Islamic Scholars of India) and *Jamaat-i-Islami* (the Islamic Party). In fact, the *Jamiat-i-Ulama-i-Hind* opposed the Muslim League's demand for Pakistan in the 1940s. This organization cooperated with the nationalist Hindu-dominated Indian National Congress for independence from Britain and remained opposed to the partition of India on a communal basis.[2] It was only on the very eve of partition that a faction of the Ulama belonging to the *Jamiat-i-Ulama-i-Hind* under Mawlana Shabbir Ahmad Usmani eventually backed the Muslim League's campaign for Pakistan.[3]

The Pakistan movement under the leadership of it secular leader, Muhammad Ali Jinnah, who himself belonged to the minority Shiite sect, represented the interests of India's Muslim elite comprising an amalgam of aristocratic landlords, professional middle classes and intelligentsia who were generally loyal to the British Raj. The movement's core support base lay in the Muslim minority areas such as the United Provinces (UP), the Central Provinces (CP) and Bombay Presidency. The Muslim minority of these regions was greatly apprehensive of their possible marginalisation in a future united India run by a Hindu majority. On the other hand, the Muslim majority regions of India that were to form Pakistan were less concerned about the consequences of a Hindu-dominated central government after the end of India's colonial status. This fear of Hindu domination in the Muslim minority provinces had made the Viceroy of India, Archibald Wavell, note in 1945 that the idea of Pakistan: 'is stronger in the Muslim minority provinces than in the (proposed) Pakistan provinces'.[4] Moreover, the Pakistan movement spearheaded by the Muslim League comprised a spectrum of Indian Muslims belonging to diverse ethnic, linguistic and sectarian groupings. For political reasons the modernist Muslim leadership utilised religious sentiments to rouse India's largely illiterate Muslim population to achieve its goal of separate nationhood. In this regard, Peter Hardy aptly observes that the Muslim League was: 'a chiliastic movement rather than a pragmatic political party'.[5] In sum, to the Indian Muslim political elite the invocation of Islamic symbolism and rhetoric was a 'way of papering over the cracks in the splintered ranks of Muslim India'.[6]

At independence, there was no general agreement amongst the political elite on the question of what kind of Islamic state Pakistan would be. It is evident from Jinnah's political speeches that he did not envision a theocracy, and many of his statements support the contention that he stood for the separation of religion and politics.[7] In the immediate post-independence phase, Pakistan witnessed the beginning of heated debates and controversies regarding the status of Islam in the State. The secular-oriented political elite persisted in paying lip service to Islamic

ideals behind Pakistan's existence in order to counter the Ulama's demands for the establishment of an Islamic state based on the *Sharia*, yet refrained from practically implementing any concrete proposals in that direction.

Apart from the failure of the elite to come up with a clear conception regarding the role of Islam, Pakistan had emerged as a physically splintered country, divided into two separate geographical units containing an ethnically diverse population. The western portion contained four distinct ethnic groups: Punjabis, Sindhis, Pashtuns and the Baluchis. A fifth group comprised the Urdu-speaking *Muhajirs* (refugees) who had migrated to Pakistan after partition. Pakistan's eastern wing, known as East Pakistan, comprised more than half of the total population of the country, and was inhabited almost exclusively by the Bengali ethnic group. Even with respect to Islam, Pakistan's population did not belong to a single sect. Although the overwhelming majority subscribed to the Sunni sect of Islam, substantial differences existed with respect to the interpretation of Islam within this sect. The Sunni *Deobandi* School differed with the *Barelvis* over various theological issues.[8] The Deobandis' scriptualist interpretation of Islam, influenced by the puritan *Wahhabi* doctrines, was at odds with the Barelvi School that represented a more moderate form of *Sunnism,* emphasising aspects of Sufism and spirituality – the hallmark in the evolution of the Indo-Pakistani Islamic culture. Intense rivalry existed between the 'Deobandi' Jamiat-i-Ulama-i-Islam (JUI) and the 'Barelvi' Jamiat-i-Ulama-i-Pakistan (JUP).[9] Along with the differences within Sunni Islam, there existed a sizeable segment of *Ithna Ashari* (Twelver) Shiite Muslims in Pakistan. Moreover, areas of Karachi and the northern parts of West Pakistan were inhabited by a substantial number of *Ismaili* Muslims. The Ismailis are a sub-sect of the main *Ithna Ashari* Shiite sect.[10] In the Punjab, prominent members of the political and the bureaucratic elite adhered to the teaching of the *Ahmadiyya* (also known as *Qadiani*) sect founded by Mirza Ghulam Ahmad (d. 1908).[11] Both the Sunnis and the Shiites considered the Ahmadis as heretics due to this sect's refusal to accept the Prophet Muhammad as the final Prophet to humanity – a fundamental tenet of Islam. Thus, the heterogeneous religious and ethnic composition of the Pakistani populace complicated the task of creating a sense of Pakistani nationalism.

In terms of social and economic development, Pakistan had a backward colonial economy at independence. The regions that constituted Pakistan were politically the most underdeveloped parts of British India. A class of feudal landholders, in association with religious divines, who had prospered under British rule, essentially dominated West Pakistan's largest province, the Punjab. In Sind the feudal elite was well entrenched as well, while in Baluchistan and the North West Frontier Province the society was segmented on the basis of tribal relationships. The military establishment and the bureaucracy that Pakistan inherited from the British colonial administration were the only organised state structures on which the edifice of the Pakistani state could rest.

The newly created Pakistan Army, which was formed from the Muslim component of the British Indian army, consisted mainly of Punjabi soldiery with the second largest group coming from the North West Frontier Province.[12] Traditionally, the British Indian Army's ultimate objective was to safeguard Britain's Empire in India from internal and external threat. The soldiers recruited in this army generally came from peasant backgrounds and to give them a stake in the maintenance of the

system they were paid well and were granted crown lands for their services to the Empire. In short, loyalty to the Raj was made lucrative. In this sense, to many Indian nationalists the British Indian army was a 'mercenary force' hired to sustain foreign rule. Most importantly, the relatively under-developed regions of northwest India like the Punjab and the Frontier supplied a large proportion of sepoys for the British Indian army from 1857 to 1947. The supposedly 'martial races' of Northwest India such as the Punjabi Muslims, the Sikhs and to a lesser extent the Pashtuns formed the military bulwark of the British raj.[13]

Like its military establishment, Pakistan's bureaucratic institutional framework was fashioned on the pattern of the British colonial administrative structure. In pre-partition India, the colonial bureaucracy and its selected officialdom was regarded as the 'steel frame' of the British Indian Empire. In this connection, the lack of developed representative institutions, conflict over the relationship between the executive and the legislature, and a subsequent failure to develop a culture of democracy enabled the bureaucracy along with the military to control the political process in Pakistan shortly after independence.[14] In the Punjab and the North West Frontier, a tradition of strong authoritarian rule persisted that was directly associated with the priorities of what Talbot has termed the colonial British 'security-state' in the northwestern parts of India.[15] These priorities were directly related to the threat of Russian expansion from Central Asia that in turn had enhanced the imposition of emergency laws and repressive police powers in these provinces. Hence, authoritarian administration by military–bureaucratic methods was not an unusual phenomenon in the regions that formed Pakistan.

In the immediate aftermath of partition, the Muslim League, the party that claimed to represent the interests of India's Muslims, was unable to assert control over the state. Its organizational apparatus was weak in the provinces of West Pakistan. A plethora of regional politicians and parties constantly vied for power. Furthermore, the lack of consensus amongst the politicians on issues concerning future centre-province relations, the role of Islam and matters related to the shaping of the new state's political institutions provided the impetus for the continuation of the colonial methods of bureaucratic authoritarianism backed up by military force when the need arose. The chaos of Pakistani politics, coupled with constant demands for regional autonomy by the smaller provinces, tilted the balance in favour of the military–bureaucratic establishment. In this respect, the retention of the Government of India Act of 1935 as Pakistan's interim constitution until 1956 ensured the existence of a powerful executive. Under this Act, the real power was vested with the Viceroy, who ruled with a powerful bureaucracy. Muhammad Ali Jinnah, Pakistan's first Governor-General, retained nearly all the powers of the British Viceroy. Consequently, a strong executive diminished the role of the Prime Minister and the elected legislatures from the very onset. This legacy of 'vice-regalism' has, according to some scholars, been the source for persistent authoritarianism in Pakistan's political history.[16]

The incipient Pakistani political system, characterised by weak political institutionalisation and a failure either to develop standards of political accountability or to evolve a civil society committed to pluralism, facilitated the overbearing control of the military–bureaucratic establishment over the Pakistani state. Extraneous factors, most notably tensions with India and Afghanistan, plus pressures for regional

autonomy emanating from East Pakistan, Sind and Baluchistan strengthened the ascendancy of the military and the bureaucracy over the persistently squabbling politicians.

By the mid 1950s, state power in Pakistan was essentially being wielded by a pro-Western ruling elite comprising senior military officials, civilian bureaucrats and politicians hailing from feudal landowning classes.[17] The assassination of Pakistan's first Prime Minister, Liaqat Ali Khan, in October 1951 by an Afghan had severely disrupted the nascent democratic political processes.[18] The dismissal of the Muslim League government headed by the Islamic-leaning Bengali Prime Minister, Khwaja Nazimuddin, in 1953 decisively shifted the centre of power towards the military–bureaucratic nexus then dominated by the Governor-General Ghulam Muhammad, a former officer of the Indian Audit and Accounts Service, Defence Secretary, Iskander Mirza and the Commander-in-Chief of the Pakistan Army, General Muhammad Ayub Khan.[19] This triumvirate played a major role in cultivating relations with the United States that eventually made Pakistan into Washington's most 'allied ally' in Asia during the Cold War.[20]

In this connection, it is appropriate to stress that the persistent sense of insecurity brought about by the Kashmir dispute with India paved the way for the military's participation in the political process. It was the military that was instrumental in pressing forward to build a military alliance with the United States in order to procure modern weapons. Pakistan found the United States, a rising global power in the late 1940s, willing to furnish Karachi with military and financial assistance. In the United States' perception, Pakistan could serve as an important strategic client in Southwestern Asia, in view of Washington's desire to establish global defence alliances with anti-communist states aimed at the 'containment' of the Marxist–Leninist threat emanating from the Soviet Union.[21]

The rise of radical Arab nationalism in Egypt in 1952 and the threat posed by the Iranian Prime Minister Muhammad Mussadiq's nationalisation of the Iranian oil industry enhanced the importance of Pakistan for the proposed Anglo-American plans for the defence of the Middle East between 1951 and 1954. During 1952–1953, the US Secretary of State, John Foster Dulles, had come up with the concept of the 'Northern Tier', linking the Muslim states on the southern periphery of the Soviet Union into one defensive bloc. Iran, Pakistan and Turkey formed the core of the so-called 'Northern Tier'. Pakistan had signed a defence cooperation agreement with Washington in 1950 and by late 1953, the United States was becoming actively involved in the country through its economic assistance programs. Thus, the emerging Cold War geopolitics had a decisive effect on the evolution of Pakistan's interaction with the United States.

The perceived security threats made defence the foremost priority for subsequent Pakistani governments since the inception of the country in 1947. The military establishment came to regard itself as the sole institution responsible not only for the defence of Pakistan but also as the protector of the country's 'Islamic ideological' frontiers. Pakistan's perception of India as its greatest enemy, bent upon the destruction of the 'Islamic' state, allowed defence to take nearly two-thirds of the central government's budgetary allocations from as early as 1949.[22] Pakistan's entry into the US-sponsored defence alliances such as the Baghdad Pact (later renamed as the Central Treaty Organization – CENTO) and the South East Asia Treaty

Organization (SEATO) was in the first place motivated by its fear of India rather than to fight communist aggression. The participation in these alliances gave Pakistan a superpower patron and domestically it boosted the position of the military over the civilian sphere of the state.

The fragility of the parliamentary political system and a fragmented political leadership, along with a constant fear of Indian aggression has, in fact, allowed for recurrent praetorianism or rule by the military in Pakistan. As the country's most organised and powerful institution with enormous coercive powers, the Pakistan Army did not allow the political leadership to interfere in its internal workings and this situation has persisted for over five decades. The almost continuous challenges faced by Pakistan from India and Afghanistan, plus intermittent security threats coming from ethno-nationalist movements within the country, gradually enabled the military to gain ascendancy over the bureaucracy by the early 1960s.[23]

Pakistan's defeat at the hands of India in 1971 allowed the civilian regime of Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto (1972–1977) to attempt to assert civilian authority over the military. However, repeated military intervention against 'secessionist' ethno-nationalist movements in Baluchistan and the NWFP again brought the military's influence over the political processes by 1976.

The Pakistan Army's political stake in maintaining the status quo and deflecting attempts to establish civilian supremacy over the military from the early 1950s to the present has been immense. Even during the period of quasi-democratic rule in the periods 1947–1958, 1972–77 and 1988–1999, national security decision making remained influenced by the military. In this regard, Pakistan has been termed at various times as an 'over-developed state' by developing world standards, where a relatively strong state apparatus controlled by a military–bureaucratic establishment is able to exercise hegemonic influence over the various social classes.[24]

Closely connected with the domination of the military over the state has been the use of Islam as a binding force for national unity. Since independence successive regimes have used Islam to legitimise their rule. The political elites have usually communicated with the masses in the name of Islam over the heads of the religious establishment. It was the state that often patronized and sponsored the Ulama. Under the Zia regime (1977–1988) this trend reached its apogee. In terms of foreign policy orientation, the emphasis on the Islamic character of the state gave the political and military elites the reasoning to confront 'Hindu' India. Similarly, the Zia regime justified Pakistani backing for the Afghan Islamic groups opposed to the Soviet sponsored Afghan government on the basis of Islamic solidarity. In short, Islam has been used by the ruling elites in Pakistan to effect the country's internal and external policies in a way favourable to the building of the state and to maintain the legitimacy of the regimes in power. After the secession of East Pakistan, increased use of Islamic rhetoric and symbolism by the Bhutto regime assisted in strengthening Pakistan's relations with the oil-rich Gulf States, Syria and Libya. In this context, the pro-US, conservative military regime of General Zia-ul-Haq went much further in taking advantage of the Islamic revivalist trend in the Middle East in the late 1970s by highlighting Pakistan's Islamic identity. The utilisation of Islam acted as a substitute for a national identity that the Pakistani polity lacked.

Domestically, the Zia regime thrust a traditional legalistic form of rather superficial 'Islamisation' upon the country. It was the state that coopted various

disparate Islamic parties and groups to support the military regime against secular and leftist opposition forces that included the Peoples Party of the deposed Prime Minister Bhutto. The Zia regime's integration of the hitherto marginalised Islamic groups in the political system was to have a profound effect on the Pakistani polity in terms of vesting the religious establishment with a degree of legitimacy, which it had not possessed previously. This contrasted starkly with the trends in Iran (before 1979), Algeria, Egypt, Iraq and Syria where relatively secular regimes faced opposition from the Islamists and associated groups.

Pakistan's involvement in the internal affairs of Afghanistan by fuelling the anti-Soviet insurgency in the period 1978–1979 was related to the internal political dynamics of that country to a certain degree. In many Third World states where democratic institutionalisation is weak and the ruling elites' hold on power is not buttressed by popular election or a strong tradition of constitutional order, the goal of retaining power becomes even more central.[25] In these circumstances, external threat can at times provide the regime respite from internal opposition and divert the attention of the masses from the domestic turmoil. In a sense, regime security becomes linked to external factors. The increasingly isolated Zia regime utilized the 'Soviet threat' from Afghanistan to consolidate its position internally by stamping out the democratic opposition. On the external front, the military's Afghan adventure got it much needed support from its old patron, the United States.

The Zia era saw the defence establishment virtually becoming a state within a state. The military and its intelligence agencies became the ultimate powerbrokers in Pakistani politics. The Pakistan Army's role as the protector of the nation's core value, that is, its Islamic identity, was emphasised.[26] In effect, the armed forces were regarded as pivotal to the existence of the Pakistani state. Externally, the major security interest of the military was to guarantee the state's survival against the threat from India and the Soviet sponsored regime in Afghanistan. The military regime's security perception, anchored in a combination of anti-India and anti-Soviet mindset, encouraged it to support militant Islamic groups in Afghanistan from the late 1970s. In the military's strategic vision, these groups could serve the regime's domestic and external security agenda. The support for the anti-Soviet Afghan Islamists bolstered the Zia regime's popularity amongst the Islamic parties and at the same time gave it a certain amount of legitimacy. Most importantly, Pakistan's assistance to the Afghan Islamic groups provided it with an instrument to counter Afghan sponsorship for Pashtun irredentism in the NWFP, a stance explored in detail in the succeeding chapters.

Afghanistan, Pakistan and the 'Pashtunistan' Issue

Pakistan appeared to be an artificial construct at independence, built on weak social and political structures, and this concern has constantly confronted the Pakistani elite with the problem of defining a national identity for the nation. The emphasis on an ill-defined and rather abstract notion of Islam to create a sense of national identity since 1947 was related to the country's shaky foundations. The Pakistani national identity was associated with religion by a generally modernist Muslim elite who visualized Islam as a unifying force for the new nation-state. The elites employed

Islamic symbols and rhetoric in order to create a Pakistani identity, despite having very little influence of the *Sharia*, the Islamic code, in their everyday lives. However, religious symbolism and stress on Pakistan's 'Islamic' identity could work to counter the ethno-nationalistic tendencies prevalent within the various minority ethnic groups that comprised the multi-ethnic Pakistani polity. In this regard, Afghanistan's support for Pashtun irredentism in the post 1947 period, in fact, not only jeopardized the territorial integrity of Pakistan but also challenged the very notion of Pakistani identity, which was being constructed on the basis of religious nationalism.

In the Pakistani elites' perceptions, the Islamic origins of their state should have provided the crucial binding factor for a cooperative relationship with Muslim Afghanistan. Afghanistan's geographical contiguity, religion and cultural affinity with the regions that became Pakistan could, indeed, have inclined both the countries to establish friendly relations. However, this was not to be the case. Pashtun nationalism, which was already a force in the North West Frontier Province before independence, was given a boost by Afghanistan's refusal to recognize the Durand Line and advocacy of the 'Pashtunistan' issue.

Pashtun nationalism preached by Abdul Ghaffar Khan, as noted in the previous chapter, had its origins in pre-partition India. During the 1930s, his speeches and articles in the *Khudai Khidmatgar*'s periodical *Pakhtun* had vaguely articulated the concept of an autonomous Pashtun entity along with stressing the Frontier Pashtuns' kinship ties with their brethren in Afghanistan.[27] The *Khudai Khidmatgars* regarded the Pashtuns of the NWFP and Afghanistan as forming one nation and on occasions referred to the Afghan King as their *Amir*. In the pre-Independence era, ethnicity was the main factor in the politics of the province rather than religion. The ill-defined Pashtun entity which was sometimes referred to as 'Pashtunistan', 'Pakhtunistan' or simply as 'Pakhtunkhwa' represented the desire of the Pashtun middle classes, medium-sized landlords and sections of peasantry in the settled districts of Peshawar, Mardan, Bannu and Kohat for political expression based on distinct cultural identity derived from common language, genealogy, custom and law incorporated in the *Pashtunwali*. Politically, Abdul Ghaffar Khan's strategy paralleled Mohandas K. Gandhi's political philosophy that stressed a non-violent struggle to achieve independence.

The emphasis on non-violent political protest had made Abdul Ghaffar Khan oppose the partition of India because he thought that this would enhance violence between Hindus and Muslims rather than end it.[28] He perceived non-violence with the true spirit of Islam. It must be noted that Abdul Ghaffar Khan's Pashtun nationalism had less appeal in the religiously conservative tribal belt of the Frontier, partly due to his alliance with the secular Hindu dominated Indian National Congress. This sentiment was successfully exploited by Jinnah's Muslim League to woo the Pashtun tribes towards the Pakistan Movement in the mid 1940s. In this context, Sir Olaf Caroe observes that: 'Tribal influence, such as it was, was cast on the side of Jinnah's forthright appeal to Islam in peril; Abdul Ghaffar Khan's ideas seemed to them at best equivocal and over-subtle, at worst disloyal to the Pathan canon which calls for at least some service to the idea of Muslim solidarity.'[29] A noteworthy point in this relation is that it was the Muslim League to a great degree which introduced the Islamic element in the politics of the Frontier in the 1940s in

order to gain the backing of the hereditary religious leaders or *sajjada nishins* and big landlords towards its communal ideology.

In the 1930s, there was a growing stress on provincial autonomy in other regions, apart from the NWFP, which were to constitute Pakistan. In Baluchistan, a movement called *Anjuman-i-Itehad-i-Baluchistan* sought to unify the Baluchs and form a 'Greater Baluchistan'.[30] Its main leaders, Mir Ghous Baksh Bizenjo, Abdul Karim Shorish and Mir Ahmad Yar Khan, the ruler of the Kalat State, would later play an important role in the politics of Pakistan.[31] In Sind also there were elements in the population who favoured greater autonomy, despite the general trend supportive of the Pakistan Movement. All in all, these movements in the Muslim majority provinces of India demanded provincial autonomy within an all-India context. In fact, Abdul Ghaffar Khan's ethno-nationalist movement was probably the only significant movement in British India that had the potential to draw external support, in this respect from Afghanistan, to achieve its objectives.

The rise of Pashtun nationalism in the NWFP in the late 1920s had coincided with similar developments across the Durand Line in Afghanistan. King Amanullah's rule had seen attempts by the state to support Pashtun culture and language. Amanullah himself resorted to giving speeches in Pashto in a bid to forge better relations with the Pashtun tribes on both sides of the Durand Line whose backing was considered necessary to maintain Muhammadzai rule in Afghanistan from the time of Dost Muhammad.[32] The failure of the Amanullah regime to retain the support of the Pashtun tribes had been a major cause of its downfall in 1929. After coming to power in 1931, General Nadir Khan continued to show interest in Pashtun nationalism and the welfare of the Pashtun tribes. He referred to the tribal areas of the NWFP as *Sarhad-e-Azad* or 'Free Frontier'.[33] However, Nadir owed his position to the assistance he received from the British. Because of this Nadir's policy towards the trans-Durand tribes remained passive, and he refrained from assisting the Mohmand, Orakzai and Afridi rebellions in the early 1930s.[34] Likewise, Nadir showed a cautious attitude towards Abdul Ghaffar Khan due to the latter's sympathies for Amanullah Khan.

At home, however, Nadir Khan, and after his assassination in 1933, his son, Muhammad Zahir, continued a policy aimed at enhancing the role of Pashtuns in Afghanistan. In this regard, the *Pashto Tolana* (Afghan Academy) that was formed in 1937 was intended to serve as a means to propagate Pashtun culture, language and history. The *Pashto Tolana* included the institutes of social sciences, natural sciences and the centre for Pashto studies. Earlier, the Pashto Society had been founded in 1931 to facilitate the propagation of the Pashto language.[35] In 1932, Kabul University was established and it, too, became a centre for the growth of Afghan nationalism centred on projecting a Pashtun identity for the whole nation. In 1936, Pashto was formally promoted to the status of official language by a royal decree despite the fact that it was spoken and understood only in the mainly southern and eastern parts of the country. It was virtually unknown to the country's large Dari (Persian) speaking population. Even the ethnically Pashtun royal family and the bureaucracy spoke Dari at home and in official work. The importance given to Pashtun language and culture was aimed at promoting Pashtun solidarity on both sides of the Durand Line.

In the 1940s, new groups had arisen amongst the growing Afghan Pashtun middle

classes advocating social, political and economic modernisation. This tendency gained momentum under the Prime ministership of King Zahir's more liberal uncle, Shah Mahmood (1946–1953). The most prominent amongst such groupings was the Pashtun dominated *Tehrik-e-Naujawanan-e-Baidar* (TNB).[36] The TNB, like its counterpart in the Frontier Province, aimed to remove outdated customs in Afghan society and encouraged mass education, legal rights for women, free press and the development of a modern economy based on industrialization. In fact, it was the TNB that popularised the concept of a 'free' Pashtun state east of the Durand Line.

By the time Pakistan emerged in 1947, the Afghan ruling elites' emphasis on Afghan nationalism based on Pashtun ethno-centrism coincided with Abdul Ghaffar Khan and the *Khudai Khidmatgaran*'s efforts for an autonomous Pashtun entity. The sponsors of the movement passed a resolution to this effect on 21 June 1947 in Bannu. In the meeting members of the Frontier Provincial assembly aligned with the Indian National Congress, leaders of the *Khudai Khidmatgaran* and members of its youth wing, *Pakhtun Zalme* (Pashtun Youth) called for the establishment of Pashtunistan.[37]

The Afghan Government's efforts to negotiate with the British on the issue of return of Pashtun territories had failed in the months preceding the partition of India. Britain's refusal to discuss Afghan claims to the NWFP brought the Muhammadzai rulers of Afghanistan much closer to the *Khudai Khidmatgars* and Abdul Ghaffar Khan's position on the Pashtunistan issue on the eve of Pakistan's emergence. Britain's rejection of the Afghan claims further motivated the Afghan ruling elite to support the Frontier Pashtun nationalists and at the same time reject the Durand Line as the international frontier between Afghanistan and Pakistan.

After the establishment of Pakistan, Afghanistan expressed its open sympathies and support for Pashtun nationalists across the border. Kabul's sponsorship of Pakistani Pashtuns was primarily geared towards uniting the Pashtun ethnic group on both sides of the border. This policy also served to enhance the dominance of the Pashtuns vis-à-vis non-Pashtun groups inside Afghanistan. Afghanistan's backing for Pashtun irredentism did not, however, hinder Pakistan from successfully persuading the Pashtun tribal *Khans* and *Maliks* to accept the new state's authority over the tribal belt. Through a series of *Jirgas* (assemblies), Pakistani and British officials obtained the allegiance of the major tribes on the Pakistan–Afghanistan border. The Pakistani authorities continued to administer the tribal areas on the British colonial pattern. The system of paying subsidies to the tribes initiated by the British was continued. The national and provincial laws of Pakistan were not applied in these areas. The Pakistani political agent, as in the British era, remained the symbol of the central government's authority in each tribal agency.[38] The tribes, in general, accepted Pakistani sovereignty. During the 1947–1948 Indian–Pakistani conflict, the Pakistan Army recruited large numbers of Pashtun tribesmen belonging to the Wazir, Mohmand and Afridi tribes to wage a *Jihad* against Indian forces in the vale of Kashmir.[39] These irregular forces had, in fact, reached very close to Srinagar by late October 1947 when Indian reinforcements pushed the Tribal *lashkars* (war parties) back towards the Pakistani border.

Notwithstanding the peaceful incorporation of the Frontier Province in the Pakistani state, Afghanistan continued to utilise Pashtun nationalism in order to undo the Durand Line. The Afghans insisted that the Durand Line was illegal and imposed

by Britain. They pointed out that King Amanullah's regime had secured a concession from the British during the signing of the Anglo-Afghan Treaty of 1921. The treaty had a letter attached to it that conceded Afghan 'interest' in the trans-Durand tribes.[40] The Afghans maintained that the treaties between Afghanistan and Britain signed in 1893, 1905, 1919 and 1921 did not explicitley acknowledge the Durand Line as an international boundary but confirmed the respective spheres of influence of the two states.[41]

In response to Afghanistan's non-recognition of the Durand Line, Pakistan based its case upon the principles of International law. The Pakistan Government argued that as the successor to British India it had inherited the entire complex of international rights and obligations previously held by the British Indian Government. According to International law, the principle *res transit cum sua onera*, treaties of an extinct state concerning borders retained validity, and all rights and obligations arising from such treaties of the extinct state pass on to the absorbing state.[42] From the Pakistani viewpoint, this argument refuted Afghan claims that all treaties that Afghanistan had concluded with British India ceased to have effect after the British withdrawal from the Indian subcontinent and Pakistan would have to re-negotiate anew its borders with Afghanistan. Pakistan saw the Pashtunistan issue as an Afghan political manoeuvre aimed at destabilising Pakistan in the wake of Afghanistan's reluctance to have the validity of the Durand Line adjudicated by an international tribunal.

Afghanistan's border dispute with Pakistan made the chances for the development of a cooperative bilateral relationship between the two countries extremely difficult in the years immediately succeeding partition. In February 1948, Pakistan and Afghanistan established diplomatic ties but relations remained strained. Afghanistan strongly condemned the Pakistani Government's imprisonment of Abdul Ghaffar Khan and his brother Dr Khan Sahib on charges of subversion in 1948. The Pakistani authorities, military action against the Afghan-inspired 'Free Pashtunistan' movement led by the Faqir of Ipi further antagonized Kabul. In July 1949, the Afghan *Loya Jirga* (Grand Tribal assembly), the highest national authority, revoked all the treaties signed with Britain, starting with the Durand Agreement. On 12 August 1949, an Afghan-sponsored meeting of Afridi tribesmen at Tirah Bagh, on the Pakistani side of the Durand Line, proclaimed the establishment of 'Pashtunistan'. The Afghan Government pledged its complete support for this, rather symbolic, move and declared 'Pashtunistan Day' as a national holiday in Afghanistan. During 1949–1950, there were numerous crossborder raids by regular Afghan troops in the tribal areas of NWFP and contiguous regions of Baluchistan which resulted in occasional skirmishes with Pakistani paramilitary border security forces. In June 1949 tensions had risen dramatically after the Pakistan Air Force bombed the village of Mogholgai, inside Afghanistan. Pakistan later claimed that the bombing was a mistake and agreed to pay compensation.

In the period 1949–1955, Afghanistan's discord with Pakistan over the status of the Frontier Province transformed into a central foreign policy issue for the Afghan Pashtun elites. Afghan politicians and officials stressed the need for 'restoration' and 'safeguarding' of the rights of Pakistani Pashtuns in international organizations and fora. Kabul sought support for its stance from virtually every major regional and extra-regional state. Afghan views were sympathetically heard in India owing to that

country's tortured relationship with Pakistan.[43] An intriguing element in Afghanistan's approach towards the issues concerning the Frontier was that various figures in Afghan officialdom at times presented differing versions of their Government's position regarding the Pakistan–Afghanistan dispute. The Afghan position ranged from demanding the right of self-determination for the Pakistani Pashtuns to outright merger of the North West Frontier, extending to the Indus River, with Afghanistan. At times Afghan officials even included Baluchistan in their ill-defined claims on Pakistani territory. The inclusion of Baluchistan would have given Afghanistan an access to the sea.[44]

The Cold War and Pakistan–Afghanistan Relations

By the late 1940s, the Pakistan–Afghanistan dispute had started to become associated with the emerging Cold War between the United States-led bloc of Western nations and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (USSR). The newly independent states of Asia and Africa, collectively known as the 'Third World', became a contested battleground upon which the geopolitical, military and ideological competition between the United States and the Soviet Union was fought. Ò Tuathail correctly notes that to George Kennan, one of the key architects of the 'containment' strategy: 'Russia was never simply a territory but a constantly expanding threat. The very geographical terminology used to describe the world map was also a description of ideological identity and difference.'[45] More significantly, with the post-Second World War decline of Britain, the United States tried to supplant British power internationally by averting any attempt by the Soviet Union to fill the power vacuum resulting from the collapse of the British Empire.

In South Asia, Pakistan's conservative politicians and the British-trained military–bureaucratic establishment viewed Marxism–Leninism with disdain. The country's religious ethos reinforced the ruling elites' apprehensions about the 'atheistic' Soviet Union. Overall, an antipathy towards India, anti-Communism and a rather superficial rhetoric of 'Islamic solidarity' with the Muslim World formed the main pillars of Pakistani policymakers' worldview in the Cold War. Moreover, a fundamental goal of Pakistan's foreign policy was to seek external allies in its disputes with its archrival on the subcontinent, India. Thus, Pakistan's conflict with India, and to a lesser extent with Afghanistan acted as one of the most important factors in the evolution of Pakistan's relations with the major powers.

The perceived Soviet threat to the Arab Middle East, Iran and the Indian subcontinent had made Pakistan a favourite for inclusion in British and, later, American plans for Middle Eastern defence between 1950–1953.[46] Pakistan had offered its services for this purpose as early as 1947. Pakistan's first Governor-General, Muhammad Ali Jinnah had expressed his desire for United States economic and military assistance in October 1947. The Pakistani leader's request was justified by citing the strategic role Pakistan could play in the defence of the Indian subcontinent against possible 'Soviet encroachments'.[47]

In 1947, the United States had already embroiled itself in the initial stages of the Cold War with the Soviet Union. Stalin's Soviet Union showed a relatively reticent attitude towards the growing number of 'independent' states in Asia and Africa by

the late 1940s. In the Stalinist view many of these countries were run by a 'national bourgeoisie' aligned with its former imperialist masters. As a result these states could not achieve real independence unless they underwent a socialist transformation under the guidance of revolutionary Marxist–Leninist parties. The Soviet Marxist–Leninist analysis of the 'Third World' contended that the national bourgeoisie had a dual nature; it could be progressive if it followed an anti-imperialist policy, which accorded with Soviet interests, but it could be reactionary if it allied with imperialist forces.[48] Stalin's spokesman to the Cominform, which was set up to coordinate the world communist movement, had stated in 1947 that the world was divided into two camps representing the capitalist and communist blocs and he denied the possibility of a middle way between the two.[49] In this context, the Soviet Union viewed the religious basis for the existence of Pakistan with a degree of suspicion.

Although Moscow agreed to establish diplomatic relations with Pakistan in April 1948, important sections of its leadership regarded Pakistan as an outcome of British imperialist machinations. Prominent Soviet historians noted that the Muslim League was a tool of the British policy of 'divide and rule' in India.[50] A section of the Soviet press alleged that Pakistan was to become 'a British base in the East – a second Transjordan of tremendous size'.[51] While remaining apprehensive about Pakistan, the Soviet Union tried to strengthen its bilateral ties with Afghanistan in this period. In 1947, a Soviet–Afghan trade agreement was initialled and by the end of the year a border treaty was concluded with Kabul.

In contrast with the improvement in Afghan–Soviet relations by the early 1950s, Kabul's ties with Britain and the United States became increasingly complicated due to these powers' sympathies towards Pakistan in the Pashtunistan dispute. The United States was sensitive about the security implications resulting from Britain's departure from India. A State Department analysis noted that:

> Pakistan has inherited responsibility for the defence of the strategic North West Frontier, but it is without the military means of providing an adequate defense. Afghanistan whose position has always rested on the balance of Russian and British power, has been left isolated on the Soviet frontier without the counter balance of British power behind it; while at the same time Afghan leaders have raised issues regarding the status of the North West frontier tribes which have adversely affected relations with Pakistan.[52]

However, these observations did not substantially motivate the United States to act on the repeated Afghan requests from 1948 to 1953 for Washington's military assistance to bolster the weak Afghan armed forces. Although the United States decided to extend technical assistance to Afghanistan under the Point Four Program, Afghanistan's problems with Pakistan acted as a barrier to cooperation with Washington in the area of defence. This was in spite of the fact that Britain and the United States supported the retention of a pro-Western Afghanistan free from 'excessive Soviet or Chinese influence' vital for the security of South Asia.[53] Interestingly, the United States assumed that a large-scale military assistance package for Afghanistan might encourage Moscow to take 'overt' action against that country.[54] Furthermore, Afghanistan's acute social and economic underdevelopment further mitigated American interest in preparing a major aid program for that country.

Washington tended to view South Asia in the Cold War geostrategic perspective in the 1950s and regarded cooperation between Pakistan, Iran, Afghanistan and India as the best possible approach to deter Soviet designs in that region. Yet, the Pakistan–Afghanistan dispute along with the Pakistan–India conflict became a hurdle in United States' endeavours to forge a solid anti-Soviet front in the region throughout the Cold War.

India, the largest non-Communist state in the Third World, under Prime Minister Nehru's leadership turned out to be an advocate of nonalignment in the East–West struggle by the onset of the 1950s, much to the chagrin of the United States. In these circumstances, Pakistan's political and strategic value for the United States in Asia was enhanced. Being the largest Muslim state at that time gave Pakistan a certain prestige in a Muslim world that extended from Morocco to Indonesia.* Pakistan's alignment with the West and its 'helpful' attitude in support of the American position in the United Nations, especially on the Korean issue, won it plaudits with Washington and London.[55] The United States perceived Pakistan's 'Islamic Credentials' positively and was inclined to back Karachi instead of Cairo for the leadership of the 'Moslem World'.[56] In relation to Asian security, the State Department indicated that a pro-United States Pakistan was necessary for maintaining a 'desirable balance of power in South Asia'.[57]

The United States' focus on Pakistan as its foremost anti-Soviet ally in South Asia motivated Washington to ignore Afghanistan's stand on the Pashtunistan issue. Nevertheless, in a bid to keep the Soviets from exploiting Pakistan–Afghanistan tensions, Washington did offer its 'Good Offices' to encourage both the countries to paper over their differences in November 1950. The need for such an approach was necessitated at a time when Pakistan had halted the transit of Afghan goods and petroleum products after Afghanistan's repeated instigation of the Pashtun tribes in the tribal areas. Besides its own initiatives, the United States sought the help of pro-Western Muslim Middle Eastern regimes in Turkey, Iraq and Saudi-Arabia to dissuade Pakistan and Afghanistan from aggravating their relations. United States Assistant Secretary of State, George McGhee requested the Saudi Arabian King Abdul Aziz Ibn Saud to advise the Afghan Government to 'reconcile' its differences with Pakistan. McGhee, in fact, regarded Afghanistan 'to a considerable extent responsible for the unrest among the tribes' in the NWFP.[58] Similarly, Britain, the main architect of the Durand Line, favoured Pakistan. In April 1949, the British Ambassador to Kabul, Sir Giles F. Squire, clearly conveyed to the Afghan Government that in case of an armed conflict between Afghanistan and Pakistan, London would assist Pakistan.[59] His Majesty's Government emphasised that Pakistan had an 'unassailable case' as the disputed tribal areas lay on the Pakistani side of the Durand Line, the validity of which Kabul had acknowledged in the Anglo-Afghan Treaty of 1921.[60]

The antagonistic Pakistan–Afghanistan relations during the 1950s, which resulted in frequent Pakistani closures of Afghan transit trade facilities, compelled the Afghan Government to strengthen economic ties with its giant northern neighbour, the Soviet Union. Afghanistan had signed a four-year barter trade agreement with the

*Pakistan before 1971 was the largest Muslim state by population but not by area. Indonesia is far larger.

Soviet Union in July 1950. The agreement facilitated duty-free transit for Afghan goods and a high currency exchange rate. Moscow also agreed to construct several gasoline storage facilities in the country. Furthermore, the protracted dispute with Pakistan made Afghanistan foster cooperative relationships with India. In Afghanistan, India had found a regional Muslim country to counter Pakistan's policy of seeking Muslim allies in its confrontation with India. The Indian leaders' friendly ties with Abdul Ghaffar Khan and other Pashtun nationalists prior to independence assisted in the development of cordial relations between the two states. India supported Afghanistan's case against Pakistan and its intelligentsia often upheld Afghan claims to the Frontier Province.[61]

Militarily and strategically, Pakistan was being transformed into a key American ally in the region by the mid 1950s. The United States envisaged that Pakistan had the 'greatest current potential, next to Turkey, for contributing to Middle East defense'.[62] It supported the establishment of defence relationships between Pakistan and Turkey as a precursor for a wider anti-communist Middle Eastern Defence pact. Pakistan could provide a bridge for an American-sponsored alliance system extending from the Middle Eastern oilfields to the rubber plantations of Southeast Asia. The Pakistani state controlled by bureaucrats and generals imbued with the colonial tradition, whose Islamic faith was often seldom not more than skin deep, indicated an enthusiastic willingness to enter into a close security relationship with the United States, unlike the Indian Prime Minister Nehru's 'rather mystical attitude towards international communism'.[63] More specifically, Pakistan fitted well in the schemes of a group of Middle Eastern specialists associated with the Truman administration that desired to utilise Islam against communism.[64]

The emergence of Pakistan as a 'dependable bulwark against communism' led the United States to counsel the Afghan Government to soften its stance on the Pashtunistan issue and stop its anti-Pakistan propaganda.[65] During the period 1951–1954, the rising importance of Pakistan for Anglo-American strategic aims in South Asia also meant a gradual diminishing of Afghanistan's already low priority for these major Western powers. In fact, Washington tended to see the Royal Government of Afghanistan as the real culprit behind the discord. Nevertheless, it desired that Pakistan should react in a 'conciliatory manner' with Kabul in order to keep the Afghans from going over to the Soviet Union.[66] The rather lukewarm American and British initiatives to solve the Pakistan–Afghanistan tangle from 1949 to 1954 did not have much impact in altering the positions of either of the two states.

Between 1953 and 1955, a number of important developments significantly influenced Afghanistan's relations with Pakistan that would have far reaching consequences for the South Asia. These were: (1) the formal inclusion of Pakistan in the American containment strategy. The United States, which had begun a Military Assistance Program (MAP) to Pakistan in 1953, signed a Mutual Defence Assistance Agreement with Karachi in May 1954, which provided military equipment and training to the Pakistan armed forces along with the stationing of American military advisors in the Pakistan Army's headquarters in Rawalpindi. In September 1954, Pakistan joined the American sponsored South-East Asia Treaty Organization (SEATO).[67] In the Middle East, Pakistan entered the United States backed regional mutual security and defence agreement known as the Baghdad Pact, in September 1955;[68] (2) the death of J.V. Stalin in March 1953 led to a more assertive Soviet

policy in the Third World under the new Soviet Communist Party First Secretary, Nikita S. Khrushchev, that aimed at countering the American containment strategy globally and; (3) the appointment of King Muhammad Zahir's first cousin, Sardar Muhammad Daud,* as the Prime Minister of Afghanistan in September 1953, which would have important repercussions on the future course of the Pakistan–Afghanistan relationship.

Prime Minister Daud was a fervent Afghan nationalist and a strong supporter of the Pashtunistan issue. Even so, Daud had attempted to seek United States military assistance in October 1953, but Afghanistan's uncompromising position on the Pashtunistan issue acted as one of the disincentives for Washington to accept Kabul's requests. The United States believed that military assistance to Afghanistan: 'would create problems not offset by the strength it would create'.[69] A significant problem in this regard was that Washington's major client in the region, Pakistan would have objected to such an eventuality apart from possible 'adverse Soviet reaction'.[70] In other words, as a NSC memorandum of 14 December 1954 pointed out: 'in the light of our present relations with Pakistan, anything we undertake in the way of military assistance should be with the knowledge and concurrence of Pakistan'.[71] In fact, as Bradsher notes, the United States considered 'Afghanistan ... a potential aggressor against Pakistan'.[72] Moreover, Prime Minister Daud's reluctance to distance his country from the traditional Afghan policy of neutrality and join American backed regional alliances made Washington more insensitive to Afghan appeals for military cooperation. Washington had tied arms sales to either membership in the Baghdad Pact or at least in a Mutual Security pact.

The withdrawal of Britain from the subcontinent and the aggravated relationship with Pakistan had diminished Afghanistan's source of financial assistance needed to sustain the flimsy Afghan state structures and at the same time boost its security. Historically, all Afghan regimes relied on external assistance or revenues to sustain their control over a tribal and ethnically fractious country. Rubin demonstrates that Afghanistan has remained a 'rentier' state, that is, a state that depends upon external assistance (or other revenues) rather than on the production of goods and services and internal revenue generation to maintain its existence.[73] The lack of a capacity to generate autonomous economic development meant that the Afghan state utilised external sources of assistance to weld the heterogeneous tribal society by distributing foreign largesse and playing one tribe off against the other. The United States' refusal to assist Afghanistan militarily and its negative perception of the Pashtunistan stance compelled the Afghan elites to alter radically their policy of balancing Soviet and Western power in the post-Cold War era. In the absence of meaningful Western assistance, the government of Prime Minister Daud turned towards the Soviet Union in 1955 to seek much-needed economic and military aid. In addition to military aid, Daud sought closer ties with Moscow to promote intensive internal economic development. In the Soviet Union, Afghanistan found a great power that was more than ready to accommodate Kabul's needs and at the same time support its stand on Pashtunistan. For the Soviets, Afghanistan provided an opportunity to check and exert pressure on neighbouring United States' clients in the region, Iran and Pakistan. This decision by the Daud government not only

*Also spelt as Daoud.

brought his country directly into the Cold War geopolitics but gradually ensconced Afghanistan in the Soviet orbit.

In 1955 Pakistan–Afghanistan relations took a turn for the worse with the announcement by the Pakistan Government of the decision to amalgamate the four provinces of West Pakistan into one administrative unit. This was aimed to rectify, at least in theory, the discrepancy in power sharing between East and West Pakistan. Afghanistan, however, regarded the 'one unit' plan as an attempt to absorb and marginalise the Pashtuns of the Frontier. Prime Minister Daud severely denounced the Pakistani move and pledged his support for the Pashtuns. Daud's open criticism of Pakistan inspired mobs in Kabul to attack the Pakistan Embassy in April 1955, inflicting severe damage. The mob also hoisted the Pashtunistan flag on the Embassy building. Similar attacks were carried out on Pakistani consulates in Kandahar and Jalalabad with the connivance of the Afghan Government.

In retaliation, Pakistan closed its consulates and trade establishments in Afghanistan. In addition, Karachi suspended Afghanistan's transit trade through Pakistan. Pakistan insisted that it would take more punitive measures against Kabul until the Afghan Government furnished an explanation and an 'apology' for its actions. In these circumstances, Washington became fearful that the situation might be 'open to exploitation by the USSR'.[74] The United States Secretary of State, John Foster Dulles, indicated to the Afghan Foreign Minister, Muhammad Naim, that the US was: 'deeply concerned over recent sharp deterioration in relations between two Muslim brother states' and urged 'moderation on both sides'.[75] Washington encouraged its allies Turkey, Iraq and Iran to 'use their influence to ... bring about better relations between Pakistan and Afghanistan'.[76] The animosity between Kabul and Karachi had led the United States to suspect that the Pakistanis might close the Afghan border and decide to overthrow the Afghan monarchical regime itself.[77] Dulles had to instruct the United States embassy in Karachi to advise the Pakistanis that the 'ouster of the present Royal Family without an alternative regime available to maintain stability ... would probably result in reversion to a period of uncertainty and chaos similar to those characterizing interregnums of past'.[78]

The complications arising in Afghanistan's relations with the United States due to the Pashtunistan issue motivated the Soviet leaders to win over the Afghan ruling elite. In December 1955, Nikita Khrushchev, First Secretary of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union (CPSU) and Prime Minister Nikolai Bulganin visited Kabul and offered cash-strapped Afghanistan a loan of US$100 million to construct industrial and agricultural projects. During their visit the Soviet leaders clearly demanded 'an impartial plebiscite in the Pashtun areas of Pakistan'.[79] After the closure of the Pakistan border and the Afghan inability to create an economically viable alternate route through Iran, the Daud regime had no other option but to utilise the Soviet Union's territory for land-locked Afghanistan's trade.[80] More importantly, the Soviet Union offered to provide Afghanistan extensive military aid that included the supply of arms, ammunition and training of personnel. The decision to establish military ties with the Soviet Union had far-reaching political impact on Afghanistan, as it was Soviet-trained Afghan army and air force officers who became instrumental in bringing the pro-Soviet Peoples' Democratic Party of Afghanistan (PDPA) to power in April 1978. However, in 1955, the Pashtunistan issue became a major factor in motivating Daud to seek assistance from

the Soviet Union to ensure Afghanistan's security against a militarily superior Pakistan.

Tensions generated by the 1955 events subsided by the end of 1956 through United States' efforts to 'save Afghanistan from Soviet control'.[81] The Americans continued their low-level aid program to Afghanistan and simultaneously advised their regional allies Iran and Pakistan to remain engaged with Kabul. Subsequently, Afghan transit trade through Pakistan was resumed by late 1955. The Pakistani President, Iskander Mirza, visited Kabul in August 1956 without arriving at any agreement with his hosts on the increasingly intractable Pashtunistan problem. Again, in June 1957, Prime Minister Hussain Shaheed Suhrawardy, who had replaced Chaudri Muhammad Ali, held an inconclusive meeting with Daud in Kabul on the two countries' bilateral differences.

In October 1958, the Pakistani military under General Muhammad Ayub Khan seized power in a *coup d'etat* and imposed martial law.[82] The coup, according to an United States intelligence estimate, was orchestrated to derail plans for the country's first general elections which the military feared might bring a neutralist Bengali 'influenced' government.[83] As a result, relations between Karachi and Kabul deteriorated sharply with the military's arrest of veteran Pashtun leaders Abdul Ghaffar Khan and Abdus Samad Khan Achakzai. Daud vehemently denounced these actions. Significantly, the Afghan Ambassador to Washington, Muhammad Hashim Maiwandwal, complained to the State Department about the arrests taking into view the United States' influence in Pakistan.[84]

By the late 1950s, the United States was beginning to see Afghanistan as a 'contested field in the Cold War' and consequently took some measures to counter the increasing Soviet involvement in that country by counselling General Ayub to 'support Zahir, Daud and Naim at present juncture' in the 'interest of the free world'.[85] In spite of this advice from Washington, General Ayub continued to take a hard line against Afghanistan. During a visit of the Afghan Foreign Minister, Sardar Naim to Pakistan in 1959, Ayub reportedly warned him that Pakistan had the 'ability to take Kabul within a few hours' if the Afghans did not desist from their policies.[86]

Pakistan's relations with Afghanistan fell to a new low in August 1960 when Daud sent Afghan troops and armed Pashtun tribesmen across the Durand Line to assist a small feudatory prince, the Khan of Bajaur, against his rival. The Afghan forces were repulsed by regular Pakistan Army units.[87] Pakistan severed diplomatic relations with Afghanistan on 6 September 1960. Karachi, once again, halted all Afghan transit trade facilities thus hindering US aid projects that had been started to reduce Kabul's dependence on Moscow. In an attempt to minimize the damage, the United States special envoy, Livingston T. Merchant, was sent by President Eisenhower to urge a peaceful resolution of tensions between Kabul and Karachi. As had been the case in previous American initiatives, Livingston T. Merchant's mission failed to achieve anything meaningful, due to the intransigence of both the countries.

In the period 1961–1962, the new Kennedy Administration continued its predecessor's efforts to bring about a resolution of the Pakistan–Afghan dispute. In 1962, an increasingly exasperated United States requested the Shah of Iran to mediate in the dispute. The United States was cautious that this initiative should 'appear to be the natural result of Shah's previous efforts rather than a result of US intervention'.[88] This stance was seen to be necessary in order to avoid Soviet

interference. In Afghanistan, Daud's intransigent policy towards Pakistan and reliance on the Soviet Union was creating apprehensions in the royal family, which feared that a continuation of this trend could have a negative effect on Afghanistan's independence and traditional neutrality. In view of the Pakistani economic blockade, prominent members of the ruling elite, including Daud's brother and Foreign Minister Naim, had started to consider the growing Afghan dependence on the USSR 'undesirable'.[89] Moreover, the King and other members of his household comprehended that Daud's removal might lead to an improvement in relations with Pakistan and have a positive impact on Afghan relations with the regional Muslim states. These factors contributed to the resignation of Sardar Muhammad Daud on 9 March 1963. Dr. Muhammad Yusuf, a commoner and non-Pashtun, who had previously served as the Minister of Mines in the Daud cabinet, became Prime Minister. Two months later, the Shah's mediatory efforts, backed up by Washington's persuasive influence over Pakistan, bore fruit and on 26 May 1963 Pakistani and Afghan representatives agreed in Tehran to restore diplomatic ties. Notwithstanding this agreement, the Afghan Minister, Sayed Qasim Rishtiya, is reported to have stated that the Pashtunistan issue was still the main obstacle in the development of cordial relations between Pakistan and Afghanistan.[90]

Important political changes at the regional and international level in the 1960s brought about significant alterations in Pakistan's foreign policy. In October 1962, China and India fought a brief border war. Heavy fighting occurred in the Ladakh area of the disputed Jammu and Kashmir state and on India's North Eastern Frontier Agency (NEFA) along the McMahon Line – the British-demarcated Indo-Chinese frontier. To Pakistan's ire, the United States offered India considerable military assistance and even indicated that Pakistan and India should cooperate to counter the communist aggression. President Ayub and his socialist-oriented Foreign Minister, Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto regarded this as a severe breach of faith on the part of Washington to arm their enemy, 'non-aligned' India at Pakistan's expense.* In the words of Robert W. Komer, a member of the NSC Staff, the Pakistanis were: 'going through a genuine emotional crisis as they saw their cherished ambition of using US as a lever against India going up in the smoke of the Chinese border war'.[91] Pakistan's disillusionment with the United States was deeply felt as prior to this Karachi had braved Soviet Premier Khrushchev's explicit nuclear missile attack threat against its territory following the U-2 incident.[92] Consequently, despite American resentment, President Ayub, under the influence of Bhutto, had begun to establish close political and defence ties with the Peoples Republic of China.[93]

In South Asia, the 1962 Sino-Soviet split also enabled India and Pakistan to cultivate Moscow and Beijing respectively as alternate alignment options to offset their dependence on the West. Nevertheless, Pakistan's relationship with Beijing was focused primarily on boosting its security to counter India's military superiority. The Pakistani military elite stayed committed to its alliance with the United States. The United States remained Pakistan's major source of economic assistance, with the

*General Ayub had introduced a new Presidential system under a constitution inaugurated in 1962 that replaced the 1956 constitution. This system was to continue until the demise of the Yahya military regime in December 1971.

flow of aid rising from US$ 455.8 million in 1950–1955, to US$ 3.4 billion between 1960 and 1968.[94]

Daud's removal did not stem Soviet influence in Afghanistan during the 1960s but King Zahir did attempt to balance it by cultivating links with the West and neighbouring Muslim states such as Iran. On the surface, relations with Pakistan also improved and President Ayub visited Kabul in 1964 and again in 1966. In September 1965, Pakistan fought a short war with India over Kashmir; Afghanistan showed its restraint and did not create any trouble along the Durand Line. An important development in Pakistan during the Ayub period (1958–1969) was the gradual integration of Pashtuns into Pakistani society and the military–bureaucratic establishment. It was a period in Pakistan's political history which saw a large number of ethnic Pashtuns holding high positions in the military and the bureaucracy. Ayub himself was a non-Pashto speaking ethnic Pashtun belonging to the Tarin sub-tribe of the Hazara district in the Frontier. The growing participation of Pashtuns in the Pakistani Government resulted in the erosion of the support for the Pashtunistan movement in the Province by the end of the 1960s. Furthermore, in the later part of Ayub's rule, Pakistan's ties with the Soviet Union showed an upward trend owing to the general improvement in the United States' relations with the Soviet Union that assisted in easing Pakistan–Afghanistan tensions.[95]

In Afghanistan, the King, with the consent of the royal family and American encouragement, had allowed limited democratisation from the mid 1960s. A new constitution was inaugurated in 1964. The constitution barred members of the royal family from participating in government and politics. It envisaged a bicameral parliament and was approved by a *Loya Jirga*. The parliamentary experiment provided for a popularly elected lower house (*Wolesi Jirga* in Pashto) and a partially elected upper house (*Meshrano Jirga*).[96] Numerous political organizations ranging from Islamic fundamentalist groups to pro-Soviet Marxists emerged as an outcome of political liberalisation.[97]

Between 1964–1972, Pakistan–Afghanistan relations remained distant, though not as hostile as in the 1950s, due to the domestic transformations taking place in both of these states. Although subsequent Afghan Governments after Daud's removal continued to pay lip service to the Pashtunistan issue although it was not central to the Afghan foreign policy of that period. In Pakistan, President Ayub resigned in March 1969 after popular demonstrations against his regime. Ayub handed over power to the Army Chief General Agha Muhammad Yahya Khan.

The Ayub dictatorship had marginalised East Pakistan and other smaller provinces of West Pakistan. Yahya, who declared himself President and Martial Law Administrator, abolished the one unit framework in an attempt to appease the resentment of the Bengalis, Sindhis, Baluchis and segments of the Pashtun population against what they perceived as Punjabi military domination. However, Yahya's piecemeal reforms, including holding of the country's first general elections in 1970, could not satisfy the Bengali majority of Pakistan who wanted their main political party, the Awami League that had won majority of the seats for the proposed National Assembly, to form government at the centre. This was unacceptable to the military and the West Pakistani political elite. By March 1971 East Pakistan was in revolt. In December 1971, India, which had been planning an offensive in the East for months, directly intervened in the civil war in support of the Bengalis and routed

the isolated Pakistan Army's Eastern Command comprising 90,000 (West) Pakistani servicemen.[98] The Pakistani forces surrendered on 16 December 1971 and consequently East Pakistan ceased to exist and the state of Bangladesh was born. In West Pakistan, the United States' famous 'tilt' towards (West) Pakistan in cooperation with China precluded further dismemberment of the Pakistani state and led India to agree to a ceasefire by 17 December.[99] In the aftermath of the East Pakistan crisis, the much weakened Pakistani military decided to hand over power to Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto, the leader of the Pakistan Peoples Party (PPP) that had won a majority of the seats in the West.[100]

The 1971 war had severely shaken the 'Islamic' foundations of Pakistan and had showed that ethno-nationalism could override religious solidarity. Most significantly, the East Pakistan debacle added to the paranoia of the Pakistani ruling elite regarding ethnically inspired nationalism, and this mindset played an important part in aggravating Pakistan's relationship with Afghanistan in the period 1973–1975.

Pakistan–Afghanistan Relations under the Bhutto Regime, 1972–1977

Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto had to grapple with the problems confronted by a truncated Pakistan that had lost half of its population through a humiliating defeat at the hands of India. Bhutto was probably the most charismatic leader Pakistan had produced in the last 25 years of its existence, and his energetic leadership heralded important changes in Pakistan's foreign policy. Since his days as Foreign Minister in the Ayub regime, Bhutto had been an ardent advocate of pursuing an 'independent' policy. In fact, this trend in his political outlook played a part in his removal, due to US pressure, from the Ayub cabinet in 1966.[101] In his essays on Pakistan's foreign policy, *The Myth of Independence*, written before he came to power, he stressed that: 'Pakistan should reject all obnoxious conditions' imposed by big powers and 'resolutely resist foreign interference.'[102] The two major strands in his foreign policy perception were an emphasis on 'Third World solidarity' and forging strong ties with Muslim states including the radical Arab regimes of Syria and Libya.

Afghanistan, however, remained the only Muslim state with which Pakistan still had a discord. Despite overt manifestations of cordiality towards Pakistan, Kabul had not renounced its policy concerning the Durand Line and support for the 'self-determination' for the Pashtuns of the NWFP. Therefore, this dispute continued to impinge on post-1971 Pakistan's security calculations and affected its domestic politics because of the trans-border tribal and familial relationships between the two countries.

Pakistan showed its keenness to reach an understanding with Kabul after the assumption of power by Bhutto's civilian administration in December 1971. The loss of East Pakistan had changed the geostrategic environment of South Asia to the detriment of Pakistan, and Bhutto perceived that Pakistan's defence priorities now hinged more on cooperation with Iran and even Afghanistan. Thus, one of the first states he visited, after becoming Pakistan's President and the first civilian Martial Law Administrator, was Afghanistan.[103] Officially the visit was portrayed as a gesture of Pakistan's appreciation of Afghanistan's neutrality during the

Indo-Pakistan conflict of 1971. However, Bhutto's discussions with King Zahir touched on Afghanistan's instigation of Pashtun nationalists in the Frontier Province. Even so, Bhutto got on well with the Afghan monarch and agreements were concluded on economic cooperation with Afghanistan. But these steps did not inhibit the Afghan media, especially Radio Afghanistan, from frequently demanding Pashtunistan's independence. In early 1973, Afghan Prime Minister, Musa Shafiq, who had replaced Dr. Abdul Zahir, tried to mend fences with Islamabad* by giving indications of softening Afghanistan's policy regarding Pakistan.[104] Musa Shafiq had concluded an agreement with Pakistan's regional ally, Iran, regarding the distribution of the Helmand River waters. Hence, it was hoped that an agreement with Pakistan could also be achieved over the Pashtunistan problem.

The Pakistani general elections of 1970 had given Bhutto's Pakistan Peoples Party (PPP) a comfortable majority in the two populous provinces of Punjab and Sind. However, the PPP proved unable to muster a majority to form governments at the provincial level in the Frontier and Baluchistan. In the Frontier, the National Awami Party (NAP), a 'successor' of the *Khudai Khidmatgar* movement, led by Abdul Ghaffar Khan's son, Abdul Wali Khan, formed the provincial government in coalition with the traditionalist Deobandi Jamiat-i-Ulama-i-Islam (JUI) party under Mawlana Mufti Mahmood.[105] Similarly, in Baluchistan the NAP and the JUI had won enough seats in the provincial assembly to form government. The NAP–JUI coalition governments in both of these provinces were inimical towards the PPP and felt the need for more provincial autonomy from the centre. The NAP and JUI also opposed Bhutto's intention to implement 'Islamic Socialism' in Pakistan. In fact, fundamentalist parties like the Jamaat-i-Islami (JI) and its student wing *Jamiat-i-Tulaba-i-Islam* had observed a 'Black Day' in Lahore in December 1971 after Bhutto's assumption of power.[106] The ethno-nationalist parties and Islamic groups alleged that Bhutto was an autocrat scheming to establish a one party rule in the country. Nevertheless, the Bhutto regime initially accepted the right of the NAP–JUI coalition governments in the Frontier and Baluchistan to form government by signing a tripartite agreement with them in March 1972.

In the Frontier, the government headed by Mawlana Mufti Mahmood showed a cautious attitude in relation to the 'Pashtunistan' issue considering the long history of its main leaders in agitating for this cause. Initially, Wali Khan even declared that Pashtunistan was 'no longer an issue for the NAP'.[107] However, some Pashtun nationalists and intelligentsia did raise demands for renaming the North West Frontier Province as 'Pakhtunkhwa', along with making Pashto the official language of the province. The Chief Minister, Mawlana Mufti Mahmood, who stressed the province's commitment to the territorial integrity of Pakistan, downplayed the politics of ethnicity and resisted these demands. Notwithstanding the divergent political orientations of the secular NAP and JUI, it remained a fact that Pashtun nationalists finally got an opportunity to influence the political developments of their province for the first time since 1958. This enabled them to lift the ban on the *Khudai Khidmatgaran* movement. The youth wing of the NAP, the *Pakhtun Zalme*, was organised on the pattern of the *Khudai Khidmatagran*. The political changes in the Frontier motivated Abdul Ghaffar Khan to return to Peshawar from his self-exile

*In the early 1960s the capital was transferred from Karachi to Islamabad.

in Kabul, where he had been staying since 1964. In Baluchistan, Mir Ghaus Baksh Bizenjo, a NAP nominee, became the Governor in April 1972.[108] The provincial assembly elected a Baluch nationalist, Sardar Ataullah Mengal, as Chief Minister. Like their counterparts in the Frontier, the Baluch nationalists also sought to redress Baluch grievances by giving preferential treatment to ethnic Baluch, who had become a minority in their own province, in public services, which were dominated by Punjabis, Muhajirs and Pashtuns. The provincial government demanded greater provincial autonomy and increased Baluch participation in this extremely underdeveloped province's economic and political life.[109]

By early 1973, the Federal Government in Islamabad began to show its uneasiness about the growing assertiveness of the Baluchistan provincial government in stressing its demand for provincial autonomy. Islamabad alleged that the Baluch leaders had failed to maintain 'law and order' in the province and were conspiring to secede from the Federation to form an 'Azad' or free Baluchistan with the help of Iraq and the Soviet Union.[110] More significant was the pressure put by the Shah of Iran on Bhutto to remove the Baluch nationalist government in Quetta, as this could spark Baluch separatism in the neighbouring Iranian Baluchistan. The Shah had reportedly told Bhutto in early 1973 that he 'felt strongly that letting the Baluch have provincial autonomy was not only dangerous in itself for Pakistan, but would give his Baluch dangerous ideas'.[111] Thus, Bhutto's distrust of the Baluch nationalists reinforced by Iranian pressure resulted in the Federal Government's decision to dismiss the Baluchistan provincial government in February 1973. The NAP–JUI government in the Frontier resigned in protest over this 'undemocratic' action. The developments in Baluchistan and the Frontier were a severe blow for the consolidation of democratic processes in Pakistan after years of autocratic and repressive military rule that had stifled the emergence of a civil society based on the rule of law and respect for human rights.

As the ethno-nationalist challenges to the central government were increasing in Pakistan, Sardar Muhammad Daud overthrew King Zahir's regime in Afghanistan in a bloodless *coup d'etat* on 17 July 1973. Daud's putsch had the backing of Soviet-trained Afghan military officers belonging to the Parcham faction of the PDPA.[112] Daud spent little time in declaring himself President of the new Republic and announcing the end of the *ancien regime*.[113] A fractious coalition of Army officers, modernist sections of Afghanistan's small urban elite and groups within the civil bureaucracy tended to support the new regime. It was mainly this middle class segment of the population that had grown in the 1960s as a consequence of the spread of higher education during this 'liberal' period of Afghan history. However, these middle classes were impatient at what they perceived was the slow pace of social and economic reform under the monarchy. The internal political pressure for reform generated from this segment became an important cause for the demise of the monarchical regime.

Daud still remained a vigorous advocate of Pashtunistan even after years of absence from active politics. For him this issue had remained a matter of *Izzat* (Honour).[114] In Afghanistan during his time in power, he had been instrumental in imposing Pashto as the official national language upon Persian (Dari) speakers in the bureaucracy and the school system. Daud's stress on highlighting the Pashtun identity inside and outside Afghanistan was related to his country's fragile ethnic

balance in which the Pashtuns, though dominant in the government, comprised less than half of the population. By keeping the Pashtunistan issue alive, Daud hoped to unite quarrelsome and rivalry-ridden Pashtuns tribes on both sides of the Durand Line. This policy served to counterbalance the non-Pashtun ethnic groups such as the Tajiks, Uzbeks, Farsiwans and Hazaras that had began to challenge the Pashtun hold on power within Afghanistan by the advent of the 1970s.[115]

Another important development in Afghanistan by the early 1970s was the rise of a political Islamist movement led by religious intellectuals and scholars, mainly educated at the Kabul University. The leading figures of this nascent movement were Kabul University affiliated personalties like the Tajik Professor (*Ustad*) Burhanuddin Rabbani and the Pashtun Professor Ghulam Muhammad Niazi. These Islamists were influenced by the ideas of the Egyptian Islamists such as Hassan Al-Banna and Sayyid Qutb belonging to the *Ikhwan-ul-Muslimin* (Muslim Brothers).[116] Unlike the traditional rural Afghan Ulama, the Islamists aimed to adapt Islam to the modern world by utilizing it as a political ideology to transform their society. Many younger Afghans from tertiary and secondary schools were enticed towards the evolving Afghan Islamism and were motivated to form the Islamic Youth Movement (*Sazman-i-Jawanan-i-Musalman*) in the early 1970s. Some members of this movement were staunchly anti-communist and tended to view the United States positively.[117] This movement included personalities such as Gulbaddin Hekmatyar, Ahmad Shah Masoud, Abdul Haq and many others who later rose to prominence in the struggle against the Soviet Union. The Islamist movement not only gained popularity amongst intellectuals and students but also struck a sympathetic chord with the traditionalist Pashtun Ulama in southern and eastern Afghanistan, where Islamic fundamentalism and strains of anti-imperialism had historically remained strong. Several important Pashtun Ulama and students such as Mawlawi Yunis Khales, Muhammad Nabi Muhammadi and Jalaluddin Haqqani, some of whom founded their own parties, were drawn to this movement.

Almost immediately after seizing power, President Daud had referred to the 'political dispute with Pakistan, which had not been solved' and he pointed out that relations with Pakistan were subject to the 'peaceful and honourable solution to this problem (Pashtunistan) in accordance with the hopes and aspirations of the Pashtun and Baluch people and their leaders'.[118] Notably, Daud had now included Baluchistan alongside the Frontier as a problem in the bilateral Pakistan–Afghanistan relationship. The Afghan government's open support for Pashtun and Baluch nationalists posed the greatest threat to Pakistan's integrity since the secession of East Pakistan. In Baluchistan, the Bhutto regime had to rely on the military to regain control of the province, which had been in virtual revolt since February 1973. Almost four divisions of the Pakistan Army confronted an assorted coalition of ethnic Baluch comprising nationalists, pro-Soviet leftist organizations and traditional tribes. In the Frontier many NAP members fled to Kabul and issued anti-Pakistan statements.[119] This situation was exploited by the Daud regime and, in the period from mid 1973 to 1975, Afghanistan not only provided sanctuary for the Baluch and Pashtun dissidents but also provided the Baluch insurgents with arms and ammunition.[120] The Pakistani military's ruthless suppression of the Baluch was coordinated with Iran, which supplied US-manufactured AH-IJ 'Cobra' helicopter gunships to strengthen the Pakistan Army's counter-insurgency operations.

Tensions between Islamabad and Kabul reached boiling point between 1974 and 1975. The Afghans did not lose any opportunity in international forums to highlight Pakistan's dismal record in subjugating ethnic minorities. Daud personally wrote to the United Nations Secretary General on 22 November 1974 regarding Pakistan's violation of the UN Charter and the Universal Declaration of Human Rights with respect to the Baluch and the Pashtun people. He requested UN intervention to stop Pakistan's alleged 'act of genocide and mass extermination' against the 'defenceless Baluchi people'.[121] Regionally Daud sought Indian and Soviet assistance in confronting Pakistan. In an interview, Daud had proclaimed: 'If Pakistan attacks Afghanistan, India and other countries will come to the rescue of Afghanistan.'[122]

By late 1974, the Bhutto regime was becoming extremely perturbed by Afghanistan's moral and material assistance to what it regarded as 'secessionist forces' in Pakistan. Bhutto perceived that Afghanistan's belligerent stance was undermining the territorial integrity of Pakistan. In order to curtail Kabul's interference in the internal affairs of Pakistan, Bhutto formulated a 'forward policy' in Afghanistan that hinged on assisting the disparate Islamic groups opposed to the secularly oriented Daud regime. The policy to aid the Afghan Islamists was purely strategic and had little to do with Islamic ideology. The Afghan Islamists did not back Kabul's policy on the territorial dispute with Pakistan and were also opposed to Afghanistan's friendly relations with India. Because of this, they made ideal proxies for Pakistan to destabilise Afghanistan. By doing so, Islamabad wanted to send a message to Daud that if he persisted in aiding 'secessionists' in Pakistan then he could expect Pakistan to reply in the same vein. Several important Afghan Islamic leaders had moved across the Durand Line in 1973 to escape the Daud regime's crackdown on the Islamist and pro-monarchy opposition after a failed coup attempt in October 1973. Besides the Islamists, the republican regime had also arrested former Prime Minister Muhammad Hashim Maiwandwal and some military officers on charges of conspiring to overthrow the Government.

In the North and South Waziristan Agencies lying adjacent to the Afghan Paktia, Logar and Paktika Provinces, Islamabad activated camps to carry out military training for the anti-Daud opposition. The Afghan Islamists fleeing from repression were easily accommodated in these tribal areas where the government was already beefing up security due to the threat from Afghanistan.[123] A large military garrison was stationed at Razmak in South Waziristan and substantial numbers of troops were quartered in Mohmand Agency, bordering Kunar and Nangarhar Provinces of Afghanistan.[124] The Frontier Corps NWFP, a para-military body comprising mainly tribal Pashtun personnel but commanded by regular Pakistan Army officers, was given the responsibility to organise and train the Afghan Islamists. Brigadier (later Major General) Naseerullah Khan Babur, Inspector General Frontier Corps (IGFC), was entrusted with the overall responsibility for this operation.[125] Gulbuddin Hekmatyar and Ahmad Shah Masoud (who in the 1990s became a symbol of opposition to the Pakistan-backed Taliban militia) were among the first Afghan Islamists to receive training from the Pakistani military from late 1973.[126] To keep the Afghan project secret, the Afghan Islamists were enlisted as Frontier Corps trainees. The Frontier Corps, the Pakistan armed forces' Interservices Intelligence Directorate (ISI) and the Special Services Group (SSG)

of the Pakistan Army jointly handled the training. Between 1973 and 1977, the Pakistani military reportedly trained around 5000 Afghan Islamists opposed to the Daud regime.[127]

One of the biggest operations the Pakistani trained Afghan Islamists undertook was in July 1975 in the Tajik-populated Panjshir valley north of Kabul. The operation, in which Ahmad Shah Masoud was also involved, aimed to launch a full-scale armed insurrection against the Daud regime.[128] Another operation was planned for Paktia province bordering Pakistan under Gulbuddin Hekmatyar. The anti-Daud opposition spread propaganda regarding the 'communist dominated regime' and appealed to the populace to join their Jihad against the regime.[129] Despite Pakistani support, the Islamist insurrection failed to get a head start. By the end of August, 1975 the Afghan army was able to successfully crush the Pakistani-instigated uprising.

Pakistan's organization and backing of the 1975 Islamist insurgency had been a well-guarded secret even within the military–bureaucratic establishment. According to General Babur only Prime Minister Bhutto, Army Chief Tikka Khan and Minister of State for Defence and Foreign Affairs, Aziz Ahmad, knew about the details of the matter.[130] The Pakistani policy makers had also contemplated using the services of the ex-King Zahir against his recalcitrant cousin. Bhutto had hoped that the former Afghan monarch, along with moderate Afghan politicians such as the former Prime Minister Musa Shafiq, could be used to create an alternate to the Daud regime.[131]

However, Daud had begun to significantly change the direction of Afghanistan's foreign policy by 1975. On the Pashtunistan issue, he had not been able to get the Soviet Union's support as Moscow was improving its relations with the 'progressive' Bhutto regime.[132] Domestically, Daud was getting increasingly suspicious of the pro-Soviet army officers and the PDPA's growing influence in the army and the bureaucracy. In an attempt to reduce Soviet influence over the Afghan state apparatus, Daud removed several pro-Soviet army officers and political figures in late 1975. To reduce Afghanistan's reliance on the Soviet Union, he initiated a policy of improving relations with Afghanistan's neighbours, the conservative Muslim states of the Arab world and the Soviet Union's arch-rival, the Peoples Republic of China. Moreover, he contemplated sending large numbers of Afghan army officers for training to Egypt and India instead of the Soviet Union, to decrease their susceptibility to Marxist ideology.[133]

Afghanistan's warming relations with Iran contributed to the improvement in Pakistan–Afghanistan ties in the years 1975 and 1976. The Shah urged Daud to resolve Afghanistan's long-standing dispute with Pakistan. Iran was the key pro-US 'regional gendarme' in the region and the Shah desired to see Afghanistan becoming a part of an anti-communist, Iranian dominated, regional political and economic bloc.[134] In April 1975, Daud visited Tehran and the Shah offered Afghanistan US$ 700 million in the form of loans to finance development projects.[135] Significantly, Iran's attempt to wean Afghanistan away from the USSR was paralleled by another ally of Pakistan, the Peoples Republic of China. In December 1974, Daud's brother Muhammad Naim visited Beijing and secured a US$ 55 million loan.[136] In other words, Afghanistan's growing involvement with Iran and China, the two states having very cordial relations with Islamabad, was bound to have a positive impact on the future course of Pakistan–Afghanistan interaction.

The Iranian efforts for a Pakistan–Afghanistan agreement were given a boost by the visit of the US Secretary of State, Henry Kissinger to Kabul in November 1974.[137] Kissinger in his meetings with Daud stressed the need for a rapprochement between Kabul and Islamabad.[138] Iranian mediation and Daud's desire to orient Afghanistan towards the West contributed to his decision to initiate negotiations with Pakistan without any preconditions in May 1975.[139] This indicated that Kabul had dropped its insistence on bringing the Pashtunistan problem as a starting point for any talks with Pakistan.

In June 1976, Bhutto visited Kabul and held extensive negotiations with Daud on resolving the 'differences' between the two states. During the talks, Afghanistan made no mention regarding the establishment of a Pashtun state.[140] The two Governments recognised the need for goodwill to conduct negotiations and agreed that they would refrain from hostile propaganda against each other. In an abrupt policy change, the Afghans were now insisting on safeguarding the cultural and ethnic identity of the Pashtuns living in Pakistan instead of their past emphasis on territorial issues. They demanded the release of Pashtun and Baluch leaders arrested by the Bhutto regime on charges of treason in 1975.[141] Daud paid a return visit to Pakistan in August 1976 and now stressed the importance of 'Islamic brotherhood' as the basis for future Pakistan–Afghanistan relations.[142] Notwithstanding the goodwill generated by the Bhutto–Daud parleys, the two states failed to reach a solid consensus over the issue of Afghanistan's non-recognition of the Durand Line.[143] Nevertheless, the thaw in Islamabad–Kabul relations made Pakistan stop its assistance to the Afghan Islamists in early 1977.

During their sanctuary in Pakistan, the Afghan Islamists had been able to forge substantial links with right-wing Pakistani religious parties like the Jamaat-i-Islami and the Jamiat-i-Ulama-i-Islam, which received substantial financial assistance from Saudi Arabia. Islamabad had gathered a heterogeneous mixture of Islamists ranging from Dari speaking Tajiks belonging to the JIA to traditionalist Pashtuns hailing from the tribal belt straddling the Pakistan–Afghanistan border. These groups remained divided on ethnic and tribal lines. In spite of the growth of a modern elite in Afghanistan, large segments of the population still primarily identified itself with ethnic or tribal groups or 'qawm' rather than as Afghans. The absence of Pakistani backing from 1977 split the Afghan Islamic groups on ethnic and ideological bases. The Dari-speaking Islamists generally continued to back Burhanuddin Rabbani's more moderate vision for an Islamic Afghanistan based on the cooperation of all pro-Islamic segments of the society. In contrast, the Pashtuns led by Hekmatyar advocated a tightly disciplined Islamic group acting as a vanguard to achieve an Islamic revolution in Afghanistan, and this motivated him to disassociate himself from Rabbani's Jamiat in mid-1977. Hekmatyar was to form the Hizb-i-Islami-i-Afghanistan (The Islamic Party of Afghanistan) dedicated to attaining his radical objective. His views were influenced by the philosophy of the Pakistani Islamist Syed Abul Ala Mawdudi, the founder of the Jamaat-i-Islami.[144]

In March 1977, general elections were held in Pakistan and Bhutto's PPP won a landslide victory. Bhutto had tried to appease the Islamic parties by pointing to his role in the making of the 1973 Constitution that declared Pakistan an 'Islamic Republic'.[145] The 1974 Islamic Conference held in Lahore and Pakistan's growing economic and political ties with the Middle Eastern states were shown as Bhutto's

brainchild. However, the opposition Pakistan National alliance (PNA), an amalgam of right wing secular and religious parties, accused Bhutto of rigging the election and refused to accept its verdict. The Islamic parties in the PNA pressed for the implementation of a *Nizam-i-Mustafa* (The system of the Prophet Muhammad). After months of demonstrations, the Army Chief, General Muhammad Zia-ul-Haq, overthrew the Bhutto regime in a second *coup d'état* in Pakistan's turbulent history on July 5, 1977. Bhutto and his supporters alleged that the coup had the tacit consent of the United States. A few months before his fall Bhutto alleged in the National Assembly that some important foreign powers were engineering his downfall. Several Pakistani scholars and politicians have given credence to these charges.[146] Bhutto had earned Washington's ire in pursuing an agenda contrary to US interests in the region. His wish to transform Pakistan into a nuclear power particularly worried Washington and Henry Kissinger reportedly warned him that the US would make a 'horrible example' of him if Pakistan persisted with its nuclear ambitions.[147] According to Benazir Bhutto the US was also 'concerned' about Bhutto's advocacy of Third World countries' causes, like the New International Economic Order (NIEO), that were detrimental to Washington's interests.[148]

Whatever the veracity of the theses that ascribed Bhutto's downfall to US machinations, it remains a fact that the PPP regime's domestic policies contributed to the military's emerging as the main political player in post-1971 Pakistani politics. During its tenure in office, Bhutto failed to develop a viable pattern of civil–military relations that ensured the supremacy of the elected institutions over the military establishment. The military continued to receive the largest portion of the budgetary allocation in the national budget in view of the perceived threats from India and Afghanistan.[149] The use of the military for establishing law and order in Baluchistan further eroded whatever control the Bhutto regime had tried to impose on the military after 1971.[150]

The military coup in Pakistan, however, did not fundamentally affect Pakistan's improving relations with Afghanistan that had begun during the tail end of the Bhutto era. Zia continued to build on Bhutto's work aimed at settling the bilateral 'differences' between the two countries. Daud's seemingly firm hold on power, coupled with a foreign policy seeking to strengthen ties with the West and the Islamic nations, had made the environment more conducive to a lasting Pakistan–Afghanistan rapprochement by the end of 1977.

Notes

1 For a political and historical exposition regarding the development of the 'Two Nations' theory see Khalid Bin Sayeed, *Pakistan: The Formative Phase, 1857–1948*, London: Oxford University Press, 1968. An excellent study concerning the Muslims of British India is in Peter Hardy, *The Muslims of British India*, London: Cambridge University Press, 1972.

2 Ziaul Husain Farooqi, *The Deoband School and the Demand for Pakistan*, Bombay: Asia Publishing House, 1963.

3 An examination of the debates amongst the Indian Ulama with regards to the establishment of Pakistan see Ishtiaq Husain Qureshi, *Ulama in Politics*, Karachi: Oxford University Press, 1972.

4 Letter from Wavell to Secretary of State Pethick Lawrence. 20.8.1945.*R/3/1/105*, India Office Records, Public Records Office (PRO), London.

5 Peter Hardy, *The Muslims of British India*, London: Cambridge University Press, 1972, p.239.

6 Sugata Bose and Ayesha Jalal, *Modern South Asia: History, Culture, Political Economy*, London: Routledge, 1988, p.193.

7 Hector Bolitho, *Jinnah: Creator of Pakistan*, London: John Murray, 1954, pp.8–12.

8 Most of the prominent leaders of the Deobandi parties were trained in the religious seminary at Deoband in the pre-partition United Provinces (UP) of India. Therefore, commonly such parties and their affiliated groups are referred as *Deobandi* in Pakistan's religio-political circles.

9 The *Jamiat-i-Ulam-i-Islam* (JUI) was the successor of the *All India Jamiati-i-Ulama-i-Hind* (JUH). The JUI was formed by pro-Pakistan Ulama who had earlier differed with Jamiat-i-Ulama-i-Hind's support for a united India. The leading JUH luminary Mawlana Husain Ahmad Madni repudiated the Pakistan movement and its leader Muhammad Ali Jinnah. For details see Mawlana Ahmad Saeed, *Jamiat-i-Ulama-i-Hind ka Faisalah: Ijlas-i-Amrohah ki Nihayat Aham Tajviz* (The Decision of the Jamiat-i-Ulama-i-Hind) (Urdu), New Delhi, 1981.

10 According to US Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) 20% of Pakistan's population belongs to the Ithna Ashari and related Shiite sub-sects. See 'Pakistan' in CIA *World Fact Book*, Washington DC 2003.

11 Pakistan's first Foreign Minister, Sir Zafarullah Khan belonged to this sect.

12 Stephen Cohen, *The Pakistan Army*, 2nd edition, Karachi: Oxford University Press,1998, p.42.

13 See David Omissi, *The Sepoy and the Raj: The Indian Army*, 1860–1940, London: Macmillan, 1994, p.232.

14 Tan Tai Yong, 'Punjab and the Making of Pakistan: The Roots of a Civil–Military State', *South Asia*, vol. XVIII (special Issue), 1995, pp.55–70.

15 For an exposition of the concept of the 'security state', see Ian Talbott, *Pakistan: A Modern History*, London: Hurst, 1998, Chapter 2.

16 A detailed examination of this facet in Pakistan's politics is in Khalid Bin Sayeed, Pakistan: *The Formative Phase*, London: Oxford University Press, 1958. More recent works on this subject are Ian Talbot, *Pakistan: A Modern History*, London: Hurst, 1998; Iftikhar Malik, *State and Civil Society in Pakistan: Politics of Authority, Ideology and Ethnicity*, Basingstoke: Macmillan, 1997; and Muhammad Waseem, *Politics and the State in Pakistan*, Islamabad: National Book Foundation, 1994.

17 Hamza Alavi, 'Authoritarianism and legitimation of State Power in Pakistan' in Subrata Kumar Mitra (ed), *The Post-Colonial State in Asia: Dialectics of Politics and Culture*, Hertfordshire: Harvester Wheatsheaf, 1990, Chapter 2.

18 The Afghan, Saed Akbar, had worked for the British intelligence before partition. See telegram of the US Ambassador in Afghanistan to the State Department. 'The Ambassador in Afghanistan (Merell) to Secretary of State' (Secret), *FRUS*, 1951, Vol.VI, *Asia and the Pacific*, pp.1995–1996. Liaqat's assassination is believed to be an outcome of the internal political rivalries of that time see M.S. Venkataramani, *The American Role in Pakistan*, Lahore: Vanguard, 1984, Chapter 5.

19 For an excellent analysis regarding the collapse of parliamentary democracy in Pakistan and the insidious role of the Governor-General, Ghulam Muhammad, see Allan McGrath, *The Destruction of Pakistan's Democracy*, Karachi: Oxford University Press, 1996.

20 Ayesha Jalal asserts that these powerful men wanted to retain the British Empire 'rather than issue an unequivocal call in support of their Muslim brothers in Iran and Egypt. For

them the bond of Islam was weaker than the old imperial connection'. See Ayesha Jalal, *The State of Martial Rule: The Origins of Pakistan's Political Economy of Defence*, London: Cambridge University Press, 1996, p.130.

21 See M.K. Venkataramani, *The American Role in Pakistan*, Lahore: Vanguard, 1984; and for an in-depth analysis of the external factors that led to Pakistan's alliance with the United States see Anita Inder Singh, *The Limits of British Influence: South Asia and the Anglo-American relationship, 1947–56*, New York: St. Martins Press, 1994.

22 Omar Noman, *Pakistan: Political and Economic History since 1947*, London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1990, p.19.

23 During the Ayub era (1958–1969), the status of the bureaucracy was relegated to that of a junior partner to the armed forces in running the country. See Qudratullah Shahab, *Shahabnamah* (Urdu) Lahore: Ferozsons, 1987. Qudratullah Shahab served as General Ayub's Principal Secretary in the 1960s.

24 For an elaboration of these arguments see Hamza Alavi 'Class and State' in Hassan Gardezi and Jamil Rashid (ed), *Pakistan: The Roots of Dictatorship: The Political Economy of a Praetorian State*, London: Zed, 1983, pp.40–93.

25 See Jack Levy, 'The Diversionary Theory of War: A Critique', in Manus I. Midlarsky (ed), *Handbook of War Studies*, Boston: Unwin Hyman, 1989. See also Steven David, 'Explaining Third World Alignment', *World Politics*, Vol.43, No.2, 1991; and Mohammad Ayoob, *The Third World Security Predicament*, Boulder: Lynne Reinner, 1995.

26 For Zia's attempts to 'Islamise', the Pakistan Army see Stephen P. Cohen, *The Pakistan Army*, 2nd edition, Karachi: Oxford University Press, 1998, pp.89–100.

27 See D.G. Tendulkar, *Abdul Ghaffar Khan: Faith is Battle*, Bombay, 1967. Stephen Alan Rittenberg's *Ethnicity, Nationalism and the Pakhtuns: The Independence Movement in India's North West Frontier Province*, Durham: University of North Carolina Press, 1988 provides an excellent analysis of the rise of Pashtun nationalism in pre-partition India.

28 Robert C. Johanson, 'Radical Islam and Non-Violence: A Case Study of Religious Empowerment and Constraint Among Pashtuns', *Journal of Peace Research*, Vol.34, No.1, 1997, p.53.

29 See Olaf Caroe, *The Pathans*, London: Macmillan, 1958, p.435.

30 The Provincial Government of Pakistani Baluchistan officially adopted the spelling 'Baloch' and 'Balochistan', replacing Baluchi and Baluchistan in 1990.

31 Tahir Amin, *Ethno-National Movements of Pakistan: Domestic and International Factors*, Islamabad: Institute of Policy Studies, 1988, pp.68–72.

32 Leon B. Poullada, *Reform and Rebellion in Afghanistan, 1919–1929: King Amanullah's Failure to Modernize a Tribal Society*, Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1973, p.88.

33 Leon B. Poulluda and Leila D.J. Poullada, *Kingdom of Afghanistan and the United States, 1828–1973*, Omaha: University of Nebraska, 1995, pp.86–97.

34 Vartan Gregorian, *The Emergence of Modern Afghanistan: Politics of Reform and Modernization, 1880–1946*, Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1969, p.329.

35 Interestingly, the Pashtun Afghan intellectuals influenced by the Nazi racist theories of the 1930s linked the Pashtun ethnic group to the ancient Aryan invaders of India. Subsequently, Pashto was classified as one of the purest Aryan languages. See Vartan Gregorian, *The Emergence of Modern Afghanistan*, p.347.

36 Many Afghan intellectuals and students who participated in the TNB were later to become prominent in left wing Afghan politics. Foremost amongst such individuals were Babrak Karmal, Nur Muhammad Taraki and Faiz Muhammad Faiz. Due to its increasingly radical tone the TNB fell foul of the Royalist Afghan Government by the early 1950s. For details, see Raja Anwar, *The Tragedy of Afghanistan*, London: Verso, 1990, Chapter 3.

37 Erland Jaenson, *India, Pakistan or Pakhtunistan?* Stockholm, 1981, p.213.

38 Each Agency retained its para-military forces also referred as 'scouts'. These forces were created by the British to maintain law and order in the tribal areas. The Scouts were officered by British Army officers and after independence by the officers of the Pakistan Army. Moreover, the Scouts were on occasions supported by irregular *Khassadars* or militiamen recruited from the local tribes.

39 See Brian Cloughley, *A History of the Pakistan Army: Wars and Insurrections*, Karachi: Oxford University Press, 1999, pp.18–20.

40 Leon Poullada and Leila B. Poullada, *The Kingdom of Afghanistan and The United States: 1828–1973*, p.90.

41 A Government of India report acknowledged this position in 1925. See Government of India, *Military Report on Afghanistan* (classified), Calcutta: General Staff, 1925, p.69.

42 *Oppenheim's International Law*, ed. Lauterpacht, Vol.I, Essex: Longman, 1947 (Ch.1, s.82 (b)).

43 In January 1950, Afghanistan and India signed a Treaty of Friendship.

44 For details of Baluchistan's historical relationship with Afghanistan see Inayatullah Baluch, *The Problem of 'Greater Baluchistan': A Study of Baluch Nationalism*, Weisbaden: Steiner Verlag, 1987.

45 Tuathail, Georoid Ò, 'Thinking Critically about Geopolitics', in Tuathail, Georoid Ò and Dalby, Simon (ed), The *Geopolitics Reader*, London: Routledge, 1998, p.5.

46 Anita Inder Singh, *Limits of Influence*, Chapters 3 and 4.

47 Winthrop W. Aldrich to the Under Secretary of State (Will Clayton), 8 October 1947, 845F.51/10.1747, Record Group 59, Diplomatic Branch, National Archives and Records Administration (NARA) of the United States. For details of the Pakistani leaderships desire to forge a security relationship with the United States, see M.S. Venkataramani, *The American Role in Pakistan, 1947–58*, Chapter 1.

48 See A.A. Iskenderov, 'The Theory of Marxism and the National Liberation Movement', in the *National Liberation Movement: Vital Problems*, Moscow: Progress Publishers, 1967.

49 See Alvin Z. Rubinstein (ed), *The Foreign Policy of the Soviet Union*, New York: Random House, 1960, p.237. An excellent discussion of the Soviet conception of national liberation is in Neil S. Mcfarlane, *Superpower Rivalry and Third World Radicalism: The Idea of National Liberation*, Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1985.

50 A.M. Dyakov, *Natsional' nyy vopros i Angliysky imperialism v Indii*, Moscow, 1948. p.189. Despite Soviet reservations about Pakistan, Prime Minister Liaqat Ali Khan was invited to visit Moscow in 1949 on the invitation of Joseph Stalin. However, the visit did not take place owing to opposition from the British trained bureaucracy. This was disclosed by a retired Foreign Service officer who at that time was serving on the USSR desk of the Foreign Office in Karachi. Interview, Islamabad, 23 September 2000.

51 See *Glasgow Herald*, 6 January 1948.

52 'Analysis and Comparison of the United States Policies with Regard to Aid to Greece, Turkey, Iran and Afghanistan (Annexure)' – Secret, *Foreign Relations of the United States, 1949*, Vol.VI, Washington DC: Government Printing Office, 1977, p.13. These series will hereafter be cited as *FRUS* and the appropriate year and volume number will be provided in each case.

53 *Background Brief on Afghanistan (Confidential)*, Foreign and Commonwealth Office, South Asia Department FCO 37/778, November 1971, Public Records Office (PRO), UK, p.1.

54 'Analysis and Comparison of United States policies with regard to Aid to Greece, Turkey, Iran and Afghanistan (Annexure)' – Secret, *FRUS*, 1949, Vol.VI, p.7.

55 Record of Informal United States–United Kingdom Discussions, London, 18 September 1950, *FRUS*, 1950, Vol.V, p.208.
56 Ibid, pp.204–208.
57 Policy of the United States with regard to Pakistan (Secret), 7 April 1950, *FRUS*, 1950, Vol.V, pp.1490–1499.
58 Memorandum of Conversation by the Ambassador in Saudi Arabia, Secret. 23 March 1950, *FRUS*, 1950, Vol.V, pp.1148–1149.
59 Telegram: 'Afghan–Pakistan Relations'. From CRO to UK High Commissioner in Pakistan, London, 25 April 1949, FO 371/75634F5634/1061/97, PRO, UK.
60 Telegram: 'Afghan–Pakistan Relations'. From CRO to UK High Commissions in Canada, Australia, New Zealand, South Africa, India, Pakistan and Ceylon. London, 17 April 1949, FO 371/75634F5491, PRO.
61 Arnold Fletcher, *Afghanistan: Highway of Conquest*, New York: Cornell University Press, 1965, p.251.
62 United States Policy Toward South Asia (India, Pakistan, Afghanistan, Ceylon and Nepal) NSC 5409, Secret, February 1954, *FRUS*, 1952–54, Vol.XI, pp.1089–1093.
63 Arthur H. Dean to the Secretary of State, 27 January 1954, RG 59,611.91/2-154, US National Archives and Records Administration (NARA), College Park, Maryland.
64 See Miles Copeland, *The Games of Nations: The Amorality of Power Politics*, New York, 1969, p.58.
65 Memo of Discussion, 14th Meeting of the NSC, 2 June 1953, AWF, NSC series, Box 4 in Andrew J. Rotter, 'Christians, Muslims and Hindus: Religion and US–South Asian Relations, 1947–1954', *Diplomatic History*, Vol.24, No.4, Fall 2000.
66 The Acting Secretary of State to Embassy in Pakistan (Secret), 24 November 1951, *FRUS*, Vol.VI, p.1944.
67 The SEATO alliance primarily aimed to oppose further communist gains in Southeast Asia after the coming to power of communists in Mainland China and Vietnam. It had as its members Australia, France, Britain, New Zealand, Pakistan, Phillipines, Thailand, and the United States. The alliance was disbanded in 1977.
68 Initially the Baghdad Pact comprised Britain, Iraq and Pakistan. Later Iran also joined. The United States remained an associate member. This pact, aimed at combating Soviet influence in the Middle East, was regrouped and called the Central Treaty Organization (CENTO) in 1959 after the overthrow of the pro-Western monarchy in Iraq.
69 See Abdul Samad Ghaus, *The Fall of Afghanistan: An Insider's Account*, New York: Pergamon, 1989 p.80.
70 US Policy Toward South Asia. Secret. Memorandum by the Executive Secretary (Lay) to the National Security Council, Washington DC, 14 December 1954, *FRUS*, 1952–54, Vol.XI, pp.1151–1155. Several documents in the US State Department records indicate that Pakistani officials delivered a continuous barrage of anti-Afghan sentiments in their meeting with US officials in the period 1951–55. They stressed that the Afghan royal family was unreliable and pro-Soviet. See *FRUS* Series on South Asia from 1951 to 1954.
71 US Policy Toward South Asia. Memorandum of the Executive Secretary (Lay) to the National Security Council. Secret. Washington DC,14 December 1954, *FRUS*, 1952–54, Vol.XI, p.1155.
72 Henry S. Bradsher. *Afghanistan and the Soviet Union*, Durham: Duke University Press, 1983, p.22.
73 See Barnett R. Rubin *The Fragmentation of Afghanistan: State Formation and Collapse in the International System*, New Haven: Yale University Press, 1995.

74 Memorandum From the Secretary of State's Special Assistant for Intelligence (Armstrong) to the Secretary of State. Washington DC, 15 April 1955. Pakistan–Afghanistan Situation, *FRUS*, 1955–1957, Vol.VIII, p.172.
75 Telegram from the Department of State to the Embassy in Afghanistan, Washington DC, 5 May 1955, *FRUS*, 1955–1957, Vol.VIII, South Asia, p.179.
76 Memorandum of Discussion at the 285th Meeting of the National Security Council, Washington DC,17 May 1956, *FRUS*, 1955–1957, Vol.VIII, pp.233–237.
77 In fact, Pakistani President Iskander Mirza had suggested to Secretary Dulles during the latter's visit to Karachi in March 1956 that a 'coup (in Afghanistan) would be necessary to clear up the situation' in Pakistan's favour! See Memorandum of Discussion at the 285th Meeting of the National Security Council, Washington DC, 17 May 1956, *FRUS*, 1955–1957, Vol.VIII, p.235.
78 See Telegram from Department of State to the Embassy in Pakistan Washington DC, 16 April 1955, *FRUS*, 1955–1957, Vol.VIII, p.173. The US Ambassador to Pakistan, Horace Hildreth had reported in a telegram that the Pakistani Prime Minister Chaudri Muhammad Ali did 'not have objective of removal of royal family' but sought only the 'removal of Daud' (Department of State, Central Files, 689.90D/5-855).
79 Hafiz Malik, *Pakistan–Soviet Relations and the post-Soviet Dynamics*, London: Macmillan, 1997, p.88.
80 Pakistan had even suspended the shipments of the US Morris-Knudsen Company involved in the development of hydroelectric and irrigation projects in the Helmand river valley, delaying the completion of American-financed projects.
81 Memorandum of a Conversation, Prime Minister's Residence, Karachi, 7 March 1956, *FRUS*, 1955–1957, Vol.VIII, p.225.
82 It appears from declassified documents that the United States had prior knowledge of the impending *coup d'état*. See Telegram from the Department of State to the Embassy in Pakistan, 21 May 1958, *FRUS*, 1958–1960, Vol.XV, p.648. See also Telegram from US Consul General in Dacca to Department of State, 29 May 1958, p.649.
83 Memorandum from Acting Director of the Bureau of Intelligence and Research (Arneson) to Secretary of State, *FRUS*, 1958–60, Vol.XV South and Southeast Asia, pp.672–673.
84 Memorandum of Conversation Between the Afghan Ambassador (Maiwandwal) and the Assistant Secretary of State for Near Eastern and South Asian Affairs (Rountree), Department of State, Washington DC, 13 October 1958, *FRUS*, 1958–1960, Vol.XV, pp.240–241.
85 See Memorandum from Under Secretary of State (Herter) to the President, Washington DC, 8 November 1958, *FRUS*, 1958–1960, Vol.XV, pp.248–249 and Telegram from the Department of State to the Embassy in Pakistan, 12 January 1959, *FRUS*, 1958–1960, Vol.XV, p.259.
86 M. Hassan Kakar, *Afghanistan: The Soviet Invasion and the Afghan Response, 1979–1982*, Berkeley: University of California Press, 1995, p.9.
87 Lt. Gen. Gul Hassan Khan, *Memoirs of Lt. Gen. Gul Hassan Khan*, Karachi: Oxford University Press, 1993, pp.105–107.
88 Telegram from the Department of State to the Embassy in Afghanistan, Washington DC, 12 October 1962, *FRUS*, 1961–1963, Vol.XIX, South Asia, pp.347–348. The Shah had previously tried to mediate in the Pakistan–Afghanistan dispute and had even suggested a confederation between Iran, Pakistan and Afghanistan. See Louis Dupree, 'A suggested Pakistan, Afghanistan, Iran Federation', *Middle East Journal*, Vol.17. No.4, Autumn 1963, pp.383–399.
89 Memorandum of Conversation, Meeting of the President and Prince Naim, Washington DC, 27 September 1962, *FRUS*, 1961–1963, Vol.XIX, pp.334–338.

90 S.M.M. Qureshi, 'Pakhtunistan: The Frontier Dispute Between Afghanistan and Pakistan', *Pacific Affairs*, Vol.XXXIX, Nos 1 and 2, Spring–Summer 1966, pp.99–114.

91 Memorandum from Robert W. Komer of the NSC Council Staff to President Kennedy, Washington DC, 12 November 1962, *FRUS*, 1961–1963, Vol.XIX, South Asia, p.375.

92 A United States U-2 spy plane flown by Francis Gary Powers had taken off from the American base and intelligence facility at Badaber near Peshawar in May 1960 to gather information about the Soviet Union. The plane was shot down over Soviet territory and the Soviets had warned Pakistan of dire consequences if such an action was repeated.

93 An excellent analysis of Pakistan's relationship with China is in Anwar Hussain Syed, *China and Pakistan: The Diplomacy of Entente Cordial*, London: Oxford University Press, 1974.

94 Tahir Amin Khan, 'Economy, Society and the State in Pakistan', *Contemporary South Asia*, **9** (2), 2000, p.184.

95 The United States Ambassador at Large, Chester Bowles had stated in a conversation with the Soviet Ambassador to Washington that the US had 'absolutely no military objectives in Afghanistan ... in 1953 when the Afghan government asked us for military equipment and military training mission, we refused because Afghanistan was traditionally neutral, directly bordering the USSR and under such circumstances US military mission would be provocative'. See Memorandum from the Ambassador at Large (Bowles) to President, Washington, 14 October 1962, *FRUS 1961–1963*, Vol.X, Soviet Union, p.359.

96 The upper house (Senate) was supposed to have one third of its members appointed by the King, the rest comprising one representative from each provincial council and one representative directly from each province. See Asta Olesen, *Islam and Politics in Afghanistan*, London: Curzon, 1995, chapter 7 for a discussion of the political reforms introduced in Afghanistan in the period 1964–1965.

97 The leading pro-Soviet group, the Peoples Democratic Party of Afghanistan (PDPA) was founded in January 1965. Nur Muhammad Taraki and Babrak Karmal emerged as the leading ideologues of the PDPA. The PDPA was formed with tacit Soviet consent and funding. In 1967, the PDPA split into two factions: Khalq headed by Taraki largely comprised rural Pashtuns and Parcham led by Babrak Karmal had more urbanised Persian-speaking cadres. See Vasiliy Mitrokhin, 'The KGB in Afghanistan', Working Paper No.40, *Cold War International History Project*, Washington DC: Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars, February 2002.

98 For a detailed discussion of India's role in the dismemberment of Pakistan see R. Sisson and L.E. Rose *War and Secession: Pakistan, India and the Creation of Bangladesh*, Berkeley: University of California Press, 1990.

99 See Henry Kissinger, *The White House Years*, Boston: Little Brown and Company, 1979, p.572. Henry Kissinger used the Yahya regime as a conduit to initiate United States' relations with the Peoples Republic of China. Kissinger secretly visited Beijing via Islamabad in July 1971. Most significantly, the United States was deeply involved in the India–Pakistan conflict over East Pakistan. President Nixon had told the British Prime Minister Edward Heath that the 'worst thing' that could happen was 'for Pakistan to disintegrate'. In fact, Nixon told Heath that Pakistan was not going to do anything against India because 'we have got a pretty good hold there' as a result of US involvement in 'the military area'. See *Telephone Conversation between the Prime Minister and the President of the United States on the afternoon of Thursday, 25 November, 1971* (Secret), PREM 15/741, PRO, UK.

100 According to Stanley Wolpert before taking power Bhutto had met Nixon and Kissinger, raising rumours in Pakistan that the change had the approval of Washington. Stanley Wolpert, *Zulfi Bhutto of Pakistan*, London: Oxford University Press, 1996, p.259.

101 See Memorandum from the Ambassador in Pakistan (Locke) to President Johnson, Washington DC, 26 July 1966, *FRUS*, 1964–1968, Vol.XXV, South Asia, pp.704–705. The US Ambassador enthusiastically wrote to the President, 'Ayub has shown his good faith by A. Firing Bhutto B. Conduct at SEATO meeting C. Not particularly warm reception of Chou En-Lai'!

102 Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto, *The Myth of Independence*, Karachi: Oxford University Press, 1967, p.186.

103 Bhutto had to assume the responsibilities of Martial Law Administrator as the State of Emergency imposed by the Yahya regime continued. Moreover, in the absence of a viable constitution, the country was still being run under the Legal Framework Order (LFO) enacted by the Yahya regime after it had deposed Ayub and dissolved the One Unit.

104 See Marvin G. Weinbaum, *Pakistan and Afghanistan: Resistance and Reconstruction*, Boulder: Westview Press, 1994, p.3.

105 The JUI had split into two major factions in the late 1960s. The more politicised faction led by Mawlana Mufti Mahmood and Ghaus Baksh Hazarvi had considerable following in the NWFP while Mawlana Ehteshamul Haq Thanvi controlled the conservative faction of the group.

106 The Jamaat-i-Islami headed by its renowned leader, Mawlana Syed Abul Ala Mawdudi, could only win two seats for the National Assembly in the Punjab despite having an organised party structure.

107 *Nawai-e-Waqt* (Urdu), 12 May 1972.

108 Actually this was the first time an elected Baluch-dominated government had been formed in the province after 1947. The Governor-General had administered Baluchistan from 1947 to 1955 when it was integrated in the province of West Pakistan.

109 See Selig S. Harrison, *In Afghanistan's Shadow: Baluch Nationalism and Soviet Temptations*, Washington DC: Carnegie Endowment Study, 1981. The Bhutto regime's abolition of the tribal *sardari* (Chieftain) system that allowed the local tribal chiefs to impose their taxes and keep private jails put a dent in the tribal nature of Baluchi politics that further alienated the mainstream Baluch nationalist politicians who were largely chiefs of their tribes.

110 William L.F. RushBrook, *Pakistan under Challenge*, London, 1975. p.94.

111 Selig S. Harrison, *In Afghanistan's Shadow: Baluch Nationalism and Soviet Temptations*, p.97. In the period 1973–1977, Iran had provided Pakistan with over US$600 million in economic assistance. See *Pakistan Economic Survey*, Ministry of Finance, Government of Pakistan, 1976.

112 The two key players involved in the coup, Colonel Abdul Qadir, Head of the Airforce and the Commander of the Tank Group in Kabul, Colonel Aslam Watanjar, were members of the pro-Soviet PDPA's Parcham faction. See Henry S. Bradsher, *Afghan Communism and Soviet Intervention*, London: OUP, 1999, pp.15–16.

113 King Muhammad Zahir, who at the time of the coup was holidaying in Italy, announced his abdication on 24 August 1973. To erase the vestiges of monarchical rule, Daud stopped the usage of honorific titles preceding names of Afghan, mostly Pashtun, tribal chiefs such as *Sardar*.

114 See Niloufar Qasim Mahdi, 'Pakhtunwali: Honour and Ostracism in the Pathan Hill Tribes', *Journal of Ethnology and Social Biology*, Vol.VII, 1983, New York: Elsevier Publishing House, pp.295–303.

115 The non-Pashtun Afghans were particularly active in the formation of Islamist political parties in the late 1960s. The most famous of such parties was the *Jamiat-i-Islami-i-*

Afghanistan (Islamic Society of Afghanistan) headed by Burhanuddin Rabbani, an ethnic Tajik from Faizabad in Badakshan who taught at the Faculty of Islamic Studies of the Kabul University that emerged in 1972. Pashtun Islamists Gulbuddin Hekmatyar and Abdul Rab Rasul Sayaf, who later played an important role in the anti-Soviet war and became rivals of Rabbani, were initially affiliated with *Jamiat-i-Islami-i-Afghanistan*.

116 Hassan al Banna founded the Muslim Brotherhood movement in 1928. Al Banna believed that the main reason for the Muslims' backwardness and subservience to the West lay in their estrangement from Islam. He emphasised that a return to the precepts of Islam should be the key to the revival of the power and glory of Islam. Later, al Banna's contemporary, Sayyid Qutb would develop an entire Islamist discourse in which he proposed the necessity for establishing an Islamic political system and ideology as a prerequisite for the revival of Islam. For a summary of Qutb's thought, see Ibrahim M. Abu-Rabi, *Intellectual Origins of Islamic Resurgence in the Modern Arab World*, Albany: State University of New York Press, 1996.

117 Members of this grouping were in contact with the officials of the US Embassy in Kabul to get financial assistance against the 'communists.' See US Embassy Kabul to Department of State, Airgram A-60, 29 May 1972, 'Merajuddin: Portrait of a Moslem Youth Extremist' (Confidential), National Security Archive, Washington DC. Http://www.gwu.edu/~nasarchiv/NSAEBB/NSAEBB59/index2.html. Accessed 16/9/2002.

118 Radio Kabul BroaD.C.ast, 17 July 1973, published in the *Dawn*, Karachi, 18 July 1973 and in *Kabul Times*, 20 July 1973.

119 The Secretary General of the NAP, Ajmal Khattak was one of the more prominent Pakistani Pashtun exiles.

120 See Government of Pakistan, *White Paper on Baluchistan*, Islamabad: Printing Corporation of Pakistan Press, 1974.

121 Letter of President Muhammad Daud to the United Nations Secretary General, Kurt Waldheim accusing Pakistan of using force against the 'Baluch Freedom Fighters'. United Nations Documents 1974 published in the *Pakistan Horizon*, First Quarter, 1975, pp.174–182.

122 *Dawn*, Karachi, 7 May 1974.

123 Coincidentally, Daud's measures against the internal opposition were taken at a time when Islamabad was pursuing a more activist policy to integrate the semi-autonomous tribal agencies. New roads and communications infrastructure were being built to facilitate this effort.

124 See William J. Drummond, 'Pakistan is moving to secure Afghan border tribal areas', *International Herald Tribune*, Paris, 19 November 1973.

125 See Interview with Major General (retired), Naseerullah Babur, *Defence Journal* (Rawalpindi), April 2001.

126 Babar (interview), Op. Cit, p.4.

127 Ibid.

128 Lawrence Lifschultz, 'Afghanistan: The not-so-new rebellion', *Far Eastern Economic Review*, January 30, 1981.

129 Olivier Roy, *Islam and Resistance in Afghanistan*, London: Cambridge University Press, 1986, pp.74–77.

130 Naseerullah Babur claimed in an interview with *The New York Times* that the United States knew about this covert Pakistani operation, *The New York Times*, 23 April 1989.

131 Bhutto had reportedly threatened to take Jalalabad, the Capital of Nangarhar Province if Kabul maintained its hostile attitude towards Pakistan. See Niloufer Mahdi,

Pakistan's Foreign Policy, 1971–1981: The Search for Security, Lahore: Ferozsons, 1999, p.135.

132 *Pravda*, 14 October 1974. Bhutto visited Moscow in October 1974 and met Soviet Prime Minister Kosygin, General Secretary L.I. Brezhnev and President Podgorny. The leaders of Pakistan and the USSR showed a willingness to improve their historically cold relations. The Soviet media praised the Bhutto regime's socialist policies in the area of building a strong public sector, nationalisation of banks and land reforms.

133 Henry S. Bradsher, *Afghan Communism and Soviet Intervention*, p.19.

134 Miron Rezun, 'Iran and Afghanistan: With Special Reference to their Asian Policies and Practices' in Ashok Kapor (ed), *Diplomatic Ideas and Practices of Asian States*, Leiden: E.J. Brill, 1990, p.11. Pakistan, Iran and Turkey were already members of a regional political and economic grouping known as the Regional Cooperation for Development (RCD). The RCD was formed in 1964 by a joint initiative of President Ayub and the Shah. After the Iranian revolution, the RCD was renamed the Economic Cooperation Organization (ECO) in 1985. The ECO presently includes, apart from its original members, the former Soviet Central Asian Republics, Azerbaijan and Afghanistan. However, the ECO has remained a mainly ceremonial organization and has been largely ineffectual in fostering regional economic cooperation.

135 *BBC, SWB*, Far East, Weekly Report, W.827, 1.5.75.

136 *BBC Summary of World BroaD.C.asts (SWB)*, Far East, Weekly Economic Report, W.808, 2.1.75.

137 Daud's interest in developing stronger ties with the United States was known to have grown before the July,1973 coup. According to the US Ambassador to Afghanistan, Robert Neumann, Daud had been in contact with the US Embassy through an Afghan Foreign Ministry official, Wahid Abdullah, to gauge Washington's reaction toward his possible return to power. See US Embassy Kabul to Department of State, Cable 1806, 21 March 1972, 'Afghanistan – Political Uncertainties' (Secret), 4 pp. NSA. http://www.gwu.edu/~nsarchiv/NSAEBB/NSAEBB59/index2.html. Accessed 19/9/2002.

138 Hafizullah Emadi, 'New World Order or Disorder: Armed Struggle in Afghanistan and United States' Foreign Policy Objectives', *Central Asian Survey*, Vol.18, No.1, 1999, pp.49–64.

139 Abdul Samad Ghaus, *The Fall of Afghanistan*, p.127.

140 Abdul Samad Ghaus, *The Fall of Afghanistan*, pp.127–129.

141 Ibid.

142 *Kabul Times*, 23 August 1976.

143 A deal is reported to have been reached at that time between Afghanistan and Pakistan under which the NAP leaders were to be released under a general amnesty and, as a *quid pro quo*, Afghanistan was to accept the Durand Line as the permanent border. See *Far Eastern Economic Review*, 5 May 1978 and *Times of India*, 30 December 1978.

144 For a discussion of Afghan Islamic groups' ideological orientation, see Olivier Roy, *Islam and Resistance in Afghanistan*. Mawdudi's views on political Islam are discussed in Sayed Vali Reza Nasr, *Mawdudi and the Making of Islamic Revivalism*, London: Oxford University Press, 1996.

145 Moreover, he had the parliament declare the heretical *Qadiani* or *Ahmadi* sect non-Muslims in 1974 to appease the Islamic parties belonging to the Sunni and Shiite sects. This had, in fact, antagonised the mainly Punjabi members of this sect, who had considerable representation in the military and bureaucracy.

146 This is indicated in Niloufar Mahdi, *Pakistan's Search for Security, 1971–1981*, and Kausar Niazi, *Aur Line Kat Gayee* (Urdu), 1991. Shaikh Rashid, a former Minister in the Bhutto government asserted that the US directly threatened Mr. Bhutto, see *Herald*,

Karachi, Vol.18, No.6, June 1987, pp.136–141. Before the July coup, it is now known that General Zia had been in contact with the US Ambassador, Henry Byroade (an ex-US Army Officer). The meetings were conducted in June 1977 and without the approval of the Government as was required. See Sayyid A.S. Pirzada, *The Politics of the Jamiat-i-Ulama-i-Islam Pakistan*, Karachi: Oxford University Press, 2000, pp.191–193.

The US National Security Agency's declassified documents on the US/UK-instigated coup against the Iranian Prime Minister M. Mossadegh in 1953 suggest Byroade's involvement in this episode. See *The Secret CIA History of the Iran Coup, 1953*, National Security Archive, Washington DC: The George Washington University, 2000.

147 Shafqat Ali Shah, 'Pakistan's Foreign Policy Dilemmas in the New Millennium', *The Round Table*, Vol.360, 2001, pp.345–356.

148 Benazir Bhutto, *Foreign Policy in Perspective*, Lahore: Classic, 1978, p.79.

149 In the period 1972–1975, approximately 43% of the national budget was allocated for defence purposes. See Hasan Askari Rizvi, *The Military and Politics in Pakistan, 1947–1997*, Lahore: Sang-e-Meel, 2000 p.219.

150 Notably, Bhutto's choice of appointing General Zia-ul-Haq as the Army Chief in 1976 contributed to the overthrow of the government. Zia, who was regarded as loyal by Bhutto, sympathised with the Jamaat-i-Islami and was staunchly anti-communist. Earlier, Zia had served with the Royal Jordanian Army as an adviser and played a part in the suppression of a radical Palestinian uprising in that country in September 1970. See Gul Hassan Khan, *Memoirs of Lieutenant General Gul Hassan Khan*, p.165.

Chapter 3

The Zia Regime and Afghanistan, 1978–1988

The military regime headed by General Muhammad Zia-ul-Haq continued the momentum in improving Pakistan–Afghanistan ties that had been generated during the concluding phase of the Bhutto administration. In the context of the tortuous Pakistan–Afghanistan relationship, President Daud's enhancement of economic and political links with Iran and Saudi Arabia facilitated the emerging rapprochement between Kabul and Islamabad. Monarchical Iran and Saudi Arabia were Pakistan's closest allies in the region and had openly welcomed the advent of the Zia regime. In this regard, Iran's rapidly growing influence in Afghanistan had a positive effect in dampening the strains between Pakistan and Afghanistan. Pakistan's intensive strategic relationship with the Shah's Iran rested not only on the mutuality of interests with Tehran but also on both of these countries' dependence on their superpower patron, the United States.

Afghanistan's tilt towards the conservative Muslim states of the region had also motivated Kabul in desisting from actively encouraging Pashtun irredentism in Pakistan. However, the overthrow of the Daud regime in April 1978 would fundamentally alter the regional security scenario and act as a catalyst in bringing about a fundamental change in Pakistan's policy towards Afghanistan.

This chapter examines Islamabad's policy towards the pro-Soviet Afghan PDPA regime from the April 1978 coup onwards. It evaluates the reasons for the Zia regime's decision to covertly support the anti-communist Islamic groups prior to the Soviet military intervention in December 1979. The influence of Pakistan's domestic political conditions on its Afghan policy is also analysed. The chapter scrutinizes the role of the Pakistani military in backing the anti-Soviet Afghan Jihad during the period 1980–1988 with the connivance of the United States. Lastly, the chapter provides a broader picture of Pakistan–Afghanistan interaction by linking it with the overall geopolitical changes in the region during the tumultuous decade of the 1980s.

The Making of Pakistan's Afghan Policy

General Zia-ul-Haq retained the essential ingredients of the deposed Prime Minister Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto's foreign policy, which had aimed at forging strong ties with the oil-rich Muslim Arab states and Iran. The relations with Pakistan's key major allies, namely, the United States and the Peoples Republic of China (PRC) remained steady, despite the Zia regime's suspension of the constitution and incarceration of the legally elected Prime Minister.[1] However, the Soviet Union was perturbed by the

advent of military rule in Pakistan as earlier Moscow had approvingly wooed Bhutto and praised his 'independent foreign policy'.[2] Pakistan's relations with India, its archrival in the subcontinent, continued to be frigid. Concerning Afghanistan, the Zia regime adhered to the policy of improving Pakistan's relations with the government of President Muhammad Daud. The basis of this policy had already been set during the last months of Bhutto's rule. Nevertheless, the apparent cordiality in the Pakistan–Afghanistan relationship was still marred by the 'problem' of the Pashtun and Baluch peoples. This was regarded by Kabul as the 'only political difference' it had with Islamabad.[3]

The July 1977 *coup d'état* in Pakistan was seen by Afghanistan as an internal matter and Kabul refrained from giving any comments on this development. Moreover, General Zia-ul-Haq took a conciliatory stance towards the Pashtun and Baluch nationalist leaders imprisoned under the Bhutto regime for allegedly inciting secessionist movements. The release of Baluch nationalist politicians like Sardar Khair Bux Marri, Sardar Ataullah Mengal, Ghaus Bux Bizenjo and the veteran Pashtun leader, Abdul Wali Khan, was seen as a positive step by Afghanistan. In order to bolster ties with Islamabad, Daud had appointed former Prime Minister, Noor Ahmad Etemadi, as Ambassador to Pakistan. General Zia himself visited Afghanistan in October 1977. Zia and Daud developed a good understanding between each other and agreed that President Daud would visit Pakistan.[4] On 5 March 1978, Daud arrived in Islamabad and commenced negotiations with General Zia regarding further improvement of bilateral relations. Daud declared in Lahore on March 8 that Pakistan and Afghanistan will now: 'walk hand in hand in the warm glow of brotherhood ... the era when both of us were subject to the old classic imperialistic technique of "divide and rule" is over.'[5] Some prominent commentators have noted that during the Zia-Daud parleys in Islamabad, Daud agreed to discontinue the use of Afghan territory by Pashtun and Baluch dissidents opposed to the Pakistan Government.[6]

President Daud's desire for a rapprochement with Pakistan was in a sense a corollary of the changes he had brought in Afghanistan's internal and external policies since 1975. Domestically, Daud had virtually abandoned the earlier promises of social reform and democratic governance. By 1977, he had dispensed with the pro-Soviet Parcham faction of the PDPA that had been crucial in his rise to power. Daud had adopted an authoritarian political model for the sustenance of his regime that aimed to create a strong centralised state based upon an all-powerful Presidency. His 1977 constitution replaced the former bicameral parliament with a unicameral legislature. This new legislature was structured according to a one party system and was controlled by Daud's *Hezb-e-Inqelab-e-Melli* (the National Revolution Party). The President was not accountable to the legislature. Only the *Loya Jirga* (grand national tribal assembly) could scrutinise certain Presidential acts. However, the *Loya Jirga*, the highest body in the structure of the Afghan state, was only summoned in national emergencies or in situations of extreme national importance such as beginning or terminating a war. Most significantly, Daud raised the position of the armed forces in the political structure by assuring their participation in the country's political life. Under the 1977 constitution, the Supreme Council of the Armed Forces was established to represent the interests of the military.[7] Daud's dictatorial orientation alienated not only both the pro-Soviet Parcham and Khalq factions of the PDPA but also the traditional clergy as growing secularisation eroded their influence over the education system. Nevertheless, the Pashtun dominance of the Afghan state continued under Daud's rule with the Muhammadzais, including members of Daud's *Musahiban* clan, still holding some key appointments.[8]

In the area of external relations, Daud had by late 1977 moved his regime considerably away from the embrace of the Soviet Union. Increasing involvement of Iran in Afghanistan's internal affairs greatly disturbed the Kremlin leadership.[9] The Shah's intelligence agency, SAVAK, started to train the Afghan secret police. Moreover, the influence of the Shah increasingly motivated the Afghan elites to move towards the West. In pursuance of enhancing ties with conservative Muslim states, Daud travelled to Saudi Arabia and Egypt, both firmly anti-Soviet states in the Islamic world. The Saudis promised Daud US$500 million in financial assistance.[10] Afghanistan's improvement of ties with Pakistan was to an extent assisted by the Shah's mediation.[11] Daud's turn towards the West and the conservative Muslim states had increased Soviet apprehensions about the future of Soviet–Afghan ties. By 1978, the Soviet Union and its Eastern bloc allies had given Kabul aid to the value of US$1.5 billion, excluding large-scale military assistance.[12] Moscow had remained Afghanistan's largest aid donor during the Daud era in spite of the changes in Afghan foreign policy that went contrary to Soviet sensitivities.

Daud's increasingly anti-leftist stance motivated the persistently squabbling Khalq and Parcham factions of the PDPA to unite in 1977.[13] The Communist Party of India acted as a mediator in this development. The PDPA's unity move was in fact aimed to deter the Daud regime from eliminating the Afghan left.[14] The advent of 1978 saw a decline in Daud's popularity owing to his regime's increasingly dictatorial turn exacerbated by a declining economy. His repressive measures against the left provided the spark for, *coup d'état* by the pro-Soviet PDPA against his regime on 27 April 1978. This coup was glorified by the PDPA as the Great Saur (April) Revolution. The Parcham–Khalq coalition gained power with the assistance of Soviet-trained officers of the Afghan army and the air force who in 1973 had also been instrumental in installing Daud.[15] The coup claimed the life of Daud and several members of his family. Despite the violent nature of the coup, the Afghan armed forces handed over power to the civilian leadership of the PDPA, unlike neighbouring Pakistan where the military regime exerted almost complete hegemony over the state. The leader of the Khalq faction, Nur Muhammad Taraki, who headed the PDPA regime, became the President and the Prime Minister of the newly proclaimed Democratic Republic of Afghanistan (DRA). Hafizullah Amin, the chief organiser of the coup and also belonging to Khalq, was named one of the deputy prime ministers along with Parcham's Babrak Karmal. Taraki and Amin were Ghilzai Pashtuns whereas Babrak Karmal came from a mixed Pashtun–Tajik ancestry.

The Saur coup had come at a time when the ultra-conservative military administration in Pakistan was in the process of imposing an 'Islamisation' agenda. The military's flaunting of its 'Islamic' credentials served to counter the leftist opposition led by Bhutto's Pakistan Peoples Party (PPP). The ruling military junta regarded the change in government in Kabul as a Soviet-inspired move that impinged on the security of Pakistan. This radical political shift could give an

incentive to the leftist and ethno-nationalist forces to challenge the military regime.[16] Thus, the leftist coup in Kabul was regarded by the military as threatening and had the potential to destabilize the fragile military regime. The Zia regime was not entirely inaccurate in its assessment, as Bhutto sympathizers and ethnically oriented parties led by Pashtun and Baluch nationalists had expressed sympathies for the PDPA.[17]

Mohammad Ayoob's argument that internal insecurities 'fundamentally determine the security predicament of the Third World state' certainly has some validity, especially in the context of military ruled Pakistan of the late 1970s.[18] To Zia, an alleged admirer of the Spanish Fascist leader, Francisco Franco, and a follower of the conservative Islamist teachings of the founder of the Islamist Jamaat-i-Islami (JI), Syed Abul Ala' Mawdudi, a Marxist-leaning regime across the Durand Line was certainly an anathema.[19] In this regard, Zia, who openly called himself a 'rightist', issued an unambiguous warning to Pakistan's 'leftists' after the Saur coup to behave or face the consequences. He observed that: 'the sooner the leftists wake up and come to the middle of the road, the better it would be for them'.[20]

The leading Islamist party of Pakistan, the Jamaat-i-Islami (JI), and the traditionalist Jamiat-i-Ulama-i-Islam (JUI) had led the campaign against Bhutto. These two groupings were an integral component of the right-wing Pakistan National Alliance (PNA) opposed to the PPP government. For the JI, JUI and other smaller Islamic groups, an overt goal was the establishment of an 'Islamic system' based on the *Sharia* in Pakistan.[21] It is alleged that these groups were funded by conservative Arab states such as Saudi Arabia during their anti-Bhutto campaign.[22] The JI was the most organized and disciplined Islamist party in Pakistan that had some penetration in the armed forces and the bureaucracy. As an Islamist party its objective was the pursuit of political power with the aim of establishing a regime based on the *Sharia* law. With General Zia's assumption of power, the JI had, for the first time in Pakistan's troubled history, a leader inclined towards Mawdudi's interpretation of Islam. Zia, a son of a Sunni Muslim clergyman from the now Indian East Punjab, unambiguously associated the identity of the Pakistani state with Islam. For an individual like Zia the collective identity of the Pakistani nation could only be based on the cultural construct of Islam. Islam and Pakistan were synonymous in Zia's vision for Pakistan.[23] Despite Zia's zeal for Islamisation, the mainstream military elite's allegiance to Islam tended to be rather nominal, but articulation of Islamic rhetoric served to legitimise the armed forces' control over the Pakistani state. Hence, by utilising Islamic symbols, Zia tried to provide legitimacy to his regime, while at the same time distracting the politicised masses away from Bhutto's brand of 'Islamic socialism'.

Almost immediately after coming to power the military had denationalised several agricultural based industries and shelved Bhutto's ambitious land reform agenda that was intended to ameliorate the social and economic disparities in Pakistani society. In contrast the regime played on the populace's Islamic sentiments by offering an 'Islamisation' package devoid of any concrete social or economic content other than measures to improve the 'law and order' situation by introducing seventh century Islamic penalties for robbery, consumption of alcohol and so on. According to Zia: 'Pakistan, which was created in the name of Islam, will continue to survive only if it sticks to Islam. That is why I consider the introduction of Islamic

system as an essential prerequisite for the country.'[24] This, in fact, contradicted his first speech on 5 July, 1977 in which he had proclaimed that his 'sole aim is to organise free and fair elections ... I give solemn assurance that I will not deviate from this schedule'.[25] In short, Zia used Islam as a tool to perpetuate his unconstitutional military regime. His intention of furthering the cause of Islam was linked to his political compulsion for survival in office. During his repressive and authoritarian rule, the Pakistani military truly exhibited the traits of a praetorian-ruler army portraying itself as the guardian of the state.[26] Religion was used as a rallying point to cement the military's authoritarian control over political institutions and civil society.

The developments in Afghanistan in April 1978 coincided with Zia's 'Islamisation' of Pakistani society. Many key members of the regime in Islamabad suspected that PDPA's takeover was totally controlled and planned in Moscow.[27] Recently declassified Soviet archives, however, tend to dispel this notion which was prevalent amongst a majority of Western and Pakistani analysts on Afghanistan at that time.[28]

In the immediate aftermath of the changes in Afghanistan, General Zia had held a special cabinet meeting to discuss Pakistan's policy towards the new order in Kabul. An important member of Zia's inner military council, Lieutenant-General Faiz Ali Chishti, stressed during this meeting that Pakistan should pursue a forward policy in Afghanistan to counter this pro-Soviet move by installing a 'favourable government in Kabul, using friendly Pashtun tribes' as 'defence of Pakistan lay in the defence of Afghanistan'.[29] Pakistan's national security policy priorities at this juncture were determined by a small coterie of military officers comprising General Zia and the most senior generals of the junta. Zia as chief executive and the chief martial law administrator (CMLA) was the head of a military council comprising Lieutenant-Generals: Faiz Ali Chishti (X Corps, Rawalpindi), Jehanzeb Arbab (Governor Sind and Commander V Corps, Karachi), Sawar Khan (Governor Punjab and Commander IV Corps, Lahore), Iqbal Khan (Chairman Joint Chiefs of Staff Committee) plus the military Governors of NWFP and Baluchistan. These individuals constituted the supreme decision making apparatus of the country.

Notwithstanding the reservations held in Islamabad about the events in Kabul, Pakistan recognised the newly designated 'Democratic Republic of Afghanistan' on 5 May 1978 after consulting its major allies, Iran, Saudi Arabia and the United States. The announcement of the decision to accord recognition was made in a cryptic and rather undiplomatic statement that made no reference to the conventional formalities, such as, expressing the desire to improve ties.

Pakistani military's apprehensions about the nature of the new government in Afghanistan prompted reactivation of the secretive Afghan Cell in the Foreign Ministry on 2 May 1978. Earlier the Afghan Cell had been created by the Bhutto regime in 1973 to formulate and coordinate Pakistan's policy vis-à-vis Sardar Daud's government. It comprised officials belonging to the Foreign Ministry and the Pakistani military's Interservices Intelligence Directorate (ISI) and was headed by the Prime Minister. The Cell worked in close collaboration with sections of the military establishment responsible for implementing the Afghan policy. The Cell essentially evaluated the Afghan governments' policy towards Pakistan and planned the Pakistani response to it. Over time, the Cell, however, was overshadowed by the

military's direct assumption of policy planning and implementation with regards to Afghanistan.

The Khalq faction of the PDPA had a sizeable cadre from rural Pashtun background who had affiliation with their Pashtun ethnic cousins east of the Durand Line. The Zia regime's fears about the revival of the 'Pashtunistan' issue were realised when on 9 May the Afghan President, Nur Muhammad Taraki, referred to the 'border dispute with Pakistan' after meeting the ageing Pashtun leader Abdul Ghaffar Khan in Kabul.[30] Hafizullah Amin, the Afghan Foreign Minister, indicated to his Pakistani counterpart in a meeting at the United Nations that the PDPA regime was not bound by any of the agreements that were made by Pakistan with President Daud.[31] The PDPA's stance on the Pakistani Pashtun and Baluch 'problem' signalled the renewal of tensions between Kabul and Islamabad. In this regard, Pakistan tried to counter the Afghan stand by coordinating its policy in cooperation with Iran. The installation of a left-wing Soviet backed regime in Kabul had changed the balance of power on Iran's south eastern borders signifying the failure of the Shah's policy to stem Soviet influence in the region. Soon after the Saur coup, Pakistan and Iran had increased their exchange of views on Afghanistan, as both were then members of the Central Treaty Organization (CENTO). In 1978 CENTO remained an important Middle Eastern component of the extended system of US-led regional security alliances directed against 'international communism' extending from Europe to Southeast Asia. Iran was a key member of CENTO, especially with regard to the Shah's shared values and interests with the United States in stemming Soviet penetration in the Middle East. The Shah had shown his approval of Zia's actions in overthrowing the socialist-leaning Bhutto administration in Pakistan. In addition, the Iranian monarch remained hostile to the PDPA regime until the last months of 1978, when his hold on power began to loosen in the wake of countrywide protests against his rule.[32]

The PDPA's announcement of a number of radical social and economic reforms in the months of May–June 1978 sparked considerable opposition within Afghanistan from conservative Islamist groups and vested interests who had a stake in maintaining the archaic and grossly iniquitous socio-economic system. The regime's measures included land reforms, improvement in the status of women, attempts at alleviating the country's over 90 per cent illiteracy rate, granting of rights to national minorities and the cancellation of debts owed by peasants to rich landlords, an act encouraged under the Islamic *Sharia*.[33] The intention behind the reforms tended to be reasonable but taking into account Afghanistan's tribal social structure, their implementation required patience, tact and an educated bureaucracy – attributes that the PDPA lacked. The Afghan armed forces, the only relatively organised institution in the country, although considerably strengthened by Soviet assistance were not strong enough to assist the PDPA in its ambitious schemes. Even Soviet specialists regarded the PDPA's reform program as over-ambitious and ill planned. According to a leading Soviet scholar on Afghanistan, the PDPA tried to 'do in two or three years what twenty or thirty years would not be sufficient to accomplish'.[34]

Afghanistan's semi-autonomous tribes have resisted centralised control since the emergence of the Afghan state in the mid-eighteenth century. Afghan governments had historically utilized tribal militias to crush domestic uprisings and foreign interventions. These irregular forces augmented the Afghan army. Alternatively,

local tribal chiefs could also muster these irregular forces for or against the central government in times of domestic disturbances. In fact, tribal and local loyalty amongst the Afghan soldiery impaired their commitment to the government cause, and this tendency has repeatedly marred attempts by subsequent Afghan regimes to form cohesive armed forces loyal to the Afghan state. Hence, societal segmentation based on tribalism favoured the evolution of a culture of guerrilla warfare based upon tribal militias.

The regime's attempts to broaden its social basis from the centre in a traditional society based on tribal, clan and kinship ties was in itself an herculean endeavour in the absence of an organised party infrastructure. The tribal, clan and kinship cleavages within society had impaired, throughout the course of history, the Afghan state's ability to meaningfully: 'penetrate society, regulate social relationships, and extract resources, and appropriate resources in determined ways'.[35] An Afghan's loyalty was primarily to his or her tribe, clan and associated patronage network rather than to the state. The country's social structure was composed of a heterogenous mosaic of tribal and ethnic groups that formed virtually autonomous 'microsocieties' predicated on the notion of *qawm* – the sub national identity based on kinship, region and language.[36] These microsocieties had their own distinctive pattern of leadership in rural areas founded upon age-old patron–client relationships. The traditional landowners, known as *Khans* or *Maliks*, in association with the village clergyman, acted as the link between the rural populace and the central government in Kabul. The rural power structure in which the local Khan and mullah were the *primus inter pares* was firmly intact on the eve of the PDPA's reforms. Even in urban centres of the country, political and religious groups had been unable to transcend their tribal, ethnic, sectarian and linguistic differences. The assertion of this ethno-tribal particularism became a major factor in the inability of the PDPA in the 1980s, or the Islamist groups, which succeeded it in the post-Soviet period, to consolidate their authority over a country where central authority had traditionally been weak.

The socialist PDPA regime proved to be incapable of implementing its comprehensive reform program in the face of stiff resistance from the rural clergy and affiliated landowners. The regime's emphasis on portraying the landowners as 'feudal' exploiters by using Marxist–Leninist terminology that gave primary importance to class struggle played into the hands of the Afghan Islamists. The utilisation of Marxist–Leninist language and symbols strengthened the Islamists' argument about the ungodly nature of the PDPA.[37] Furthermore, the PDPA's persistent internal dissension and factional disputes waged between the Khalq and the Parcham factions undermined its ability to face the growing opposition from the Islamists and the segment of the population whose interests were being directly threatened by the proposed reforms.[38] These problems were compounded by the fact that the PDPA never had more than a slender basis of support and that was concentrated mainly in Kabul, probably numbering no more than a few thousand people in a country that had a population of 15 million in 1978. By all accounts, the PDPA regimes of Nur Muhammad Taraki (May 1978–September 1979) and later Hafizullah Amin (September 1979–December 1979) were extremely repressive and thousands of people were imprisoned and executed during their brief tenure in office. Immature measures like changing the Afghan flag; renaming the country as

the Democratic Republic of Afghanistan (DRA); invocation of the names of Marx and Lenin by government officials and other such measures provided the Islamic groups and anti-PDPA clergy opportunity to denounce the government as 'atheistic' and a puppet of the Soviet Union. This further alienated the government's support base and fed the strength of its opponents who had already established their connections with the Zia regime in Pakistan. Therefore, at this stage, Pakistan's involvement in covertly backing the Islamic oriented Afghan opposition against the new regime in Kabul was to become a significant factor in exacerbating the political instability in Afghanistan.

In the summer of 1978, PDPA's policies had led thousands of conservative pro-Islamist Afghans to move over to Pakistan. This influx boosted the numbers of Afghan Islamists who were already residing in the NWFP and Baluchistan under the patronage of the ISI. The infrastructure created by Pakistan to destabilise the Daud regime had remained intact. The prominent Afghan Islamic leaders, dubbed as 'Muslim Brothers' or 'Ikhwanis' by the PDPA, like Gulbuddin Hekmatyar (Hizb-i-Islami), Ahmad Shah Masoud and Professor Burhanuddin Rabbani (Jamiat-i-Islami) continued to reside in Pakistan after the failed uprisings against President Daud between 1975–1976.

The Kabul regime's policies had induced other conservative Afghan religious personalities like Sibghatullah Mujaddidi, hailing from a family of *pirs* or holymen, to strengthen the counter-revolutionary forces based in Pakistan. Mujaddidi claimed descent from the hereditary leadership of the Sufi *Naqshbandiya* order, which had disciples in the eastern Pashtun provinces of Logar and Nangarhar. Afghan Sufism revolved around the traditional *Tariqa* (way) based upon the intellectual initiation of the disciple (*murid*) into the esoteric knowledge of Islam by his spiritual master or *pir*.[39] Sibghatullah Mujaddidi himself owned large tracts of land in Kandahar and Nangarhar provinces that had come under the PDPA land reform programme.[40] Generally, Mujaddidi's group was considered ineffective and prone to squandering the finances provided to it by the Pakistani intelligence. Another 'charismatic' Pashtun leader who gained prominence due to his *hijrat* (migration) to Pakistan in the Spring–Summer of 1978 was Pir Sayyed Ahmad Gaylani. Gaylani had followers amongst the Eastern Pashtuns inhabiting Wardak, Paktia and Nangharhar provinces. Gaylani was a big landowner and, according to Afghan Islamists opposed to his group, the Gaylani family had worked for the British intelligence in pre-partition India.[41] Further details about the Afghan Islamists are elaborated in the next section.

The two Islamic traditionalist personalities, who were to remain closely allied to Pakistani military, were Mawlawi Mohammad Yunus Khalis and Mawlawi Mohammad Nabi Mohammadi. They started operating from Pakistan in early 1979 and they were to exercise a prominent role as Pakistan's proxies in the Afghan civil war even after the withdrawal of the Soviet forces in 1989. As discussed in Chapter 2, the Hizb-i-Islami faction of Gulbuddin Hekmatyar had separated from Jamiat-i-Islami-i-Afghanistan (JIA) due to ideological disputes and latent ethnic tensions in the years 1977–1978. However, Hizb itself splintered further in late 1978 when Mawlawi Yunis Khalis broke away from Hekmatyar's party and formed his own group. The split primarily occurred due to Yunis Khalis's displeasure over Hekmatyar's authoritarian personality.[42] Nevertheless, ideological differences also played a part in this separation. Hekmatyar's party was an Islamist party patterned

on Pakistan's Jamaat-i-Islami, where a tightly controlled party hierarchy formulated the policies, rather akin to a Marxist–Leninist communist party Politburo. In contrast, Yunis Khalis and his followers were traditionalist village clergy for whom modern political ideas and notions of democracy held little appeal. Their main goal was the establishment of an Islamic state based upon the *Sharia*, as implemented during the time of the Prophet Muhammad, without the entrapping of western concepts. Yunis Khalis equated the United States with the Soviet Union in its hostility towards Islam. Similarly, Mawlawi Mohammad Nabi Mohammadi's group also showed 'traditionalist' traits as exhibited by the Yunis Khalis faction. Some scholars have termed Mohammadi's group as 'moderate' or 'traditionalist' without qualifying these terms adequately. In the post–Soviet era, Harakat's members were to become closely aligned with the Taliban militia, which was considered the epitome of the Pashtun 'traditionalist' movements associated with Ulama networks revolving around the hundreds of madrassas scattered across the Pakistan–Afghanistan border regions.[43]

Several Shiite groups were initially allowed by the Zia regime to open offices in Peshawar. The Shiites comprised 15–20% of the Afghan population. Groups such as *Shura-i-Inqilab-i-Etttefaq-i-Islami* (The Council for the Revolutionary Unity of Islam) under Sayed Ali Behesti established its presence in Pakistan but with the coming of the ostensibly anti-American regime of Ayatollah Khomeini in Iran, Islamabad ceased its rather nominal support for the Shiite anti-Soviet Afghans in Pakistan.

The situation in Afghanistan prompted General Zia to organise the disparate Afghan Islamic groups in Pakistan into a viable political and military force under Pakistani control. The Pakistani state became instrumental in giving the Pakistan-based Afghan Islamists international respectability and authenticity. Moreover, this policy domestically assisted the Pakistani military junta in giving legitimacy to its Islamic credentials. In this endeavour, the military coopted several Pakistani Sunni Islamic parties like the JI and the JUI to strengthen its political support vis-à-vis the left. From 1978 onwards, Zia drew the Jamaat into his Afghan policy. Zia, who was related to the Jamaat's Deputy Amir, Mian Tufail Muhammad, met with the ailing Mawlana Mawdudi, and the Jamaat's rising Pashtun star, Qazi Hussain Ahmad, to devise an Islamist policy aimed at destabilising the PDPA regime as early as May 1978.[44] The Pakistani military dictator had appointed his close confidant, Lieutenant-General Fazle Haq, a Pashtun, as Governor of the NWFP. Haq, who was commander of the Army's XI Corps, became the key personality in managing the covert operations against the Taraki–Amin regime. In this context, the Pakistani JI forged close associations with the radical Islamist Afghan parties especially the Hizb-i-Islami's two factions. Syed Vali Reza Nasr correctly points out that the Pakistani military's induction of Islamist parties into its Afghan strategy brought groups like the Jamaat-i-Islami: 'into Pakistan's foreign policymaking process, which taught the party leaders much about foreign policy making and forced them to develop regional and global perspectives'.[45]

In the Pakistani military's perception, the April coup in Kabul had altered Afghanistan's geopolitical status in Southwestern Asia. The country was no longer the traditional buffer between the Soviet Union and the Indian subcontinent. It was feared by members of the junta that Afghanistan could serve as a launching pad for

further Soviet incursions towards Pakistan. There was an apprehension that the Afghan socialist model, if successful, could lure Pakistan's disaffected Baluch and Pashtun minorities into the Soviet sphere.[46] Afghanistan's signing of more than 30 agreements in the fields of defence, culture, education and health over a short period with the Soviet Union tended to confirm the Pakistani elite's worst fears. Since the Afghan coup, the Zia regime had been conveying its apprehensions about Afghanistan to the Carter administration.[47] The regime's hidden agenda aimed to increase US involvement in Afghanistan. A NATO symposium codenamed 'SeaLink' had discussed developments in Afghanistan in June 1978 and suggested the appropriate response to the threat emanating from Soviet controlled Afghanistan.[48] A US State Department memorandum suggested a tough policy towards the new Afghan government and anticipated that: 'Pakistan, Iran, Saudi Arabia and our other friends in the area will see the situation clearly as a Soviet coup'.[49] While prodding the US for involvement in Afghanistan, the Zia regime kept in constant contact with Pakistan's 'all weather friend', the Peoples Republic of China. Zia publicly referred to his concerns about the 'stability of Afghanistan' to the Chinese Vice Premier, Geng Biao, during the latter's visit to Pakistan for the opening of the Karakorum Highway (KKH) linking Chinese Xinjiang to Islamabad.[50] The Chinese official had responded by repeating the standard Beijing mantra about Soviet 'hegemonism' and interference in the region.[51] The Karakorum Highway would later serve as one of the main channels for the supply of Chinese arms and ammunition for the Afghan Islamic groups.

As a shrewd and pragmatic politician, Zia pursued a two-pronged strategy with regards to Afghanistan between 1978 and 1979. At one level he tried to engage the PDPA regime in negotiations concerning improvement of bilateral ties, while on the other level he kept Pakistan's borders open for the opponents of the Kabul regime on 'purely humanitarian grounds' – a cliché uttered by the Foreign Ministry *ad nauseam* during the initial stages of the Afghan tragedy. The main objective of this strategy was to hinder the consolidation of the 'communist' government in Kabul, because it was perceived by the military that a Soviet-backed Afghanistan had the potential to unleash forces challenging the military's dominance over an elitist state run with the connivance of a *status quo* coalition of semi-feudal rural gentry and the relatively small financial–industrial groups. The military regime's involvement in Afghanistan was to firmly entrench the army's hegemony over Pakistan and brought to the fore its autonomy in relation to other institutions of the state.

Pakistan and the Afghan 'Jihad'

The PDPA's hasty and ill-conceived reforms provided an opportunity for the Afghan Islamic opposition to initiate a low-level, uncoordinated resistance to the government in various regions of the country by late 1978. The Soviet ambassador to Afghanistan, Alexander Puzanov, in a secret report to the Soviet Foreign Ministry acknowledged this trend. According to Puzanov 'internal reaction' was 'activating underground efforts (propaganda, dropping in of weapons, and diversionary groups which are being prepared in Pakistan)' to topple the PDPA regime.[52] For its part, the Pakistani military regime had allowed the Afghan Islamic groups to establish and

organize their anti-PDPA campaign within Pakistani territory. By August 1978, several Afghan opposition figures were issuing statements against Kabul from their safe sanctuary in Peshawar. The Pakistani state-controlled media highlighted the opposition's press statements.[53] Pakistan claimed that nearly 35,000 Afghan refugees had fled 'communist' rule and entered its territory by the end of 1978. However, even the conservative British media contested these figures and estimated that about 10,000 Afghans including tribesmen, religious leaders and refugees had fled to Pakistan's North West Frontier Province.[54]

Some key members of the regime in Islamabad feared that acquiescing to PDPA's rule over Afghanistan could jeopardize Pakistan's security and could possibly pave the way for potential Soviet advances in the region in the future.[55] An important member of the military had disclosed the regime's mindset regarding Afghanistan to the *New York Times* by emphasising that: 'For all practical purposes, the Soviet Union now has a border with Pakistan. The United States must realize that there has been a historic readjustment in this part of the world and act accordingly.'[56] Essentially, this statement implied the Zia regime's plea for the United States to get itself involved in countering the pro-Soviet administration in Kabul.

In order to facilitate Pakistan's covert backing for the Afghan groups opposed to the Kabul administration, Zia had instructed Lieutenant-General Fazle Haq to reduce the more than 50 Afghan groups and parties in Pakistan to a smaller figure. In this regard, the ISI was assigned the task of enhancing links with the Pakistan based Afghan oppositional groups. The Afghan Islamic opposition itself had by now crystallized around several personalities in Peshawar that had earlier been prominent in the evolution of Afghan Islamism in the 1960s. Nevertheless, the leadership of resistance inside Afghanistan largely remained with the *maliks* and *sardars* or tribal chiefs, and not directly under the control of the groups that were to gain prominence under the Pakistani auspices. In fact, the differences between these groups were more based on the ethno-linguistic and other traditional cleavages within the Afghan society rather than on ideology.

Scholars like Olivier Roy and Asta Olsen strongly emphasise the difference between 'fundamentalist' and 'moderate' Islamic parties.[57] However, in the Afghan and even Pakistani Islamism, political exigencies led to cadres from 'fundamentalist' parties moving over to the 'traditionalist' camp with ease. Therefore, it is difficult to apply a rigid fundamentalist/traditionalist dichotomy in the case of such groups. Afghan Islamism, was and still is, fluid and opportunistic. The Shiite–Sunni divide is the only area where distinctions can be made more authoritatively. For instance, after the Soviet withdrawal from Afghanistan in 1989, many Pashtun 'fundamentalists' belonging to Gulbuddin Hekmatyar's Hizb-i-Islami faction sided with the traditionalist Pashtun Harakat-i-Inqilab-i-Islami party against the mainly Tajik Jamiat-i-Islami. Hence, the simple dichotomy of attributing the description 'fundamentalist', 'traditionalist' or 'revolutionary' ignores the personal ambition for power, ethno-linguistic rivalry and other societal cleavages that acted as an obstacle in the way of the emergence of a united 'Islamic' front even in the formative years of the Afghan Islamic resistance.

It was under the tutelage of the Pakistani military that the disparate Afghan groups presented a semblance of unity in order to get Western support. In this context, seven major Afghan Islamic parties gained prominence, especially in the West, only with

the support and assistance of the Zia regime months before the Soviet military intervention in December 1979. The main Sunni groups that had coalesced by this time were:

Jabha-i-Nejat-i-Melli-i-Afghanistan (National Front for the Salvation of Afghanistan)

The National Front established an office in Peshawar in June 1978. Sibghatullah Mujaddidi headed this group. Mujaddidi remained in close contact with the Pakistani ISI until the mid-1990s when Pakistan stopped backing his rather ineffectual group in favour of more radical Islamists. The Mujaddidi family was commonly known in Kabul as the Hazrats of Shor Bazaar. They had participated in the anti-Amanuulah uprising in 1928. This had led to the family being labelled as British agents by the PDPA regime. Some members of the family had connections with the Egyptian Muslim Brothers (Ikhwan-al-Muslimin) and had fallen foul of Colonel Nasser's Arab nationalist government. The Mujaddidi family had contributed to the formation of a loose Islamic association, the *Khuddam al Furqan* (Servants of the Quran) that consisted of the traditionalist Islamist clergy and religious students (*Talibs*). The Khuddam was founded in association with Mawlana Ataullah Faizani (executed 1978), a prominent member of Afghan Islamism in the 1960s.[58] In January 1979, 21 members of the Mujaddidi clan were shot on the orders of Hafizullah Amin. This prompted Sibghatullah Mujaddidi to issue a *fatwa* or religious edict announcing Jihad against the Kabul regime on 12 March,1979. On his arrival in Peshawar, Mujaddidi formed the Jabha-i-Nijat-i-Melli-i-Afghanistan (National Front for the Salvation of Afghanistan) or the NFSA with the assistance of the Zia regime. The core of the NFSA comprised the disciples of Mujaddidi and royalist sympathizers, owing to the Mujaddidi family's association with the Muhammadzai monarchs since the early 1930s.

Harakat-i-Inqilab-i-Islami (Islamic Revolutionary Movement)

Mawlawi Muhammad Nabi Muhammadi led the Harakat. Muhammadi, a Ghilzai Pashtun, came to Pakistan in late 1978 and formed his group in Quetta, Baluchistan. Harakat represented a coalition of Pashtun mullahs or clergymen hailing from the southern Afghan provinces of Helmand, Kandahar and Zabol. Harakat had also established links with a network of Pashtun clergy hailing from the eastern provinces of Nangharhar, Logar, Ghazni and Paktika. Most importantly, Muhammadi had an old association with the Pakistani Deobandi Jamiat-i-Ulama-i-Islam party, then led by Mawlana Mufti Mahmud. Mahmud was an important leader in the anti-Bhutto agitation and was respected by General Zia. Later, Mawlana Mufti Mahmud's son, Mawlana Fazulur Rahman, would forge a bond between his faction of the JUI and Muhammadi's Harakat. Muhammadi had been a student of Mawlana Mufti Mahmud at the Haqqaniya madrassa in Akora Khattak, NWFP. During the anti-Soviet struggle Harakat remained very active in eastern and southern Afghanistan with the backing of the Pakistani military. Harakat could be described as the classic rural Pashtun 'traditionalist' group that emphasised adherence to the *Sharia* blended with Pashtun customs. Politically, this group was not hierarchically structured like Hekmatyar's

Hizb faction and it did not incorporate a modernist Islamic agenda, as was the case with Jamiat-e-Islami of Professor Rabbani. Most significantly, like its Deobandi counterparts in Pakistan and India, Harakat remained hostile to Shiite Islam. Later, Harakat provided a substantial number of cadres for the Taliban movement. Moreover, Harakat members had forged links with Pakistani Pashtun clergy in the tribal areas of the NWFP and regions in northern Baluchistan in the late 1970s. Mawlawi Muhammadi was a professional Islamic agitator who had earlier opposed the governments of Zahir Shah and President Daud. For a short period, he had served as a member of the *Wolesi Jirga* in the late 1960s. He fled Afghanistan in the summer of 1978 and was immediately cultivated by the ISI. Harakat's main cadres came from madrassas in southern Afghanistan near Kandahar.

Hizb-i-Islami (party of Islam) Khalis

The Hizb-i-Islami's splinter faction headed by Mawlawi Muhammad Yunus Khalis was founded in 1979. The Khalis faction resembled Muhammadi's Harakat as it also represented Pashtun village mullahs and had strong links with Pashtun Ulama on the Pakistan side of the Durand Line. Yunis Khalis was a veteran leader of the Afghan Islamic movement, having participated with Minhajuddin Gahiz in the publication of the Islamic magazine *Gahiz* in the 1960s. *Gahiz* was published with the backing of the leading luminaries of the Islamic movement such as Burhanuddin Rabbani, Ghulam Muhammad Niazi and Muhammad Musa Tawana.[59] Khalis belonged to Nanagharhar province and had resided in Pakistan for a long period. He had links with the two factions of the Pakistani JUI before the April coup in Kabul. Yunis Khalis started his operations from Pakistan in the summer of 1978.[60] The Khalis group's military commander, Jalaluddin Haqqani, gained prominence in actions against the Soviet/DRA forces during the 1980s. In the 1990s, Haqqani, backed by the ISI, associated himself with the Taliban. Even, the Taliban Amir, Mullah Muhammad Omar, had been a sub-commander with the Khalis faction during the Jihad against the Soviet Union. Moreover, some Pashtun commanders considered as 'moderates' by the United States were also initially associated with the Khalis faction. These included Abdul Haq (killed by the Taliban in October 2001), Amin Wardak and Haji Abdul Qadir (assassinated in Kabul, July 2002). Mawlawi Yunis Khalis remained a trusted ally of the Pakistani military during the more than two decades of conflict in Afghanistan. Moreover, the Khalis group formed a good relationship with the Saudi Arabian government and Khalis remained a frequent visitor to that country during and after the anti-Soviet Jihad.[61] The Khalis group had a considerable following among the tribal Pashtun clergy in the eastern Afghan provinces of Nangharhar, Paktia and Konar.

Hizb-i-Islami (party of Islam) Hekmatyar

Hekmatyar, as mentioned earlier, had stayed on in Pakistan since 1973 and with Pakistan's incitement, his group started low level operations against the PDPA administration in late 1978. Hekmatyar was openly supported by the leaders of the Pakistani Jamaat-i-Islami (JI) and according to the then Major-General Kamal Matinuddin 'the late President Zia gave him maximum support as he was fiercely

anti-Soviet and strongly in favour of continuing the Jihad'.[62] In fact, the Pakistani Jamaat-i-Islami maintained links with all Afghan Islamic groups. It did not matter whether they were 'traditionalist' or 'fundamentalist' as long as they continued their Jihad and accepted Pakistan's tutelage. The JI had been part of the Zia regime since August 1978 and influenced the military's policy about Afghanistan.

Jamiat-i-Islami-i-Afghanistan-JIA (the Islamic Society of Afghanistan)

The JIA was one of the largest Islamic parties opposed to the PDPA regime. A sizeable number of its cadres came from the Persian speaking Tajik population of Afghanistan. It had established its office in Pakistan in 1974. In 1978, the JIA was again revitalised by its leader, Professor Burhanuddin Rabbani, against the regime in Kabul. The Jamiat had earlier been waging intermittent guerrilla operations inside Afghanistan, especially in the Panjshir valley northeast of Kabul. Its famous guerrilla commander, Ahmad Shah Masoud, who had been trained by the Pakistani military, started the campaign by leaving Pakistan in 1978 in order to organise resistance in his native Panjshir valley. JIA was probably the only party that put up an effective resistance to the DRA regime from 1978 onwards. JIA had a relatively dedicated membership and its less rigid and accommodating attitude led it to attract substantial support from Afghanistan's non-Pashtun ethnic groups. The JIA did not receive as much Pakistani backing as it deserved, due to the Pakistani military's bias towards the Pashtun groups. According to an unpublished report, nearly 34% of the Pakistan Army's top military elite hailed from Pashtun ethnicity in the 1980s and this became a factor in Islamabad's lack of enthusiasm for Islamic groups comprising Tajik, Hazara and Uzbek populations.[63]

Mahaz-i-Melli-i-Islami-i-Afghanistan (The National Islamic Front of Afghanistan)

The National Islamic Front, led by Pir Sayed Ahmad Gaylani, opened its offices in Peshawar in August 1978. Gaylani claimed descent from the venerated Shaikh Abdul Qadir Gaylani of Baghdad, the founder of the Qadiriyya Sufi order. Gaylani had owned a Peugeot car salon in Kabul during the early 1970s. The PDPA's reforms had led to the confiscation of the Gaylani family's large land holdings leading the family to migrate to Pakistan. Gaylani, a supporter of the royal family, had some backing amongst relatively rich *Khans* in the provinces of Nangharhar and Paktia south of Jalalabad adjoining Pakistani North and South Waziristan agencies. Gaylani had formed contacts with the Pakistani military and with the United States through its Embassy in Islamabad.[64] In the early phase of the anti-PDPA campaign, Gaylani had tried to forge an alliance with Afghanistan's most impoverished community, the Shiite Hazaras. The central Hazarajat region, however, eventually revolted against the government in early 1979.[65]

Ittehad-i-Islami (Islamic Unity)

This group, headed by a former theology lecturer of Kabul University, Abdur Rab Rasul Sayyaf, was formed in early 1979. In late 1978, Mawlawi Faizani, who had been an associate of Sayyaf, was killed in Kabul by the PDPA regime and this

motivated Sayyaf to escape to Pakistan after bribing some officials of the regime. Sayyaf subscribed to the 'Wahhabi' brand of Islam and thereby received substantial financial assistance from Saudi Arabia. He had a considerable following in Paghman Province near Kabul.

Pakistan gave substantial financial and military aid to these Peshawar-based Afghan Islamic parties also dubbed the 'Peshawar Seven' from late 1978. The Pakistani government paid for the housing and office facilities for the Afghan Islamists in Peshawar and Quetta. In strategic terms, the Zia regime made the most significant contribution to the anti-PDPA opposition by harbouring the resistance forces in clandestine military camps established in various parts of the NWFP and Baluchistan.[66] Some Pakistani bases used for training and facilitating incursions into Afghanistan were located close to the Durand Line in: Chitral, Miram-Shah (Kurram Agency), Parachinar (Kurram Agency), Warsak (near Peshawar), Spinwan and Zhob (Baluchistan).[67] Despite actively escalating Pakistani assistance to the Afghan resistance, Zia continued to maintain contact with Kabul in the hope that the 'Afghan Marxists' could be compelled to change course through diplomatic means backed by the use of force. Zia's brief visit to Kabul en route to Tehran in September 1978 had failed to improve ties with Afghanistan. According to a Zia confidant, Lieutenant General K.M. Arif, the Afghan President, Nur Muhammad Taraki, viewed Zia as a US client and repeatedly passed 'blunt' comments on Pakistan's relationship with the United States and its regional proxy Iran.[68]

By early 1979, regional and international events impacted on the internal situation of Afghanistan and this in turn motivated the Zia regime to increase its interference in that country. The geopolitics of Asia was transformed by the Sino–US rapprochement that the US National Security Adviser Zbigniew Brzezinski explicitly stated was largely aimed at 'discouraging Soviet expansionism'.[69] The Beijing–Washington 'axis' became one of the central foreign policy concerns of the ageing Soviet leadership in Moscow. In Iran, the Shah's regime was confronted with severe opposition from the Islamic movement led by Ayatollah Khomeini that resulted in the overthrow of the monarchy in January–February 1979. In brief, the political conditions around Afghanistan favoured the Islamic opposition fighting the faction-ridden government of the 'Democratic Republic of Afghanistan'.

In December 1978, Afghanistan signed a friendship treaty with the USSR. An article of this treaty stated that the 'high Contracting Parties ... shall take appropriate measures with a view to maintaining the security, independence and territorial integrity of both countries'.[70] Moreover, the PDPA steadily increased its reliance on Soviet military and civilian advisers.[71] The Soviet–Afghan treaty greatly perturbed the military regime in Islamabad and its key regional ally, the Peoples Republic of China (PRC). The right-wing of the Chinese Communist Party under Deng Xiaoping had gained ascendancy by 1978 after ousting the Maoist 'Gang of Four'. The Chinese leadership perceived the Moscow–Kabul alliance as an instrument to project Soviet power in South Asia.[72] China had been urging Pakistan to wean Afghanistan way from the Soviets in the aftermath of the April 1978 coup. In this regard, the Chinese backed, pro-Maoist *Shola-e-Javid* had escalated its actions against Kabul and tried to win over marginalized Afghan minorities such as the Hazaras.[73] The Soviets claimed that Chinese-made weapons were being seized from

alleged 'conspirators' as early as July 1978.[74] In effect, the Zia regime's strategy to counter the political setup in Kabul had tacit Chinese consent months before the large scale United States involvement.

In Afghanistan, President Taraki's Deputy Prime Minister, Hafizullah Amin, enhanced his power base by mid 1979 and pursued the Party's reformist agenda in a more forceful manner as compared to the previous year. Moreover, Amin's personality revealed a combination of Pashtun nationalism mixed with a strong authoritarian streak. Under his influence, the PDPA's Parcham faction was virtually eliminated from the government, a development that undermined the regime's already flimsy foundations in view of the internal and external opposition it faced. As the PDPA was engaged in an intra-party power struggle, the fall of the Iranian monarchy and its replacement by a radical Islamist government accentuated Kabul's insecurity as the new Iranian regime 'flirted with aiding Sunni led Islamic fundamentalists who were headquartered in Pakistan' apart from organising 'Shiite Afghans in the isolated, semi-desolate Hazarajat region of Afghanistan'.[75]

The Pakistani military elite, while maintaining a pretence of having a desire to improve ties with Kabul, allowed the disorganised and fractitious Afghan resistance to set up forward guerrilla bases along the inhospitable mountainous areas riven by hundreds of ravines and valleys along the Durand Line. Several resistance training camps for the Afghan resistance now termed as the 'Mujahideen' (Holy Warriors) were added to the already functioning guerrilla bases within Pakistani territory. The new camps were established in the tribal areas and were located in Bajaur, South Waziristan (Razmak and Mir Ali), Parachinar (Kurrum agency), Ghazlmai and Miram-Shah (North Waziristan).[76] Miram-Shah and Parachinar remained the two most strategic points on the Pakistani side of the Durand Line from where the ISI assisted the Afghan Islamic groups to launch operations in the Khost area of Paktia from late 1978. Afghan opposition centres were organised in Pakistan taking into account their geostrategic utility. For instance, camps were located in regions like the Mohmand Agency bordering Afghanistan's Nangarhar Province; the Bajaur Agency adjacent to Kunar Province; and Chitral opposite the Nooristan region of Kunar and Badakhshan provinces and so on. The ISI's assistance also led to the establishment of a large training camp for Afghans belonging to Gulbuddin Hekmatyar's Hizb-i-Islami near Peshawar.[77] Pakistan's support for the resistance led the CIA to observe in September 1979 that the 'insurgent tribesmen' were expanding 'their areas of operation in the eastern provinces, currently the scene of the heaviest fighting'.[78]

While giving covert military assistance to the Afghan Islamic opposition, Pakistan highlighted the plight of the Afghan refugees entering its territory as a result of the insurgency.[79] Many of these refugees were semi-nomads who were known amongst the Pashtuns as *Kochi Powindas*. Due to the fighting along the Durand Line, several thousand Ghilzai nomads, who traditionally migrated to Pakistan for greener pastures for their flocks of sheep, took refuge within Pakistani territory, thereby boosting the number of Afghan refugees.[80] The bulk of the Afghan refugees entering Pakistan belonged to the Pashtun ethnic group, followed by Tajiks, Hazaras and others.

The insurgency in Afghanistan, aided and abetted from Pakistani territory, continued to grow throughout 1979. This added to the grave problems being caused

by the faction ridden PDPA's inability to stabilise the country. These factors forced the Soviets to incrementally increase their role in assisting their inept Afghan allies. By the spring of 1979, there were at least 2,500 Soviet military personnel in Afghanistan advising the Afghan army in suppressing sporadic revolts in the country, while at the same time helping the rather minuscule Afghan military units deployed on the Durand Line to interdict guerrilla incursions from Pakistan.[81] In March 1979, elements of the 17th Infantry Division of the Afghan army led by Captains Ismail Khan and Alauddin mutinied in Herat. Ismail Khan was to later join Professor Rabbani's Jamiat and virtually became an autonomous ruler of Herat after the fall of the pro-Soviet regime in April 1992.

Political conditions in Herat were exacerbated by the influx of thousands of Afghan workers expelled by the Islamic regime in Iran. In this connection, a meeting of the Soviet Politburo on 19 March 1979 had specifically mentioned Iran and Pakistan as sparking 'counter-revolution' in Afghanistan.[82] The mutiny was brutally put down by units loyal to the regime, with considerable Soviet assistance. The Herat mutiny underlined the fragility of the regime. In fact, during this turmoil Taraki personally requested the Soviet President, L.I. Brezhnev, and Prime Minister, A.N. Kosygin, for deployment of Soviet combat troops in his country to ward off an armed intervention by 'counter-revolutionaries' backed by China and Pakistan.[83] The Soviet leadership, however, rejected Taraki's pleas for assistance as Brezhnev noted: 'this should not be done. This would only play into the hands of our enemies – yours and ours'.[84] Instead, Moscow advised Taraki to gain popular support through 'political and economic means'.[85]

A major goal of the Pakistani military regime was to induce the United States onto its side in pursuance of its policy on Afghanistan. Pakistan was instrumental in establishing relations between the Afghan Islamic opposition and the United States' Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) between April and May 1979.[86] Numerous CIA and State Department documents and cables which have been declassified, and some that were seized in Tehran by the radical Islamist Iranian students, tend to give credence to the suggestion that the United States developed contacts with a number of Islamic organizations based in Pakistan at that time.[87] To an extent this predates the assertion by the US National Security Advisor, Zbigniew Brzezinski, that: 'it was July 3, 1979 that President Carter signed the first directive for secret aid to the opponents of the pro-Soviet regime in Kabul. And that very day, I wrote a note to the President in which I explained to him that in my opinion this aid is going to induce a Soviet military intervention'.[88]

While trying to coopt the United States into its Afghan strategy, the Zia regime continued to implement its Islamic agenda domestically. As pointed out before, the military regime hardly rested upon the consent of the governed and hence it aggressively legitimised its unconstitutional hold on power by touting its 'Islamic' credentials. This strategy had become even more necessary after the military's execution of the former Prime Minister Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto on 4 April 1979. Bhutto's Pakistan Peoples Party (PPP) still had a considerable following amongst the workers, peasants and the intelligentsia, especially in the provinces of Punjab and Sind. The Pakistani military's active encouragement of Afghan Islamic groups and 'Islamisation' at home enabled it to distract the populace's attention from Pakistan's deteriorating political and economic conditions. There was a sustained

effort to 'Islamise' the civil society. The regime nominated several conservative Ulama to the Council for Islamic Ideology (CII) and tasked them to suggest ways to bring existing laws into conformity with the Quran and Sunnah. Zia introduced visual symbolism of the 'Islamic code' in every day public life in the form of a dress code, creation of an Islamic banking system, enhanced study of Islam in the educational system and other measures to 'bring Islamic order to Pakistan'.[89] In spite of the euphoria generated among the regime's supporters, the Islamisation drive remained superficial and ad hoc. 'Islamisation' in Pakistan was being imposed by a military regime and it was the state that coopted the Islamic groups to consolidate its rule in contrast to neighbouring Iran, where an 'unprecedented alliance between radical intelligentsia and fundamentalist clergy' advocated a much more sophisticated form of Islamism that included themes emphasizing Third World solidarity associated with an anti-imperialist rhetoric.[90] In a sense, Zia's Islamisation hardly affected the Pakistani elites represented by the military, bureaucracy, business interests and feudal landowners who continued their Westernised life styles and whose allegiance to Islam tended to be either nominal or purely instrumental. The regime's Islamic exhortations were essentially for the consumption of the illiterate masses. The Islamisation process did, however, cause a deepening of the sectarian divisions within the Pakistani polity.

The revival of Islamic laws ignited centuries-old juristic, doctrinal and theological disputes amongst Pakistan's diverse Muslim sects and schools of jurisprudence. Zia regarded the oil-rich Kingdom of Saudi Arabia as the ideal model to be emulated by Pakistan. The puritan brand of Sunni Hanbali School of law practised in Saudi Arabia had an appeal with the right-wing religious parties, especially the JI and the JUI. The JI and the JUI were receptive to the military regime's 'Islam oriented' policies. The inauguration of Islamic laws by the military paralleled with the Islamic revolution in neighbouring Iran. The revolution had raised significant interest amongst Pakistan's Muslims, especially the Shiite minority. The events in Iran strengthened the religious consciousness of Pakistani Shiites, while reawakening sectarian identities by making people aware of their distinct doctrinal position. After the victory of Ayatollah Khomeini in Iran, the Pakistani Shiites had reorganised their originally non-political movement into a religio-political party named the Tehrik-i-Nifaz-i-Fiqh-i-Jafaria (the movement for the imposition of the Jafari Jurisprudence), or the TNFJ. The leaders of the TNFJ identified the military's 'Islamisation' as a sectarian ploy to marginalize the Shiite community by imposing Sunni laws. The Iranian revolution had galvanized the Afghanistan's Hazara Shiite community that set up an autonomous zone in the Hazarajat region of central Afghanistan. The increasing assertiveness of the Shiites and the continued left-wing opposition to martial law led the military to bolster Sunni fundamentalist groups in Pakistan in order to counter any challenge to the dictatorship.[91] Moreover, the military's selective attempts at imposition of the *Sharia* without a comprehensive national debate laid the basis for the emergence of militant sectarian conflicts that would convulse Pakistan and Afghanistan in the post-Soviet era.

In Afghanistan, the PDPA's hold on power had become shakier by the end of September 1979. In a bid to usher in change in Pakistan's policies, President Taraki had met General Zia at the Non-Aligned Movement's (NAM) heads of state conference in Havana, Cuba, in early September.[92] The Zia-Taraki parleys in Havana

failed to achieve any substantial breakthrough as Zia failed to give a conclusive response to Taraki's offer, as reported by the Soviet envoy-counsellor at Kabul, Vasili Safronchuk, of 'recognising the Durand Line if Pakistani authorities closed it for the rebels'.[93]

Internally, Zia was pursuing a very repressive policy and the military continued to renege on its promises of holding general elections that were scheduled to be held in October, 1979. The Zia regime's wholehearted support for the Afghan resistance gained momentum after August 1979 and this corresponded with changes in Afghanistan that eventually resulted in the murder of President Taraki on 9 October 1979 by his Prime Minister, Hafizullah Amin. Amin's autocratic style of leadership and unleashing of repression against both the Khalq and Parcham cadres that did not toe his policy seriously disturbed the Kremlin. In a highly confidential note to Erich Honecker, leader of the East German Communist Party, the Soviet Politburo observed that conditions in Afghanistan had been made more difficult due to: 'Amin's methods and activities, in particular his extreme lust for power, ruthlessness in his relations with his former colleagues, forming opinions and making decisions single handedly.'[94] Earlier, Moscow had also tried to assassinate Amin in a plot involving Taraki. However, Amin caught wind of these plans and pre-empted them.

The increased instability in Afghanistan with the elimination of Taraki gave an impetus to the Pakistani military's efforts to undermine the PDPA's tenuous hold on power. In June, Zia's appointment of Lieutenant-General Akhtar Abdul Rahman, a staunch anti-Communist, as chief of the ISI signalled Pakistan's intention to escalate the insurgency. By September 1979, fighting in eastern Afghanistan resulted in increasing the number of refugees in Pakistan to 170,000.[95] In August, ISI officers introduced Gulbuddin Hekmatyar to CIA officials in Peshawar where at least 2000 of Hekmatyar's cadres were undergoing military training.[96] The CIA had been closely monitoring Pakistani support for the Afghan Islamists since early 1979 and on occasions gave its advice on operational plans for destabilizing Afghanistan.[97]

President Carter's secret directive to assist the Afghan Islamic groups on 3 July 1979 greatly encouraged the Pakistani military and this gave a boost to Zia's plans of increasing material assistance to the Afghan resistance. The Pakistani army elite was determined that the communists in Kabul should not be allowed to consolidate their rule.

The most important elements of the policy of backing Afghan Islamists aimed to:

1 curtail Afghanistan's support for Pashtun and Baluchi ethno-nationalists, who could rekindle the Pashtunistan issue,
2 prevent the PDPA regime from stabilising its internal position. If the PDPA was allowed to strengthen itself, it might serve as an example for leftist forces in Pakistan to confront the elites,
3 counter any move by socialist Afghanistan that could make it a regional ally of pro-Soviet India, as this was considered detrimental to Pakistan's security.

Islamabad perceived that the application of sufficient pressure on the PDPA regime might precipitate its collapse and this would enable Islamabad to install a friendlier 'Islamic' government, amenable to Pakistani overtures. Zia was a realist and a shrewd politician with a Machiavellian streak; his major aim was to stay in

power and at the same time bolster the military's control of the Pakistani state. By gradually raising the stakes in Pakistan's involvement in Afghanistan and exploiting the anti-Soviet sentiments of the US, China and Saudi Arabia, he was able to obtain significant economic and military assistance from these states. The Zia regime's strategy found a sympathetic ally in the Carter administration. The growing armed opposition in Afghanistan from September 1979 to December 1979 substantially curtailed the writ of the PDPA administration over large parts of the country. Pakistan's enhanced role in backing this increasingly Islamic oriented insurgency during this period had the consent of the United States. Zbigniew Brzezinski, President Carter's National Security Adviser, acknowledged that the US knew that this policy would create conditions for Soviet intervention. Brzezinski notes that the:

> Secret operation was an excellent idea. It had the effect of drawing the Russians into the Afghan trap and you want me to regret it? The day that the Soviets officially crossed the border, I wrote to President Carter, 'we now have the opportunity of giving to the USSR its Vietnam War.' Indeed, for almost 10 years, Moscow had to carry on a war unsupportable by the government, a conflict that brought about the demoralisation and finally the break-up of the Soviet empire.[98]

Hafizullah Amin's 'regime of personal dictatorship' and his desire to conduct a more balanced policy in relation to Western powers challenged the Soviet Union's investments and strategic interests. Most significantly, Pakistan's intention to resume dialogue with Amin while maintaining its assistance to the insurgency seriously affected Moscow's perceived security position, especially when Islamic activism was on the rise in Iran and the US–China de facto alliance had tilted, according to Soviet geo-strategic terminology, the 'regional correlation of forces' against the USSR. The Soviet leadership was particularly incensed by Amin's personalistic style of leadership and his contacts with 'representatives of the USA' which led them to apprehend a 'conclusion about the possibility of a change in the political line of Afghanistan in a direction which is pleasing to Washington'.[99] To an extent, Moscow had exaggerated Amin's contacts with the US. The US was approached but turned down his overtures. Amin was desperate, knowing that the Soviets were determined to get rid of him, probably sooner than later. Amin was an independent-minded person but not disloyal to Moscow until he had been targeted.

The Zia regime was certainly trying to improve ties with Amin, and the Afghan leadership had reciprocated by inviting Zia to Kabul.[100] Pakistan's Foreign Minister, Agha Shahi, planned to visit Kabul on 22 December 1979 in a bid to induce a rapprochement between Kabul and Islamabad. Notwithstanding this posture, Pakistan had continued to 'subvert' the Afghan regime through material assistance to the opposition, psychological warfare and inducing Afghan military and diplomatic officers to defect.[101] Shahi's visit, however, had not materialised owing to Soviet military intervention between 25–27 December 1979 that resulted in Amin's elimination by Soviet forces and his replacement by the leader of the Parcham faction of the PDPA, Babrak Karmal. The events surrounding the Soviet intervention have been extensively dealt with elsewhere and need not be discussed here, but it suffices to mention that Pakistan's involvement in Afghanistan's internal affairs was an important factor in the Soviet Union's quite reluctant decision to send in its armed forces to save the tottering PDPA regime.[102] In fact, the Soviet military leadership

from the Chief of General Staff down argued strongly against the introduction of Soviet forces into Afghanistan right up to the time the Politburo specifically ordered them in.

The Soviet military intervention gave a new lease of life to the unpopular Pakistani military dictatorship. Zia was facing mounting economic problems and increasing political opposition at home before the introduction of Soviet combat troops into Afghanistan, The execution of a Sindhi Prime Minister had alienated Pakistan's second largest province, Sind. The military's violation of the constitution and fundamental human rights had created a fearful atmosphere within Pakistan. Zia had repeatedly called off the scheduled national elections, banned all political parties and imposed strict press censorship. By constantly amending the constitution through Presidential decrees he made a mockery of his statements regarding the creation of an Islamic system where 'equality, justice social values, respect for women, dignity of man' would be safeguarded.[103]

The Soviet action transformed the military regime's standing in the West and as a noted Pakistani politician aptly observed Pakistan became a: 'frontline state in the Cold War between the superpowers. The United States government found itself committed to propping up the Pakistani military dictatorship with a massive supply of funds and weaponry in pursuance of its global interests. Zia exploited this new found status fully to the hilt.'[104]

The Pakistani Military and the Afghan Jihad

The introduction of what the Soviet Union termed the 'Limited Contingent of Soviet Forces' (LCOSF) into Afghanistan from 25 December 1979 was prompted by a complex mixture of external security-related issues and political misperception by the top decision-making elite of the Central Committee of the CPSU under L.I. Brezhnev. A top secret Soviet Politburo report had observed with apprehension Amin's efforts to destroy 'the party, army and government apparatus' and establish a 'regime of personal dictatorship'.[105] The report stressed that through eliminating 'persons openly sympathetic to the USSR', Amin was reaching a compromise with leaders of internal counter-revolution and consequently creating conditions that 'threatened the gains of the April revolution and the interests of maintaining our (Soviet) national security'.[106]

Brezhnev had justified the Soviet intervention, which was in itself contrary to international legal norms, as it had resulted in the murder of the head of the state of an independent country and his replacement by a loyal Soviet client, by citing US actions in Chile where Washington, in concert with the Chilean army, had 'drowned the people's freedom in blood'.[107] Such a development could not be allowed in Afghanistan, a state adjacent to Soviet Central Asia. Thus, the so-called 'Brezhnev Doctrine', which emphasised the Soviet government's right to intervene with armed force to safeguard socialism in Eastern Europe, was for the first time after the Second World War applied in Asia. In essence, the Soviet role in Afghanistan had certain parallels with Britain's interference in Afghanistan during the nineteenth century that also aimed to keep a pliant regime in power in Kabul. Karmal's imposition by Soviet forces could be summed up in Frederich Engels' observation

in the mid-nineteenth century regarding Britain's attempt 'to set up a prince of their own making in Afghanistan' in 1839.[108]

The Soviet move was designed to pre-empt any action by Pakistan, China and the United States to make inroads into Afghanistan, thereby creating on the southern borders of the Soviet Union 'a source of serious danger to the security of the Soviet state'.[109] Soviet Politburo's documents pertaining to the Afghan crisis indicate that the Soviet leadership at that time specifically regarded Pakistan under General Zia-ul-Haq as providing the 'most important base of the Afghan bandit formations'.[110]

The intervention of over 80,000 Soviet troops belonging to the Soviet 40th Army based in the Turkestan Military District (TMD) into Afghanistan was no surprise for either the Zia regime or the United States. Since late September 1979, the CIA and its counterparts in the ISI had steadily increased their assistance to the disparate Afghan opposition. On 14 September 1979, CIA Director Admiral Stansfield Turner observed in a memorandum to the National Security Council that the Soviets: 'may be on the threshold of a decision to commit their own force ... in Afghanistan'.[111] By late 1979, Pakistan was claiming that more than 200,000 refugees had entered its territory.[112] Pakistani Pashtun tribal *lashkars* (war parties) were aiding the Afghan opposition to attack Afghan army positions and targets such as schools, hospitals and other infrastructure all along the international frontier.[113] According to a report, Quetta, the administrative centre of Pakistani Baluchistan province had turned into an important base for supplying food, arms and ammunition to Shiite Hazara groups operating in central Afghanistan.[114]

The Soviet military intervention gave the United States the opportunity to openly come out in support of the Afghan Islamic groups, whose struggle was now being dubbed as a 'Jihad' against Communism in Afghanistan. The events in Afghanistan prompted President Carter to enunciate what became known as the Carter Doctrine, which stressed that: 'an attempt by any outside force to gain control of the Persian Gulf region ... {would} be regarded as an assault on the vital interests of the United States and ... {would} be repelled by any means necessary, including military force'.[115] The United States foreign policy elite visualized the Soviet intrusion into Afghanistan as a part of a Soviet grand strategy to expand its influence south towards the warm waters of the Arabian Sea and the oil fields of the Persian Gulf. This theme of Soviet 'expansionism' towards the South derived from British security paranoia in Asia dating back to the late eighteenth century that saw any Russian move in the direction of the Indian subcontinent as a threat to British interests in the region. The Pakistani military elite reinforced this perception with the Reagan administration. Zia skilfully manipulated the US fears of the alleged Soviet schemes to push southward in his so-called 'red template' briefings to the Director of the Central Intelligence Agency (DCI) in 1981. A key goal of exaggerating the Soviet danger was to persuade the Americans to boost their aid to Pakistan and the anti-Soviet Afghan insurgency.[116]

The events in Afghanistan enthralled the Zia regime. They solidified the prospects of renewed US military and economic assistance and Zia publicly stated that he 'would dearly love to see a more active US participation' in the region.[117] Being a duplicitous person, Zia had earlier publicly rejected a US aid package of $400 million as 'peanuts', in anticipation that Pakistan could get more from Washington by skilfully playing the 'Afghan Card'. Officials close to Zia privately conceded that

this was a publicity ploy for domestic consumption, to show Pakistan's 'autonomy' in foreign policy decision-making vis-à-vis the United States.[118] Pakistan skilfully utilised international organizations such as the Organization of Islamic Conference (OIC), NAM and the UN to harness the sympathy of the international community for its stance on the Afghan issue. This was in accord with the general thrust of US policy in the Middle East that put a stress on protecting the 'Islamic' character of the states in the region. Islam could serve as an effective antidote to Soviet 'expansionism'.[119]

Interestingly, while openly showing lack of interest in the US aid package, the Zia regime was 'marketing itself to senior White House emissaries as America's best friend in the crisis area'.[120] Months before the Soviet intervention, and despite Islamabad's differences with Washington on the nuclear program, the Zia regime had enhanced intelligence cooperation with the United States. Pakistan hosted US electronic monitoring facilities in the northern areas in proximity to Soviet missile and satellite testing sites in Central Asia.[121] These facilities replaced the large network of sophisticated electronic monitoring stations closed down in northern Iran because of the revolution in that country.

Without the unfolding of the Afghan crisis and especially without the Zia regime's conjecture about the Soviet threat following the introduction of Soviet combat troops in Afghanistan, the military may not have been so successful in consolidating its control of the Pakistani state in the late 1970s. The military and especially General Zia presented Pakistan as an 'island of stability. And it is this, I think the United States of America ... must exploit because if Pakistan goes then from Turkey to Vietnam, the name of the United States will be hard to hear.'[122]

The Soviet presence in Afghanistan realised the Pakistani military's objective of rejuvenating US interest in the region. In 1981, the US and Pakistan initialled US$3.2 billion worth of economic and military assistance spread over six years, followed by US$4 billion over the next six. The US supplied Pakistan with sophisticated military hardware and provided for the training and education of the Pakistani army officer corps. Between 1980–1990, approximately 200 officers were sent for training abroad and the majority went to the US.[123] Many of these officers served as instructors or at an operational level in the Afghan Jihad. The US involvement in Afghanistan increased the Zia regime's 'incentive to stay on the nuclear path' without much pressure from Washington.[124] The Afghanistan crisis motivated Washington to practically ignore Islamabad's clandestine nuclear weapons program in view of the Pakistani role as a 'frontline' state deterring Soviet expansionism. The importance of the Afghanistan crisis for the military elite can be judged by General Zia's remark that the: 'Afghans are fighting the war for Pakistan. We must support them. American interest has been regenerated because of Afghanistan. Let us cash in on this.'[125]

The Reagan administration that had come to power in 1981 focused its foreign policy priority on rolling back the Soviet 'evil empire' by strengthening strategic linkages with China and 'moderate' Arab states, and Pakistan was an important plank in this agenda as an alternative to the Shah's Iran – a collapsed pillar of the US security architecture in the region. The US now perceived a 'strong, stable and independent Pakistan ... an essential anchor to the entire South west Asian region'.[126] The Zia regime used the large injection of aid to strengthen the military's hold on

Pakistan politics and create a large network of Sunni Islamist-oriented groups in the country that also served as the regime's security instruments in suppressing the democratic movement.[127] These groups boosted the ideological and operational capability of the ISI-backed Afghan Islamic opposition.

By early 1980, the ISI had become the most important branch of the Pakistani military, which held the overall responsibility for the armed operations, coordination and implementation of the anti-Soviet guerrilla campaign in Afghanistan.* The ISI was transformed into the CIA's operational arm in launching the covert assistance program for the Afghan 'freedom fighters' from 1980 onwards.[128] The CIA became the 'quartermaster, to supply arms, equipment, and munitions for the mujahideen' through the ISI.[129] Most importantly, the CIA agreed to deal with the Afghan Islamists via the ISI channel.

Undoubtedly, the enhanced power projection and operational potential of the Afghan Mujahideen (Holy Warriors) was due to the comprehensive support of the Pakistani military during the period of Soviet presence in Afghanistan from late December 1979 to February 1989, when the last Soviet combat formation left the country. The ISI's Afghan Bureau charged with the responsibility of managing the Afghan Jihad was directly responsible for:

1 Training the Afghan Mujahideen. The CIA assisted the ISI to establish secret schools in the NWFP and Baluchistan to teach the Afghan Islamists techniques of guerrilla warfare and urban sabotage. Techniques used with devastating effect in the ensuing 'blowback' of some militant 'Islamic' groups that were to evolve because of the Afghan Jihad in the post-Cold War era.[130]
2 Policy, planning and organisation.
3 Provision of equipment, weapons and funds supplied by a host of nations that included the United States, Egypt, PRC, Britain, France, Saudi Arabia, Turkey, Israel and, to a lesser extent, Iran.
4 Abetting of cross-Durand Line infiltration and exfilteration.
5 Selection of targets inside Afghanistan.

The United States CIA gave the ISI freedom of action in choosing which groups were best suited to inflicting the maximum damage on the Soviets and their allies in Afghanistan. Pakistan's backing of the Jihad was officially denied and the entire program remained 'covert' despite being known to the international community.[131] The PDPA regime even continued to maintain its embassy in Islamabad. There was no declaration of hostilities by either side. The Reagan administration and the Zia regime were not unduly concerned about the legal anomalies arising from this situation.[132] In the words of one US diplomat, Washington's aim was not to seek: 'peace and grooviness (sic) in Afghanistan. Our objective was killing commies (sic) and getting the Russians out'.[133]

The CIA ignored the deceptive role of the ISI in channelling a large proportion of weapons and resources to pro-Pakistan Pashtun Islamic fundamentalists. In this context, the Pakistani military selected those groups that would remain subservient to Pakistan's long-term strategic objectives in the region. It particularly gave a

*The ISI's operational structure is outlined in Appendix A.

disproportionate allocation of arms and ammunition to the Hizb-i-Islami factions of Hekmatyar and Mawlawi Yunis Khalis as these Pashtun Islamists had little interest in the Pashtunistan issue or the Afghan governments' territorial dispute with Pakistan. Moreover, these groups also received substantial financial support from Pakistan's allies in the Arab world – the pro-US Gulf States such as Saudi Arabia, Kuwait and the United Arab Emirates.[134] Most significantly, the Afghan Islamists had forged close links with Pakistani JI and the JUI parties that had connections with the Zia regime. This policy worked in tandem with and complemented Zia's 'Islamisation' process at home and his goal of forging security and political relationships with Saudi Arabia and other conservative states in the Middle East. Washington's consent for the involvement of the Arab states, whose agendas ranged from combating communism to containing Shiite Iranian influence, in the Afghan Jihad was to have far reaching implications for the evolution of radical Islamism in Pakistan and Afghanistan.

During the Afghan Jihad the CIA, ISI and Al-Istakhbara al 'Ama (General Intelligence) of Saudi Arabia devised a joint operational strategy in relation to Afghanistan. Moreover, China's cooperation in providing ample supplies of weaponry from late 1978 to the Afghan Islamists through the ISI further assisted in creating a well coordinated infrastructure to sustain the Jihad.[135] The ISI was the sole organization involved in administering the Jihad infrastructure and implementing the war strategy on the ground.[136] The Saudi government's financial and material assistance to the Afghan Islamist cause motivated thousands of Islamists from the Arab countries to come to Pakistan and fight the Soviet 'atheists'. A majority of these Islamists embraced the Islamist discourse preached by the founding fathers of Sunni political Islamism namely Hassan al-Banna, Sayyed Qutb, and Sayed Abul Ala Mawdudi. These personalities had focused their Islamist agenda and political agitation on the goal of establishing an Islamic political order.

However, some of the Arab Islamists who came to Pakistan for the Jihad had mixed the discourse of Qutb and Mawdudi with the Salafist doctrines derived from the teachings of medieval Islamic thinkers like Taqiuddin ibn-Taymiyya (1263–1328) and Imam Ahmad ibn-Hanbal (783–855), which emphasised a puritanical implementation of Islam devoid of any *Bidaa* or innovation.[137] This sort of purist Islam was referred to by Manfred Halpern as 'neo-Islamic totalitarianism'.[138] The teachings of Ahmad bin Hanbal, Ibn-Taymiyya and their twentieth century counterparts like Mawdudi and Sayed Qutb emphasise the importance of Jihad not only against non-Islamic powers encroaching on the Islamic world but also against Muslim rulers who neglect or transgress Islamic Law.[139] The Sunni fundamentalists who base their inspiration on the opinions of Islamists like Ibn Taymiyyah and Ahmad Ibn Hanbal remain antagonistic to other sects of Islam. Shiite Islam is a particular target of their hostility. The Shiites are dismissed as heretics and some Wahhabi Scholars in Saudi Arabia and their Deobandi counterparts in Pakistan even regard killing of Shiites and other 'infidels' who fail to side with them as justifiable.[140]

The seven Afghan parties based in Peshawar were presented to the world by the Pakistani establishment as the main Mujahideen groupings waging the Jihad for the liberation of Afghanistan. The ISI's head of the Afghan Bureau, Brigadier Muhammad Yousaf, rightly observes that the 'leaders were well aware that without

Pakistan's, and that meant Zia's, backing everything was finished'.[141] Yousaf emphasises that it was a principle of Pakistani policy that 'every commander must belong to one of the seven parties, otherwise he got nothing from us at ISI – no arms, no ammunition and no training. Without these he could not exist.'[142] Throughout the struggle against the Soviets and their clients, the Afghan groups remained firmly under Pakistani control and those who disregarded Islamabad's dictates were penalised by a reduction in their financial and military assistance. Professor Rabbani's 'moderate' Jamiat-i-Islami-i-Afghanistan composed primarily of Dari-speaking Tajiks, became one of the main groups subjected to this treatment in the late 1980s owing to its 'nationalist agenda'.[143] Living in Pakistan as political refugees, the Afghan Islamists had little choice but to accept their Pakistani host cum mentor's directions on the overall objectives of the Jihad.

The Afghan refugee exodus to Pakistan increased during the first half of the 1980s, due to the intensification of the war as a result of increased Soviet counter-insurgency operations unfolding along the Durand Line. The Pakistani and US response was to step up guerrilla activities in all of Afghanistan's 29 provinces.[144] The strategy pursued by the Pakistani army strove to inflict 'death by a thousand cuts' on the Soviet/Afghan forces.[145] The Pakistani elite believed that its security was 'best assured by keeping the Soviets tied down in Afghanistan'.[146]

The end result of the policy that aimed to escalate the war was that by 1984, Pakistan had become home to nearly 2.5 million refugees.[147] Nearly 80% of these refugees were ethnic Pashtuns who developed close relations with their ethnic cousins in Pakistan (Table 3.1 indicates the ethnic affiliation of the Pashtun tribes

Table 3.1 Tribal and ethnic affiliations of some major tribes residing on the Pakistan–Afghanistan border

	Pashtun and Baluch Tribes along the Durand Line		Contiguous areas along the Durand Line	
	Afghanistan	Pakistan	Afghanistan	Pakistan
A	Nooristani	Chitrali	Badakhshan	Chitral
B	Salarzai	Salarzai	Konar	Bajaur Agency
C	Mohmand	Mohmand	Konar	Mohmand Agency
D	Shinwari	Shinwari	Nanagarhar	Khyber Agency
E	Zazie/Sakkani	Shiite Turis	Paktia	Kurram Agency
F	Wazir	Wazir	Paktia	Waziristan Agencies
G	Achakzai	Achakzai	Kandahar	Chaman (Baluchistan)
	Noorzai	Noorzai		Spin Boldak
	Kakar	Kakar		
H	Baluch	Baluch	Nimroz /Helmand	Marri-Bugti Pakistani Baluchistan

Adapted from Shah Zaman Khan, 'Afghan refugees in Pakistan: the possibility of assimilation' in Ewan Anderson and Nancy H. Dupree (ed), *The Cultural Basis of Afghan Nationalism*, London: Pinter Publishers, 1990.

residing on both sides of the Pakistan–Afghanistan border). The mainly Pashtun clergy in the tribal agencies of NWFP sympathized with the Afghan refugees entering Pakistan after the introduction of the Soviet forces. Encouraged by the Zia regime, the Mullahs in these regions invoked Islam to mobilise the Afghans and their Islamist Pakistani counterparts in the Islamic networks dominated by the Ulama to wage Jihad against the Soviet 'infidels'.

The full impact of Pakistani sponsorship of radical Islamism would come to realisation in the aftermath of the Soviet withdrawal when Afghanistan became a battleground of various regional powers vying for influence in this strategically located country. In this context, Pakistan's policy of supporting Pashtun Islamists contributed in accentuating inter-ethnic conflict in Afghanistan that resulted in fostering violent internal warfare in this country in the post-Soviet era.

According to the Pakistani government, there were nearly 300 refugee camps in the NWFP and Baluchistan in 1985. Many refugees in these provinces started small urban businesses and got employment as labourers. On the other hand, the Afghan war resulted in the creation of ethnically based trading and smuggling networks that indulged in illegal activities ranging from smuggling of arms to illicit drug production. The destruction of Afghanistan's agricultural production resulting from the war facilitated large-scale cultivation of opium along the Pakistan–Afghanistan border. A CIA assessment noted that Pakistan largely ignored opium production along the Durand Line due to its 'own stated objective with regard to Afghanistan – keeping open the supply lines to the Afghan resistance in the NWFP and protecting the refugees in the area'.[148] Army personnel, drug smugglers and members of the Mujahideen groups belonging to Hekmatyar's Hizb-i-Islami faction forged a symbiotic nexus, which transformed the Afghanistan–Pakistan region into one of the world's largest opium growing regions and at the same time gave some Islamic groups an autonomous financial source.[149] According to some commentators, elements of the ISI became allegedly involved in money laundering by using banks like the defunct Bank of Credit and Commerce International (BCCI).[150] ISI and the CIA ignored these activities and, according to a former CIA official: 'our main mission was to do as much damage as possible to the Soviets. We didn't really have the resources or the time to devote to an investigation of the drug trade.'[151]

The Afghan conflict led the Zia regime, in collaboration with the CIA, to allow thousands of Arab volunteers to enter Pakistan and join the anti-Soviet struggle. Saudi Arabia, the Arab Gulf Shaikhdoms and Egypt participated in this venture with enthusiasm. The US alone sent US$5 billion worth of weapons to the mujahideen during 1986–1990 and the Saudi financial assistance for arms purchase, according to Muhammad Yousaf, 'equalled' Washington's expenditure.[152] In addition to the overt and covert funding operations by several Western governmental agencies for the Mujahideen, a plethora of private 'aid' agencies, think tanks and other odd outfits opened offices in Pakistan after the Soviet intervention, with the ostensible aim of liberating Afghanistan from the clutches of the Soviets.

Along with providing generous military and financial assistance, the Arab states emulated their Western counterparts and also set up a vast array of welfare and relief agencies for the Afghans in Pakistan. The Saudis were most active in establishing their governmental and non-governmental organizations (NGOs) in NWFP and Baluchistan. Offices of the Saudi Red Crescent opened in 1980. From 1981 to 1985,

the Saudi Relief Committee, Kuwait Red Crescent, and even the Islamic Relief Agency of poverty-stricken Sudan started functioning in Peshawar. Saudi Arabia and other Gulf Shaikhdoms funded a host of NGOs ranging from the Islamic Dawa Committee to the Al Madina Institute. These NGOs concentrated on imparting religious education to the Afghan refugees. The main theme of the religious instruction in the madrassas funded by the Arab countries was based on the philosophy that Islam was a complete socio-political ideology and Islam in Afghanistan was being violated by the 'Godless' Soviet occupiers, therefore Jihad against them was the most meritorious activity. The CIA even published thousands of copies of the Quran to be distributed amongst the Afghans and Central Asian Muslims in order to subvert the Soviet hold over Central Asia.[153] Most significantly, thousands of Arab volunteers coming from Egypt, Saudi Arabia, the Gulf Shaihkdoms, Iraq, Algeria, Jordan, Syria and even the Israeli occupied Arab territories were accommodated by the Pakistani military in the NWFP with the connivance of the CIA. In 1984, Osama bin Laden opened the *Maktab al Khidmat lil Mujahideen* or the Services Office for the Mujahideen in Peshawar with the cooperation of the Saudi Intelligence Chief, Prince Turki bin Faysal bin Abdul Aziz, and the Pakistani ISI.[154] Soon several other Arab Mujahideen agencies, like the Afghanistan Reconstruction Office, funded by King Fahd, and the Education Centre of the Egyptian Shaikh Fathi Al Refai also opened their offices in Peshawar. The Islamic NGOs with substantial support of their governments developed linkages with Pakistani and Afghan Islamic parties.

The introduction of diverse groups of Islamists from different parts of the Muslim world enhanced the Zia regime's religious legitimacy and stature within Pakistan and helped to a substantial degree to win it societal support from Islamic oriented sections of the population. It aided in strengthening the 'Islamisation process', which saw the government funding madrassas in different parts of the country and, thereby, creating an atmosphere conducive to the emergence of militant Sunni Islamism, permeated with religious symbolism that emphasised the concept of Jihad. Zia's utilization of Islamic parties in implementing this agenda, coupled with his sense of 'special responsibility' in supporting the Afghan resistance, enabled him to marginalise Pakistan's mainstream secularly oriented politicians.[155]

In 1985, Zia had allowed a nominal restoration of civilian rule, staging 'partyless elections' but he reserved the authority to dissolve the parliament and call new elections whenever deemed necessary. In this regard, Ziring correctly notes that: 'no significant restrictions had been imposed on the President who was also the head of the military establishment and in Zia, Pakistan had come very close to experiencing absolute rule'.[156] The military backed Islamists in Jamaat-i-Islami remained Zia's 'tacit allies' despite condemning Zia's dismissal of the civilian Prime Minister Muhammad Khan Junejo in May 1988.[157]

The Zia Regime and Changing Context of the Afghan War, 1985–1988

The advent of Mikhail Gorbachev as General Secretary of the CPSU Central Committee in 1985 heralded dramatic changes in Soviet foreign policy, aimed at reducing tensions with the United States. Gorbachev opened new channels with

the United States for the resolution of the Afghan conflict.[158] Gorbachev's accommodating policy on Afghanistan was linked to the introduction of his internationally acclaimed policies of *Glasnost* (openness) and *Perestroika* (a reference to economic and political restructuring) domestically that aimed to revitalise the Soviet Union. A corollary of these reformist policies was the reduction in the Soviet Union's foreign assistance, especially to its Third World clients, in a bid to divert economic resources to uplift the economy. Paradoxically, the ill-conceived reforms acted as a factor in the decline of the Soviet Communist Party's control over society and the eventual collapse of the Soviet state.

As Gorbachev contemplated a Soviet disengagement from Afghanistan, the Afghan war reached a new threshold with increased US support for the Mujahideen between 1985 and 1987. President Reagan's National Security Decision Directive 166 of 1985 had authorized increased military assistance to the Mujahideen, leading to a surge in arms supplies through Pakistan totalling 65,000 tons annually from 1985 to 1987.[159] The directive authorized provision of more advanced weaponry to the Afghan guerrillas, along with expanded US cooperation with the Pakistani and Chinese governments, to escalate the war by 'all means available'.[160] This US/Pakistani intensification of the war in this period proved crucial in bringing about the change in the Soviet stance. The Soviets had not been able to control Afghanistan's countryside and their hold remained, at best, precarious even in the urban centres. The Soviets, in fact, had not aspired to completely control the countryside. Their presence was never on the same scale as that of the US in Vietnam (maximum about 120,000, versus the US peak of 500,000 in Vietnam). They expected the Afghan Army to do most of the fighting. However, the external backing provided by Pakistan and its patrons to the Mujahideen in terms of sanctuaries, training and even combat personnel, had proved decisive in forcing the Soviets to contemplate a withdrawal from the costly stalemate of Afghanistan in late 1986. The UN's Special Representative on Afghanistan had been active in negotiating a settlement of the Afghan issue since 1981.[161] His efforts had not borne fruit, due to the United States and Pakistan's lack of interest in agreeing to the Soviet position on the negotiations, which stressed that Islamabad, should deal directly with the government in Kabul, a stance unacceptable to Islamabad. This aspect will be discussed more comprehensively in the next chapter.

Gorbachev's coming to power had brought about a change in Soviet policy as Moscow gradually pulled back from its previously 'hardline' position on Afghanistan from late 1986. The history of the complex negotiations that culminated in the Geneva Accords of April 1988 setting the schedule for Soviet withdrawal from Afghanistan has been detailed elsewhere.[162] However, it is pertinent to point out here that despite the Geneva Accords that explicitly restrained Islamabad and Kabul from interfering in each other's internal affairs, the conflict in Afghanistan persisted. Islamabad continued to back the Afghan Islamists, with US consent, against the Soviet sponsored government of Dr Muhammad Najibullah. Najibullah, the former chief of Afghan secret police, KHAD (*Khidmat-e-Itelaat-e-Dawlati*) had replaced Babrak Karmal under Gorbachev's policy that sought Soviet disengagement from Afghanistan. Najibullah, an Ahmadzai Pashtun, had a good grasp of Pakistani politics. His tenure as head of the KHAD between 1981 and 1986 had witnessed an Afghan covert campaign to back organizations such as the *Al-Zulfiqar* headed by the

executed Bhutto's sons, Mir Murtaza Bhutto and Shahnawaz Bhutto, who were bitterly opposed to the Zia dictatorship.[163]

The Zia regime's policy of waging covert war through the use of religious groups in Afghanistan had a profound impact on the evolution of Jihadist groups within Pakistan. The Zia regime deliberately focused Pakistani largesse and military assistance to the Pashtun Islamists represented in the Hizb-i-Islami factions, Harakat and the other smaller Pashtun factions. Moreover, by allowing these groups to receive ideological and material backing from Pakistani Sunni Islamists it contributed to intertwine the interests of these Afghan Islamic groups with their Pakistani counterparts. The close collaboration of the Afghan and Pakistani Islamic groups resulted in the evolution of a web of personal and institutional relations amongst these Islamists that transcended geographical frontiers and many developments in the region pertaining to Islamic militancy after the conclusion of the Cold War would bear, in a direct or indirect way, the imprint of this nexus.

The state sponsorship of militant Islamist groups espousing a radical pan-Islamic agenda based on Salafi-Wahhabi interpretation of Islam led to the development of a vast infrastructure of madrassas in Pakistan. Hundreds of these religious seminaries specifically served as camps for training Mujahids to fight the Jihad in Afghanistan. The ISI's Afghan Bureau alone trained more than 80,000 Mujahideen in Pakistani military's secret training camps in NWFP and Baluchistan.[164] In 1986, CIA estimates put the number of Afghan resistance fighters at 150,000 who were opposing combined Soviet/Afghan forces of nearly the same number.[165] Most of these Mujahideen were trained in Pakistan. With the exception of Ahmad Shah Masoud, who had the ability to 'coordinate attacks', the CIA had remained apprehensive of the other, mainly Pashtun groups, ability to mount 'small-unit operations'.[166]

The Afghan Islamic opposition's Jihad was bolstered by hundreds of Pakistani Islamists belonging to the JUI and JI who fought alongside their Afghan counterparts and a significant number were killed.[167] The military not only encouraged such groups to fight in Afghanistan but also tacitly used orthodox Sunni factions within Pakistan to counter Shiite radicalism spawned by the Iranian revolution. A host of splinter Sunni groups associated with the traditionalist JUI emerged in the mid 1980s whose agenda was inspired by Salafist doctrines. The growth of these groups was to fuel a violent sectarian conflict in Pakistan in the 1990s.

The Afghan conflict proved to be a training ground for the Islamic militias, which received comprehensive training in the ISI centres that gave them skills in sabotage, assassination, endurance and other techniques of guerrilla warfare. These skills were imparted by the ISI under the guidance of US CIA, US Special Forces from the famous Green Berets, the British SAS and Chinese weapons instructors.[168] Even Israeli intelligence service operatives were reportedly involved at some stages in the Afghan war.[169] Besides giving assistance in the form of military hardware and instructors, hundreds of Pakistani regular servicemen gained extensive experience in providing tactical advice and experience in waging low intensity warfare by participating in guerrilla hit and run operations with the Afghan opposition.[170] In this respect, officers and men of the Pakistan Army's Special Services Group (SSG) took the lead. The Afghan war also offered the Pakistani officer corps an opportunity to siphon off large sums of financial aid sent by various donors. Dozens of military officials in Zia's inner circle enriched themselves. The Governor of NWFP,

Lieutenant-General Fazle Haq reportedly embezzled a substantial amount of financial assistance targeted for covert operations in Afghanistan and some noteworthy heroin smugglers were allegedly operating under his protection.[171] Conservative US estimates point out that approximately 30 per cent of the CIA assistance to the Afghan resistance was diverted by the Pakistani military for its own use.[172] Moreover, the Pakistani military also failed to deliver a considerable number of high technology weapons, such as the Stinger anti-aircraft missiles, to their intended recipients.[173]

The basic goal of the Zia regime in the late 1980s continued to revolve around the need to install a pro-Pakistan government in Kabul. Zia clearly outlined this stance to a US journalist:

> We have earned the right to have a friendly government in Kabul. We won't permit it to be like it was before, with Indian and Soviet influence there and claims to our territory. It will be a real Islamic state, part of a pan-Islamic revival, that will one day win over the Muslims in the Soviet Union, you will see.[174]

The Pakistani military elite under Zia had artfully used the Soviet threat to expand the armed forces and assured their overbearing influence on the political system of the country. The US financial and military largesse emboldened the military junta in creating a pan-Islamic militant movement that could serve Islamabad's long-term geo-strategic objectives in South and Southwestern Asia. Most significantly, this policy enabled Zia to firmly establish the armed forces as the only body that could guard Pakistan's 'ideological' and geographical frontiers. The 'army' and 'Islam' became synonymous for the preservation of Pakistani national integrity. Zia saw himself as divinely ordained to 'preserve Pakistan's Islamic identity'.[175] In this connection, he believed that that his regime's persistent denial of Pakistani support for the Afghan resistance since 1978 was morally justifiable. After the Geneva Accords, Zia is said to have told President Reagan that Pakistan would continue to assist the Afghan Islamists but deny it publicly. In an answer to Reagan's concern over how Pakistan would deny its covert assistance, Zia replied by grossly misinterpreting Quranic teaching that 'Muslims have the right to lié in a good cause'.[176] Indeed, this mindset certainly proves the ancient Chinese strategist Sun Tzu's dictum: 'Warfare is the art (tao) of deceit.'[177]

General Muhammad Zia-ul-Haq was killed along with 37 high ranking Pakistani military officials including the architect of the Jihad, the ISI Chief, General Akhtar Abdur Rahman, in a plane crash on August 17, 1988. The plane, which also carried the US Ambassador to Pakistan and a senior US military adviser, was allegedly sabotaged. Zia left behind a legacy that included the creation of Jihadi organizations, which would be the cause of greater instability not only for the South and Southwestern Asian region but also for the world as a whole for years to come. At home, the Zia regime propelled religion into politics, facilitating divisiveness and sectarianism in Pakistan's fissiparous body politic. More importantly, the Zia era saw the culmination of the military's hegemonic control over the Pakistani state that had begun in the mid-1950s. A significant outcome of Pakistan's role in the Afghan conflict was to further legitimise the use of irregular warfare and terrorism by states in the pursuit of ideological and strategic goals. The utilisation of religious groups

as instruments to achieve strategic objectives at the tail end of the twentieth century was to ensure that Afghanistan would remain one of the foremost epicentres of religiously inspired militant groups in the post-Cold War era.

Notes

1 In fact, at the time the US State Department's spokesman had declined to comment on the military's assumption of power. See 'Replies by the Department of State's spokesman (Carter) to Questions asked at a Press Briefing, 6 July 1977' in *American Foreign Policy Basic Documents, 1977–1980*, Washington DC: Department of State, 1980, p.900.
2 Quoted in Stanley Wolpert, *Zulfi Bhutto of Pakistan*, London: OUP, p.293.
3 *Dawn*, Karachi, 18 July 1977.
4 Abdul Samad Ghaus, *The Fall of Afghanistan*, London: Pergamon, Brassey's, 1988, p.141.
5 Speech of President Mohammad Daud at Lahore in *Foreign Affairs – Pakistan*, Islamabad: Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Vol.VI, Issue 3, March 1978.
6 Selig S. Harrison, 'Nightmare in Baluchistan', *Foreign Policy*, No.32, Fall 1978, p.147.
7 Jolanta Sierakowska-Dyndo, 'The State in Afghanistan's Political and Economic System', *Central Asian Survey*, Vol.9, No.4, 1990, pp.88–89.
8 See Barnett R. Rubin, 'The Old Regime in Afghanistan', *Central Asian Survey*, Vol.10, No.3, 1991, pp.73–100.
9 Interview with a former Pakistani Foreign Ministry official, Islamabad, 1 October 1999.
10 *The New York Times*, 3 February 1975, p.A4.
11 *Kayhan International* (Tehran), 4 April 1976.
12 Bruce J. Amstutz, Afghanistan: *The First Five Years of Soviet Occupation*, Washington DC: Department of State, 1986, p.22.
13 Soviet role in instructing both factions of the PDPA to cooperate is revealed in Vasily Mitrokhin, 'The KGB in Afghanistan', Working Paper No.40, *Cold War International History Project* (CWIHP), Washington DC: Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars, February 2002.
14 Several smaller leftist groups other than the Khalq and Parcham factions had emerged in Afghanistan during the late 1960s. A prominent leftist group *Shola-e-Jawaid* (eternal flame) was influenced by Maoist ideas and had gained some support amongst lower middle class Hazaras, Tajiks and some Pashtuns. Another ultra-leftist group *Sitam-e-Melli* (the oppressed nation) led by the Tajik leader, Tahir Badakshi, surfaced in Afghan Badakshan in the early 1970s. These groups could not muster much support and remained on the periphery of the Afghan left. In fact, a US Department of State Airgram paraphrased an observation from Sardar Abdul Wali that: 'if the mullahs were unleashed all leftists in the country would be dead'. US Department of State Airgram, *The Afghan Left*, Kabul, 22 May 1973, National Archives and Records Administration (NARA), Declassified 2001, National Security Archive.
15 This period of Afghan history has been extensively covered. In this context Henry Bradsher's, *Afghan Communism and Soviet Intervention*, Karachi: Oxford University Press, 1999, T. Hammond, *Red Flag Over the Hindukush*, Boulder: Westview, 1984 and Barnett R. Rubin, The *Fragmentation of Afghanistan. State Formation and Collapse in the International System*, New Haven: Yale University Press, 1995 provide comprehensive coverage of this period in Afghan history.
16 *The Economist* echoed the Zia regime's fears over the change in government in Kabul by alleging that the Soviets could support the then imprisoned Bhutto as 'means of promoting a change in government in Pakistan'! See 'The Cockpit of Asia', *The Economist* (London), 6 May 1978.
17 Bhutto in his last book written from his death cell had praised the civil control over the armed forces in Afghanistan. See Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto, *If I am Assassinated*, New Delhi: Vikas, 1985, p.129.
18 Muhammad Ayoob, *Third World Security Predicament*, p.42.
19 Interview with Mr. Massarat Hussain Zuberi, former Secretary General, Regional Cooperation for Development (1965–1968), Karachi, 16 August 1986. Mr Zuberi had worked with Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto in various senior positions during the 1960s.
20 *The Tribune*, New Delhi, 6 May 1978.
21 The Islamic system as visualized by these parties meant the complete political, social and economic transformation of the society. An illustration of only the economic aspect with which this issue is dealt by Islamists, see Khalid M. Ishaque, 'The Islamic Approach to Economic Activity and Development', *The Pakistan Economist*, **17**:26, July 2, 1977, pp.13–23.
22 Interview with a prominent minister in Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto's cabinet, Lahore, 8 April 1998.
23 In his *Imagined Communities*, Benedict Anderson argues that a nation is a cultural construct, not necessarily based on a historical tradition but in a collectively imagined mindset by all those who share the same kind of mental map and surrounding vision of the world. See Benedict Anderson, *Imagined Communities: Reflections on the Origin and Spread of Nationalism*, London: Verso, 1983.
24 *The Pakistan Times*, 7 July 1977, p.8.
25 Quoted in Brian Cloughley, *A History of the Pakistan Army: Wars and Insurrections*, Karachi: Oxford University Press, 2000, p.223.
26 See Amos Perlmutter and Valerie Plave Bennet, *The Political Influence of the Military*, New Haven: Yale University Press, 1980.
27 Interview with Lieutenant-General (retd), Sahibzada Yakub Khan, Islamabad, 9 October 1999. Yakub served as Pakistan's Foreign Minister under the Zia regime from 1982 to 1987.
28 See declassified papers from Russian and East German archives translated and published by *Cold War International History Project* (CWIHP), Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars. The decisions of the Soviet Politburo from 1978 reveal a growing apprehension about the policies pursued by the PDPA. See also Vasiliy Mitrokhin, 'The KGB in Afghanistan', Working Paper No.40 *Cold War International History Project* (CWIHP), Washington DC: Woodrow Wilson International Center For Scholars, February 2002, p.28. Mitrokhin notes that the Soviet Politburo and the Soviet Ambassador to Afghanistan tried to dissuade the PDPA from mounting a coup against Daud. He also asserts that: 'the Residency (KGB in Kabul), the embassy and the Moscow leadership had little knowledge of the situation in the country, misinterpreted the situation and were hedging against the possibility that the attempted coup would not succeed.' Interestingly, the KGB blamed elements working for the Israeli intelligence service, Mossad for instigating some coup makers to take action against Daud.
29 Faiz Ali Chishti, *Betrayals of Another Kind: Islam, Democracy and the Army in Pakistan*, New Delhi: Tricolour Books, 1989, p.205. Chishti had played the major role in bringing General Zia to power on the night of 5 July 1977 as commander of the army's key X Corps stationed in the Islambad–Rawalpindi area.
30 *Dawn*, Karachi, 10 May 1978.
31 Press interview at the United Nations by Hafizullah Amin. reported in the *Dawn*, Karachi and *The Pakistan Times*, 7 June 1978. In fact, the first published program of the PDPA had declared that the Durand Line was imposed upon Afghanistan 'against the wishes of

its people' and it emphasised Afghanistan's support for 'the liberation movement of Pakhtunistan'. See *Program of the Peoples Democratic Party of Afghanistan*, Kabul, 11 April 1966.

32 See Asadollah Alam, *The Shah and I: The Confidential Diary of Iran's Royal Court, 1969–1977*, London: I.B. Tauris, 1991, p.231.

33 Mounstuart Elphinstone had observed in 1815 the exploitative role of mullahs in accumulating wealth by charging exorbitant interest on money loaned to peasants. This practice of Usury referred in the Quran as *riba* is thoroughly condemned and prohibited in Islam. See Mountstuart Elphinstone, *An Account of the Kingdom of Cabul*, Vol.1, pp.285–286. Quranic injunctions regarding debt relief are explained in detail in Sayyid Abul Ala Mawdudi, *Towards Understanding the Quran*, Vol.I, Surahs 1–3 (English version of Tahfhim al-Quran), translated and edited by Zafar Ishaq Ansari, London: Islamic Foundation, 1988. See in the text, Surah Al-Baqarah (The Cow), Verse 280, p.221: 'But if the debtor is in straitened circumstance, let him have respite until the time of ease; and whatever you remit by way of charity, it is better for you, if only you know.'

34 See Lawrence Lifschultz's interview with Dr Nodari Simoniya, 'Afghanistan: A Voice from Moscow', *Monthly Review* (New York), Vol.39, No.4, September 1987, p.11.

35 An excellent discussion of State–Society relationships is in J.S Migdal, *Strong Societies and Weak States: State–Society Relations and State Capabilities in the Third World*, Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1988, p.4. In the context of Afghanistan, it can be asserted that most Pashtuns outside the urban centres are organized on a tribal basis, while the non-Pashtun groups tend to be linked more on the basis of clan and kinship ties.

36 Amin Saikal and William Maley, *Regime Change in Afghanistan: Foreign Intervention and the Politics of Legitimacy*, Boulder: Westview Press, 1991, p.8.

37 For an analysis of the Afghan Islamists' denunciation of the PDPA, see Asta Olesen, *Islam and Politics in Afghanistan*, London: Curzon, 1995, pp.274–281.

38 For a detailed examination of the PDPA's policies, see B. Male, *Revolutionary Afghanistan*, London: Croom Helm, 1981 and Bradsher, *Afghan Communism and Soviet Intervention*, Karachi and London: OUP, 1999.

39 The Mujaddidi family came to Afghanistan at the behest of Ahmad Shah Durrani in the late eighteenth century. The family claimed a relationship with the famous Indian Sufi Shaykh Ahmad Sirhindi (1564–1624). Shaykh Sirhindi was the possessor of the singular honorific title *Mujaddid-e-alf-e-thani* ('the renewer of the Second Millennium'). For general information on Sirhindi and the *Naqshbandiya* order see Ann Marie Schimmel, *Mystical Dimensions of Islam*, Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1975.

40 Interview with a prominent Afghan personality who requested to remain anonymous, Islamabad, 4 October 1999.

41 Interview with an Afghan political figure, Islamabad, 23 February 1994.

42 K. Matinuddin, *Power Struggle in the Hindukush*, 1978–1991, Rawalpindi: Service Book Company, 1992, p.69.

43 See Willem Vogelsang, *The Afghans*, Oxford: Blackwell Publishers, p.72. Vogelsang, in fact, lists Mohammadi's group with Mujaddidi and Gaylani's factions in the 'moderate' classification. However, in the 1990s, Gaylani and Mujaddidi were opposed to the Taliban while Mohammadi's 'traditionalist' Harakat-i-Inqilab-i-Islami was aligned with this Sunni 'fundamentalist' militia.

44 Khurram Badr (Urdu), *Qazi Hussain Ahmad*, Karachi: Saba Publications, 1988, pp.70–71.

45 Sayed Vali Reza Nasr, *International Relations of an Islamist Movement: The Case of Jamaat-i-Islami of Pakistan*, New York: Council on Foreign Relations, 2000, pp.32–33.

46 Interview with a former Foreign Minister of Pakistan, Islamabad, 8 October 1999.

47 See interview of Gen Zia with Richard Reeves of the ABC (America), 30 June 1984. Published by the Ministry of Information and Broadcasting, Government of Pakistan, Islamabad, 1984.

48 S. Mukkherjee *Afghanistan: From Tragedy to Triumph*, Karachi: Pak Publishing House, 1984, p.132.

49 United States Department of State, 'The Afghan Coup', 30 April 1978 in Digital National Security Archive: *Afghanistan: The Making of U.S. Policy (1973–1990)*. Http://www.gwu.edu/~nsarchiv/NSAEBB/NSAEBB28/index.html. Accessed 2/2/2002.

50 Nilofar Qasim Mahdi, *Pakistan's Foreign Policy, 1971–81: The Search for Security*, Lahore: Ferozsons, 1999, p.209.

51 Ibid, p.210.

52 Political Letter from USSR Ambassador to Afghanistan A. Puzanov to Soviet Foreign Ministry, 'About the Domestic Political Situation in the DRA', 31 May 1978. *Cold War International History Project (CWIHP)*, Washington DC: Woodrow Wilson Center for Scholars, November 2001.

53 See *The Pakistan Times* and other papers including privately owned *Dawn* between June to August 1978. Under the Zia regime, all press was under close government censorship.

54 'When Russia signs, look for trouble', *The Economist*, 13 January 1979.

55 Interview with Sahibzada Yakub Khan, former Foreign Minister of Pakistan, Islamabad, 7 October 1999.

56 *The New York Times*, 20 May 1978, p.4.

57 See Olivier Roy, *The Failure of Political Islam*, Harvard, Mass: Harvard University Press, 1994 and Asta Olesen, *Islam and Politics in Afghanistan*, Richmond, 1995.

58 See F.R. Marwat, 'History of Pirs and Mullahs in Afghan Politics', parts I–II, *The Frontier Post*, 26–27 April 1986.

59 Asta Olesen, *Islam and Politics in Afghanistan*, pp.230–235.

60 K. Matinuddin, *Power Struggle in the HinduKush, 1978–1991*, p.68.

61 Interview with a member of the Jamaat-i-Islami, Pakistan, Islamabad, 22 August 1999.

62 K. Matinuddin, *Power Struggle in the Hindukush*, p.66.

63 See 'Regional representation in the Pakistan Army: An Unpublished Report' in Tahir Amin, *Ethnonational Movements of Pakistan*, p.174.

64 Interview with a former senior official of the Government of Pakistan, Islamabad, 18 September 1999. This officer had close connections with former officials of the Zahir Shah's regime residing in Islamabad.

65 See Beverly Male, *Revolutionary Afghanistan*, p.146.

66 Interview with a Senior Research Associate, Institute of Strategic Studies, Islamabad, 4 September 1999.

67 See Fred Halliday, *Threat from the East*, London: Penguin, 1982, p.146 and DRA Ministry of Foreign Affairs, *Interference in the Internal Affairs of the Democratic Republic of Afghanistan*, Kabul, 1984.

68 K.M. Arif, *Working with Zia: Pakistan's Power Politics, 1977–1988*, Karachi: Oxford University Press (OUP), 1995, pp.308–309.

69 Zbigniew Brzezinski, *Power and Principle: The Memoirs of the National Security Adviser, 1977–1981*, New York: Farrar Strauss & Giroux, New York, 1983, p.199.

70 See Article 4 of the Treaty of Friendship, Good neighbourliness and Cooperation between the Democratic Republic of Afghanistan and the USSR, 14 December 1978. *Undeclared War: Armed Intervention and other forms of Interference in the Internal affairs of the Democratic Republic of Afghanistan*, Kabul, 1984, p.28.

71 Henry S. Bradsher, *Afghan Communism and Soviet Intervention*, p.64.

72 See Yaacov Y.I. Vertzberger, *China's Southwestern Strategy: Encirclement and Counter encirclement*, New York: Praeger, 1985, pp.109–110.

73 The *Shola-e-Javid* had been operating since 1973 and had some support in the 'discriminated' Shiite Hazara community. According to an Afghan associated with this group it had escalated its anti-regime activities in 1978. Interview, Peshawar, 23 August, 2000.
74 See 'Subversive activity against the people of Afghanistan', *Pravda*, 1 August 1978.
75 US Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), Background Paper. *Iranian Support to the Afghan Resistance*, Directorate of Intelligence, 11 July 1985, Washington DC, 1985, p.1.
76 The tribal agencies of the NWFP are officially referred as Federally Administered Tribal Areas or FATA.
77 *The Economist*, 17 January 1979.
78 See,'Afghanistan: Outlook for the Insurgency During Winter', *Near East and South Asia Review*, Central Intelligence Agency, 23/11/1979. F-1991-00257. Declassified 20/11/1997.
79 *Foreign Affairs*, Pakistan, 15 March 1979.
80 See G. Pedersen, 'Afghan nomads in exile: patterns of organization and reorganization in Pakistan', in Ewan W. Anderson and Nancy Hatch Dupree (ed), *The Cultural Basis of Afghan Nationalism*, London: Pinter Publishers, 1990.
81 'Soviet Options in Afghanistan', Interagency Intelligence Memorandum, *Director of Central Intelligence Agency 1/91979*. EO-1995-00553. Declassified 11/18/1999.
82 CPSU Politburo Decisions on Afghanistan, 18 March, 1979. Source TskhSD, f.89.25 dok.111.1 12-25. *CWIHP*.
83 'Record of Meeting of A.N. Kosygin, A.A. Gromyko, D.F. Ustinov and B.N. Ponomarev with N.M. Taraki, Moscow 20 March 1979' in *CWIHP*, Washington DC: Woodrow Wilson Center, August 2002. The Afghan government had reportedly requested the Soviet government 14 times between 1978 and 1979 to send in Soviet forces to assist it in defeating the 'counterrevolution'.
84 Record of conversation of L.I. Brezhnev with N.M. Taraki, 20 March 1979, *CWIHP*.
85 Ibid, p.74.
86 Barnett R. Rubin, *US House of Representatives, Foreign Affairs Committee, Hearing*, 7 March 1990, p.5.
87 See Digital National Security Archives, *Afghanistan: The Making of US Policy (1973–1990)*. Http://192.195.245.32/afessayx.htm and 'Muslim Students Following the Path of the Imam', *Documents from the Den of Spies*, Vol.28, Tehran, 1983. See 'Memorandum of Conversation-Participants Ambassador Mahmoud Foroughi and Henry Precht, Director, Near Eastern Affairs', Department of State, 17 September 1979, *Documents from the Den of Spies*, Vol.28, p.79. This document indicates that the former Iranian ambassador to the US, Mahmoud Foroughi, had been in contact with the 'moderate' Afghan Islamic groups before July, 1979 at the behest of the United States!
88 'The CIA's Intervention in Afghanistan'. Interview with Zbigniew Brzezinki President Carter's National Security Adviser *Le Nouvel Oservateur*, Paris, 15–21 January 1998.
89 Zia's interview with BBC, 7 April 1978.
90 Olivier Roy, *The Failure of Political Islam*, p.169.
91 S.V.R. Nasr, 'International Politics, Domestic Imperatives, and Identity Mobilisation: Sectarianism in Pakistan, 1979–1998', *Comparative Politics*, Vol.32, Number 2, January 2000, pp.171–190.
92 Pakistan had been compelled to leave the CENTO alliance system due to Iran's withdrawal from the pact in April 1979 that led to this organization becoming defunct.
93 Cited in Vasili Safronchuk, 'Afghanistan in the Amin period', *International Affairs* (Moscow), February 1991, p.80.
94 Information from the CC CPSU to GDR leader Honecker, 1 October, 1979. Source: SAPMO, Berlin, JIV2/202.A.575. *CWIHP*.

95 *Foreign Affairs – Pakistan*, Vol.V, September 1979.
96 Steven Galster *Afghanistan: Lessons from the Last War in Afghanistan: The Making of US Policy, 1973–1990*, National Security Archive. Http://www.gwu.edu/~nsarchiv/NSAEBB/NSAEBB57/essay.html, p.8.
97 Steven Galster, *Afghanistan: Lessons from the Last War in Afghanistan: The Making of US Policy, 1973–1990*, Op.Cit, p.8.
98 'The CIA's Intervention in Afghanistan', Interview with Zbigniew Brzezinski, *Le Nouvel Observateur*, Paris, 15–21 January 1998.
99 Gromyko-Andropov-Ustinov-Ponomarev Report to CPSU CC, 27 October 1979 Source A.A. Liakhovskii, *The Tragedy and the Valour of the Afghani*, Moscow: GPI 'Iskon', 1995, p.102 (*CWIHP*).
100 V. Safronchuk, Op.Cit, p.93.
101 See S.A.I. Tirmizi, *Profiles of Intelligence*, Lahore: Combined Printers, 1995, Chapter 6.
102 Hassan Kakar, *Afghanistan: The Soviet Invasion and the Afghan Response, 1979–1982*, Berkeley: University of California Press, 1995. Henry Bradsher's *Afghan Communism and Soviet Intervention* gives a good account of the events leading to the Soviet intervention. Soviet Politburos minutes dated 31 December, 1979 show that the administration of Nur Mohammad Taraki had requested several times throughout the course of 1979 for sending of Soviet combat troops to Afghanistan. See 'Andropov-Gromyko-Ustinov-Ponomarev Report on events in Afghanistan on 27–28 December 1979', Top-secret, *CWIHP*, p.160. The arguments against intervention largely echoed those used by the British opponents of the 'forward policy' more than a century earlier. See also *Izvestia*, 17 November 1989.
103 General Zia's Interview with William James Eaton, of *The Los Angeles Times*, 26 January 1984.
104 Sherbaz Khan Mazari, *A Journey to Disillusionment*, Karachi: Oxford University Press, 1999, p.530.
105 Andropov-Gromyko-Ustinov-Ponomarev Report on events in Afghanistan on 27–28 December 1979, dated 31 December 1979. Top secret. Source: TskhSD, f.89, per.42, dok.10 in *CWIHP*.
106 Ibid.
107 L.I. Brezhnev quoted from O. Bykov and D. Tomashevsky, *The Priorities of Soviet Foreign Policy Today*, Moscow: Progress Publishers, 1981, p.132.
108 Frederick Engels' article *Afghanistan* published in the New American Cyclopaedia, Vol.I, 1858 in Marx-Engels, *On Colonialism*, Moscow: Progress Publishers, 1981, p.151.
109 See L.I. Brezhnev quoted from O. Bykov and D. Tomashevsky, *The Priorities of Soviet Foreign Policy Today*, p.132. Amin's murder was certainly a breach of international law, but it is not clear that the intervention was. Amin himself was reportedly very happy when he heard that Soviet Army units were on the way, presumably because he thought they had come to support him, and in response to Taraki's numerous appeals. Therefore, it looks to have been not invasion but intervention by consent followed by a double cross, morally perhaps even more reprehensible than invasion, but not quite the same in legal terms.
110 See CPSU Politburo Decision, 28 January 1980, 'Report by Gromyko-Andropov-Ustinov-Ponomarev, 27 January, 1980'. Source TsKhSD, F.89, per.34, dok.3 *CWIHP*. See also CC CPSU Politburo Transcripts, 7 February 1980 (*CWIHP*).
111 'Alert Memorandum on USSR–Afghanistan', 9/14/79, *Directorate of Intelligence*, CIA, Washington DC. Declassified 11/18/1999.

112 Tahir Amin, *Ethno-National Movements of Pakistan: Domestic and International Factors*, Islamabad: Institute of Policy Studies, 1988, pp.206–207.
113 See Akbar S. Ahmad, 'Afghanistan and Pakistan: The Great Game of the Tribes', *Journal of South Asian and Middle Eastern Studies*, Vol.III, No.4, Summer 1980, pp.24–25.
114 Anthony Hyman, 'The Afghan–Pakistan Border Dispute', *Asian Affairs*, vol.XI, Part III, October 1980, p.272.
115 'Carter would fight for Persian Gulf; seeks to resume Draft Registration', *The Washington Post*, January 24, 1980.
116 See Dennis Kux, *The United States and Pakistan: 1947–2000: Disenchanted Allies*, Washington DC: Woodrow Wilson Center Press, 2001, p.262.
117 These comments were made by Zia in an interview with Arnaud de Borchgrave, 'A Talk with Zia', *Newsweek*, 14 January 1980.
118 Interview with a former senior Pakistani Foreign Ministry official, Islamabad, 28 September, 1999.
119 'Replies by the Secretary of Defense (Brown) at a News Conference, Beijing, January 9, 1980' in *American Foreign Policy: Basic Documents 1977–1980*, Washington DC: Department of State 1983, p.827.
120 Jonathan Kwitney, 'Afghanistan: Crossroads of Conflict', *The Atlantic Monthly*, May, 1980, p.29. General Zia advocated that the US should take 'active interest in the affairs of the area as American influence in this region has received tremendous set back by the events in Afghanistan and by the events in Iran'. See President Zia-ul-Haq's interview with CBS television in Rawalpindi, 22 February 1979 in K.Arif (ed) *American–Pakistan Relations – Documents*, Volume 1, Lahore: Vanguard, 1984, p.344.
121 Diego Cordovez and Selig S. Harrison, *Out of Afghanistan: The Inside Story of Soviet Withdrawal*, New York: OUP, 1995, p.56.
122 President Zia-ul-Haq's interview with CBS correspondent Walter Cronkite for 'Face the Nation' programme, 18 May 1980 in K. Arif (ed), *America–Pakistan Relations – Documents*, p.366.
123 Saeed Shafqat, *Civil–Military Relations in Pakistan: From Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto to Benazir Bhutto*, Lahore: Pakistan Book Corporation, 1997, p.225.
124 See Ashok Kapur, *Pakistan's Nuclear Development*, London: Croom Helm, 1987, p.192.
125 Lieutenant-General Kamal Matinuddin has quoted this based on his interview with General Zia's friend and confidant, Lieutenant General K.M. Arif. See Kamal Matinuddin, *Power Struggle in the Hindukush: Afghanistan – 1978–1991*, Rawalpindi: Services Book Club, 1992, p.127.
126 Statement by Under Secretary of State Buckley in the hearings before the Subcommittee on International Security and Scientific Affairs, International Economic Policy and Trade, and Asian and Pacific Affairs of the House CFA on security and military assistance to Pakistan, 16 September 1981 in K. Arif (ed), *America–Pakistan Relations – Documents*, p.446.
127 The US ignored the Pakistani military's overthrow of a civilian government and its dismal human rights record. According to Secretary of State, Alexander Haig it was Pakistan's 'internal problem'. See Dennis Kux, *The United States and Pakistan, 1947–2000: Disenchanted Allies*, p.257.
128 The Afghan Islamists were then regarded by the US and UK officialdom as 'freedom fighters'. See John Simpson, 'The wreck of the land I love', *The Sunday Telegraph*, London, 14 October 2001.
129 Dennis Kux, *The United States and Pakistan, 1947–2000: Disenchanted Allies*, p.258.

130 Steve Coll, 'Anatomy of a victory: CIA's covert Afghan war', *The The Washington Post*, 19 July 1992. Coll notes that the CIA provided the Afghan resistance through the ISI with satellite mapping intelligence, sophisticated use of delayed timing devices for the large tonnage of C-4 plastic explosives supplied for urban sabotage. It also supplied targeting devices for mortars, wire guided anti-tank missiles and eventually the Stinger anti-aircraft missiles. Sniper rifles were provided to assassinate senior Soviet and Afghan government functionaries.
131 Jean Marc Sorel, 'Some Questions About the Definition of Terrorism and the Fight Against Its Financing', *European Journal of International Law*, Vol.14, No.2, 2003, pp.365–378. In effect, the Reagan administration's assistance in providing covert training in the methods of sabotage and assassination to a loose confederation of Afghan Islamists under the tutelage of Pakistani intelligence amounted to sponsorship of 'terrorism'.
132 The ISI was supporting groups that were also responsible for attacks on civilians and civilian infrastructure within Afghanistan. Acts that could be included in the US Department of Defense's current definition of terrorism. The US Department of Defense defines Terrorism as 'the calculated use of unlawful violence or the threat of unlawful violence to inculcate fear; intended to coerce or to intimidate governments or societies in the pursuit of goals that are generally political, religious or ideological'. Department of Defense, *Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms*, Joint Publication 1-02, Washington DC: Department of Defense, 2002, p.433.
133 John Thor Dahlberg, 'Cold War Incursion Sowed Seeds of Terror', *Los Angeles Times*, August 4, 1996. According to US Undersecretary of State, Michael Armacost, United States' main goal was the 'restoration of the strategic balance in the region' and it had 'no blueprint for Afghanistan' in terms of future reconstruction. Armacost testimony before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee 23 June 1988, *Afghanistan: The Making of US Policy: 1973–1990*, National Security Archive.
134 Interview with Dr Samiullah Mujahid Qureshi, former Additional Secretary (Middle East), Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Islamabad, 3 October 2000.
135 See Muhammad Yousaf and Mark Adkin, *The Bear Trap, Afghanistan's Untold Story*, Leo Cooper, London, 1992, p.27.
136 Interview with Barnett Rubin, *Asia Source*. Http://www.asiasource.org/news/special_reports/rubin.cfm.
137 *Salaf* literally means 'predecessors' in Arabic. The Salaf are the first generation of Muslims, who are considered the most authoritative source for emulation and guidance for the succeeding generations.
138 See Halpern's seminal book, *Politics of Social Change in the Middle East and North Africa*, Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1963, pp.134–155.
139 Sayed Abul Ala Mawdudi, *A Short History of the Revivalist Movements in Islam*, trans Al-Ashari, Lahore: Islamic Publication Limited, Lahore, 1972, pp.63–69. Originally published in Urdu in 1940.
140 Alexander Ignateko, 'Islamic radicalism: A Cold war By-Product', *Central Asia and Caucasus*, August 2001, pp.6–7.
141 Muhammad Yousaf and Mark Adkin, *The Bear Trap*, p.40.
142 Ibid, p.40.
143 Interview with a Pakistan Army officer involved in providing logistical support to the Mujahideen groups between 1987 and 1989. Islamabad, 8 September 1999.
144 Muhammad Yousaf, *The Silent Soldier*, Jang, Lahore, 1991, p.45.
145 Ibid. p.46.
146 See Dennis Kux, *The United States and Pakistan, 1947–2000: Disenchanted Allies*, p.266.

147 Pakistan government claimed that there were nearly 3 million refugees but some UN officials privately viewed this number with scepticism. For Pakistani estimates of refugees, see *Humanitarian Assistance Programme for Afghan Refugees in North West Frontier Province, Pakistan*, Afghan Refugee Commisionarate, Peshawar, 1983. The Pakistanis allegedly boosted the refugee numbers in order to get more foreign assistance. Interview with a UNHCR Auditor, New York, 23 May 1991.

148 Central Intelligence Agency, Director of Intelligence, *Pakistan: Countering an Expanding Drug Industry*, An Intelligence Assessment, 9/1/1988E1537B. Declassified 29 August 1999.

149 US Department of State, Bureau of International Narcotics Matters, *International Narcotics Control Strategy Report* (1984), p.4.
Alfred McCoy's study asserts that within two years of the Soviet intervention the Pakistan–Afghanistan region was supplying a large percentage of the US demand for heroin. Moreover, large amounts of heroin produced in this area also went to Europe. See Alfred McCoy, *The Politics of Heroin*, New York: Lawrence Hill Books, 1991.

150 Interview with a former official of the BCCI, Karachi 8 April 1996. For details, see Jonathan Beatty and S.C. Gwenyyen, *The Outlaw Bank*, New York: Random House, 1993. The BCCI was formed by a Pakistani, Agha Hasan Abidi with the participation of the UAE President Shaikh Zayed ibn Sultan al Nahiyan in the early 1970s. The BCCI earned ill repute for its alleged affiliation with drug smugglers, covert arms deals and money laundering.

151 Alfred McCoy, 'Drug fallout: the CIA's Forty Year Complicity in the Narcotics Trade', *The Progressive*, 1, August 1997.

152 Muhammad Yousaf, *The Silent Soldier*, p.87. The Saudi government matched U.S. committed dollars, dollar for dollar. Moreover, these funds did not go directly to the ISI or the Mujahideen, but to Washington where it was lumped together with the U.S. contribution.

153 Muhammad Yousaf, *The Bear Trap*, p.195.

154 *Janes Intelligence Review*, 1 August 2001.

155 CIA, Directorate of Intelligence, *Pakistan Implications of the Dissolution of the Civilian Government*, 6/15/1988, F-1995-00042.

156 Lawrence Ziring, *Pakistan in the Twentieth Century: A Political History*, Karachi: OUP, p.475.

157 CIA, Directorate of Intelligence, *Pakistan: Implications of the Dissolution of the Civilian Government*, 6/15/1988, F-1995-00042.

158 See Diego Cordovez and Selig S. Harrison, *Out of Afghanistan*, Chapter 10.

159 *The Washington Post*, 19 July 1992.

160 Christopher Simpson, *National Security Directives of the Reagan and the Bush Administrations: Declassified History of U.S. Political and Military Policy, 1981–1991*, Boulder: Westview Press, 1995, p.446.

161 In 1980–1981, Javier Perez de Cueller had served as the Special Representative on Afghanistan before being appointed Secretary-General of the UN. Diego Cordovez of Ecuador replaced him in early 1982.

162 See Diego Cordovez and Selig S. Harrison, *Out of Afghanistan: The Inside Story of the Soviet Withdrawal* and for a Pakistani perspective Riaz Mohammad Khan, *Untying the Afghan Knot: Negotiating Soviet Withdrawal*, Durham: NC, 1991. Initially, after coming to power Gorbachev had sought to escalate military operations in Afghanistan in a bid to defeat the Mujahideen. However, the Soviet inability to weaken the resolve of the Mujahideen and their backers strengthened his resolve to find a way out of the Afghan quagmire.

163 Shahnawaz Bhutto had been mysteriously killed in his Paris apartment in 1987. Many prominent politicians in Pakistan including members of the Bhutto family suspected that Shahnawaz had been killed by the ISI on the instructions of General Zia.

164 Muhammad Yousaf and Mark Adkin, *The Bear Trap*, p.3.

165 Directorate of Intelligence (CIA), *The Soviet Invasion of Afghanistan: Five Years After*. An Intelligence Assessment, CIA Historical Review Program, Declassified 1999.

166 Directorate of Intelligence (CIA), *The Soviet Invasion of Afghanistan: Five Years After*, Op.Cit.

167 S.V.R. Nasr, *International Relations of an Islamist Movement: The Case of Jamaat-i-Islami of Pakistan*, Council of Foreign Relations, New York, 1999, p.33.

168 John K. Cooley, *Unholy Wars: Afghanistan, America and International Terrorism*, London: Pluto Press, 1999, Chapter 5. A British NCO (Non-Commissioned Officer) serving with the SAS has given his account of involvement with Afghan Islamists belonging to Hekmatyar's Hizb-i-Islami during the early 1980s. This individual was based in Pakistan and on occasions participated with the Afghans in combat operations against the Soviets. See Tom Carew, *The Secret War in Afghanistan: Jihad*, London: Mainstream Publishing, 2000.

169 See John Cooley, *Unholy Wars*, p.100. The Israelis supplied the Afghan Mujahideen with ex-Soviet weaponry that the Zionist state had seized during the 1973 Yom Kippur War from Egypt and Syria. Muhammad Yousaf in *The Bear Trap* acknowledges this. The role of Israeli instructors in training the Afghans is mentioned by Tariq Ali in *The Clash of Fundamentalisms: Crusades, Jihads and Modernity*, London: Verso, 2002, p.209. The involvement of the Israelis in providing arms and training services to the Pakistan based Afghan Islamists was done with the approval of senior functionaries of the Pakistani state including General Zia. See George Crile, *Charlies Wilson's War: The Extra-Ordinary Story of the Largest Covert Operation in History*, New York: Atlantic Press, 2003, Chapters 5 and 6.

170 See Muhammad Yousaf, *The Bear Trap*, Chapter 7.

171 Ikramul Haq, 'Pak-Afghan Trade in Historical Perspective', *Asian Survey*, vol.XXXVI, No.10, October 1996, pp.670–683.

172 Matthew M. Aid, 'The NSA and the Cold War', *Intelligence and National Security*, Vol.16, No.1, Spring 2001, p. 51.

173 Personal communication from an Uzbek source working with the ISI's financial disbursement system for the Afghan Islamist leaders, Islamabad, 23 September 1993.

174 Selig S. Harrison quoted in M. Ahsan Ahrari, *Jihad Groups, Nuclear Pakistan and the New Great Game*, Carlisle, PA: Strategic Studies Institute, U.S. Army War College, August 2001, p.4.

175 Directorate of Intelligence (CIA), *The Implications of the Dissolution of the Civilian Government*, 6/15/1988, p.6.

176 George P. Shultz, *Turmoil and Triumph*, New York: Charles Scribners Sons, 1993, p.1091.

177 Sun Tzu, *The Art Of Warfare*, Roger T. Ames (Trans), New York: Ballantine Books, 1993, p.95.

Chapter 4

The Concluding Years of the Cold War and the Afghan Conflict

The course of the Afghan conflict was considerably influenced by the changes in the international system resulting from the reform process initiated by the Gorbachev regime in the Soviet Union. These dramatic changes within the Soviet Union were to have far-reaching implications for Moscow's policy towards Afghanistan. The transformation in Soviet domestic and foreign policy under Mikhail S. Gorbachev paved the way for renewal of détente with the West, while at the same time providing impetus for the easing of tensions with Beijing. In the case of Afghanistan, Moscow had begun to show willingness to withdraw its troops from that country and indicated an interest in accepting a new government in Kabul that could include non-PDPA members.[1] This was a complete departure from the previous Soviet stance that regarded external interference in Afghan affairs by regional and extra-regional powers as the sole cause of the war and, therefore, refused to accept the legitimacy of the Afghan Islamic opposition, which was considered as a mercenary force.

Notwithstanding the changes in the Soviet stance in relation to Afghanistan, the essence of Pakistan's policy toward Afghanistan did not alter. The Pakistani military, with Washington's consent, sought the complete eviction of the pro-Moscow elements in Afghanistan and their replacement by Islamist forces sympathetic to Islamabad. It is important to stress that Pakistan's goal of establishing an 'Islamic' government in Kabul had the support of a small but influential constituency of Pakistani Islamic groups and sections of the military that were close to General Zia. The interests of the Pakistani Islamic groups had become inseparable from the Afghan Jihad. Pakistan's utilisation of these groups to further its elusive goal of installing a pro-Pakistan regime in Kabul, even after the withdrawal of Soviet forces from Afghanistan in 1989, was to have a profoundly destabilising ramifications for South, South west and Central Asia in the post-Soviet era.

This chapter examines Pakistani policy towards Afghanistan in view of the relaxation of US–Soviet rivalry from 1988 onwards. It discusses Pakistan's role in the formation of the so-called Afghan Interim Government (AIG) in 1989. Most importantly, it explores Pakistan's Afghanistan strategy in the aftermath of the collapse of the Soviet Union and the subsequent takeover of Kabul by the fractious and quarrelling Afghan resistance. This is undertaken within the context of the changing regional geopolitical scenario resulting from the demise of the Soviet Union that affected policies of all regional and extra-regional powers involved in the Afghan imbroglio.

Pakistan and the Afghan Conflict in the Post-Zia Era

Almost eight years of civil war and foreign military intervention in Afghanistan had resulted in terrible loss of human life and massive physical destruction, especially in the countryside.[2] The United Nations had been conducting indirect proximity talks between Afghanistan and Pakistan to facilitate the withdrawal of Soviet troops since late 1981.[3] In the tense Cold War atmosphere of the early 1980s, the United States reportedly put pressure on the Zia regime to refrain from giving in to Soviet overtures for a negotiated settlement of the Afghan issues. Washington aimed to give the Soviets a 'dose' of what it had faced in Vietnam.[4]

Under the Reagan administration, Washington had pursued a policy of supporting right-wing guerrilla movements against pro-Moscow regimes in the Third World in order to reverse the perceived 'advances' the Soviet Union had made in Asia, Africa and Latin America.[5] Afghanistan, being located on the Soviet periphery, was the highlight of this strategy. Pakistan had served as the primary sanctuary and base of operation for the US-aided anti-Soviet insurgency in Afghanistan. General Zia, in order to bolster his unpopular dictatorship, was more than willing to act as a US proxy to unseat the socialist regime in Kabul. The military junta in Islamabad went along with Washington in spurning Soviet overtures for a dialogue under the two short-lived 'hardline' post-Brezhnev administrations headed by Yu.V. Andropov (1982–1984) and Konstantin Chernenko (1984–1985). Moscow had indicated to the UN special representative on Afghanistan, Diego Cordovez, its interest in withdrawal of troops provided Pakistan and its backer the United States 'guarantee' pledges of non-interference in Afghanistan, several times between 1982 and 1984. Washington, however, did not take these attempts seriously and was determined to keep the Russians trapped in the Afghan quagmire.[6] Some of the Pakistani senior civilian officials who tended to show interest in the Soviet proposals were quietly sidelined by the military. In this regard, Foreign Minister, Agha Shahi's lack of enthusiasm for a military solution to the Afghan conflict as propounded by his military bosses resulted in his removal in 1982. Shahi also held reservations about Pakistan's renewed security relationship with the United States.[7] His inclination to accept Soviet requests for negotiations was allegedly vetoed by Zia under US coercion.[8]

A Zia confidant and a fellow armoured corps officer, Sahebzada Yakub Khan, replaced Agha Shahi as Foreign Minister in November 1982. Under Yakub, Pakistan's Afghan policy increasingly converged with that of the United States. Foreign policy decision-making became the domain of the senior military and a handful of bureaucrats. The Foreign Ministry played a secondary role of simply implementing the decisions of the military elite rather than formulating the contours of Pakistan's foreign relations. The military elite autonomously implemented its Afghan strategy through its Intelligence Directorate, severely undermining the role of institutions such as the Foreign Ministry.

Pakistan continued to spurn attempts for a political solution to the conflict in Afghanistan until the rise of M.S. Gorbachev to the top leadership of the Soviet Union in 1985 brought about a fundamental change in Soviet policy on Afghanistan. Gorbachev held a more conciliatory and non-ideological position on foreign policy than his predecessors. According to him 'the foreign policy that served the utopian

aim of spreading communist ideas round the world, had led us into the dead end of the Cold War ... and dragged us into adventures like the one in Afghanistan' needed to be re-examined.[9] Gorbachev was willing to make concessions on Afghanistan that may not have been followed by any of the other contenders for power in 1985.[10] His subsequent restructuring of Soviet foreign policy resulted in the growing rapprochement between the United States and the Soviet Union by 1988. This acted as a catalyst for the conclusion of the Geneva Accords initialled by Pakistan and Afghanistan on 14 April 1988 and guaranteed by the United States and the Soviet Union. The Accords facilitated the withdrawal of the Soviet forces from Afghan territory by February 1989. Under the Accords, Pakistan and the United States were supposed to cease their assistance to the Afghan resistance by May 15, 1988. The United States, however, had insisted on continuing to provide assistance to the Mujahideen as long as the Soviet Union continued to support the Kabul regime. This so-called 'positive symmetry' ensured that the war in Afghanistan would continue indefinitely.

Interestingly, at this stage some prominent former American policymakers had begun to acknowledge that the PDPA 'government was not communist and technically not even socialist'.[11] Nevertheless, the Pakistani military continued to exploit the anti-Soviet sensibilities of the Reagan administration in order to pursue its goal of toppling the 'Kabul regime' and supplanting it with a client pro-Pakistan 'Islamic government'.

The Geneva Accords were essentially designed to be a 'face saving' device for the Soviets to withdraw from Afghanistan.[12] General Zia hesitantly agreed to sign the Accords under US pressure. Days after the signing of the Accords, he had explicitly commented that 'the Mujahideen should and would continue to fight and topple the Kabul regime'.[13] This made a mockery of Article 1 of the Accords that, explicitly forbade Pakistan and Afghanistan from interference in each other's affairs.[14] However, Zia's hand picked Prime Minister, Muhammad Khan Junejo, who was amenable to a peaceful settlement of the Afghan crisis, had ignored Zia's pleas for the creation of an alternate Afghan interim administration before Pakistan signed the Accords.[15] This prompted Zia to conclude that the US had 'reached an agreement with the Soviet Union' over Afghanistan, thereby ignoring Pakistani interests.[16] Junejo's keenness for signing the Accords, plus his assertion of civilian authority over the armed forces, proved fatal for his administration, as Zia dismissed the Junejo government a month after the agreements at Geneva.[17]

The farcical nature of the Geneva Accords was revealed as the Afghan conflict continued. The Soviet Union and the United States persisted in aiding their respective proxies. Zia's death in August 1988 and the installation of a quasi-democratic regime led by Benazir Bhutto in December 1988 did not deter the military from persisting to realise their goal of using factions of the Afghan resistance as surrogates to advance Pakistan's interests in Afghanistan. The primary objective still revolved around creating a pro-Pakistan Pashtun-dominated Islamic government in Kabul after the exit of the Soviet forces.

The military's decision to hold multi-party elections in 1988 and devolve limited power to a civilian government was taken under extenuating circumstances resulting from the virtual elimination of a sizeable section of the military elite responsible for Pakistan's Afghan policy in the plane crash that had killed General Zia. The military,

through its intelligence outfits the ISI and MI (Military Intelligence), engineered the 1988 elections in such a manner that the opposition Pakistan Peoples Party of Benazir Bhutto could not garner a sufficient majority to form government on its own.[18] The ISI's political cell blatantly manipulated the national elections held in 1988 and later in 1990 to prevent the PPP from winning a clear majority at the centre. The agency's two former chiefs, Lieutenant-Generals Hamid Gul and Asad Durrani, admitted to having rigged the elections and distributed millions of rupees to anti-PPP politicians of the so-called *Islami Jamhoori Ittehad* (Islamic Democratic Alliance) led by Nawaz Sharif through the ISI linked Mehran Bank between 1988 and 1992.[19] According to the Army's policy-making elite this was done in the 'larger national interest' and to ensure continuity in what the army perceived should be the 'national security agenda'.[20] To ensure continuity in foreign policy the military compelled the weak PPP government to include Lieutenant- General Sahebzada Yakub Khan (Zia's Foreign Minister) in the cabinet.

The Army chief remained the pivot in Pakistan's post-1988 power structure. It was General Mirza Aslam Beg, Zia's successor, who along with the Corps Commanders decided to hold elections and allow an ethnic Pashtun civilian bureaucrat, Ghulam Ishaq Khan to become the President of the Republic after Zia's death.[21] The military-bureaucratic nexus remained strong and interventionist, even when a civilian government appeared to be in control. The army retained its pre-eminent influence over the formulation of Pakistan's security policy despite the façade of democratic rule.

Washington continued to back the general aims of Pakistan's Afghan policy in the post-Zia era regardless of the misgivings of some Pakistani military officers about United States' alleged opposition to the emergence of an Islamic regime in Afghanistan. One of the largest CIA stations in Asia continued to operate in Islamabad.[22] It continued to coordinate the Afghan war with the ISI. Earlier, the Reagan administration's Director of Intelligence, William J. Casey, had forged a very intense relationship with Zia and other senior army officers, including ISI Director General Akhtar Abdul Rahman. The CIA's Office of Technical Services provided specialists, who assisted in organising Zia's personal security.[23] The close ISI-CIA relationship was to persist after Zia's death. The CIA established SIGINT (Signals intelligence) facilities along the Pakistan-Afghan border to monitor Afghan/Soviet communications.[24] The United States also reportedly set up electronic intelligence facilities at Gwadar in Baluchistan near the Iranian border to monitor radio communications emanating from Iran and other Persian Gulf states.[25]

Pakistan's 'Islamisation' with Saudi backing and its security relationship with Washington had made the regime of Ayatollah Khomeini cautious in its dealing with Pakistan.[26] Iran had vociferously condemned the Soviet presence in Afghanistan and had tried to forge links with some CIA-ISI supported Sunni Islamist parties like the Hizb-i-Islami of Hekmatyar and the Jamiat-i-Islami of Burhanuddin Rabbani. However, during most of the 1980s Tehran was engaged in a protracted war with Iraq and it could not give much importance to the conflict occurring on its eastern frontiers. Most of Iran's limited assistance went to the ethnic Hazara Shiite groups that had formed obscure groups such as the Nasr (Victory), Harakat-e-Islami (Islamic movement), Pasadaran-e-Jihad-e-Islami (Soldiers of the Islamic Jihad) and many other minor factions.[27] The assistance to these groups as noted by a 1985 CIA

analysis gave Tehran a ' bargaining chip in any decisions regarding the future of the Kabul regime'.[28] The Iranian-backed groups remained marginalised, due to their inability to win US favour owing to Washington's hostility to anti-US Shiite fundamentalism of the 1980s that was motivated by the Iranian revolution. This was in sharp contrast to the United States' generous assistance and overt sympathy to nearly all the major Sunni Mujahideen groups based in Pakistan, which were at that time considered pro-Western. In June 1986, President Reagan personally honoured Burhanuddin Rabbani, Pir Gaylani, Sibghatullah Mujadiddi and Muhammad Nabi Muhammadi for resisting the Soviets in Afghanistan during the Mujahideen leaders' visit to Washington.[29] In fact, Washington pressured Saudi Arabia between 1987 and 1989 to publicly endorse its backing of the Afghan Jihad and increase its support for the Afghan Islamic groups.[30] This strategy was part of the Reagan administration's policy to portray its active support for an anti-Soviet Islamic cause.[31]

The most significant development resulting from the Pakistani-US collaboration on Afghanistan was that it had enabled thousands of non-Afghan Islamists hailing from a region extending from Morocco to Indonesia to come to Pakistan and join the anti-Soviet Jihad with the consent of the Pakistani government. By 1989, these foreign Mujahideen had established intricate networks with their Pakistani and Afghan counterparts. Within Pakistan, parties such as the JUI and the JI had firmed their relationships with Afghan Pashtun Islamists of the Hizb-i-Islami's two factions and the traditionalist groups like Muhammadi's Harakat and Sayyaf's Ittehad-i-Islami to attain the goal of a Sunni Islamic government in Kabul. The flow of finances from the external patrons of the Jihad and the Islamic groups' involvement in heroin smuggling had created an atmosphere of relative affluence in Pakistani regions bordering Afghanistan. Saudi financial backing, along with US assistance in terms of weaponry and monetary aid, gave the Pakistani military and the Islamists a sense of inflated optimism and inspiration to implement their agenda of forming an Islamic state not only in Afghanistan but also in other parts of Southwest and Central Asia by the late 1980s.

To a sizeable segment of the Pakistan Army's officer corps, Afghanistan served to 'redeem' Pakistani 'honour' and wiped out the 'humiliation' suffered at the hands of India in 1971.[32] In fact, the success of the Jihad in Afghanistan gave Pakistani strategic planners an ability to pursue a revanchist agenda against India by assisting secessionist forces in that country, especially in Kashmir and Punjab.[33] The military's success in waging covert low-intensity warfare in Afghanistan through Islamist proxies enabled it to take advantage of the political insurgency in Indian-administered Kashmir in 1989 by backing Kashmiri Islamic militants seeking to secede from the Indian Union. Some cadres from the organizations that had served in the Afghan Jihad would also serve as the 'cannon fodder' for the military's Kashmir strategy. The strategy of conducting war by proxies ensured that the Pakistani state retained an element of deniability in the event of being accused of involvement in assisting such groups.[34]

The Afghan war contributed to the establishment of thousands of madrassas in Pakistan. According to a reliable estimate in 1956, there were roughly 244 madrassas in what was then West Pakistan. In 1988 there were approximately 2,891 madrassas in Pakistan, of which 1869 belonged to the Deobandi interests, 717 to the Barelvi School, 47 to the Shiite sect and Ahl-e-Hadith had 161. Jamaat-i-Islami and

independent madrassas accounted for 97.[35] The Zia regime's pro-Saudi tilt favoured the growth of Deobandi madrassas. The puritanical anti-Shiite views of the Deobandis also conflicted with the more moderate Sunnism represented by the Barelvi School. Pakistan's alliance with Saudi Arabia enabled Riyadh to lavishly fund Saudi-oriented Islamists and madrassas. Moreover, the presence of over a million Pakistani workers in Saudi Arabia and the Gulf strengthened orthodox Islamic influences on the lower middle class strata of Pakistani society, which was the largest contributor to the worker influx to the Gulf.[36]

The Deobandis and the Ahl-e-Hadith, a conservative traditionalist school within Sunni Islam that emphasises strict adherence to the precepts of the Sunnah and does not follow the four Sunni Schools of law, found much favour with the military owing to their support of the Afghan Jihad and the domestic 'Islamisation' drive. The military's support for the Deobandis and associated groups reduced the influence of the previously dominant Barelvis on the religio-political debates in Pakistan. This diminished the importance of the major Barelvi party, the Jamiat-i-Ulama-i-Pakistan (JUP), in comparison to that of the JUI in finding favour with the military. Esposito and Voll rightly observe that the military's 'Islamisation' of society resulted in exacerbating sectarian tensions and created rivalry amongst the various Sunni schools of thought. They point out that the: 'zeal of these Sunni Schools to purify and strengthen the Islamic community has not only contributed historically to anti-Shiism but also to inter-Sunni competition'.[37]

The linkages between the madrassas, the military's intelligence agencies and the Afghan conflict became stronger by the late 1980s as hundreds of Deobandi madrassas emerged in the NWFP, Punjab and Baluchistan. These madrassas imparted a traditionalist Islamic education emphasising such concepts as Jihad to the poverty-stricken local students and to the Afghan refugees residing in these provinces. The ordinary mullahs in the majority of these madrassas, who had usually acquired very little scriptural learning, offered a very crude and biased education to the students filled with sectarian hatred and half-baked concepts pertaining to Jihad. The rapid rise of these madrassas, often funded by dubious foreign sources, went hand in hand with the decline of Pakistan's educational system during the Zia era. The government, in spite of substantial US financial assistance, failed to devise a universal primary education system for the country and continued to spend less than 2 percent of the Gross National Product (GNP) on education.[38] Owing to the lack of an organized educational program for the education of Afghan children in Pakistan, many Afghan families enrolled their sons in madrassas run by the Pakistani religious parties associated with the Afghan Islamic groups.[39] The madrassas received financial assistance not only from the government but also from private sources in the Arab sheikhdoms of the Gulf. The Pakistani JUI and JI were most prominent in sponsoring the madrassas in NWFP and Baluchistan.

Conflicts are made in social space and not in isolation, and in the case of Afghanistan, the Pakistani state's decision to act as a sanctuary for Afghan Islamists resulted in the fusion of some elements of Afghan Islamism with their Pakistani hosts. The JUI's (Samiul Haq faction) Darul Uloom Haqqania (Centre for Learning) at Akora Khattak, near Nowshera in NWFP, which was one of the major centres of Deobandi education in the province even before the Afghan Jihad became the key centre of Islamic education for several Afghan commanders who would rise to

prominence in the Taliban militia. Moreover, the participation of Pakistani Islamists in the Afghan Jihad led them to form personal associations with leading Arab 'volunteers' in the Jihad like Osama Bin Laden.

Towards the end of 1988, Osama Bin Laden had gained substantial prominence with Pakistani and Afghan Pashtun Islamists. His *Maktab al Khidmat lil Mujahideen al-Arab* (MAK) or the Services Bureau, had expanded at Peshawar with the encouragement of his Palestinian-born mentor, Sheikh Abdullah Azzam. The Maktab's activities were encouraged by the ISI and the Saudi intelligence. Osama quickly forged links with pro-Islamist officers of the Pakistani ISI. The MAK was specifically created to cater for the Arab 'volunteers' that had come to fight alongside the Afghan resistance. The Pakistani Mawlanas Samiul Haq and Fazlur Rahman, the leading Pashtun Deobandi Ulama of Pakistan, came to regard Bin Laden as a 'great Mujahid' and praised the services of the Arab Mujahideen in the war.[40] Osama was to eventually transform the MAK into the Al Qaeda organization, specifically oriented to spreading radical Islamism in the region extending from the Arab Middle East to Central Asia. Al Qaeda's ideological leaning subscribed to the Orthodox Sunni Salafist philosophy which regarded all practices introduced after the eclipse of the first generation of Muslims under the Prophet Muhammad (circa 572–632 AD) to be unwarranted innovations.[41] Furthermore, Osama started to advocate an Islamic struggle against what he termed as corrupt 'puppet' regimes in the Arab world and Western influence in the region. He called for the establishment of a pan-Islamic Caliphate, a system of government based on the Sharia under a sole leader called the Amir-ul-Muminin (Prince of Believers).

In fact, according to some reports, Bin Laden was introduced to the future leader of the Taliban, Mullah Mohammad Omar, through the auspices of Mawlana Nizamuddin Shamzai of Binori Town, Karachi.[42] The Binori Town Deobandi madrassa had had close connections to the Pashtun Deobandi network of NWFP and adjoining regions of eastern and southern Afghanistan since 1951.[43] The Deobandi centre at the Jamia Binori in Karachi was where the Pashtun *alim* Mufti Shamzai acted as a mentor for hundreds of Afghans, Pakistanis, Arabs and Southeast Asian Muslims.[44] His religiously inspired instruction was permeated with advocating the virtues of fighting Jihad in Afghanistan. Ironically, some of the textbooks used in the sub-madrassas affiliated with these institutions were reportedly published under the auspices of the CIA under a US Agency for International Development (AID) grant to the University of Nebraska Centre for Afghanistan Studies. These textbooks, written in the main Afghan languages of Pashto and Dari, exhorted the students to fight the Jihad against the Russians.[45]

The involvement of Saudi Arabia and other conservative Gulf states fuelled the growth of Sunni radicalism in Pakistan. Since the late 1970s, Pakistan was deeply involved in forging security relationships with the pro-Western Persian Gulf states. This process was initiated by the Bhutto regime and essentially aimed at strengthening Pakistani security vis-à-vis India. Zia continued with this policy and by 1984 large contingents of Pakistani military personnel were stationed in Saudi Arabia in return for Saudi funding for major rearmament packages for Pakistan.[46] Saudi assistance to Pakistan served US strategic objectives as it enhanced the Pakistani military's role in Afghanistan and assisted in containing revolutionary Iran's influence in South and Southwest Asia. Zia believed that Pakistan's long-term

interests were better served by not tilting towards Iran in the Iran–Iraq war (1980–1988). In 1985, he ordered the Pakistani foreign and defence ministries to 'delay' Iran's requests for assistance in various military and non-military fields.[47]

Domestically, Zia's apprehensions about Shiite Islam, along with the state's patronage of vehemently anti-Shiite Sunni groups sparked the formation of militant groups specifically targeting Pakistani Shiites. These groups would later form a symbiotic relationship with the Taliban militia in Afghanistan. In 1985, the Jamiat-i-Ulama-i-Islam's (JUI) militant faction from central Punjab formed a specifically anti-Shiite party called the Sipah-i-Sahaba Pakistan (Soldiers of the Companions of the Prophet) or the SSP. The SSP agitated for declaring all Shiites as non-Muslims and its more virulent armed faction, Lashkar-e-Jhangvi (Troops of Jhangvi), founded in 1990, advocated the 'physical elimination of all Shias'.[48] Often these groups' parent bodies received substantial funding from Saudi Arabia with the consent of the Pakistani intelligence agencies.[49] The military regime's cynical utilisation of Islam and tacit sponsorship of radical religious groups became one of the major causes for sectarian hatred and intolerance in Pakistan.

Shiite–Sunni discord reached alarming proportions by the end of 1988. In August 1988, unknown gunmen assassinated the Shiite TNFJ's pro-Iranian leader Arif Hussaini. There was a strong suspicion that the assassination was organised by the military intelligence with the connivance of General Zia.[50] Hussaini, a Pashtun from the Shiite Turi tribe of NWFP's Kurram agency, was an outspoken critic of Zia's pro-US foreign policy and opposed the use of Pakistani territory for guerrilla incursions into Afghanistan.

The Pakistani Military and Afghanistan 1989–1990

The army leadership that had emerged after Zia's departure from the political scene continued to strive for a military solution to the Afghan conflict. Zia's successor, the Chief of Army Staff (COAS), General Mirza Aslam Beg (1988–1991), and the new head of the ISI, Lieutenant-General Hamid Gul, were loyal to the late dictator and shared his vision of a 'liberated' Afghanistan strategically aligned with Pakistan. Emboldened by the success in transforming the Afghan conflict from a regional problem to an international issue by harnessing the support of the UN, OIC and most importantly the United States, the military was confident that with the withdrawal of the Soviet forces in February 1989 it could finally achieve its objective in Afghanistan.

Pakistan had kept a firm grip on the military operations conducted by Pashtun Islamists in eastern and southern Afghanistan.[51] ISI's overall control over the distribution of money and weaponry for the mujahideen meant that many autonomous Afghan commanders joined one of the seven Pakistan-based Islamic parties only to become eligible for assistance, although they did not necessarily share these parties Islamic vision. Political imperatives made Pakistan shower its largesse in the form of finances and weaponry on the Ghilzai Pashtuns as compared to the Durrani Pashtuns who historically had pursued the 'Pashtunistan' agenda with zeal. The Pashtun commanders retained considerable influence in their areas and persistently quarrelled with their rivals. Their authority was fluid and had to be

continually bolstered with Pakistani assistance in negotiation and power brokering. The Afghan Islamic groups' latent ethno-centric animosities and lack of discipline were starkly revealed when on many occasions Hekmatyar's mainly Pashtun party members refused to allow supply trains to pass to Ahmad Shah Masoud in the Panjsher valley even at the height of Soviet offensives in 1983 and 1984.[52] It was Pakistani pressure and generous financial inducements from the US and Saudi Arabia that kept the very loosely structured Islamic parties from fragmenting.[53]

By 1989, the non-Pashtun Islamists in the JIA and the Shiite Hazara factions had been sidelined by Islamabad in favour of the Pashtun Islamists belonging to the two Hizb factions and Harakat-i-Inqilab-i-Islami. Itehad-i-Islami remained on good terms with the ISI but it was not regarded as a potent fighting force. Gulbuddin Hekmatyar had, in the words of a noted Pakistani observer developed 'relations of trust and confidence with the military'.[54] Some reports suggested that his faction received around 20–25% of US-supplied arms through the CIA-ISI pipeline in the late 1980s.[55] Zia trusted Hekmatyar and through this connection, the Afghan Islamist had formed cordial ties with the Pakistani Jamaat-i-Islami.[56] He shared the Jamaat's vision of a pan-Islamic union encompassing Pakistan, Afghanistan, Iran and Central Asia. The Jamaat's chief, Qazi Hussain Ahmad along with Hekmatyar declared at a public meeting in Peshawar in 1987 that a Mujahideen victory in Afghanistan would give impetus to the 'liberation of the occupied areas of Soviet Central Asia'.[57] The Jamaat's top leadership on more than one occasion served as the unofficial advisor to Zia and later to his successors on Afghanistan.

The Pakistani military believed that after the Soviet exit the Islamists associated with Hekmatyar and other Pashtun groups would easily be able to topple the beleaguered Najibullah regime. Islamabad's confidence in forging a pro-Pakistan alliance of Afghan Islamists stemmed from its earlier experience in bribing and coercing the seven resistance groups in Peshawar to form the Islamic Unity of the Afghan Mujahideen (IUAM) in 1985. The chairmanship of this body revolved on a rotational basis amongst the seven leaders of the Islamic parties. The Iran-based Shiite groups were not represented in this nebulous arrangement whose leaders were more often conducting Byzantine power struggles against each other rather than with their common enemy, the Soviets. In 1989, the Pakistani military establishment again favoured the formation of an Afghan Interim Government (AIG), which could establish its presence in the Mujahideen-controlled areas in the aftermath of the Soviet departure. On 20 February 1989, after months of haggling and intricate negotiations for a consensus amongst the feuding Afghan Islamists, the ISI's Afghan bureau, with the support of the CIA and Saudi Arabia, gathered the leaders of the Afghan Islamic resistance at Rawalpindi's Madinutal Hajjaj (a complex intended as a transit facility for pilgrims going to Mecca) to elect an Afghan interim administration. Pakistan and Saudi Arabia ensured that most leaders selected for the AIG would be sympathetic to Islamabad. Important posts went to Ghilzai Pashtuns, followed by pro-monarchical moderate Pashtun parties. Controversy over the proportion of Shiite representation in the AIG eventually led to the virtual exclusion of the pro-Iranian Shiite parties. Iranian Foreign Minister Ali Akbar Velayati's efforts to persuade the Pakistani government on the inclusion of Iran-based Mujahideen were unsuccessful and signalled the widening rift between Tehran and Islamabad over Afghanistan's future.[58] The US continued to support the Pakistani

policy aimed at strengthening Pashtun Islamists in the future political set-up of Afghanistan, as this catered to Washington's goal of preventing 'the Khomeini regime from exploiting the Afghan crisis to its advantage'.[59]

The Pakistan military appeared to have taken a leaf from the pre-partition British administrative policy for Northwest India (area constituting Pakistan and the border regions of Afghanistan) in designing its strategy on Afghanistan. The British purportedly based their policy on the aphorism: 'Rule the Punjabis, intimidate the Sindhis, buy the Pashtun, and honour the Baluch.'[60] Indeed, the various Pashtun groups participating in the formation of the AIG were given substantial financial inducements to bring about a desirable outcome satisfactory to Pakistan, Saudi Arabia and the United States.[61] Pashtun Islamists with firm links to the Pakistani intelligence such as Sibghatullah Mujaddidi and Abdul Rab Rasul Sayyaf were 'elected' President and Prime Minister respectively in this ineffectual body, constituted outside the territory of Afghanistan. Mujaddidi was reportedly promised his position by the ISI Chief, Hamid Gul.[62] Hekmatyar obtained the foreign affairs portfolio while Yunis Khalis was allocated the interior portfolio. However, disputes erupted even at the outset of this arrangement as Burhanddin Rabbani insisted that the *Shura* (Council) should be constituted through elections, a point rebuffed by Yunis Khalis who said that it was enough to nominate 'true believers and honest Muslims' in this body.[63]

The US intelligence assessments were forecasting the demise of the PDPA regime after the Soviet withdrawal and predicted that: 'the regime may fall before the withdrawal is complete'.[64] Washington had also nominated a special emissary to the AIG, Peter Tomsen, to coordinate US policy with the leaders of the Pakistan-backed seven Mujahideen groups. The ISI, with US consent, planned to take the third largest city of Afghanistan, Jalalabad, and install the AIG there in order to give the Afghan resistance international legitimacy. The ISI Chief, Lieutenant-General Hamid Gul, reportedly told the Afghan Cell (the meetings of this body were attended by the Prime Minister, Benazir Bhutto, Chief of ISI and the US Ambassador, Robert Oakley (who was dubbed by some Pakistanis as the 'Viceroy'), that Jalalabad could be taken in a week 'if the government was prepared to allow for a certain degree of bloodshed'.[65] The plan to attack the city was conceived by Pakistani military strategists and rather foolishly relied on the use of ill-disciplined Afghan guerrillas to wage conventional war by launching frontal assaults on fortified Afghan army positions. The absence of air support and lack of coordination between the elements of various Afghan Mujahideen doomed the Jalalabad offensive after nearly two months' fighting between April and June 1989.

To the surprise of the over-optimistic Pakistani ISI, the Afghan army's 11 Division defeated the Mujahideen at Jalalabad in one of its most important battles of the war, without the support of Soviet forces. However, the Mujahideen belonging to Khalis' faction of the Hizb and Muhammadi's Harakat were eventually successful in taking considerable areas in the provinces of Khost, Kandahar, Paktika and Kunar by early 1990 as the Soviet backing for the Najibullah regime floundered. Pakistani Army officers apportioned blame for the Jalalabad fiasco to the cutback in US arms supplies. They rather simplistically attributed the failure of the Mujahideen in 1989 to the machinations of the US, which in their view did not want an outright victory for the Mujahideen due to its fear of 'Islamic fundamentalism'.[66] This view does not

hold, as the US continued to supply the Mujahideen with an aid package totalling US$715 million, of which the Saudi portion (approximately US$435 million) disbursed with Washington's consent, was not subject to any restrictions and largely went to fundamentalist Islamic groups.[67] The Jalalabad setback, however, resulted in the removal of General Hamid Gul from the ISI. Gul claimed that his removal was due to his 'Islamic' views, which were 'unacceptable' to the US.[68]

The fractious Islamist organizations in Pakistan were prone to power struggles and financial corruption at the higher leadership levels.[69] The rank-and-file party cadres of groups such as the Hizb-i-Islami received bare subsistence allowances, while their party leadership lived in relative opulence in Peshawar and Islamabad. Moreover, some of these groups had little support inside Afghanistan. In the post-Soviet-withdrawal period, the Islamic groups spent considerable periods in internecine conflict, thereby eroding their appeal to many rural Afghans who were earlier sympathetic to their cause. In July 1989, heavy fighting ensued between commanders loyal to Hekmatyar and rival commanders answerable to Jamiat's Ahmad Shah Masoud. This conflict led Hekmatyar to leave the moribund AIG in August.

Most importantly, the Mujahideen also committed the same human rights violations they attributed to the Kabul regime. Some Mujahideen groups kept their private prisons inside resistance-controlled areas and within Pakistan with the approval of the Pakistani authorities.[70] These prisons served not only as centres for keeping captured PDPA regime soldiers but also as incarceration houses for individuals opposed to these groups as well. Furthermore, the Mujahideen conducted massive bombardments of rural and urban centres like their Soviet/PDPA opponents in a bid for control of various regions during 1989-1990 with ammunition and logistical support provided by the Pakistani military. This strategy, along with summary executions and deadly reprisals against their opponents, considerably eroded their support amongst the common people.[71]

Pakistan's objectives in the period 1989–1990 revolved around a persistent effort to install a client regime in Kabul, while continuing to keep the United States involved in the Afghan conflict in view of Washington's perceived lack of enthusiasm for Afghanistan in the wake of the Soviet withdrawal. However, the policymakers in Islamabad failed to realise that over a decade of civil war and foreign intervention had transformed Afghanistan's political, social and tribal structures. The pre-war Pashtun dominance of the Afghan state had weakened, owing to the war that had 'emancipated' the non-Pashtun ethnic groups from Pashtun hegemony. The participation of non-Pashtun groups in the Jihad and, most importantly, the PDPA's efforts to enhance the participation of Tajiks, Uzbeks, Hazaras and Turkomans in the government effectively undermined Pashtun grip on the already much weakened Afghan state apparatus. The role of regional states like Pakistan, Iran and Saudi Arabia along with the Superpowers accentuated ethnic and sectarian fragmentation within the tribally based society, as local commanders funded by foreign powers emerged as independent power centres in Afghanistan's chaotic body politic.

The Pashtun 'internal colonialism' that had supposedly kept the non-Pashtun minorities marginalised had unravelled during the anti-Soviet war and fundamentally altered inter-ethnic relations.[72] The PDPA's policies contributed to the

weakening of Pashtun control over the debilitated Afghan state. Since 1980, the Soviet-installed government of Barak Karmal had been active in widening the regime's support base by coopting non-Pashtun elements into the government. The establishment of the National Fatherland Front and giving the regime an increasingly Islamic colour was part of a strategy to dilute the Afghan resistance's support base. In this context, the regime had formed the Supreme Council of Ulama and Islamic clergy (*Shura-e-Alia-e-Ulama wa Ruhanian*) representing pro-PDPA Sunni, Shiite and Ismaili clergy.[73] For the first time in Afghanistan's history, Shiite Ulama were given official recognition. The appointment of Sultan Ali Kishtmand, a Shiite of Hazara ethnicity and a member of the PDPA's Parcham faction, as Prime Minister from 1981 to 1988 indicated the PDPA's wooing of the hitherto 'discriminated' minorities. The Soviets particularly encouraged this policy in the post-1986 period as they aimed to construct a state apparatus that could survive the withdrawal of their forces.

The Peshawar-based resistance was also confronted with problems associated with proving its legitimacy after 1989. In the absence of the Soviet enemy, the Pashtun Islamist leaders like Gulbuddin Hekmatyar, Yunis Khalis, Mohammad Nabi Mohammadi, Abdul Rab Rasul Sayyaf and others became increasingly identified by many Afghan nationalists as tools of Pakistan. The AIG was mostly composed of Afghan Islamists directly under the influence of the Pakistani military. To many non-Pashtun Afghans, and even nationalist Pashtuns, the AIG was hardly representative of Afghanistan's population as it excluded the Afghan Shiites, a large portion of independent field commanders and also nationalist Afghans who wanted to retain Afghanistan's independent and non-aligned status.

Islamabad, however, continued with its policy of accommodating only those Afghan factions that would do its bidding in the post-Soviet Afghanistan. This was predicated on the notion that a solid pro-Pakistan Pashtun Islamist bloc could counter the emergence of Afghan nationalism that had been a persistent thorn in Pakistan–Afghanistan relations since 1947. The pursuit of this policy could possibly lead to a confederation of Afghanistan with Pakistan, a goal that General Zia had alluded to many times.[74] A sizeable section of the Pakistani army officers responsible for the covert war in Afghanistan had become permeated with a 'Jihadist' mindset. Their understanding of Afghanistan was based on the rather hagiographic Pakistani history books that praised the invasions of the Indian plains over the last millennium from what is now Afghanistan. To them the Pashtuns were the only 'warrior' race in that country.[75] This along with many officers' pride in having Afghan Pashtun heritage (as was the case of the Director-General of ISI, Lieutenant General Akhtar Abdul Rahman) led them to believe that the true identity of Afghanistan was synonymous with Pashtun rule. The large proportion of Pashtuns amongst refugees that entered Pakistan after 1980 reinforced this superficial and incorrect perception. These Pashtun refugees had extensive cross-border ethnic and kinship ties with the Pakistani Pashtuns. In the NWFP and Baluchistan, Pashtun Afghan refugees had integrated with the local Pashtun population and organised intricate religious, economic and social networks. For instance, even in the case of drug trafficking, sections of Afghan refugees formed a symbiotic relationship with the Afghans supplying poppy crops to their Pakistani counterparts in the tribal areas for onward shipment to Baluchistan from where it was shipped to Europe via Iran.[76]

The Afghan refugees who were settled in NWFP and Baluchistan represented nearly 20 per cent of the local population of these provinces. As pointed out earlier, the refugee camps in these provinces became a fertile ground for recruitment of young Pashtuns for the hundreds of religious schools opened in these regions as part of the Pakistani policy of creating a strong religiously oriented 'buffer' between 'communist' Afghanistan and 'Islamic' Pakistan. These religious madrassas were an essential ingredient of Pakistan's forward policy in Afghanistan. In NWFP, the Pakistani JUI's Fazalur Rahman and Samiul Haq factions had a substantial control over these schools.[77] The JUI had direct access to the highest echelons of Pakistani policy makers through the ISI.

The leader of a JUI faction, Mawlana Fazalur Rahman, was well known to both General Akhtar Abdul Rahman and his successor Hamid Gul. Fazulur Rahman's father, the late Mufti Mahmud, was sympathetic to the royalist Afghan regime and his Islamism was interspersed with Pashtun-ethno nationalism.[78] The orthodox Sunni interpretation of Islam propounded by the JUI was based on traditional Deobandi doctrines influenced by Salafist/Wahhabi philosophy eulogising Jihad and martyrdom. Moreover, their discourse propagated a pan-Islamic vision, emphasising Sunni Islamic brotherhood irrespective of ethnicity or language. The potpourri of Islamic internationalism laced with exhortations of Jihad taught at JUI madrassas had a profound effect in influencing young Afghan refugees and their Pakistani hosts. This transnational Islamic ideology was to influence successive generations of Afghan refugees exiled in Pakistan and prepared the environment for the rise of the Taliban in Afghanistan.

By the end of the Cold War, the triangular relationship linking the ISI with the Afghan Islamists and their Pakistani counterparts had solidified to the extent that the combined strength of the Pashtun Islamist resistance eclipsed the other Afghan groups such as the Jamiat-i-Islami-i-Afghanistan (one of the largest, mainly non-Pashtun Islamist parties) or the various factions of the Shiite resistance. However, the Pakistani strategy did not take into account the fact that over a decade of continuous conflict had not only resulted in the exodus of millions of Afghans to neighbouring states but had also caused considerable displacement of population within Afghanistan. Close to one-third of the Afghan population had been displaced by war.[79] Conflict in the rural areas of the country had motivated large numbers of refugees to move into the cities under PDPA control. Over 3.2 million, mainly Pashtun, refugees had migrated to Pakistan reducing the overall strength of the Pashtun population in the country. According to some estimates in 1992 Pashtuns accounted for 38% of the population followed by 25% Tajiks, 19% Hazaras, 12% minor ethnic groups (Aimaks, Turkmen, Baluch and other) and 6% Uzbeks.[80] Nevertheless, Pashtun scholars claimed that Pashtuns represented over 50% of the population.[81] It was, and still is, not possible to give an exact estimate of the ethnic composition of Afghanistan's population owing to the lack of accurate statistics. It can, however, be inferred that a combination of factors resulting from war and PDPA policy substantially reduced the dominance of the Pashtuns not only in state institutions but also in society as a whole.

Paradoxically, it was Pakistan, which in the past had remained a vehement opponent of Pashtun nationalism, that emerged as the primary backer of the Pashtuns and thereby contributed to the splintering of Afghan society as it attempted

to impose a subservient regime in Kabul based on the presumption that the Pashtuns could reassert their hegemony as in pre-1978 Afghanistan. Most significantly, Pakistani sponsorship of Afghan Islamism resulted in the subsumption of Pashtun nationalism and Baluch separatism within the larger pan-Islamic discourse created by the Afghan Jihad. Pakistan's policy had successfully undermined Pashtun nationalism. Rather, Pakistan became the main centre for Afghan Islamists, who saw it as a brotherly Muslim state rather than the occupier of Pashtun lands west of the Indus. The Jihad and its Islamic symbolism motivated the Pashtun tribes settled on the Durand Line such as the Mangals, Jadrans, Shinwaris, Afridis, Jajis, Mohmands, Mahsuds and Wazirs, which had been a source of contention between Afghan governments and Pakistan prior to 1978, to fight against the Kabul regime that tried its best to incite them against Pakistan. These semi-autonomous tribes concentrated on getting the maximum benefit from the war by occasionally aligning with Islamabad or Kabul, based on the level of financial or other inducement they could get from either side.

Pakistani sponsorship of Pashtun Islamists such as Gulbuddin Hekmatyar had proved crucial in transforming these relatively marginalised political figures of pre-1978 Afghanistan into important actors in post-Soviet Afghan politics. By 1990, Hekmatyar was being portrayed in the Pakistani media as a veteran political leader and the mature head of the single most powerful political and military force in Afghanistan, a real ally of Pakistan, and a man with the capacity to change the paradigms of both the Afghan crisis and the Afghan polity. However, Hekmatyar's support for Iraq during the Persian Gulf conflict of 1990–1991 had made Saudi Arabia and the majority of the Gulf Arab Shaikhdoms withdraw their assistance to his group. The leaders of other Mujahideen factions: Gaylani, Mujaddidi and Burhanuddin Rabbani had followed the 'official' Islamabad policy of condemning the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait. Hekmatyar's proclivity towards the position of the Iraqi President Saddam Hussain also motivated the United States to distance itself from him.[82] Nevertheless, important elements in the Pakistani military and the intelligence establishment continued to view Hekmatyar as Pakistan's best option in the fast-changing Afghan political scene between 1990 and 1992.

The End of the Cold War and the Continuing Afghan Conflict, 1990–1992

Pakistan had played the central role in bringing the fractious Afghan groups to the brink of victory by 1991 as the Soviet Union, incapacitated by domestic problems, became unable to sustain its Afghan clients. After 1990, Afghanistan had become less important on the superpower agenda as other events such as the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait, the collapse of the Soviet satellite regimes in Eastern Europe and the growing separatism within the USSR took precedence during the several high level meetings between the leaders of the Soviet Union and the United States.[83] Nevertheless, Moscow continued to provide substantial assistance to the Najibullah regime, including advanced weaponry such as FROG and SCUD missiles.[84] Pakistan also persisted in seeking a 'military option' in Afghanistan by supplying the Afghan Islamists with armaments in connivance with the CIA.

In March 1990, the Pakistani military backed the involvement of Hekmatyar in an attempted coup against Najibullah staged by his Defence minister, General Shanawaz Tanai. Tanai was a diehard Khalqi hailing from the Tanai sub tribe of Paktia province bordering Pakistan. The coup attempted to topple the Parcham faction controlled by Najibullah and bring about a Khalq-dominated regime with the participation of Pashtun Islamists like Gulbuddin Hekmatyar. Tanai, a graduate of a Soviet military academy, particularly resented Najibullah's policy of coopting ethnically-based militias into the regime.[85] Apparently, the Pakistani establishment attempted to create a rift within the precariously balanced Najibullah regime by using Hekmatyar. Hekmatyar's role as a Pakistani surrogate was not new. In 1979, with General Zia's blessing, he reportedly had met Hafizullah Amin in Kunar province overlooking the Mohmand and Bajaur agencies of NWFP to form a 'coalition' government in Kabul.[86] The Soviet Union's intervention pre-empted these efforts. This time, again Hekmatyar's efforts to overthrow the PDPA regime failed and by 9 March 1990 Najibullah's forces, which comprised a substantial portion of the ethnic militias from the north, recaptured the Bagram airforce base near Kabul that had served as a staging area for the coup.

The US embassy in Islamabad had termed the Hekmatyar-Tanai alliance 'a step towards peace in Afghanistan'.[87] The comment indicated that the United States continued to concur with the Pakistani military's activities in Afghanistan. In fact, Barnett Rubin claims that the ISI and Saudi intelligence paid US$15,000 to each Pashtun Mujahideen commander involved in the coup.[88] Tanai fled to Peshawar and was granted asylum by the Pakistani government. In an instructive observation on the coup Marvin Weinbaum points out that:

> aside from their common desire to oust Najibullah, the Khalqi and Hizb-i-Islami leaders appeared to share a similar fate in that they would almost certainly be left out of any internationally sponsored political compromise that would favour more moderate elements. For Pakistan's military and civilian authorities, the coup offered a chance to short-circuit the war; it was an opportunity to return to a military solution made attractive by the lack of progress in finding a negotiated settlement.[89]

The factional, personal and ethnic rivalries amongst the Mujahideen groupings escalated rapidly after the exit of the Soviet forces in February 1989. Lack of organization and the decentralised nature of resistance increased the chasm between local field commanders in Afghanistan and their Pakistan based leaders. Moreover, interference from Pakistan, Saudi Arabia and the growing involvement of Iran with the Shiite resistance made the efforts for the formation of a unified 'Islamic' government in Afghanistan a mammoth task.

The Najibullah regime had resorted to age-old machinations particular to Afghan politics that played upon the religious, ethnic, sectarian and tribal cleavages within Afghan society in order to weaken the opposition. Najibullah's changing of the PDPA's name to Watan (i.e. Homeland) party and its complete disavowal of its Marxist background aimed to broaden the base of the regime. This policy had some appeal with the Uzbek, Hazara, Turkmen and the minuscule Ismaili communities. On the international front, Najibullah tried to woo the post-Khomeini leadership that was trying to enhance Iran's ties with the Soviet Union. Iran itself planned to increase its influence in Afghanistan and was instrumental in urging the eight separate Afghan Shiite parties to form the Hizb-i-Wahdat (Party of Unity) in 1990.

Abdul Ali Mazari, a Shiite from Mazar-e-Sharif, was elected as the head of this unified grouping in Tehran.[90] Most importantly, Najibullah sought a greater Indian role in Afghanistan, to the chagrin of Pakistan and some of Islamabad's backers in Washington.[91]

Najibullah's growing reliance on the militias from northern Afghanistan, such as the Uzbek Jowzjani militia commanded by Abdul Rashid Dostum, to sustain itself in power underlined the growing weakness of the regime in Kabul by late 1990. Dostum's so-called Jowzjani militia, forming the 53rd Infantry Division of the Afghan army, comprised more than 20,000 mainly Uzbek soldiers from the northern provinces of Jowzjan, Balkh, Fariab and Sar-e-Pol.[92] Similarly, Najibullah had played a prominent part in bolstering the Ismaili militia in the Kayan valley of Baghlan Province, led by Syed Mansour Naderi, against the mainly Sunni Afghan Islamists. However, Dostum's militia became one of the pivots of the regime and served in various parts of the country to defend it as the regular army began to disintegrate after the failure of the March 1990 coup.[93] The rapid rise of these militias to prominence was facilitated by the defections of Khalqi Pashtun officers and soldiery from the army after the failure of the Tanai coup.

In Pakistan, Nawaz Sharif's administration, that had come to power in November 1990 with the consent of the military, had adopted religious symbols along with verbal assurances on the implementation of the Sharia to the electorate. Nawaz Sharif's ally in the Islami Jamhoori Itehad (Islamic Democratic Alliance) coalition, the Amir (leader) of the Jamaat-i-Islami, Qazi Hussain Ahmad, regarded the Afghan Jihad as 'the only tangible victory of Islam' and hence pressured the government to continue its policy of bolstering Afghan Pashtun Islamists, in particular Hekmatyar's Hizb-i-Islami.[94] The nexus between the new 'civilian' administration, the Pakistani Islamic parties (primarily the JI and the JUI's Fazulur Rahman and Samiul Haq factions) and the military remained strong. In the context of Afghanistan, the generals retained the final say on policy. Pakistan continued to supply arms, ammunition and logistical support to nearly all the Pashtun groups, ranging from Hekmatyar's Hizb to Muhammad Nabi Muhammadis Harakat.

Continued Pakistani interference led Afghanistan to make 7,545 complaints to the rather ineffective United Nations Good Offices Mission to Afghanistan and Pakistan (UNGOMAP) over Pakistani violations of the Geneva Accords in 1990 alone.[95] Pakistan also alleged that Afghanistan armed forces had violated its airspace and bombed the bordering regions on 1,317 occasions resulting in numerous casualties.[96]

In October 1990, the US President, George H.W. Bush, cut off assistance to Pakistan by invoking the Pressler amendment that had required the President to certify annually to the US Congress since 1984 that Islamabad did not possess a nuclear device.[97] Despite harsh Pakistani criticism of this action, Islamabad continued to cooperate with Washington on the Afghan issue. A CIA operative correctly observed that 'the many political ups and downs' in the US-Pakistan relationship did not hinder the strong links between 'Pakistani intelligence and the CIA' that had started in the early 1950s.[98]

The fast-moving developments in Eastern Europe and the deepening ethno-centric nationalist threat to the existence of the Soviet Union had taken Afghanistan off Moscow's top priorities by 1991. This enabled the local Mujahideen commanders, including Ahmad Shah Masoud, to open contacts with elements in the fragmenting

Najibullah regime, like Abdul Rashid Dostum, in order to explore avenues for the future political structure of a post-Soviet Afghanistan. Apparently, Dostum, who had a reputation for double-dealing and political intrigue, had also established contacts with the ISI so as to have some influence with Islamabad in what now seemed to be the imminent collapse of the Soviet-built regime in Afghanistan.[99] Earlier, Masoud had failed to bring about a change in the Pakistani military's policy during his visit to Pakistan in October 1990. Since the late 1980s, Masoud's 'independent' personality and 'nationalistic' stance had distanced him from the ISI, despite the fact that his group continued to receive arms and ammunition from the ISI-CIA pipeline right up till the end of 1990.[100] According to CIA's senior Afghanistan specialist, Charles Cogan, General Akhtar Abdul Rahman regarded Masoud as a 'friend' of the United States and was not 'terribly enamoured of the Tajic (sic)'.[101] It was, indeed, ironic and hypocritical that the late ISI chief, who probably had the closest relations with the US intelligence establishment in the region, could so disparagingly comment on another individual's association with the United States. This was more surprising as Masoud's group affiliated to Jamiat received substantially less assistance from the CIA as compared to his Pashtun compatriots. Masoud's refusal to comply with Pakistan's agenda had become the main reason for the ISI chief's annoyance with him.

In the spring of 1991, the tottering garrisons of the Afghan army in various provinces in eastern and southern Afghanistan bordering Pakistan came under concerted attacks by the Afghan resistance. The ISI encouraged its chosen commanders to take as much area in this part of Afghanistan as possible, so as to establish their 'legitimate' Islamic government within Afghan territory. The Pakistani Army's logistical and advisory support proved decisive in the fall of the town of Khost bordering NWFP's North Waziristan and Kurram agencies on 31 March 1991.[102] The Afghan army's Khost garrison turned itself over to Hizb-i-Islami's famous commander Jalaluddin Haqqani. The ISI head, Lieutenant-General Asad Durrani, and the Amir of the Pakistani Jamaat-i-Islami paid well-publicised visits to Khost, underlining Pakistan's role in the capture of this town.[103] Islamabad also encouraged Pashtun commanders belonging to Hizb-i-Islami Khalis faction to increase pressure on the cities of Gardez and Ghazni in eastern Afghanistan, while Muhammad Nabi Muhammadi's faction escalated its attacks in other southern provinces. Saudi Arabia and the United States continued to accept Pakistan's policy at this late juncture, as Islamabad persisted in portraying the disunited and squabbling Afghan Islamists as a cohesive, conservative pro-Western force capable of forming a stable government in Kabul.

Saudi Arabia had channelled its aid to the Mujahideen through the auspices of the Pakistani intelligence. No other regime in the Middle East was closer to the United States than the Saudi monarchy and on Afghanistan its policy was conceived with the consent of Washington. The Saudis did not autonomously back some elements of the Mujahideen as Rubin has asserted.[104] Riyadh's policy remained dependent on the cooperation of the ISI and the CIA. Prince Turki al-Faysal, the head of the Saudi *Istakhbarat al-Ama* (General Intelligence), worked closely with the Pakistani intelligence establishment and in fact several Afghan leaders were introduced to Saudi Arabia through the auspices of the ISI, while the Saudi intelligence introduced Osama Bin Laden to the ISI. The induction of the Arab Mujahideen as a kind of

Islamic 'International Brigade' to assist the Afghan Islamic resistance was a joint venture between the Pakistani military and the Saudi intelligence.

The Saudi role remained limited to financing the enterprise and the operational utilisation of these Mujahideen remained the responsibility of Pakistan. Some sources have even alleged that Saudi sponsorship of Sunni Islamism in the wider Middle Eastern region continued with the acquiescence of Washington until the late 1980s.[105] The Saudi involvement in Afghanistan, however, did contribute to swaying the ISI towards allocating most of the weapons and resources to those Afghan Islamists who viewed favourably the ultra-conservative Wahhabist Islam of the Saudis. This stance assisted in the creation of mercenary groups and the evolution of a 'form of warlordism' within the Afghan resistance, as these groups became more beholden to their foreign mentors than to the interests of the cause for which they were fighting.[106] This trend was ignored by the US, as it had remained committed to bringing about: 'the demise of the (communist) regime, despite whatever setbacks this might mean for future social and economic reforms in Afghanistan'.[107]

Pakistan's domestic political turmoil, resulting from the death of General Zia, had seen the rise of unstable political groupings vying for the military's support to acquire power in the controlled 'democratic' order that had arisen in the early 1990s. Domestic compulsions compelled the military intelligence (MI) and the ISI to focus on internal politics. With regard to Afghanistan, the growing rapprochement between Moscow and Washington led to pressure on the Pakistani leadership to curtail its backing for Pashtun Islamists and this precipitated some confusion in the conduct of Islamabad's Afghan policy by the end of 1991. Hekmatyar and Afghan fundamentalists of his ilk, that were once dubbed by the Reagan administration as individuals sharing American 'values and aspirations', were now being derisively termed as 'fundamentalist' and 'anti-Western'.[108] The exit of Zia loyalist, General Mirza Aslam Beg, as Army Chief in August 1991 deprived the army of a foremost strategic 'hawk' and a proponent of a military solution to the Afghan problem. This ushered in changes in the ISI and a temporary assertion of civilian influence on the course of developments in Afghanistan.

The increasing trend of transition from authoritarian to civilian regimes in the Third World in the 1990s, encouraged by the United States, had put pressure on the army to loosen its grip on the political system.[109] In Pakistan this led to the emergence of an extra-constitutional arrangement by which a troika comprising the President, the Prime Minister and the Army chief took key decisions on foreign and domestic policy through consultations.[110] However, the military continued to guard its institutional and corporate interests and disallowed civilian intrusion even in areas like budgetary allocations that normally are the prerogative of the civilian executive in democracies.[111] In the context of national security, the army persisted in vetoing any shift in foreign policy deemed contrary to what it perceived as the 'national interest'.[112] Owing to the inherent contradictions in the troika power equation, which was tilted towards the army chief, the civilian and military components of the government seemed to be pursuing their own respective agendas on Afghanistan.

It was at Pakistan's moment of success in the Afghan war that the contradictions inherent in its domestic political structure contributed to a lack of consistency in its policy on Afghanistan. US pressure to sideline the support for the Afghan

fundamentalists motivated the Nawaz Sharif administration to taper down its backing for them in late 1991. This policy shift led to accusations from Pakistani Islamists of the government's subservience to the United States. The Jamaat-i-Islami's student wing, Islami Jamiat-i-Tulaba, protested against the alleged 'dictation' of Pakistan's foreign policy by the US Ambassador, Robert Oakley.[113] On the other hand, elements in the ISI still hoped that an Islamist regime could be imposed on Afghanistan, while the army's higher echelons under the new secularly oriented COAS, General Asif Nawaz Janjua, concurred with the civilian leadership on the advisability of promoting the UN's proposed plan for the settlement of the Afghan conflict that was also approved by the United States.[114]

The divisions on Afghan policy in the Pakistani establishment were happening at a time when the PDPA regime was crumbling in the aftermath of the failed coup attempt in Moscow in August 1991 against Mikhail Gorbachev. The defeat of the coup attempt led to the removal of key backers of the Najibullah regime within the CPSU, the KGB and the military. This deprived Kabul of vital financial and military assistance that had up until now proved crucial in sustaining it in power. In September 1991, the Soviet Union and the United States finally implemented the so-called negative symmetry that sought to halt military assistance to their clients in Afghanistan.[115] Most significantly, domestic turmoil and impending secession of the Soviet Union's constituent republics forced the Soviet government to virtually abandon Afghanistan to its own devices by the end of 1991. As a matter of fact, the leadership in Moscow opened channels with various Afghan Islamist groups. Burhanuddin Rabbani, the Foreign Minister of the illusory Afghan Interim Government visited Moscow in November.[116] In a joint statement with Rabbani, the Soviet Union's last Foreign Minister, Boris Pankin: 'confirmed the necessity for complete transfer of state power to an interim Islamic government'.[117] This signalled a complete repudiation of the thirteen year-old Soviet position regarding the illegitimacy of the Afghan Islamic resistance. However, Rabbani's visit turned out to be a merely symbolic gesture as on December 25, 1991, the Soviet state disintegrated, leaving behind a power vacuum in Central Asia and Afghanistan which ushered in a renewed struggle for influence by regional and extra-regional powers.

In January 1992, Pakistan officially announced cessation of arms supplies to the Afghan resistance in accordance with the Washington–Moscow understanding that stopped delivery of weapons to their respective proxies in the Afghan conflict. Even within the military, a two-tracked policy seemed to be emerging on Afghanistan between late 1991 and early 1992. General Asif Nawaz Janjua favoured the UN plan for an interim Afghan government acceptable to all Afghans. On 27 January 1992, General Janjua met King Zahir Shah's son-in-law, Sardar Abdul Wali, in Rome to give his support for the UN Secretary-General's plan. Even so, elements in the ISI continued to harbour designs of installing a pro-Pakistan government in Kabul, while the civilian faction of the government in Islamabad backed the Foreign ministry in giving support to the UN Secretary-General's representative on Afghanistan, Benon Sevan, for his efforts to put together a transitional administration in Kabul after the presumed fall of Najibullah.[118] The UN plan centred on convening a grand assembly of Mujahideen commanders and other parties to the conflict to decide the structure of an interim government in Kabul pending free

elections under the auspices of the UN. This had prompted several Pakistani pro-Islamist commentators to allege that Pakistan's wavering support for this plan was brought about by US pressure.[119] The differing Pakistani perceptions on the Afghan situation were contributing to the emergence of an ad hoc policy that was unable to adapt to the constantly changing political dynamics of the conflict in late 1991. The ambigous Pakistani stance motivated Gulbuddin Hekmatyar to accuse the United States of 'trying to impose a coalition government on Afghanistan, made up of communists and Westernised Afghans, (with the former king) Zahir Shah at its head'.[120]

The fracturing coalition of Afghan resistance leaders based in Peshawar was ill prepared to deal with the after-effects of the demise of the Soviet Union. The Najibullah regime had proved a resilient adversary and the Pakistani military and its Afghan allies, despite concerted efforts, had failed to dislodge its hold over Afghanistan's major cities. The Soviet collapse left Kabul unable to maintain its large tribal militias and sustain the teetering Afghan economy. As mentioned previously, throughout Afghan history, an Afghan's first loyalty remained to his clan or sub-tribe. This remained true for both the relatively Westernised Afghans and the populace living in rural-based communities. Persistent warfare over the past decade had led to the break-up of the Afghan political and societal structures. Pakistan's backing of Afghan Islamism facilitated the emergence of local commanders representing various ethnic groups and this contributed to the erosion of even a semblance of government authority over large parts of the country, accelerating the splintering of the society.

Soviet assistance had proved crucial in retaining Afghan governmental institutions and the cessation of this lifeline precipated the breakdown of the Afghan state. On March 18, 1992, Najibullah announced the transfer of power to an interim government proposed by the UN. However, power struggles within his Watan Party accelerated the regime's collapse. Ethnic animosities in the ruling oligarchy had become more pronounced in the dying years of Soviet presence in Afghanistan.[121] Deprived of Soviet assistance and apprehensive of possible reassertion of Pashtun dominance, the Kabul regime's important military commander, General Dostum, refused to relinquish his post to a Pashtun General appointed by Najibullah to head the garrison at Mazar-e-Sharif in late March. Najibullah's attempt to appoint Pashtun officers over 'unreliable' non-Pashtuns came too late. This policy switch, however, proved fatal for the Afghan President, as General Muhammad Nabi Azimi, an ethnic Tajik, commander of the Kabul Garrison, joined forces with Dostum, Abdul Ali Mazari of the Iranian backed Shiite Hizb-i-Wahdat and the Ismaili General, Mansour Naderi, to overthrow Najibullah between 14–15 April 1992.[122] Elements of the Parcham faction under Najibullah's Foreign Minister, Abdul Wakil, also aligned with Dostum and Muhammad Nabi Azimi and established contacts with the prominent field commander, Ahmad Shah Masoud of the Jamiat, in order to pre-empt the implementation of the UN-organized plan for an interim administration. Masoud had already formed a Coalition of the North, composed of his fellow Tajiks from the Panjshir valley north of Kabul along with other non-Pashtun factions. According to Anwarul Haq Ahady: 'Masoud believed that the UN process unduly marginalised the field commanders and ... would reinstate Pashtun dominance in post-Soviet Afghanistan.'[123]

The downfall of the Najibullah regime accelerated the disintegration of the Afghan armed forces, as various units split on an ethnic basis and joined with their counterparts in the Afghan resistance. Tajiks, Uzbeks and Hazara personnel of the army tried to join forces with organizations representing the respective interests of their *Qawm*, while thousands of Pashtuns in the military defected to the mainly Pashtun Islamic groups such as Hizb-i-Islami. No military unit maintained its organizational structure.[124] The Afghan regular army had ceased to exist.

The dramatic events in Kabul leading to the exit of Najibullah from power galvanised the Pakistani government to mobilise the Afghan Islamists based in Peshawar to form an interim administration, as Ahmad Shah Masoud stayed outside Kabul pending an agreement amongst the leadership on the new administration. Hekmatyar's Hizb-i-Islami had also taken advantage of the anarchical situation resulting from the demise of the Najibullah regime to deploy its forces to the south of Kabul with the tacit consent of the Pakistani military.[125]

The Pakistani government had panicked at Masoud's apparently pre-emptive move on Kabul that aimed to undermine the influence of the Peshawar based Pashtun Sunni groups. In order to forestall any further move by Masoud and the ethnic militias to the detriment of Pakistani interests, Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif frantically called the leaders of the Afghan 'Tanzeemat' (Organizations) to the Governor's House in Peshawar on 25 April 1992 to come to an agreement on the structure of the administration that was to succeed the now defunct Najibullah regime.

The Pakistani interlocutors found that organising an anti-Soviet guerrilla coalition had been relatively easy; holding such a diverse group together in the absence of a common threat was proving more difficult. The transition to this newer phase of the Afghan conflict revealed the cross-purposes at which some of Pakistan's allies were working, as well as the ambiguities of Pakistan's relationship with them. Hekmatyar was one of the key leaders who refused to attend the meeting, as he remained on the southern outskirts of Kabul confronting his rival Ahmad Shah Masoud. Sibghatullah Mujadiddi, Burhanuddin Rabbani, Pir Gaylani, Yunus Khalis, Abdul Rab Rasul Sayyaf and Muhammad Nabi Muhammadi attended the meeting. Pakistani persuasion, in coordination with the Saudi intelligence chief, Prince Turki Al-Faysal, forced the Afghan groups to sign the so-called Peshawar Accords that outlined a rudimentary interim governmental structure for the, as yet, non-existent 'Islamic State of Afghanistan'.[126] Pakistani pressure, with Saudi monetary inducements, persuaded the numerous Afghan Tanzeemat to accept allocation of posts as advised by their hosts. Hekmatyar was made the Prime Minister of the proposed administration, while Ahmad Shah Masoud got the post of Defence Minster. Most importantly, a fifty-one-member commission, headed by Sibghatullah Mujaddidi, was to acquire power from the rump Kabul regime. Mujaddidi was Pakistan's choice due to his 'moderate' views and pro-Pakistan tilt. He was to represent the nascent state as President for two months, after which power was to be transferred to Burhanuddin Rabbani for a further four months. After the conclusion of Rabbani's four-month tenure, a Shura was to decide on the creation of a political system that would remain for two years, after which elections were scheduled to be held. Even at the outset of this arrangement, Hekmatyar objected to Masoud's inclusion in the

government on account of his alleged alliance with communist factions of the defunct Najibullah regime.

The Peshawar Accord allocated some positions in the proposed set up to the Afghan Shiite community but this fell far short of their expectations. The Shiites, the second largest sect in the country, who were historically underrepresented, demanded that political power in Afghanistan be distributed according to their demographic strength.[127] Moreover, an organic flaw in the Peshawar Accord was that only the Islamist parties based in Pakistan had signed it. Hardly any group or faction inside Afghanistan participated in the deliberations. By limiting political power to the Pakistan sponsored Islamists the Peshawar transitional arrangement proved a flimsy device for building a national consensus for Afghanistan's post-Soviet future.

Pakistan's overbearing influence on the outcome of the Peshawar Accords motivated the Hizb-i-Islami (H) to accuse Islamabad of keeping the Afghan Islamists divided with Islamabad continuing to play the role of the final arbiter. A Pakistani commentator described the 'childish' debate between the ISI Chief, Lieutenant General Javed Nasir, and a representative of Hizb-i-Islami, Qazi Muhammad Amin, over the composition of the government.[128] Javed Nasir, a lay preacher associated with the *Tablighi Jamaat*, allegedly regarded Afghanistan as another Kashmir and wanted to impose a Pakistani made solution on the Afghan leadership.[129] He ridiculed Qazi Amin and the Afghan Islamists over their disunity. To this Qazi Amin is believed to have retorted in reference to Pakistan: 'How can a country enslave other people which itself is a slave of foreigners.'[130] A sarcastic aside on Pakistan's relationship with the United States.

To many Afghan nationalists, royalists and Islamists, the Peshawar Accord were another attempt by foreign powers to decide the future of their country according to their geostrategic aims rather than the aspirations of the Afghan populace. Once more the destiny of Afghanistan, as observed by an astute Afghan scholar, was decided at the provincial 'headquarters of a foreign government and agreed to accords initiated by its premier'.[131] Indeed, the Peshawar Accord undermined the already tenuous legitimacy of the Afghan resistance leaders as they concurred in the requests of their external patrons represented by Pakistan, the United States and Saudi Arabia. Iran continued to pay lip service to the need to implement these Accords, while continuing to bolster its influence in Afghanistan through the Hazara Shiite community. It was external pressure that persuaded the Afghan leaders to accept the Peshawar Accords. The culture of dependency that had grown within Afghan Islamism over decades of reliance on foreign aid proved difficult to break on the eve of their victory. Devoid of a national vision for their country, they seemed unable to arrive at an agreement independently.

The resistance that had been united against the Soviets found itself unable to present a coherent plan for an alternative government. Personality-driven politics, coupled with a lust for power and an unwillingness to compromise with their opponents, undermined their claim to legitimacy at the eve of their entry into Kabul on 28 April 1992. In a strange twist of fate, several key members of the new 'Islamic State of Afghanistan' were transported to Kabul in a Pakistani Air Force plane. To some, this was reminiscent of Babrak Karmal's entry into Kabul on a Soviet transport plane in late December 1979.[132] The Pakistani Prime Minister, together with Saudi Prince Turki al Faysal, Army Chief Asif Nawaz Janjua and the ISI

Director-General Javed Nasir, visited Kabul on 29 April 1992 to give their blessing to the new interim government arranged in Peshawar.[133] While the Pakistani Prime Minster was praising the victory of the Mujahideen in Kabul, several Pakistanis belonging to the Jamaat-i-Islami were believed to have been killed fighting alongside Hekmatyar against Ahmad Shah Masoud's forces on the outer environs of Kabul.[134] The Jamaat-i-Islami had denounced Pakistan's new policy of backing a broad based government in Kabul. The Jamaat's leaders were apprehensive that their Afghan ally, Gulbuddin Hekmatyar, could be marginalised in such a body. In May 1992, the JI withdrew from the IJI government, specifically citing Nawaz Sharif's laxity in establishing an 'Islamic' system and his refusal to back Hekmatyar.[135]

The resistance's entry into Kabul proved to be a pyrrhic victory as it exacerbated the political fragmentation in the country, and what remained of state power collapsed in the wake of the violent power struggles of more than a dozen rival militias that had entered the Afghan capital. Fourteen years of Pakistan's consistent support for the Afghan Islamists in the hope of putting a friendly regime in Kabul were being dashed as Afghanistan slid into chaos, due to the infighting amongst the resistance movement, while Pakistani policy was being pulled in several directions in a triangular tussle amongst the Prime Minister's secretariat, the ISI and the Foreign Office.

As the Afghan conflict degenerated into internecine war between rival ethnic and Islamic militias, the disintegration of the Soviet Union and the subsequent transformation of the five Central Asian Soviet Republics into independent states provided Pakistan with a unique opportunity to foster trade and economic linkages with these new states. A stable and friendly regime in Afghanistan was considered essential for Pakistan to access Central Asia. Pakistan's neighbour, Iran, owing to its geographical proximity to land locked Central Asia, was already aiming to gain maximum economic benefit from this resource-rich region. On a secondary level, cultural factors also encouraged Tehran to renew its historic ties with Central Asia. Iran was instrumental in holding a summit meeting of the Economic Cooperation Organization (ECO) in Tehran in February 1992 in which the state leaders of four Central Asian republics: Turkmenistan, Uzbekistan, Tajikistan and Kyrgyzstan participated. Most importantly, Saudi Arabia, in cooperation with Pakistan, also entered the region, ostensibly to stem Shiite Iran's influence and to propagate its own version of Wahhabite Islam. The United States, which remained apprehensive of Iranian moves in the region, tacitly supported the Saudi and Pakistani policy.

Thus, a struggle for influence in post-Soviet Afghanistan had started, that was to an extent associated with the geopolitical and geoeconomic objectives of Russia, the United States, China and lesser powers like Iran, Turkey, Saudi Arabia and India in Central Asia. Afghanistan, being the 'gateway' to Central Asia, continued to remain a top priority for Pakistan. Apart from accessing Central Asia, the Pakistani military visualised a pro-Pakistan regime in Kabul providing 'strategic depth' to Pakistan in the event of any conflict with its main adversary, India. These motivations regarding Afghanistan were solidifying within the military-bureaucratic establishment of Pakistan in 1992 as the Afghan crisis remained unresolved and was, in fact, compounded by the conflict between Ahmad Shah Masoud and Hekmatyar for supremacy over the practically non-existent organs of the 'Islamic State of Afghanistan'. It seemed that a 1980 assessment of Afghanistan by a State

Department official was coming to realisation: 'There is no Afghan nation, only a state composed of many ethnic groups with no historical or current evidence of national cohesiveness.'[136]

Afghanistan, indeed, was reverting to another chaotic period in its history with the mushrooming of various centres of power, as the weak state that had evolved since the period of Amir Abdur Rahman (1880–1901) was turning into an empty shell. The authority of the President, government, parliament, and central bureaucracy virtually disappeared, despite the farcical installation of Mujaddidi in Kabul. Afghanistan's territory was slowly being divided amongst numerous Mujahideen groups. The Pashtun Islamists controlled large parts of eastern and southern Afghanistan; General Dostum's forces controlled Mazar-e-Sharif; a virtually autonomous administration was emerging in Herat under the Jamiat-i-Islami's field commanders; the Panjshir Valley north of Kabul and the Northeastern provinces were run by Ahmad Shah Masoud's forces and the Iranian backed Hizb-i-Wahdat maintained its fiefdom in the Hazarajat region. Kabul was a contested territory, with Hekmatyar vying for control of the city against Masoud. In fact, the Peshawar Accords' stipulation allocating positions to each group within the Afghan resistance, irrespective of its actual influence in Afghanistan, ignored the reality of Afghan politics. Power had already shifted from traditional Pakistan-based Islamist politicians to new groups, particularly to armed militias and their leaders.

Notes

1 Speech by M.S. Gorbachev at the ceremony devoted to the presentation of Order of Lenin to the city of Vladivostok, *Pravda*, 29 July 1986.
2 By late 1987, Pakistan was hosting more than 2.5 million Afghan refugees and another 2 million were in Iran.
3 The proximity talks were inaugurated because of the refusal of the Zia regime to hold fact to face negotiations with the PDPA regime.
4 US Congressman Charles Wilson, an enthusiastic supporter of the Mujahideen, stressed this point on a number of occasions. *Daily Telegraph*, London, 14 January 1985. See also George Crile, *Charlie Wilson's War: The Extra-Ordinary Story of the Largest Covert Operation in History*, New York: Atlantic Press, 2003.
5 See Robert E. Harkavy and Stephanie G. Neumann, *Warfare and the Third World*, New York: Palgrave, 2001, Chapter 5.
6 *USSR-Pakistan-Afghanistan: New Soviet Proposal* 4/12/1984. CIA Archives released under the Freedom of Information Act (FOIA). Released 11/4/1999. Brezhenev's successor, Yuri Andropov, was seriously interested in withdrawing troops from Afghanistan but according to Selig S. Harrison 'Pakistan and the United States were in no mood to bargain'. See Selig S. Harrison, 'Making the Russians Bleed' in Diego Cordovez and Selig S. Harrison, *Out of Afghanistan: The Inside Story of the Soviet Withdrawal*, New York: Oxford University Press, 1995, p.92.
7 Interview with a former senior official of the Pakistani Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Islamabad, 23 August 2000.
8 See Kamal Matinuddin, *Power Struggle in the Hindukush (Afghanistan – 1978–1991)*, Rawalpindi: Services Book Club, 1991, p.212.
9 M. Gorbachev, *The August Coup*, London: Harper-Collins, 1991, p.119. See also Mark Galeotti, *Afghanistan, the Soviet Union's Last War*, London: Frank Cass, 1995, p.162.

10 See Robert D. English, 'Sources, Methods and Competing Perspectives on the End of the Cold War', *Diplomatic History*, Vol.21, No.2, Spring 1997, p.294.
11 See Interview of Dr. Henry Kissinger, former Secretary of State after a visit to Moscow. H. Kissinger, 'Kissinger: How to Deal with Gorbachev', *Newsweek*, March 2, 1987, p.40.
12 Interview with a senior official of the Pakistani Foreign Ministry, Islamabad, 22 August 2000.
13 See *The Guardian Weekly*, London, 24 April 1988.
14 See *Bilateral Agreement Between the Republic of Afghanistan and the Islamic Republic of Pakistan on the Principles of Mutual Relations, in Particular on Non-Interference and Non-Intervention*, New York: United Nations Documents, 1988.
15 The Afghan resistance was not made a party to the Geneva Accords.
16 See Saeed Shafaqat, *Civil–Military Relations in Pakistan From Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto to Benazir Bhutto*, Boulder: Westview Press, 1997, p.217. In 1994, G.M. Kornienko, a Soviet Deputy Foreign Minister acknowledged that the Soviet Union and the US had reached an agreement in December 1987 which would 'allow the Soviet Union to leave Afghanistan without losing face'. See G.M. Kornienko, 'The Afghan Endeavour: The Perplexities of the Military Incursion and Withdrawal', *Journal of South Asian and Middle Eastern Studies*, Vol.XVII, No.2, Winter 1994, p.14.
17 A large explosion at an arms depot (known as Ojheri Camp) near Rawalpindi used for the supply of weapons and ammunition to the Afghan resistance in April 1988 had further aggravated the tension between the Prime Minister and the President. Ojheri Camp, run under the supervision of the ISI, was one of the main depots for weapons supplied to the Mujahideen by the US, Egypt, China, Britain and elsewhere. Junejo indicated his desire to take action against army officers responsible for the Ojheri Camp for negligence. This was not acceptable to General Zia.
18 An informal interview with a former Prime Minister of Pakistan, Islamabad, 22 April 1992.
19 Mubashir Zaidi, 'Forging Democracy', *Herald*, Karachi, April 2000, pp.26–27.
20 Ibid, p.28.
21 Ghulam Ishaq Khan at that time was the Chairman of the Senate.
22 Bob Woodward, *Veil: Secret Wars of the CIA, 1981–1987*, London: Simon and Schuster, 1987, p.311.
23 Diego Cordovez and Selig S. Harrison, *Out of Afghanistan*, p.104.
24 See Mohammad Yousaf and Mark Adkin, *The Bear Trap*, p.94.
25 See Desmond Ball, *Signals Intelligence (SIGINT) in South Asia: India, Pakistan, Sri Lanka*, Strategic and Defence Studies Centre, Research School of Pacific and Asian Studies, Canberra: The Australian National University, 1996, pp.52–53. The US reportedly planned to involve Pakistan in the newly established CENTCOM (Central Command) military structure devised for the defence of the oil-rich Gulf.
26 Amitav Acharya, *U.S. Military Strategy in the Gulf*, London: Routledge, 1989, p.174.
27 S.A. Mousavi, *The Hazaras of Afghanistan: An Historical, Cultural, Economic and Political Study*, London: Curzon, 1998, p.185.
28 CIA Background Paper, *Iranian Support to the Afghan Resistance*, 11 July 1985. Released under the Freedom of information Act (FOIA). CIA Electronic Archives.
29 See, 'Reagan Meets with Afghan Guerrillas', *Congressional Quarterly Weekly Report*, Vol.44, No.25, 21 June 1986.
30 See Bob Woodward, 'Saudis Gave $500 million in Afghan aid', *The Washington Post*, 20 June 1986, 20 June 1986.
31 *The Washington Post*, 20 June 1986.
32 Interview with a former Foreign Minister of Pakistan, Islamabad, 8 October 1999.

33 In the mid-1980s, Pakistan had backed the secessionist Sikh 'Khalistan' movement in the Indian Punjab in order to weaken its traditional enemy.
34 According to some Indian reports, General Zia's plan for inciting the militancy in Kashmir was reportedly codenamed 'Operation Topac'. Operation Topac aimed to fuel an 'Islamic' insurgency in Kashmir that would turn out to be so costly to India as to weaken its resolve in maintaining its control of the state. See 'Operation Topac: The Kashmir Imbroglio', *Indian Defence Review*, December 1990. Operation Topac was named after Topac Amaro, an eighteenth century Incan Prince who led a rebellion against Spain to liberate Uruguay.
35 Ministry of Education, Deeni *Madaris Report*, Islamabad: Government of Pakistan, 1988.
36 Pakistani workers remittances contributed about 8 percent to the Pakistani GDP. See Jonathan Addleton, 'The Impact of International Migration on Economic Development of Pakistan', *Asian Survey*, May 1984, pp.594–595.
37 John Esposito and John Voll, *Islam and Democracy*, New York: Oxford University Press, p.119.
38 See Social Indicators of Development, *The World Bank Development Report, 1987–1988*, New York: Oxford University Press, 1988.
39 Most of the Afghan refugees were compelled by the Pakistani government to be a member of one of the seven parties in order to be eligible for assistance. This ensured that the refugees would remain under Pakistani control.
40 See Sadaqat Jan, 'The Cantonment of Islam', *The Nation* (Islamabad) special Sunday Supplement, 29 August 1999.
41 The militant groups such as Osama's Al Qaeda emphasize Jihad to liberate Muslims from non-Muslim tutelage and oppression. For a detailed discussion on the doctrine of Jihad, see Reuven Firestone, *Jihad: The Origins of Holy War in Islam*, New York: Oxford University Press, 1999. For an Islamist explanation of Jihad, see Sayyid Abul Ala Mawdudi, *Jihad Fi Al-Islam*, (Jihad in Islam), New Delhi: Islami Maktab, 1988 (in Urdu).
42 See Khaled Ahmed, *Pakistan: Behind the Ideological Mask*, Lahore: Vanguard, 2001.
43 Naziha Ghazali and Massoud Ansari, 'School for Salvation', *Newsline*, Karachi, June 2000.
44 Unknown assailants murdered Mufti Shamzai in Karachi in May 2004. His supporters attributed the cleric's murder to his opposition to the US-led wars in Afghanistan and Iraq. BBC Urdu Service, 31/5/04.
45 Joe Stevens and David B. Ottaway, 'The ABC'S of Jihad in Afghanistan', *The Washington Post*, 23 March 2002.
46 See Anthony H. Cordesman, *The Gulf and the Search for Strategic Stability: Saudi Arabia, the Military Balance in the Gulf, and Trends in the Arab–Israel Military Balance*, Boulder, Colorado: Westview Press, 1984, pp.927–929. See also William O. Staudmaier, 'The Saud–Pakistani Military Relationship: Implications for US Policy', *Orbis*, Vol.26, No.1, 1982, pp.155–171.
47 *Pakistan–Iran: Cut back in Military ties* 5/12/1984. CIA Electronic archives released under the FOIA. Declassified 11/4/1999. NID 84-119JX.
48 John Esposito and John Voll, *Islam and Democracy*, p.125.
49 Interview with a Presidential aide, Islamabad, 23 September 1994.
50 In October 1991, unidentified assassins killed the former Governor of NWFP, Lieutenant-General Fazle Haq, an important organiser of the Afghan Jihad, in retaliation for Hussaini's murder.
51 Hamid Hussain, 'Afghanistan: A Changed Landscape', *Defence Journal* (Rawalpindi), January 2002, p3. Http://www.defencejournal.com/2002/January/landscape.htm. Accessed 12/1/2003.

52 See Mohammad Yousaf and Mark Adkin, *The Bear Trap*, p.71.
53 Interview with a senior army official involved in operational planning of the Afghan Jihad, Islamabad, 24 August 2000.
54 Sheila Tefft, *Christian Science Monitor*, 3 October 1989.
55 Ibid.
56 See Marvin G. Weinbaum, 'War and Peace in Afghanistan: The Pakistani Role', *Middle East Journal*, Vol.45, No.1, Winter 1991, pp.86–87.
57 *Jang* (Urdu), Karachi, 22 May 1987.
58 M. Hassan Kakar, *Afghanistan: The Soviet Invasion and the Afghan Response, 1979–1982*, Berkeley: University of California Press, 1995, p.267.
59 Amin Saikal, 'Afghanistan's Ethnic Conflict', *Survival*, Vol.40, No.2, Summer, 1998, p.79.
60 Emma Duncan, 'Pakistan Living on the Edge'. A Supplement in *The Economist*, 17 January 1987.
61 Interview with Agha Murtaza Pooya, Editor, *The Muslim*, Islamabad. 12 October 1995.
62 See Barnett R. Rubin, *The Search for Peace in Afghanistan: From Buffer State to Failed State*, New Haven: Yale University Press, 1995, p.103.
63 See 'Khalis Disputes Rabbani's Contention', *The Muslim* (Islamabad), November 2, 1988.
64 SNIE 11/37-88, *USSR: Withdrawal From Afghanistan* (key judgements only) Special National Intelligence Estimate, Director of Intelligence, Washington DC, March 1988.
65 Iqbal Akhund, *Trial and Error: The Rise and the Fall of Benazir Bhutto*, Karachi: Oxford University Press, 2000, p.175.
66 See Mohammad Yousaf, *Silent Soldier: The Man behind the Afghan Jihad*, Lahore: Jang Publishers, 1991, p.100.
67 See Robin Wright, 'US and Saudi Agree to Fund Afghan rebels', *Los Angeles Times*, 12 November, 1989.
68 Interview given to Arnaud de Borchgrave, *Newsweek*, 14 September 2001.
69 Interview with an Uzbek ISI operative responsible for the disbursement of financial assistance to the Mujahideen leaders, Islamabad, 23 September 1992.
70 Interview with a member of Hekmatyar's Hizb-i-Islami faction, Islamabad, 22 April 1996.
71 Human Rights Watch, 'Forgotten War: Human Rights Abuses and Violations of the Laws of War Since the Soviet Withdrawal', New York: *Human Rights Watch Report*, 1990. Http:www.hrw.org/reports/991/Afghanistan/1AFGHAN.htm. Accessed 12/12/2002.
72 See M. Nazif Shahrani, 'The Future of the State and the Structure of Community Governance in Afghanistan' in William Maley (ed), *Fundamentalism Reborn? Afghanistan and the Taliban*, London: Hurst, 1998.
73 See Musa Khan Jalalzai, *Sectarianism in Afghanistan*, Lahore, 1995, pp.142–143.
74 See George Arney, *Afghanistan: The Definitive Account of a Country at Crossroads*, London: Mandarin, 1989, p.169.
75 Interview with a Pakistan Army officer attached to the *Jabha-i-Nejat-i-Milli-i-Afghanistan* led by Sighatullah Mujadiddi, Islamabad, 26 September 2000.
76 'Special Section: CIA Report on Heroin in Pakistan', *The Friday Times*, Lahore, 1994, pp.6–16.
77 These two factions of the JUI had forged an association with nearly all the Afghan Pashtun groups namely, Hizb-i-Islami (Hekmatyar), Hizb-i-Islami (Khales), Ittehad-i-Islami (Sayyaf), Harakat-i-Islami (Muhammadi). Most of the Arab, Pakistani, Central Asian and Southeast Asian 'volunteers' were also inducted into battle by one of these groups.

78 Muhammad Saidur Rahman Alvi, 'Kharijah Policy kay Mutaaliq Quaid-e-Jamiat kya Farmatay Hein' (The Jamiat Leader's view of Foreign Policy), in *Weekly Tarjuman-e-Islam* (Urdu), Lahore, 22 February 1974.
79 'Afghanistan', *CIA World Fact Book*, Washington DC: Office of Public and Agency Information, 1992. In July 1990, Afghanistan had a population of approximately 16,904,904, including 3,271,580 refugees in Pakistan and 1,277,700 in Iran.
80 'Afghanistan', *CIA World Fact Book, 1992*.
81 Anwarul Haq Ahady, 'The Decline of the Pashtuns in Afghanistan', *Asian Survey*, Vol.35, Issue 7 (Jul. 1995), pp.621–634.
82 The US became extremely apprehensive of Hekmatyar's 'independent' personality and his refusal to accept US 'advice' on Afghanistan via ISI. In 1987, Hekmatyar's aides sold more than a dozen Stinger anti-aircraft missiles to Iran; this greatly antagonized Washington. See John K. Cooley, *Afghanistan, America and International Terrorism*, London: Pluto Press, 1999, p.173.
83 Interview with a former Foreign Minister of Pakistan, Islamabad, 12 September 2000.
84 See Larry P. Goodson, 'Periodicity and intensity in the Afghan War,' *Central Asian Survey*, Vol.17, No.3, 1998, p.480.
85 Interview with a Pakistani intelligence official, Karachi, 18 March, 1990.
86 See Nasrat R, 'Bitter Facts on the war in Afghanistan' (Dari), in M. Hassan Kakar, *Afghanistan: The Soviet Invasion and the Afghan Response, 1979–1982*, p.44.
87 Kurt Lohbeck, *Holy War, UnHoly Victory: Eyewitness to the CIA's Secret War in Afghanistan*, Washington DC: Regnery Gateway, 1993, p.273.
88 Barnett R. Rubin, *The Search for Peace in Afghanistan: From Buffer State to Failed State*, p.114.
89 Marvin G. Weinbaum, 'War and Peace in Afghanistan: The Pakistani Role', *Middle East Journal*, Vol.45, No.1, Winter 1991, p.83.
90 Azmat Hayat, 'The Shias of Afghanistan', *Central Asia*, No.32, Summer 1993, p.55. (Central Asia is a research journal published by the area study centre, University of Peshawar, Pakistan.)
91 See 'The Geneva Accords on Afghanistan', *US House of Representatives, Committee on Foreign Affairs, Subcommittee on Asian and Foreign Affairs*, Washington DC: GPO, May 19 1988, p.35.
92 Splitting portions of Balkh and Jowzjan provinces in 1988 created the province of Sar-e-Pol. This was done to win over the potentially troublesome Shiite majority that inhabited the region comprising Balkh and Jowzjan.
93 The Dostum 'Division' had withstood the 1989 siege of Khost with flying colours.
94 See Seyyed Vali Reza Nasr, *Mawdudi and the Making of Islamic Revivalism*, New York: Oxford University Press, 1996, p.75.
95 Report of the Secretary General, 'The Situation in Afghanistan and its Implications for International Peace and Security', *United Nations General Assembly Documents*, 17 October 1990. p.2.
96 Ibid., p.2.
97 An excellent discussion of nuclearization of South Asia is in Devin T. Hagerty, *The Consequences of Nuclear Proliferation: Lessons from South Asia*, Cambridge, Massachusetts: BCSIA Studies in International Security, The MIT Press, 1998.
98 *Soldiers of God*, Interview with Charles Cogan, August 1997. Http://www.gwu.edu/~nsarchiv/cold war/interviews/episode-20/cogan1.html 23/09/2002.
99 A.R. Siddiqi, 'Pakistan and the Northern alliance', *The Nation*, Karachi, 17 October, 2001.
100 Interview with an army official, Islamabad, 2 September 2000.

101 See *Soldiers of God*, Interview with Charles Cogan, August 1997. http://www.gwu.edu/edu/~nsarchiv/coldwar/interview/episode-20/cogan1.htm. 23/09/2002.
102 See Bruce Richardson, 'Khost Busters', *Soldier of Fortune*, November 1991, pp.61–65.
103 Hamid Hussain, 'Afghanistan: A Changed landscape', *Defence Journal*, Rawalpindi, January 2002, p.3. http://www.defencejournal.com/2002/january/landscape.htm accessed 16/07/2002.
104 Barnett Rubin, *The Search for Peace in Afghanistan*, p.116.
105 See Pierre Devoluy and Mireille Duteil, *La Poudriere Algerienne*, Paris: Calmann-Levy, 1994, pp.119–121. The United States is believed to have acquiesced in Saudi financing of groups ranging from the Afghan Islamic militants to the Islamic Salvation Front in Algeria in order to undermine the socialist leaning governments in the Muslim world in the late 1980s.
106 Andrew Hartman, '"The Red Template": US Policy in Soviet-Occupied Afghanistan', *Third World Quarterly*, Vol.23, No.3, 2002, p.478.
107 Cited from William Blum, *Killing Hope: US Military and CIA Interventions Since World War II*, New York: Common Courage Press, 1995, p.347. Blum cites the document pertaining to Afghanistan found during the November 1979 takeover of the US embassy in Tehran.
108 *The Washington Post*, 18 January 1993.
109 Interview with a senior army officer, Rawalpindi, 23 August 2000.
110 Hasan Askari Rizvi, 'Civil–Military Relations in Contemporary Pakistan', *Survival*, Vol.40, No.2 Summer 1998, pp.96–113.
111 For more on aspects of the military's corporate interests see William Thompson, 'Towards Explaining Arab Military Coups', *Journal of Political and Military Sociology*, Vol.2, No.2 (Fall 1974), pp.243–245; Samuel Finer, *The Man on Horseback*, London: Penguin Books, 1976.
112 The emphasis on 'national security' enables the military to receive the largest portion of the national budget. Pakistan's annual defence budget from the early 1990s to 2002 was approximately US$3 billion. This amounted to around 4.5 to 5% of the Gross Domestic Product (GDP) and approximately 30 per cent of the national budget. However, these figures do not depict the true picture. An undisclosed amount of military expenditure is hidden elsewhere in the national budget (for example in spending on communications infrastructure). When this is taken into account, the defence allocation is estimated to be around 50–60% of the entire budget. Given the lack of civilian control to verify the defence allocations, the military is in a position to state whatever figures it considers appropriate. Source: *Stockholm International Peace Research Institute* (SIPRI), *Military Expenditure Data*, 1992–2002; US Department of State, *Annual Report on Military Expenditure*, 1998, Washington DC, February, 1999.
113 *Dawn*, Karachi, 18 January 1991.
114 Interview with a retired senior officer of the ISI, Rawalpindi, 18 August 2000.
115 Larry P. Goodson, *Afghanistan's Endless War: State Failure, Regional Politics, and the Rise of the Taliban*, Seattle: University of Washington Press, 2001, p.73.
116 Rabbani had been made Foreign Minister of this Peshawar based entity after Hekmatyar quit this position in August 1989.
117 See Henry S. Bradsher, *Afghan Communism and Soviet Intervention*, p.372.
118 See William Maley and Fazel Haq Saikal, *Political Order in Post-Communist Afghanistan*, International Peace Academy, Occasional Paper, Boulder: Lynne Rienner, 1992, p.27.
119 Tariq Majeed, *The Global Game for a New World Order*, Lahore: Nadeem Book House, 1995, p.166.

120 *Reuters*, 'Pakistan Shift Irks Afghan Radicals but Kabul is happy', 28 January 1992.
121 See Hasan K. Kakar, 'Afghanistan: Da dasiso, landpari au nafrat syasat' (Pashto) (Afghanistan: The Politics of conspiracy and hatred), *Mujahid Woles* (Oslo), November–December 1992, pp.1 and 3.
122 Najibullah attempted to escape from Kabul to join his family in India but his departure was blocked at the airport by troops loyal to General Dostum. He had to flee from the airport to seek sanctuary at the office of the UN mission in Kabul where he stayed until his brutal murder by the Taliban militia in September 1996.
123 Anwar-ul-Haq Ahady, 'The Decline of the Pashtuns in Afghanistan', Asian *Survey*, Volume 35, Issue 7 (Jul., 1995), p.626.
124 See Ali A. Jalali, 'Afghanistan: The Anatomy of an Ongoing Conflict', *Parameters*, US Army War College Quarterly, Spring 2001, p.86.
125 Other important players in the Afghan conflict, such as Iran, increased their interference in Afghanistan with provision of economic and military assistance to Afghanistan's Shiite minority, while at the same time wooing the Dari-speaking Sunni Afghans against the growing influence of Wahhabi Pashtun groups linked to Saudi Arabia and Pakistan.
126 See the Text of the Peshawar Accord in Appendix B.
127 Pakistan and the Sunni Islamists insisted that Afghanistan's Shiite population was not more than 15% of the total population but the Shiite groups insisted that it was over 25%.
128 Lieutenant-General Javed Nasir had replaced the Pashtun Lieutenant-General Asad Durrani on 10 March 1992.
129 The *Tablighi Jamaat* is a spiritual Sunni movement in South Asia dating back to the mid-1920s. The movements' fundamental goal has been Tabligh: 'conveying' Sharia based guidance to Muslims and non-Muslims. Over the last few decades members of the Jamaat have been susceptible to influence from radical Islamism.
130 Translation from Urdu in Musa Khan Jalalzai, *Taliban, Amerika Aur Osama Bin Laden: Afghanistan Ki Tarikhi Khanah Jangi Aur Siyasi KashmaKash par Eik Mustanad Dastawiz* (Urdu) – Taliban, America and Osama Bin Laden, Afghanistan's Historic Civil War: A Definitive Account, Lahore: Al Maarif, 1999, p.154.
131 Hassan K. Kakar, Afghanistan, *The Soviet Invasion and the Afghan Response 1979–1982*, p.276.
132 M.B. Naqvi, 'Implications of Current Developments in Afghanistan' (Panel Discussion), *Pakistan Horizon*, Vol.45, No.3, July 1992, p.27.
133 Marvin G. Weinbaum, *Pakistan and Afghanistan: Resistance and Reconstruction*, Boulder-Lahore: Pakistan Book Corporation, 1994, p.133.
134 FBIS-NES 1 May 1992, p.36. AFP, Paris, 30 April, 1992.
135 See Ian Talbott, *Pakistan: A Modern History*, London: Hurst, 1998, p.317.
136 See Francis Fukuyama, 'The Future of the Soviet Role in Afghanistan: A Trip Report', *A Rand Note*, Santa Monica, California: Rand Corporation, September 1980, p.6.

Chapter 5

Pakistan and the 'Islamic State of Afghanistan', 1992–1995

The installation of Sibghatullah Mujaddidi as the President of the Interim Afghan Islamic Government on 28 April 1992 ostensibly signalled the conclusion of the resistance's struggle against the Najibullah regime but it did not herald the end of the Afghan crisis. The underlying fissures and power struggles within the Afghan Islamic movement that had contributed to internecine conflicts between various factions remained unsolved and were in fact exacerbated and compounded in the post-Soviet period. The issues, problems and actors concerned in this ongoing crisis can best be examined in terms of four facets: the continuing domestic conflict in Afghanistan, Pakistan's quest for regional hegemony, the involvement of other regional and extra-regional powers, and the impact on the region of Pakistan-sponsored Islamic militant groups.

These components were closely intertwined. The interaction among the four components stalemated the Afghan crisis between 1992 and 1994 with the result that no single factor predominated. However, the disintegration of the Soviet Union in 1991 made the bipolar geopolitical boundaries of the Cold War irrelevant. Afghanistan, which had earlier lost its status as a buffer state with the Soviet intervention in 1979, underwent a further transformation by becoming enmeshed in Pakistan's national security strategy because of Islamabad's dominant influence in that country. The collapse of the Soviet Union made Pakistan the most influential external power in Afghan politics. Pakistan developed multifaceted objectives regarding post-Cold War Afghanistan. As already mentioned earlier, the Pakistani military–bureaucratic elites not only visualised a pro-Pakistan Afghanistan giving Islamabad a much-needed 'strategic depth' against India, but also saw it as providing access for investment and trade with the newly independent states of former Soviet Central Asia.

Islamabad had remained involved in the rapidly unfolding crises in Afghanistan as rival militias led by the former Mujahideen commanders continued with their power struggles in the period 1992–1993. The transfer of the presidency from Mujaddidi to Burhanuddin Rabbani in June 1992 as stipulated under the Peshawar Accords did not prove to be conducive to the establishment of a representative, broad-based government in Kabul. Islamabad's persistence in backing Gulbuddin Hekmatyar against his rival Ahmad Shah Masoud exacerbated the Afghan conflict and its repercussions undermined the tenuous authority of the Rabbani administration. This chapter examines Pakistan's policies towards Afghanistan between Burhanuddin Rabbani's appointment as President in June 1992 and the emergence of the Taliban in the period 1994–1995. It discusses Pakistan's role in

backing the Taliban militia as a 'new' force in the Afghan conflict. The chapter studies these developments within the international and regional context of the problem.

The Continuing Afghan Conflict and Pakistan

The state in Afghanistan had historically been weak. The efficacy of the central government depended to a considerable extent on the loyalty and cooperation of the local and regional elites. It was these elites who acted as interlocutors between the government in Kabul and the vast rural hinterland.[1] In fact, the various institutions of government – the bureaucracy, the military, the police, the courts and so on – at times served as virtually 'privatised' entities for the benefit of the small oligarchic elite comprising the Pashtun aristocracy. Afghanistan's status as a buffer state, separating Russia and later the Soviet Union from India, enabled this Pashtun elite to maintain its dominance over the country through a judicious policy of coopting the traditional leadership of the country's numerous ethnic groups while keeping a tight control over the political process.[2]

However, as noted in the previous chapters, the Soviet intervention and the backing of the United States and Pakistan for the anti-Soviet Jihad had a devastating effect on Afghanistan's state structure and society. The war led to the fragmentation of Afghan societal structures and the rise of a mosaic of resistance commanders, divided along religious, ethnic and political lines. External support enabled this resistance to achieve victory in 1992 as the remnants of the PDPA regime, deprived of foreign financial and military succour, collapsed. The disintegration of the PDPA government dealt the final blow to the secular elite that had evolved since the 1930s. The breakdown of the fragile state structure and the subsequent intensification of conflict amongst the Afghan groups ensured that no single dominant group could emerge to fill the power vacuum and restore a semblance of order and national cohesion.

The government of the 'Islamic State of Afghanistan' (ISA), representing a coalition of Islamist groups, was granted Afghanistan's UN seat and recognised by much of the international community in 1992. Nonetheless, the ISA did not meet the key criteria for sovereignty as represented by an ability to maintain existing frontiers, means to exercise its dominion over its populace and territories, and the ability to regulate the management of its domestic economy.[3] States exhibiting some of these characteristics are termed as 'quasi', 'pseudo', 'disrupted' or even 'failed' states.[4] In this respect, Robert H. Jackson's use of the appellation 'quasi-state' to describe states that, despite the recognition of the global system, lacked 'substantial and credible statehood by the empirical criteria of classical international law' was applicable to the Afghan case.[5]

Afghanistan's slide into chaos, with the rise of competing power centres in different parts of the country headed by ex-Mujahideen commanders, undermined the legitimacy of the Islamic regime imposed on the country. The UN's Special Rapporteur for Afghanistan, Felix Ermacora noted in his 1993 Report to the UN Commission on Human Rights:

> Whilst the Foreign office of Afghanistan may appear to demonstrate the features of a central government when viewed from abroad, this is misleading because there is still no effective government which truly represents all the country's political forces and segments of the population. An armed struggle is still going on between government forces and militant groups headed by political leaders and field commanders, and even struggle along ethnic and religious lines.[6]

In the absence of a spirit of reconciliation and consensus, the power struggles between the numerous Afghan factions intensified in the period 1992–1993. As stipulated under the Peshawar Accords, Sibghatullah Mujaddidi handed over the office of the Presidency to the head of the Jamiat-i-Islami-i-Afghanistan, Burhanuddin Rabbani, in June 1992. Even during the two month tenure of the ineffectual Mujaddidi, the Defence Minster, Ahmad Shah Masoud, who was allied to the Jamiat-i-Islami, had held effective power in Kabul. Most importantly, Gulbuddin Hekmatyar, the incumbent Prime Minister, persisted in denouncing Masoud's alliance with 'Communist elements' and urged his removal from the government.[7]

In fact, both Hekmatyar and Masoud collaborated with former elements of the PDPA. Masoud had coopted several prominent members of the Parcham faction into the fold of his Supervisory Council, while Hekmatyar relied on elements of the mainly Pashtun Khalqi faction and the former Pashtun *Sarandoy* militia of the PDPA's Ministry of the Interior to bolster his party.[8] In this endeavour, he was supported by Ghilzai tribal chieftains hailing from the provinces of Paktia, Paktika, Gardez and Kunar near the Pakistani border.

In this new phase of the Afghan crisis, the personal grudges of the Mujahideen commanders gave added impetus to the conflict over the future identity of the Afghan polity and the distribution of power within the state and political system. The Hekmatyar–Masoud rivalry had taken a particularly violent turn, with Hekmatyar's forces intermittently bombarding Kabul from their strongholds to the south and the east of the city, causing large-scale civilian casualties from May to September 1992. The antagonism between the two was based not only on differing ideological and operational perceptions but had an important personal bent.[9] During the Afghan Islamic movements' exile in Pakistan, Hekmatyar had reportedly been instrumental in having Masoud arrested by the Pakistani authorities in 1976 on charges of spying for the Daud government.[10] In this regard, the squabbling Afghan leaders may have unwittingly corroborated Mountstuart Elphinstone's view regarding the Afghans. According to him: 'their vices are revenge, envy, avarice, rapacity and obstinacy; on the one hand (sic), they are fond of liberty, faithful to their friends, kind to their dependents, hospitable, brave, hardy, frugal, laborious and prudent'.[11] Indeed, the Afghan groups may have showed more of the negative characteristics observed by Elphinstone in the period 1992–1994 than the positive attributes.

The internal political struggle in Afghanistan was complicated by the rise of political figures who claimed to represent the country's numerous ethnic and sectarian groupings. These individuals, sometimes also dubbed as 'warlords', vied for power and standing in the post-Soviet phase. The emergence of this phenomenon was a direct outcome of the prolonged conflict in Afghanistan that effectively destroyed the institutions of governance. With the cessation of organised political life, the irregular forces and factions of the previous regimes' armed forces

increasingly eluded any political control save that of their commander. He who could control the supply of arms became the effective ruler of the territory and could defy the central or outside authority. For instance, the Uzbek General Abdur Rashid Dostum formed his own *Junbish-i-Milli-i-Islami-i-Afghanistan* (National Islamic Movement) to advance the interests of ethnic Uzbeks, comprising approximately six percent of the population. General Dostum regarded northern Afghanistan as a separate entity and considered the nominal authority of the Masoud-Rabbani government as an infringement of 'his' territory.[12] The Dostum militia's presence in Kabul made it the crucial power broker in the capital. Moreover, within the non-Pashtun groups there was an intense rivalry as the Uzbeks, Tajiks and the Shiite Hazaras split along ideological, sectarian and ethnic lines. The Iranian-backed Shiite Hizb-i-Wahdat (Party of Unity) had evolved a network of cadres determined to go to great lengths to enhance Shiite power in the factional morass of Afghanistan. In the south and the east, intra-Pashtun tribal feuds made it impossible for a unified Pashtun organization to emerge and subsequently numerous field commanders in various regions exercised control over their areas by ignoring the fractious government in Kabul. On the bordering regions of Pakistan and Afghanistan, the Arab Mujahideen maintained their presence. They were particularly active in the provinces of Paktia, Nangarhar and Kunar. They boosted the Wahhabi Ittehad-i-Islami militia of Abdur Rab Rasul Sayyaf. Sayyaf had temporarily aligned himself with Masoud. This Saudi-financed militia became instrumental in combating the Shiite Hizb-i-Wahdat during most of 1992–1993. In turn, the Pashtun Islamists from both factions of the Hizb-i-Islami also patronised the so-called 'Arab Afghans' who had stayed on in Afghanistan after the formal conclusion of the Jihad in 1992. Furthermore, the leaders of the Hizb-i-Islami's two factions – Gulbuddin Hekmatyar and Yunis Khalis – remained in close contact with the Pakistani ISI as the internecine conflict amongst former anti-Soviet groups representing ethnic Pashtuns, Tajiks, Shiite Hazaras and Uzbeks gained momentum.[13]

The leaders of the former anti-Soviet resistance formations effectively replaced the sardars, khans and maliks that had traditionally represented the old aristocratic elites of Afghanistan. In the pre-1978 era, the local elites did not aspire to nor have the means to seek power at the national level. However, the anti-Soviet Jihad enabled a new elite to emerge comprising the Mujahideen commanders who came from all of Afghanistan's major ethnic groups. These commanders acquired the tools in terms of weaponry, manpower and external patrons to vie for nationwide power. These new elites were less educated and, as Rubin notes, 'the least Westernised (or Sovietised)' compared to their predecessors in the PDPA or the pre-1978 regimes.[14]

Afghanistan's internal social disruption and breakdown of governance structures contributed to a sharpening of ethnic and sectarian identities. The decline in state authority weakened the sense of Afghan national identity amongst the various ethnic groups. This generated the new legitimacy of countervailing ethnic nationalisms meshed with the power ambitions and sectarian outlook of the leaders of the factions. Burton *et al*'s analysis of Latin American and Southern European elites is in many ways applicable to Afghanistan where:

> Communication and influence networks do not cross-factional lines in any large way, and factions disagree on the rules of political conduct and the worth of existing political institutions. Accordingly, they distrust one another deeply; they perceive political outcomes in 'politics of war' or zero-sum terms; and they engage in unrestricted, often violent struggles for dominance.[15]

The crucial role played by the militias of Masoud and Dostum in the overthrow of the Najibullah regime gave the non-Pashtun groups in Afghanistan control over the capital Kabul. This was a bitter blow for the Pashtuns, who had played a pivotal role in Afghan politics for most of the country's 250-year-old history. They had not only lost influence in Kabul but also became just one of the several ethno-religious groups competing for dominance over the Afghan polity.[16] This turn of events prompted Hekmatyar to propagate Pashtun nationalism alongside his revolutionary Islamic credentials to gain support from the splintered Pashtun groups and tribes against his Tajik archrival, Ahmad Shah Masoud. Deprived of US support and being portrayed in the Western press, as 'a hardliner who combines Islamic zeal with the arrogant assumption that Pushtuns, numbering 40% of the population should rule Afghanistan',[17] Hekmatyar had to increasingly rely on Pakistan to prop up his ineffective campaign against the government of Burhanuddin Rabbani.

Professor Rabbani's extension of his tenure in office in September 1992 aggravated tension between the mainly Tajik-dominated government and other groups.[18] Most of the mainstream Pashtun Islamic groups representing both the Hizb-i-Islami factions and Harakat-i-Islami denounced Rabbani's 'illegal' hold on power.[19] This view paralleled to a degree the Pakistani elite's private perceptions of the constantly changing political dynamics of post-Cold War Afghanistan.[20] The non-Pashtun Afghan leaders, including Rabbani, favoured a federal structure for post-Soviet Afghanistan in order to give effective representation to the different regions and ethnic groups in the country. This was not well received by many Pashtun leaders who feared that in a federal system, the combined weight of Uzbek, Tajik and Hazara communities would marginalise their community.

The perceived marginalisation of the Pashtuns in post-Soviet Afghanistan had substantial reverberations in Pakistan. The Pakistani Pashtun nationalists urged the Nawaz Sharif administration to back the Afghan Pashtuns openly in their struggle against the non-Pashtun coalition controlling Kabul. According to one Pashtun Minister in the cabinet, 'only genuine Pashtun leadership' could restore peace in Afghanistan.[21] Another factor that particularly perturbed the Pakistani government was that its objective of having a subordinate client regime in Kabul was being fundamentally undermined, owing to the failure of its main agent, Gulbuddin Hekmatyar to defeat the non-Pashtun militias in Kabul.

The tribal Pashtun social structure considered by many anthropologists as based on 'segmentary lineage' and patrilineal kinship where cooperation takes place only against external threat militated against a unified Pashtun stance in the post-Soviet Afghan civil war.[22] Years of conflict and foreign intervention had eliminated a substantial portion of the old Pashtun elite that had risen during the rule of the Musahiban dynasty and the PDPA further exacerbating the pitfalls of a segmentarily structured tribal society. Inter and intra-tribal conflict, sometimes ignited by agnatic animosities, led to shifting alliances and treachery amongst Afghan Pashtuns, causing greater internal fragmentation and preventing them from organising a coherent challenge to the more urbane and relatively more educated Tajik groups

allied with other non-Pashtun factions. The Tajiks, although segmented along sub-ethnic lines, maintain a strong notion of 'Tajikness' that is universally shared.

Hekmatyar, who had been again nominated for the Prime Ministerial slot in the Rabbani administration in July 1992, was unable to take office owing to the threat posed to him by forces of Dostum. Therefore, he repeatedly called for the expulsion of the Uzbeks from the capital. Besides, his nominee, Ustad Abdus Sabur Farid, was equally unable to have his cabinet approved by President Rabbani. Farid blamed Rabbani for not approving his candidates while Rabbani contested Farid's power to select cabinet members.[23] Farid's appointment as Prime Minster was made through the mediation of the Pakistani ISI. The former ISI Chief, General Hamid Gul, visited Kabul in June and coerced Rabbani to accept the Hizb-i-Islami candidate for the position of chief executive.[24] Despite the Pakistani manoeuvring, the Afghan factions failed to reach any consensus for sharing power and continued to fight, which led to enormous destruction of Kabul's infrastructure. The city, which largely remained intact during Soviet occupation, was now deprived of electricity and water. This was in a country that had a very low life expectancy (42 years), an extremely high child mortality rate (177 deaths per 1000 live births) and the largest refugee population in the world (about 3 million in Pakistan and 2 million in Iran).[25] The country's minuscule industrial base, composed of basic primary and secondary industries, was wiped out. From a pre-war number of more than 300 industrial units less than 10 were operating in Kabul in late 1992.[26]

The fractious Islamic administration had no policies to rectify the enormous social, political and economic disasters confronting Afghanistan. Indeed, Kakar rightly notes that the failure of the post-Soviet order lay in lack of legitimacy and inability to govern:

> It was not a government: it was actually a commission established principally by foreigners, to transfer power in the course of two months, a short period for such a difficult task. It failed because the groups constituting it did not cooperate with it. They could not even restrain their own warriors. The Islamic state thus failed in its early critical stage.[27]

External interference had been a major cause of bringing Afghanistan to this abysmal condition.

Pakistan, a country that was the key to the victory of the Afghan Islamists would, in the post-Cold War era, serve as the principal source of continued violence and division in war-torn Afghanistan. The Pakistani military's pursuit of regional strategic goals would lead it to fan ethnic and factional tension in Afghanistan, which at the same time would compound Pakistan's domestic problems in terms of aggravating sectarianism and fomenting Islamic militancy within the Pakistani body politic.

Pakistani Politics and the Afghan Conflict 1992–1994

Pakistan's Afghan policy during 1992–1994 can be viewed in two ways: as a continuation of its earlier policy, as shaped in the 1980–1991 period, that sought the imposition of a pro-Pakistan regime in Kabul, and as a more specific effort to

exercise its geopolitical influence in the larger Central Asian region in the aftermath of the demise of the Soviet Union. However, the internecine conflict between the Afghan factions after the fall of the Najibullah regime delivered a serious setback to Pakistan as it impeded Islamabad's long-cherished desire of gaining ascendancy over its weaker northern neighbour.

The end of the Cold War and the changes in Pakistan's domestic politics had heralded the creation of a form of controlled democracy in the country. This change did not fundamentally alter Pakistan's policy vis-à-vis Afghanistan. The post-Zia civilian governments of Benazir Bhutto and Nawaz Sharif tended to follow the general parameters on Afghanistan laid down by the military. The army retained the pivotal influence on the formulation of important domestic and foreign policy agendas and the political process remained beholden to the dictates and machinations of the generals.[28] The threat of martial law was never far from the consciousness of the civilian chief executives and consequently they acquiesced to the military's holding of veto powers over policies, which the Army's General Headquarters (GHQ) perceived vital to national security.

Eleven years of General Zia's authoritarian rule eroded the foundations of Pakistan's major political parties such as the PPP and the PML. In the absence of a grassroots party structure or any economic or political program, these parties remained personality-centred and devoid of mass support. Their standing was further weakened by the role of the intelligence agencies in subverting the political processes by creating numerous 'Islamic' groups reliant on the patronage of the state, undermining the influence of moderate Islamic and secularly oriented parties. The military ensured that only politicians, businessmen, clerical leaders and feudal landlords that concurred with its vision were 'elected' to the parliament. By pursuing such policies the intelligence apparatus aimed to weaken opposition to the military's dominance and at the same time cultivate a right-wing, religiously oriented clientele to bolster the military–bureaucratic establishment.[29]

The unbridled intervention of the intelligence agencies in fostering Islamic groupings by 1992 had led to an escalation of sectarian conflict in Pakistan. The proliferation of madrassas and the Pakistani state's support for Jihad in Kashmir and Afghanistan led to the formation of dozens of mainly Deobandi groupings that actively encouraged their cadres to fight Jihad not only in 'Hindu' India and Afghanistan but also against heretical Shiites. Between 1990 and 1993, Pakistan witnessed growing sectarian discord as armed Deobandi factions such as Sipah-i-Sahaba attacked Shiites in various cities, killing dozens of people.[30] The Shiites responded by forming their own Sipah-i-Mohammad (Soldiers of Muhammad) to defend their community. The Deobandi groups also regarded the relatively moderate Barelvi Sunni factions evolved from the main Barelvi party, Jamiat-i-Ulama-i-Pakistan (JUP), with disdain.[31] During this period, several Deobandi-influenced Sunni factions associated with JI and the JUI (both Fazulur Rahman and Sami-ul-Haq factions) formed armed parties in Pakistani-administered Kashmir to wage a 'liberation struggle' against Indian occupation. The most prominent of them were the Harakat-ul-Ansar and Harakat-ul-Mujahideen. These groupings, and later their offshoots, would form close linkages with the Taliban in the future.

Apart from backing Islamists, the ISI became instrumental in propping up factions within the Muhajir Qawmi Movement (MQM), an ethnically oriented political party

set up in Sind with the backing of the military in 1984 to counter Sindhi ethno-nationalism.[32] The MQM represented a large number of mainly lower middle class Urdu-speaking Muslim migrants who had come to Pakistan after partition. This segment of the population was strongly pro-Zia and was antagonistic to Sindhi nationalism and the Bhutto family, a perception shared by the Punjabi-dominated army.

Similarly, the ISI's Political Wing had manipulated the politics of the NWFP and Baluchistan by cultivating important tribal and regional leaders and coopting them to the state establishment. The war in Afghanistan served as a diversionary device in channelling the grievances of a significant proportion of these traditional elites towards this external conflict and hence weakening the ethno-nationalist challenge to Islamabad from the NWFP and Baluchistan.

In the realm of national security, the army chief and the corps commanders persisted in influencing the civilian governments' priorities. The army, through close monitoring of the civilian government, made it certain that the political leadership would have no power over the military itself.[33] As Wayne Wilcox rightly noted, Pakistan's 'military had to command foreign policy. The foreign and defence policies are for new states a matter for survival; they seriously affect domestic policy. By this chain of logic the leader of the Pakistan Army is propelled into the centre of decision making first as its arbiter and then its monopolist.'[34] Being the most organised political institution in the country and the guardian of national defence and domestic order, the military enjoyed foremost prerogatives in the allocation of national resources. In terms of regional security perceptions, the changes in the international order resulting from the dissolution of the Soviet Union did not deter the Pakistani military elite from viewing India as the main threat to Pakistan's security and territorial integrity. The 'elected' civilian politicians had to consider this fact and shape their rhetoric accordingly.

In the post-Cold War era, Pakistan's national security goals revolved around five major objectives. These were:

1 To achieve 'strategic depth' against India. The concept of strategic depth was first articulated by army chief General Mirza Aslam Beg. This doctrine stressed the need for a dispersal of Pakistan's military personnel and assets in Afghanistan well beyond the offensive capabilities of the Indian military. Pakistan's geographical width was considered inadequate for a prolonged defence against India. In this context, post-Soviet Afghanistan was considered an ideal choice for Pakistan to gain strategic depth.[35]
2 To support secessionist movements in India, particularly in Jammu and Kashmir.
3 To gain access to Central Asia in order to open that region for Pakistani economic penetration. Moreover, Pakistan could serve as the 'gateway' to landlocked Central Asia for investment from the United States and other industrialised states. In this regard, a Pakistani controlled Afghanistan would enhance Pakistan's geostrategic importance for the United States.
4 To continue to pursue a strategy of nuclear ambivalence.
5 To enhance the existing strategic and military to military relationship with the People's Republic of China (PRC).

Pakistan's desire to see a pliant regime in Kabul that could assist in realising its goal of balancing India on the subcontinent and attaining access to Central Asia was being impaired by domestic instability and the continuation of conflict in Afghanistan.[36] In April 1993, President Ghulam Ishaq Khan, an ethnic Pashtun, dismissed the Nawaz Sharif government.[37] The dismissal of the Nawaz Sharif administration, with the tacit consent of the military, was expected. The Prime Minister's differences with the President – a protégé of the military–bureaucratic establishment – over the selection of the new army chief after the mysterious death of General Asif Nawaz in January were causing confusion in the country's external and internal policies.[38] Nawaz Sharif's removal enabled the President to appoint a Pashtun, General Abdul Waheed Kakar, as the COAS. Thus, once again Pakistan's powerful executive exercised its authority over the supposedly elected representatives of the people, proving a Pakistani scholar's apt observation that the army could not allow any 'attempts to tamper with the military's autonomy and professional interests'.[39]

Nawaz Sharif's exit paved the way for the military–bureaucratic elite to nominate a US citizen of Pakistani origin, Dr Moeenuddin Qureshi as interim Prime Minister.[40] The appointment of Moeen Qureshi indicated the United States's substantial influence on the Pakistani elites. Qureshi's installation was a signal that Pakistan's economic policies would continue to be influenced by the Washington twins, the IMF and the World Bank.[41]

Elections were held under the supervision of the army in November 1993, bringing Benazir Bhutto to power for the second time since the death of General Zia. The military establishment concluded that, in view of the Clinton administration's emphasis on democratisation and the promotion of human rights, Benazir Bhutto would symbolise Pakistan as a 'moderate' Islamic state.[42] By portraying Pakistan as a democratic state the military sought a waiver of the Pakistan specific Pressler amendment and other economic sanctions imposed by Washington on account of Islamabad's nuclear program. However, the intelligence agencies again ensured that that Bhutto's PPP did not command a majority in the parliament. It had to form a coalition government with many smaller ethnic and religious parties with strong associations with the ISI, which also included the Jamiat-i-Ulama-i-Islam faction led by Mawlana Fazulur Rahman. Moreover, Benazir Bhutto, as Mahmood Monshipouri and Amjad Samuel note, 'appeared intent on developing her own links with the army, confirming its role in Pakistani politics'.[43]

By early 1994, it had become clear that in the course of the preceding year Pakistani policy in Afghanistan was failing. The 'victorious' power of April 1992 had not only been unable to exercise its hegemony there, but its influence in Afghanistan was being challenged by its ally of the Cold War era, Iran, along with increasing Indian involvement that did not augur well for Islamabad's strategic goals.

President Rabbani extended his term of office in December 1992. There were again allegations from the Pashtun Islamic groups that Rabbani had bribed the candidates in the Council, whose members had come mainly from the non-Pashtun northern provinces of Afghanistan. Major Pashtun Islamic and tribal groups, including Hekmatyar's Hizb-i-Islami and Muhammad Nabi Muhammadi's Harakat-i-Inqilab-i-Islami, boycotted the proceedings of the Shura and demanded Rabbani's

resignation.[44] In the meantime, war continued to be waged in Kabul and other parts of the country as the factions persistently shifted alliances in order to bolster their power. The UN's efforts to mediate a solution to the crisis failed, despite the ostensible commitment of the warring parties to reach a negotiated settlement. There was an element of hypocrisy and deceit in the peace attempts, as the regional states, primarily represented by Pakistan and Iran, repeatedly voiced their desire for the settlement of the Afghan conflict but on the ground continued to back their respective proxies in a conflict of continuously shifting allegiances and alliances.

Within Kabul, the Shiite Hizb-i-Wahdat, which in 1992 allied itself with Masoud's Shura-e-Nazar, was now fighting Sayyaf's Ittehad-i-Islami forces aligned with Rabbani-Masoud forces. Most importantly, the militias of Masoud and Hekmatyar continued to skirmish in Kabul's environs. Furthermore, increased polarisation and fragmentation of Afghanistan made Afghan territory a base for various foreign ethnic and religious factions implementing multifaceted agendas. Regionally, Afghanistan's ethnic groups started forging connections with their ethnic kinsmen across the borders of states adjoining Afghanistan. For example, the Afghan Jamiat-i-Islami was supporting a coalition of Tajik Islamists opposed to the Sovietised political elite of Tajikistan.[45] The Tajik Islamic opposition, particularly elements in the Islamic Renaissance Party, received arms, training and staging bases in Badakhshan province bordering Tajikistan.[46] In the northwest, Abdul Rashid Dostum established relations with the authoritarian President of Uzbekistan, Islam Karimov, and received military assistance from Tashkent.

In the south and the east of Afghanistan, the Arab Mujahideen retained their presence, allied to various Pashtun-dominated Islamic groups.[47] For instance, the Arab Mujahideen's most prominent patron in southeastern Afghanistan, Jalaluddin Haqqani, hailing from the Jadran tribe of Paktia, was one of the ISI's most important allies. He remained in touch with his Pakistani mentors and also received financial assistance from the Saudi intelligence.[48] In Nangarhar, Pakistan's old operative, Haji Abdul Qadeer, formed a Shura (council) and maintained close links with Pakistan rather than with the 'government' in Kabul. Qadeer, a pragmatic Pashtun leader, kept in touch with nearly all the Afghan Pashtun groupings at the behest of the ISI.[49] Moreover, in areas near Paktia and Paktika, the ISI embedded several Kashmiri fighters in the former Mujahideen bases for training in order to be prepared for the Kashmiri 'liberation' struggle. These Kashmiri militants were primarily using the former CIA-ISI-constructed camps for Mujahideen near Khost and Jalalabad for training purposes.[50]

Afghanistan was becoming an important plank in Pakistan's contest with India over the control of Jammu and Kashmir. The Kashmir issue was being transformed by the military into an Islamic cause and Pakistan's strategy in creating a pro-Pakistan 'Islamic' Afghanistan was thought to be equally applicable in Kashmir. The military employed Islamic symbols and rhetoric in the Jihad in Kashmir, as it had done in the case of Afghanistan. Some in the political and military hierarchy considered the inclusion of Kashmir into the Pakistani state as necessary for strengthening Pakistani Muslim nationalism.[51]

Factional fighting in Afghanistan continued throughout 1993. In February 1993, the combined forces of the Rabbani government in league with Ittehad allegedly perpetrated a massacre of Shiites in West Kabul.[52] The massacre motivated the

Hizb-i-Wahdat leader, Abdul Ali Mazari, to strengthen his alliance with Hekmatyar's forces that were confronting Masoud's soldiers outside Kabul.[53] Mazari and Hekmatyar had earlier forged an informal alliance against Rabbani in January 1993. In addition, Abdul Rashid Dostum's exclusion from the Rabbani cabinet alienated the Uzbek warlord, leading him to switch sides once again by aligning with his former enemy, Hekmatyar. Hence, in the Byzantine world of Afghan factional power struggles there were no permanent enemies or friends. It was not war in an organised sense but a perpetual struggle in which alliances changed according to the momentary interests of the leaders.

The anarchy in Afghanistan was emerging as a significant obstacle to Pakistani goals. Therefore, Islamabad utilised its influence with the Afghan Islamists to bring about an end to the factional struggle that would enable it to realise its geopolitical objectives. Pakistan was instrumental in the conclusion of the Islamabad Accord signed on 7 March 1993. This accord sought to resolve the differences between Rabbani and Hekmatyar.[54] Pakistani Prime Minister, Nawaz Sharif, had played a crucial role in this endeavour, with the moral and financial support of Islamabad's most important Arab ally, Saudi Arabia. The Islamabad Accord had the blessing of Iran as well. According to the Pakistani interpretation of the accord, President Rabbani now had to step down on 29 June 1994 after completion of his term that began in September 1992, in order to pave the way for general elections in the country.[55]

Notwithstanding the undertakings given by the Afghan leaders in Islamabad, Afghan factional warfare persisted. Hekmatyar still refused to accept Ahmad Shah Masoud as the Defence Minister. In spite of his brief entry into Kabul in late March 1993 to take office as Prime Minister, his position remained precarious. The constantly changing allegiances of the Afghan factional leaders in the de-institutionalised political context of post-Soviet Afghanistan made them easily amenable to foreign influence. In this regard, Iran and Saudi Arabia also intensified their efforts to secure a niche in the Afghan power struggles. These countries, like Pakistan, bribed and cajoled various Afghan leaders according to their geopolitical aims. Thus, the infighting between the groups became inextricably associated with regional interests of external powers, further weakening the writ of the tottering Rabbani government over the territory and population of Afghanistan and making it even more restricted than that of the defunct Najibullah administration.

By the onset of 1994, a new four party alliance representing Hizb-i-Islami, Dostum's Junbesh-i-Melli-i-Islami, Shiite Hizb-i-Wahdat, and the former President Mujadiddi's Jabha-i-Nejat-i-Melli had evolved in a loose anti-Rabbani coalition known as Shura-i-Alie-i-Hamahangi (The Supreme Council of Understanding). Hekmatyar's Hizb-i-Islami retained its pressure on Kabul in an attempt to dislodge the Rabbani government. However, Ahmad Shah Masoud's resilient opposition and flexible defensive tactics disabled the Islamist leaders' attacks, even with Pakistani tactical and logistical assistance. Pakistan also tried to persuade Abdul Rashid Dostum, the head of the largest non-Pashtun militia in Afghanistan, to back Hekmatyar in January 1994.[56] Similarly, several Pashtun members of the Khalq faction of the former PDPA living as refugees in Pakistan joined Hekmatyar's efforts to topple the 'Tajik' government of President Rabbani with the tacit approval of the ISI.[57]

In spite of the covert assistance to Hekmatyar, Pakistan was unable to dislodge the Rabbani administration, which by late 1993, was regarded by the policy-making elite in Islamabad as 'hostile' to Pakistani interests. This was probably the key factor behind the fierce bombardment of Kabul by Hekmatyar's forces on 1 January 1994 – which in large measure inflicted severe damage on the southern suburbs of the city. In fact, the Rabbani government was asserting Afghanistan's sovereignty and was formulating an autonomous foreign policy by establishing friendly ties with Pakistan's arch foe, India. Besides this, the Dari-speaking Tajik elite gradually moved closer to Tehran, an act that perturbed the Pakistani military elite.

The Pakistani decision makers were becoming increasingly suspicious of Iran's intrusion into Afghanistan in the form of buttressing the Rabbani government. The Pakistani military had seen Afghanistan as a Pakistani fiefdom and as early as June 1992 some Pakistani generals were suggesting that Iran was trying to 'compete with Islamabad for influence' in former Soviet Central Asia and Afghanistan.[58] Rabbani had visited Tehran in October 1992 and secured Iran's assistance in reconstructing Afghanistan's shattered infrastructure, plus a loan of US$50 million.[59] Notwithstanding expressions of cordiality buttressed by flowery rhetoric of having 'brotherly' ties with Tehran, the Pakistani military establishment was apprehensive of Iran's clerical leadership.[60] It shared the United States' suspicion of Tehran's expansion in Afghanistan and Central Asia. A solidification of this trend could potentially obsruct the Pakistani aim of wooing that region and complicate plans for building oil and gas pipelines from there to Pakistan by utilising the Afghan land corridor.

Regional Geopolitics and Afghanistan: 1994–1995

Pakistan sought to foster in Afghanistan what can be termed as an internal balance of weakness, where most of the Afghan Islamist groups would remain divided and reliant to an extent on Islamabad's patronage. Recognising its limited power and resources as compared to the former Soviet Union, Pakistan opted not to control Afghanistan directly but to operate indirectly through clients and proxies. However, most of them were not considered reliable, and it seemed safer to keep them divided, with Islamabad playing the role of the final arbiter.

Unlike the Cold War era where, as Robert Jervis observed, 'the superpowers offered security to their (Third World) clients as well as enforcing a degree of restraint on them',[61] aspiring regional powers having bankrupt economies and severe domestic fissures did not possess the wherewithal to impose their will on their clients. In the context of Afghanistan, the Pakistani policy makers resented the 'ungrateful' behaviour of the Afghan groups, due to their refusal to kowtow to Islamabad's dictates.[62] The Pakistani elite believed that Pakistan nurtured the Afghan Islamists and, as a result, they should have remained indebted to it. Instead, the presence of the Rabbani-Masoud government in Kabul was not only boding ill for Islamabad's post-Cold War regional agenda, but was also marginalising Pakistan's Pashtun Islamist allies.

The Pashtuns, who within the Pakistani military–bureaucratic apparatus had built an influential network and remained well represented in the army and the

bureaucracy, influenced Pakistan's Afghan policy in the mid 1990s.[63] They were particularly piqued at the 'humiliation' suffered by their ethnic cousins across the Durand Line. In this regard, Mehtab Ali Shah notes that a significant proportion of Pakistani and Afghan Pashtuns detested Iranian 'rapport' with the non-Pashtun 'warlords' such as Ahmad Shah Masoud and felt that Iran intended to 'divide Afghanistan on sectarian and ethnic lines'.[64] Iran's attempts at forming an association of Persian speaking nations, as well as its bid to establish economic and political ties with Central Asia, gave credence to these fears.[65] Such misgivings were also fuelled by reports that Ahmad Shah Masoud, with Rabbani's connivance, was uniting the non-Pashtun Afghans in a common front against Pashtun hegemony and proposed to erase the identity of the Afghanistan that had been associated with Pashtun dominance by forming a new entity called 'Khorasan'.[66]

Iran's role in Afghanistan reinforced the latent anti-Iranian feelings of a sizeable component of the leadership of the main Sunni Islamic groups in Pakistan, particularly the JI and the JUI. These parties were closely associated with the Pashtun clergy and parties of southern and eastern Afghanistan that had received the bulk of Pakistani assistance during the anti-Soviet jihad. A significant proportion of these orthodox Sunni Pakistani Islamists saw the Iranians as 'hypocrites', 'double faced', 'effeminate' and 'heretical'.[67] The growing sectarianism and the venomous hatred of Shiites propagated by extremist Sunni groups in Pakistan led many Sunnis to regard the Shiite sect as non-Muslim.[68] A sizeable number of high-ranking elements in the Pakistani government belonging to the Muhajir, Pashtun and Punjabi ethnicities concurred with these feelings. They lamented Iran's entry into the 'tricky and treacherous arena of the Great Game with full vigour, greater interest and evangelistic zeal characteristic of the regime'.[69] However, Islamabad still insisted on maintaining, at least on the surface, correct relations with Tehran, owing to Pakistan's strategic compulsion resulting from its rivalry with India in the east.[70]

The appointment of Benazir Bhutto, on 19 October 1993, for a second term as Prime Minster did not bring about a fundamental change in Islamabad's stance on Afghanistan. The policy that evolved in the confused circumstances of the 1992 Afghanistan was predicated on the anticipation that the Pakistani Pashtun protégé Hekmatyar, along with other Pashtun Islamists, would be able to dominate the new Islamic set up in that war-ravaged country. In practice, the assumptions on which this policy was based were proved false. Pakistan had found its goals unattainable in the complex Afghan power struggle. Some Pakistani commentators point out that during the period 1993–1994, the policy on Afghanistan had been in disarray and a casualty of internal divisions in the government involving the Foreign Office, the Interservices Intelligence (ISI) and the Interior Ministry, all of which had different policies over Afghanistan.[71] Yet, this was not an entirely accurate assessment. There was, to a certain degree, a consistency in Pakistan's policy toward Afghanistan. The intelligence apparatus had continued to back the Pashtun Islamists on the ground in Afghanistan – although the military had reached the conclusion by 1994 that its proxy, Gulbuddin Hekmatyar, was becoming a liability because of his repeated defeats by forces loyal to Ahmad Shah Masoud.

Islamabad's relations with the Rabbani administration had deteriorated sharply by mid 1994. On 23 February 1994, large crowds attacked the Pakistan embassy in Kabul, forcing Islamabad to evacuate its staff. The attacks were in response to the

killing of three Afghan hijackers who had taken refuge in the Afghan embassy in Islamabad.[72] This was against the backdrop of fierce battles that had raged in Kabul in January and February between the militias of Hekmatyar, Dostum and Masoud, leaving substantial portions of the Afghan capital devastated. Masoud blamed Pakistan for this intensification of the conflict and saw this as a part of a plan to impose Pakistani hegemony in Afghanistan through its instrument, Hekmatyar.[73] In addition, the Rabbani government blamed Pakistan for violating the Afghan Transit Trade Agreement (ATTA), under which listed goods could be imported duty free into Pakistan in sealed containers for onward transmission to Afghanistan. Kabul alleged that most of the goods were being diverted by smugglers in connivance with Pakistani authorities and sold there.[74] Apart from the trade dispute, Islamabad was incensed by the failure of the Rabbani government to back Pakistan's condemnation of Indian policy in Kashmir at the United Nations.[75]

The intractable Afghan problem enticed the Pakistani establishment to seek the backing of its major strategic partner and financier, Saudi Arabia, and also of the United States, to assist it in restoring 'peace' and 'stability' in Afghanistan. Pakistan had consistently maintained very close strategic, economic and political interaction with Saudi Arabia. The Saudi intelligence continued to cooperate with the Pakistani ISI in assisting the Wahhabi-inspired Deobandi groups in Pakistan and Afghanistan. In fact, Saudi Arabia implemented its policy in the region through Pakistan and used Islamabad's services to advance its form of conservative Wahhabi Islam in Afghanistan and Central Asia. In the early 1990s, this policy was not opposed by the United States, which had intimate relations with both these states.

Washington's relations with Islamabad in the post-Cold War period had certainly developed some complications, on account of Islamabad's nuclear program and its bid to acquire medium range ballistic missiles from China.[76] Even so, the Pakistani and the United States' intelligence establishments continued to share views on Iran, Afghanistan and other regional issues. Top Pakistani policymakers had a lot of goodwill towards the United States, in spite of their differences on the nuclear program. Significantly, the Pakistani elite envisaged that their country could continue to serve Washington's regional goals. This was regarded as an important objective as Pakistan had been the fourth largest recipient of US bilateral military assistance in the 1980s, behind only Israel, Egypt and Turkey.[77] The United States actively facilitated Pakistan's yearly requests for loans from the IMF and the World Bank. However, in the aftermath of the Cold War Islamabad feared that it might be marginalised in the United States' new global priorities.

In order to rekindle the supposedly declining US involvement in Southwest Asia, Islamabad actively marketed itself as a moderate Islamic state which could not only serve as a 'gateway' to Central Asia for Western investment but also as the shortest route to the sea for the proposed energy pipelines emanating from that region. In addition, Islamabad sensed that its goal of developing future gas/oil pipelines via Afghanistan toward the Pakistani ports on the Arabian Sea, bypassing Iran – Washington's main *bete noir* in the region – would also be appreciated by the United States.

The Pakistani elites' views with respect to the post-Cold War geostrategic situation in Southwest Asia had, indeed, some congruence with Washington's interests in the region. The US foreign policy agenda continued, to an extent, to view

'national security' interests in terms of a Cold War zero-sum game worldview, despite the absence of a visible enemy. The Clinton administration persisted in maintaining the United States' position as the world's 'dominant power' with a strong emphasis on a 'strategy of enlargement of the World's free community of market democracies'.[78] In relation to the post-Soviet Southwest and Central Asian region, the US policy revolved around three main goals:

1 Facilitating the transition of the former Soviet Central Asian republics towards democracy and market-oriented economic systems.
2 Encouraging the Central Asian states in the direction of the West so as to steer them away from the Russian orbit.
3 Exploring avenues for the commercial involvement of its petroleum companies in the oil and gas sectors of the Central Asian economies. In this connection, the existence of large oil and gas reserves in Central Asia could provide the United States an opportunity to reduce its dependence on Persian Gulf oil.[79]

In addition to these goals, Washington strived to reduce the influence of those states in the region that it perceived as hostile to its strategic and economic aims. Amongst these states, Iran and, to a lesser degree, the Russian Federation took prominence.

The United States's policy towards the Russian Federation was, and largely still is, formulated upon the prospects for the evolution of pro-Western democracy based on a liberal free market economic system in Russia. To a significant degree, Washington's stance regarding Russia was conditioned by the outcomes of internal power struggles in Moscow. The emergence of pro-communist or even nationalistic elements in Russia could make that country a threat for the United States in Central and Southwest Asia. One of the major American geopolitical objectives was to prevent the emergence of an unified power in the fragmented regions of the former Soviet Union extending from the borders of Eastern Europe to the Far East.[80] Since 1994, Russia was, indeed, trying to reorganise its extensive military, political and economic linkages with Central Asia that had fallen into disarray as a result of the rather abrupt independence of this region in 1991.[81] The post-communist ruling elite in Russia regarded Central Asia and the Caucasus as Moscow's sphere of influence. To them, this region was seen as Russia's 'near abroad'. Consequently, the United States formulated its policy vis-à-vis Central Asia aiming to solicit the region away from extensive reliance on Moscow.

In the competition for a stake in the exploitation of Central Asian oil and gas reserves, the United States was only one of the major contestants amongst the several regional and extra-regional states involved in that scramble. Apart from developed countries like Japan and states of the European Union, emerging 'Third World' powers such as China and India competed with relatively smaller regional states such as Pakistan, Iran, Turkey and Saudi Arabia in securing a niche in Central Asia. Moreover, each state perceived the struggle for Central Asia as a zero sum game, leading many commentators to label this development as a new great game for power and influence in the region.[82]

In the changing regional geopolitics of the mid 1990s, sections in the Pakistani elite perceived the complementarity of interests drawing Pakistan and the United States together. In the case of Central Asia, it was felt that this complementarity was

very pronounced. The government of Benazir Bhutto agreed with the military–bureaucratic hierarchy that envisioned Pakistan as an American ally, assisting the United States in its geoeconomic and strategic plans for Southwest and Central Asia.[83] Pakistan's reliance on the United States could reap an economic windfall from the Clinton administration's policy that was predicated upon Washington's 'ability to open foreign markets and promote free trade and investment'.[84]

The United States interest in the penetration of Central Asia also coalesced with the Pakistani strategic goal of becoming a regional power. Despite severance of US aid in 1990, Washington's military and intelligence establishments maintained association with their Pakistani counterparts. The US CENTCOM commander was a frequent visitor to Islamabad. Furthermore, the US and Pakistani military continued to hold joint exercises as part of the continuation of the bilateral security treaty signed between the two countries in 1959.[85] A US Defence Department document reportedly underlined the strategic significance of Pakistan in the post-Cold War era for Washington, especially in relation to Central Asia, by pointing out that 'a constructive US–Pakistani relationship will be an important element in our strategy to promote stable security conditions in South west and Central Asia. We should therefore, endeavour to rebuild our military relationship given acceptable resolution of our nuclear concern'.[86]

The Clinton administration acknowledged Washington's overlapping regional priorities with Islamabad and subsequently depicted Pakistan as a 'moderate' and 'democratic' Islamic state. Pakistan was even being seen as a 'model' over secular Turkey to be emulated by the new Central Asian states.[87] In a speech during Benazir Bhutto's visit to Washington in April 1995, President Clinton called Pakistan 'a good partner' that had 'stood for democracy and opportunity and moderation. The future of the entire part of the world where Pakistan is depends in some large measure on Pakistan's success.'[88] Benazir concurred with President Clinton's view and promoted Pakistan as one of the United States' most dependable allies and sought US investment in the country's flagging economy.[89]

Washington had since the early 1990s remained adamant in blocking Iranian access to vital technology and finances. The US policy was clearly identified by President Clinton's advisor for Near Eastern and South Asian affairs, Martin Indyk, in June 1993. Indyk stressed the necessity for the 'dual containment' of regimes in power in Iran and Iraq until they modified their behaviour. He elaborated that:

> Dual containment derives from an assessment that the current Iraqi and Iranian regimes are both hostile to American interests in the region. Accordingly, we do not accept the argument that we should continue the old balance of power game ... we reject it because we do not need it ... as long as we are able to maintain our military presence in the region, as long as we succeed in restricting the ambitions of both Iraq and Iran, and as long as we can rely on our regional allies – Egypt, Israel, Saudi Arabia and GCC and Turkey – to preserve the balance of power in our favour in the wider Middle East region, we will have the means to counter the Iraqi and Iranian regimes.[90]

In the context of energy extraction from Central Asia, Islamabad presented alternative routes for the proposed oil and gas pipelines from Central Asia through Pakistan that circumvented Iran. In Pakistan's view, the passage of these pipelines

could give a boost to the Pakistani economy in terms of attracting foreign investment, and also provide additional energy to meet the rapidly growing domestic consumption needs. As early as 1992, Pakistan discussed the export of gas from Turkmenistan during a meeting of ECO heads of government in Ashghabat. This was part of Pakistan's bid to expand relations with Central Asia. Earlier, Islamabad had shown its interest in constructing road links to Uzbekistan via Kabul, and to Kazhakhstan via Xinjiang, utilising the Karakorum Highway (KKH) built in 1978 with Beijing's assistance. The KKH followed the traditional 'silk route' that connected China with the Middle East and on to Europe. Pakistan's emphasis in opening road links with Central Asia perturbed India. New Delhi contended that Islamabad was conceiving a grand strategy aimed at consolidating a so-called 'Trans Asian axis' that could cut off India from the Central Asian region, while enhancing a strategic alliance between Pakistan, China and possibly the Central Asian states.[91]

Certainly, Pakistan had shown great interest in Central Asia far beyond its economic and technological level. It offered the Central Asian states military and economic cooperation in addition to formalising political cooperation. In 1994, Pakistan signed a bilateral agreement with Turkmenistan to train army and air force personnel of that country.[92] It established air links with Uzbekistan, Kazakhstan and Azerbaijan. It planned to obtain supplies of electricity and gas from Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, and Kazakhstan. Moreover, Pakistan contributed to the promotion of religious education and building of mosques in the region that evoked the suspicions of the region's largest state, Uzbekistan.[93]

Plans for a gas pipeline from Turkmenistan to Pakistan via Afghanistan had reached an advanced stage by 1994. The Argentinean company, Bridas, which had obtained exploratory rights in Turkmenistan in 1993, opened negotiations with Islamabad for the construction of the 1,460-kilometre gas pipeline from Turkmenistan's Daulatabad gas field to Pakistan via Afghanistan through Herat and Kandahar.[94] The US UNOCAL-led consortium competed with Bridas in the bid to construct a Pakistan–Afghanistan pipeline.[95]

The attempts to tap the energy resources of Central Asian states catered to the American policy of 'containing' Iranian influence in the region. On the other hand, the vast geopolitical space to the north offered Pakistan prospects of addressing its strategic inferiority in relation to its rival in South Asia, India.[96] However, Pakistan's hopes for gaining influence in landlocked Central Asia could not be realised owing to the protracted internecine conflict in Afghanistan that was leading to increasing frustration on the part of the policymakers in Islamabad by the summer of 1994.

Pakistan and the Emergence of the Taliban Militia

The evolution of the Taliban and Pakistan's role in backing this militia is now sufficiently well known and will not be fully documented here. However, key issues and events that led the Pakistani policymakers to back the Taliban will be discussed in the light of the various studies that have been undertaken to assess the factors behind the rise of this ultra-orthodox Sunni militia in post-Cold War Afghanistan.[97]

By the middle of 1994, a number of patterns could be gleaned from the apparent chaos of the Afghan scene. The Pakistani military and political elite was arriving at

the conclusion that the Rabbani-Masoud administration would not accept Islamabad's hegemony. To Pakistan's ire, it was reasserting Afghanistan's sovereignty by adopting an independent and non-aligned foreign policy. It rekindled the spectre amongst the decision makers in Islamabad of an Afghanistan aligned with India, as was the case between 1947 and 1991. In fact, this development greatly alarmed sections of the military elite and was instrumental in changing Pakistan's Afghan strategy probably, more so than other factors such as accessing Central Asia through the Afghan corridor, or even the development of energy pipelines as suggested by some observers.[98]

Pakistan initiated a campaign from the spring of 1994 aimed at undermining international recognition of the Islamic State of Afghanistan. Pakistani officials began to emphasise that the Rabbani regime had 'no legitimacy' after 28 June 1994. Islamabad repeatedly stressed that the Rabbani administration was to hand over power as stipulated by the Islamabad and Jalalabad agreements of March and April 1993 by June 1994.[99] This was, indeed, ironic, as Islamabad itself was a party to the destabilisation of Afghanistan through its backing of Hekmatyar against his rivals, in violation of the agreements. Moreover, Pakistan remained silent over Hekmatyar's repeated violation of these Pakistani-brokered accords. In effect, Pakistan's persistent interference in Afghanistan was in itself a violation of international legal norms and was prolonging the Afghan civil war. In this connection, Saikal correctly notes that applying Western concepts of legitimacy in the Afghan case was problematic as 'no Afghan government had ever come to power on a popular base of legitimacy, and that the question of what has historically constituted a legitimate government in Afghanistan is a highly academic one'.[100]

The Rabbani administration's attempts to 'flirt' with India, in addition to other 'unfriendly' acts that included the occasional closure of the Pakistan–Afghanistan border at Torkham, allegedly masterminding the harassment of Pakistani diplomats in Kabul and a generally 'hostile' attitude towards its former 'benefactors' were considered a threat to Pakistan's security interests in the region.[101] Most significantly, Pakistan resented the Afghan 'nationalist streak' of Ahmad Shah Masoud, along with his non-Pashtun credentials.[102] The presence of ethnic Pashtuns in important positions within the army accentuated the anti-Rabbani Government sentiments in the Pakistani establishment. On the civilian side, Benazir Bhutto Government's Minister of the Interior, Naseerullah Babar, came from the NWFP and being an ex-army officer had affiliation with the GHQ. These officers were sympathetic to their Pashtun kin in Afghanistan and regarded with suspicion and contempt Afghanistan's non-Pashtun minorities.

The Pakistani military–bureaucratic elites predicated their Afghan policy on the notions they had inherited from the British colonial administrators of Northwest India. They regarded a pro-Pakistan Afghanistan as necessary to the country's defence in a similar vein as the British had regarded a pro-British Afghanistan essential for India's security. Even in the middle of the Cold War, during a conversation with President Eisenhower, the Pakistani President, General Ayub, echoed British geopolitical thinking that the 'natural defense line for the subcontinent was the Hindukush'.[103] The Cold War international power structure obstructed the attainment of this objective.[104] Forestalling Soviet penetration in Afghanistan compelled Washington to restrain Pakistan from taking any aggressive

measures against Kabul during the 1950s and 1960s, although the US did 'sympathize with the Pakistan case on Kashmir and Pashtunistan'.[105] However, Pakistan's crucial role in 'defeating' the Soviet army in Afghanistan, along with the collapse of the bipolar global balance of power in the late 1980s, reinvigorated the view that a post-Soviet Afghanistan would be ripe to become a client state beholden to Islamabad.

Pakistan remained the most influential external power in Afghanistan, due to its role as a base for the anti-Soviet Afghan Islamic groups in the 1980s. As noted in the previous chapters, most of the Afghan refugees that came to Pakistan were ethnic Pashtuns.[106] Pashtuns were the single largest ethnic group in Afghanistan. Notwithstanding the end of the Soviet presence in 1989, over 2 million Afghan refugees reportedly resided in Pakistan in 1995. The refugees had built strong networks with their Pakistani Pashtun cousins and participated in economic activities ranging from involvement in the transport business of the NWFP and Baluchistan to illicit drug trafficking.[107] Most importantly, Afghans residing in Pakistan had imbibed Pakistani mores and thousands received their education in Urdu in the hundreds of madrassas established in NWFP and Baluchistan under a deliberate policy by the Zia regime, which sought to encourage the burgeoning youthful population of these provinces to contribute to the Jihad in Afghanistan. These madrassas imparted religious educational cum military training especially in the tribal areas of NWFP and Baluchistan. The madrassas were well established in the seven semi-autonomous agencies of the NWFP inhabited by Pashtun tribes: Khyber, Kurrum, Orakzai, Mohmand, Bajaur, North Waziristan and South Waziristan. The Pakistani army's para-military Frontier Corps personnel, serving personnel of the ISI and even the highly regarded elite Special Services Group (SSG) had assisted thousands of the religious cadres emerging from the madrassas in acquiring military training in numerous clandestine camps located on Pakistani territory in the late 1980s.[108]

The weak civilian governments crippled by the excessive power of the military, failing administrative structures, corrupt judiciary and a lack of clear vision to ameliorate the ills of the country, were unable to stem the rise of militant Islamic groups mushrooming in Pakistan. The Islamic radicals, assisted by the ISI with the tacit approval of the army's GHQ, had become a powerful force in the country by the advent of 1995. Significantly, the infrastructure comprising Islamist training camps linked with the military, developed to wage the covert anti-Soviet Jihad, had remained intact and was being used by the Pakistan Army to further its objectives in Afghanistan and Kashmir. The Afghan Jihad and the growth of Deobandi-Wahhabi Islam, buttressed by Pakistan's regional partnership with Saudi Arabia, contributed to the formation of a pot-pourri of Wahhabi factions and sectarian parties in Pakistan. This contributed to enhancing their organizational relationship with the ISI and associated Afghan Pashtun Islamic factions aligned with the Pakistani Jamaat-i-Islami, and Jamiat-i-Ulama-i-Islam's Fazulur Rahman and Sami-ul-Haq factions.

Furthermore, in the 1990s, numerous Deobandi-Wahhabi influenced groups emerged in the Punjab and Pakistan administered Kashmir. These, mainly Punjabi led, Sunni Islamic factions were also loosely linked with three major Islamic parties mentioned previously. In this regard, the Lahore based *Markaz Ad-Dawa-Wal-Irshad* (Centre for [Islamic] Call and Propagation) led by Hafiz Muhammad Saeed

became the harbinger of militant groups such as the Harakat-ul-Mujahideen (HUM) and the Harakat-ul Ansar (HA) and later the Lashkar-e-Tayyiba (LeT). All of these groups were dedicated to fighting Jihad against Indian forces in Indian-administered Jammu and Kashmir. According to Western intelligence sources, regular Pakistani army officers supplemented ISI's instructors in training members of the Islamist groups in the fundamentals of guerrilla warfare.[109] The HA, HUM and the LeT, along with the *Markaz Ad-Dawa-Wal-Irshad*, were also influenced by the small Wahhabi oriented Jamiat Ahle Hadith (the Society of the followers of Hadith). The Harakat-ul Mujahideen also had the backing of the 'Islamist' Jamaat-i-Islami. Espousing a pan-Islamic Sunni outlook, these organizations generally cooperated with each other and as a consequence of this close interaction amongst them the distinction between 'Islamist' and 'traditionalist' groups became blurred.

The JUI had association with most of the plethora of Sunni Islamic factions operating in Afghanistan. Members of these factions frequently went from one outfit to another as dictated by the changing political strategies of these organizations. Interestingly, nearly all of the Sunni Wahhabi organizations and splinter factions remained sympathetic to each other. For instance, the Punjabi run *Markaz Ad Dawa-Wal-Irshad* claimed to have had training camps in Pashtun regions of Afghanistan near the Pakistani frontier since 1993, where militant Islamists from Kashmir, the Philippines, Sudan and Bosnia took courses in guerrilla warfare.[110]

The relatively vast organizational infrastructure and sympathetic Afghan Pashtun and Pakistani factions with experience in waging low-intensity warfare present within Pakistani territory offered the military–bureaucratic elite a chance to regain their influence in Afghanistan. The military, especially the intelligence apparatus, had concluded by June 1994 that Hekmatyar would be unable to defeat the Rabbani-Masoud combine. By July–August 1994, Islamabad decided to pursue a renewed forward policy in Afghanistan to teach a lesson to the recalcitrant Rabbani regime. The Clinton administration's ambivalent and detached attitude towards Kabul also helped Pakistan to come to this decision. Once again, the Pakistani strategy relied on covertly backing Afghan Pashtun Islamic factions hostile to the 'Tajik' government in Kabul. Already Pakistan's negative propaganda against Kabul had fanned considerable anti-Rabbani animosity in the Pashtun tribes straddling both sides of the Durand Line. Pakistani policy makers concluded that an 'honest' Pashtun Islamic force could gain the support of the Pashtun populace in southern and eastern Afghanistan – a region riven with rivalries, banditry and general lawlessness and controlled by several petty 'commanders' who had been transformed into local 'warlords' eluding any political control. This was an opportune political environment for Pakistan to regain its pre-eminence in Afghanistan.

Therefore, thousands of Afghan and Pakistani Pashtun Talibs were allowed to cross the Durand Line to subvert the shaky hold of Kabul regime's Governor in Kandahar from August 1994. In keeping with its forward policy, Pakistan rejected the Rabbani administration's plea for international monitoring of the border to cut off the supply of arms and ammunition to the anti-Rabbani factions in August 1994.[111] By aiding the rise of the Taliban, Pakistan demonstrated that it was the most effective regional power in the Afghan conflict but also had the skill to maintain the secretive nature of its interference in that country. According to A.N. Shulsky, covert action refers to the attempt by one government to pursue its foreign policy objectives

by conducting some secret activity to influence the behaviour of a foreign government or events in a foreign country in a way that is not attributable to the sponsoring state.[112] In some instances, the need for secrecy is absolute, and a state will try to conceal the details and even the existence of the activity. In other cases, the activity itself leads to its results becoming public knowledge, but the state conceals its involvement.[113] Covert activity infers the necessity for 'plausible deniability'. The action should be planned and executed in such a manner that the sponsoring state can hide its involvement to the extent that little evidence can be recovered to link the state to its complicity.

In the case of Pakistani sponsorship of the Taliban, most senior Pakistani army officers and bureaucrats officially denied any role in supporting the militia, but privately acknowledged it. In fact, the Pashtun resentment against the Rabbani administration was successfully tapped by the Pakistan and this enabled it to encourage the Pakistani Pashtun and Afghan Pashtun Islamists to recruit Talibs from the Afghan–Pakistan border regions. In this regard, the Pakistani military intelligence was instrumental in providing advice and logistical backing for the formation of the Taliban's organizational infrastructure including the group's military apparatus from the summer of 1994. Some commented with pride on the success of Islamabad's strategy and the role of the serving and former ISI chiefs in devising this 'master stroke'.[114] Pakistani military personnel from the ISI and the Frontier Corps served with the Taliban militia from the onset.[115] The mostly Pashto-speaking officers and personnel had little difficulty in merging with the religious students.[116] Dressed in traditional baggy *Shalwar-Kameez* (the loose trousers and long shirt worn by most Pakistanis and Afghans), the Pakistani Pashtuns are almost indistinguishable from Afghan Pashtuns to non-Afghans. The details of the extent of Pakistani support were limited to the inner army circle comprising the COAS, Director-General Military Operations, the ISI and MI chiefs, and the Commanders of XI and XII Corps in Peshawar and Quetta respectively. The Ministry of Foreign Affairs role in this policy was simply to deny the Pakistan interference in Afghanistan. The ISI, as an integral part of the military establishment, implemented the decisions of the military leadership, contrary to the assertions of some observers that it acted as autonomous institution.[117] Its policy making echelons, consisting of serving army officers, carried out the decisions of the Chief of the Army Staff made at the Army's General Headquarters, although theoretically the organization was supposed to be under the authority of the chief executive of the country. In this respect, the other civil institutions such as the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the Ministry of the Interior had to take into account the views of the army's higher command before taking important actions affecting national security.

At the regional level, Pakistan's creation of the Taliban was supported by Islamabad's closest allies in the Arab world: Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates (UAE). These countries felt ideological affinity with the Taliban's strict interpretation of Sunni Islam, and strategically they regarded this militia as a counter to their regional rival, Iran. Moreover, the Pakistani decision-makers regarded the Taliban as a benign 'apolitical' pro-Pakistan force that could not only restore peace in Afghanistan but could act to contain Iranian and Russian influence in the region. They viewed the militia's adherence to 'orthodox' Wahhabi-Deobandi Islam taught at Pakistani madrassas, its comprehensive linkages with Pakistani Sunni Islamists

and its almost total reliance on Pakistan for arms and ammunition as positive features that supposedly would make the Taliban a 'loyal' proxy easily amenable to Islamabad's control. In addition, the Taliban leadership's lack of enthusiasm for Afghan nationalism or the Pashtunistan issue as compared to other Afghan groups made them, at least, in theory the ideal Pakistani clients in the morass of Afghan factional politics. In fact, the military considered this semi-literate militia essentially composed of detribalised Afghan Pashtuns, Pakistani Islamists and elements of the ISI as the most reliable instrument to realise Pakistan's geostrategic objectives in post-Soviet Afghanistan.

The rise of the Taliban militia (known in Pashto as *Da Afghanistano da Talibano Islami Tehrik*) was portrayed by Pakistani and some foreign observers of the Afghan political scene as a continuation in the genre of the Islamic revivalist movements that had historically arisen in the northwestern parts of India from the seventeenth century onwards.[118] More specifically, the Taliban were presented as successors of the movements led by Syed Ahmad Barelvi in the early nineteenth century or the uprisings of the Faqir of Ipi, Hadda Mullah, Mullah Powindah and other Pashtun tribal and religious figures against the British. Indeed, the Afghan clergy in the south and eastern regions of Afghanistan had a tradition of mobilising the masses in the name of Islam against foreign occupiers. The role played by Mullah Din Muhammad, known as Mushk-i-Alam (1790–1886) in declaring Jihad against the British forces in 1880 became a symbol of Afghan resistance to foreign occupation.[119] However, the Taliban were a force organised by an external power and as such, their actions could not be compared with the indigenous Afghan Pashtun resistance against foreigners throughout history. In 1994, Afghanistan was not under foreign occupation and had a regime, despite all its weaknesses, that subscribed to the Sharia and Islamic cultural norms prevalent in Afghan society. Consequently, sociological explanations for the rise of the Taliban tend to obscure the external factors in aggravating the internal fissures in post-Soviet Afghanistan.

Islam as practised in the Pashtun regions of Afghanistan and Pakistan is influenced by the Pashtun code of honour, *Pashtunwali*. The *Pashtunwali* does not give great importance to the Sharia as its judicial foundation.[120] In contrast, the vast majority of the Taliban cadres were Pashtun Afghan refugees that had grown up in the refugee camps in Pakistan. They were imbued with an 'orthodox' religious education in the madrassas mostly affiliated with the Deobandi-Wahhabi Pakistani religious organizations. As pointed out in the preceding chapters, this strand of Wahhabi Islamic orientation in Pakistan, derived from the seventeenth and eighteenth century Indian Muslim revivalists, rejects any innovation in Islamic law, and regards other Islamic sects as deviants and heretics. This slanted vision led the Taliban to regard the Kabul government as impious and unIslamic. For the most part, the Taliban waged war against fellow Muslims and their own countrymen, a point that differentiated them from the earlier clergy-led uprisings in the NWFP and the Pashtun-inhabited areas of Afghanistan. Interestingly, the Taliban's orthodox religious indoctrination did not entirely erase some of the Taliban leadership's (including Mullah Omar's) regard for the Sufi orders or *tariqas* that commanded great respect amongst the common Afghan people. The Qadiriyya, Naqshbandiyyia, Chishtiyyia and the Suhrawardiyya orders have adherents spread over Afghanistan.[121] It cannot be denied that Mullah Omar and some of his closest

colleagues were genuinely firm in their medievalist and constrained vision of Islam. Omar's Pakistani and Afghan sympathizers would create a legend of the Mullah's charisma, piety, honesty and dedication to Islam in order to obtain the alliance of the Pashtun tribes to the Taliban militia. This transformed him into some sort of a warrior cum religious savant. In the Pakistani religious madrassas, Pashtun Afghan Islamism certainly underwent, as Lapidus comments, a 'fusion of clan, religious and political identities'.[122] This, in a sense, suited Pakistan's interests as it erased the Taliban's attachment to the Afghan identity.

The involvement of the Pakistani state in facilitating Islamic militancy transformed Afghan Islamism into a transnational phenomenon. The nucleus of the neo-fundamentalist militia already existed in Pakistan, mainly in the form of the thousands of religious students, or Taliban, residing in the religious seminaries run by Deobandi JUI (F) and JUI (S) in NWFP and Baluchistan. Moreover, the religious seminary at the Binnori Township in Karachi enrolled hundreds of Afghan and Pakistani students that were to gain prominence in the Taliban militia.[123] The Taliban leadership's major figures had received education in these madrassas or had been affiliated with them.[124] Several of the cadres in these madrassas belonged to the splinter factions of the Deobandi groups that had been armed, trained and inducted into Afghanistan during the Soviet presence in that country. According to Pakistani officials, the cadres of Pakistani Deobandi factions, Harakat-ul-Mujahideen and Sipah-i-Sahaba particularly distinguished themselves in the Jihad.[125] These factions not only developed symbiotic relationships with the Afghan Islamic groups like the Harakat-i-Inqilab-i-Islami and the two factions of the Hizb-i-Islami, but their interaction with the diehard Salafi Arab Mujahideen including members of Osama Bin Laden's Al Qaeda added to their extremist, literalistic interpretation of Islam.[126]

The Arab volunteers, who had been inducted into the Jihad with the consent of the CIA by the ISI in the 1980s, forged influential ties with the Pakistani and Afghan Islamic groups. The Arab Islamists had continued to reside in the NWFP and areas in Afghanistan with close proximity to Pakistan. The presence of so-called 'Arab Afghans' was a well-known fact with Pakistani military's intelligence apparatus. The attempts of Egypt, Algeria, Jordan, Tunisia and other Arab states to extradite some of these individuals from Pakistan on account of their participation in anti-government acts in their home countries got only partial assistance from the agencies owing to the future utility of Islamists.[127] The civilian part of the Pakistani government did provide the Arab states with information about the foreign Islamists and even extradited some of the 'Arab Afghans', yet thousands continued to stay in Pakistan with the connivance of the ISI. Their extensive combat experience would prove useful in the covert operations against India and the Rabbani government in Kabul.

The Afghan struggle against the Soviet Union inspired a large section of the Islamists and pro-Islamic youth in Pakistan. The social origins of the cadres involved in militant Islamism have been researched extensively, with several prominent scholars emphasising the 'Lumpen' background of a significant proportion of these Islamists.[128] This phrase is borrowed from Marx's description of the 'lumpenproletariat'. Marx saw this social stratum as the 'refuse of all classes', 'a disintegrated mass' composed of 'ruined and adventurous off-shoots of the bourgeoisie, vagabonds, discharged soldiers, discharged jail birds, rag pickers,

beggars' etc.[129] In brief, the lumpen elements of society comprise the rabble and social outcasts. Martin Oppenheimer refers to this stratum of society in the modern era as the alienated under-employed and the unemployed sub-class who have a tendency to turn to violence and revolution.[130] Indeed, a large proportion of Islamic cadres in the Sunni fundamentalist parties in Pakistan and elsewhere in the Muslim world came from such backgrounds. Yet, a substantial cohort came from the middle class. Participation of individuals of this background is motivated by their religious leanings, a strong sense of commitment to Islam and realisation of the injustices and suffering caused to the Muslim *Ummah* (Community) by external and internal forces. Osama Bin Laden and his Egyptian associate, Ayman Al-Zahwahri, are prime examples of this tendency.

However, many cadres in the militant Islamic groups in Pakistan also come from less educated lower middle classes or, in Marxist parlance, 'petty bourgeois' backgrounds represented by small shopkeepers, tradespersons, clerical workers and so on. The weakening of educational standards, coupled with lack of employment opportunities, aggravated by uneven economic development, rapid urbanisation and Western-imposed economic liberalisation, contributed to the growth of marginalised Islamic 'lumpen intelligentsia' in many Muslim states, including Pakistan, during the 1980s.[131] The Islamic neo-fundamentalists belonging to this strand have a very bigoted and often sectarian vision of Islam, with a tendency to gravitate towards militancy in order to impose the Sharia, which they believe has the solution for the political, social and economic problems confronting the society.

Moreover, the rise of fundamentalist Islam in Pakistan was largely led by the traditional mullah who was to a significant degree coopted into the state-sponsored Islamisation process during the Zia period. Hence, the Westernised ruling elites and the military utilised these elements to legitimise their hold on the state in the name of Islam. The Afghan war offered them a chance to channel the zeal and militancy of the Islamic groups into an external conflict that was portrayed as a Jihad. This was in sharp contrast to the evolution of Islamic extremism in countries like Egypt or later Algeria where, as Saad Eddin Ebrahim notes, Islamic militancy could be defined as 'actual violent behaviour committed collectively against the state or other actors in the name of Islam'.[132]

By 1995, the nexus between the Pakistani military and the Sunni fundamentalist groups in Pakistan and Afghanistan was firmly entrenched. The Pakistani military had gained extensive experience and enhanced capability to wage large-scale covert operations by using irregular forces as a consequence of the Afghan war. Thousands of well-trained individuals affiliated with various Jihadi organizations could be utilised for advancing Islamabad's interests in South and Southwest Asia (figure 5.1). Pakistan's tribal areas and even the urban centres of Peshawar, Quetta, Lahore and the megalopolis of Karachi were inundated with all sorts of weaponry ranging from Kalashnikov rifles to rocket launchers. These weapons, supplied by the 1980s CIA–ISI arms pipeline, had found their way into the hands of Pakistani Islamic militants.[133]

The ISI was central in motivating the Islamists to serve Pakistan's interests in the region. This was acknowledged by a former Director-General of the ISI who stressed 'religious forces have always aligned themselves with the military's views with regard to the defence budget {and} the Kashmir and Afghanistan policies'.[134] The



Figure 5.1 Linkages of the ISI and Pakistani Islamic parties with some prominent transnational Islamic groups active in Kashmir and Afghanistan in the 1990s

Islamist groups could be considered a kind of irregular paramilitary formation with clandestine links to the Pakistani security agencies.[135] Moreover, the Pakistani policymakers were having considerable success in 'bleeding' India by assisting the insurgency in Kashmir through the application of the hit and run guerrilla tactics used in Afghanistan. The Pakistani administered Azad (Free) Kashmir served as a sanctuary for the Kashmiri Mujahideen. According to some senior army officers, the Kashmiri militants tied down a large portion of the Indian army and therefore India could not 'have a 3:1 ratio which is needed for any aggressive force. This situation should continue until there is a resolution of the Kashmir issue. We will have to pay the price, but then there is no other way out of it.'[136]

The Pakistani intelligence apparatus is controlled by the military elite with a definite chain of command, contrary to the view of many scholars that the intelligence agencies act as autonomous entities. In this connection, Giles Kepel's contention that the inclusion of Mawlana Fazalur Rahman, the leader of a JUI faction in Benazir Bhutto's government, influenced Pakistan's policy of supporting the Taliban ignores the role of the military's intelligence in dictating policies to the civilian government.[137] Mawlana Fazalur Rahman had an old relationship with the military dating back to the Zia era. In fact, he retained firm links with the ISI and was inducted as chairman of the Parliamentary Foreign Affairs Committee with the tacit consent of this organization.[138] Benazir had very limited powers to formulate an independent foreign policy course without the consent of the military. Many observers have also emphasised the point that Benazir Bhutto's government and most importantly, the Interior Minister, Naseerullah Babar, was instrumental in organising and supporting the Taliban.[139] However, taking into consideration the overdeveloped military apparatus and its control over the officers seconded to the Frontier Corps, which was nominally under the control of the Ministry of Interior, it seems unlikely that General Babar would have been in a position to act independently without consulting the army's higher echelons. Furthermore, the Pashtun commanders in southern Afghanistan, where the Taliban made their debut in August 1994, retained connections with the ISI and sustained their regional power bases along the porous Durand Line by having cross-border relationships with the tribal and religious leaders in NWFP. This substantially affected their position in terms of getting cadres for their militias, logistical support, arms and other auxiliary needs for their war making capacity. This transnational linkage was firmly in place when Pakistan decided to switch its Afghan clients from Hekmatyar to the Taliban. Besides, the influence of the Islamic ideals of brotherhood and common theme of Jihad in establishing a 'pure' Islamic state enabled the Pakistani and Afghan Islamists to transcend key ethnic and linguistic differences. This development assisted the Pakistani elite's agenda of countering Pashtun ethnonationalism, which had been a nuisance for Pakistan since 1947. The pan-Islamic brotherhood propagated by the Sunni Islamists of the JUI and JI, in whose madrassas a new generation of Afghan refugees had studied, turned out to be an effective antidote to Afghan nationalism.

The leader of the Taliban militia, Mullah Muhammad Omar, was an ideal example of the hybrid character of the Taliban that fused Afghan Pashtun tribal mores with the orthodox Deobandi Islamism taught at the thousands of madrassas in Pakistan. His rise to prominence was attributed to his motivation of ridding Afghanistan of moral corruption and the banditry of the petty warlords.[140] Mullah Omar had been a guerrilla cadre of Hizb-i-Islami faction of Yunis Khalis. This faction was very closely linked to the ISI. Omar had reportedly studied in the Karachi's Binori town madrassa under the supervision of a prominent Pashtun cleric, Mufti Nizamuddin Shamzai. Shamzai, in turn, maintained a close association with the JUI.

With the assistance of the Pakistani military, the Taliban were successful in opening the Chaman to Kandahar Highway by November 1994. This highway was considered vital for Pakistani trade with Central Asia. On 2 November, the Taliban entered Kandahar and with relative ease, convinced the Governor, Mullah Naqib Akhundzadah, who had been appointed by Rabbani, to surrender. Sources in Pakistan alleged that Mullah Naqib and his associates were paid large sums to relinquish their control of the city.[141] By December, this force had control over the provinces of Kabul and Helmand. According to US Embassy sources in Islamabad, the Taliban were 'armed with brand new weapons' and had 'the active support of the GOP' (Government of Pakistan).[142] The ISI, along with other paramilitary units that provided artillery support, were the driving force behind the Taliban's capture of the large ammunition dump near Spin Boldak on the Pakistan–Afghanistan border in Baluchistan.[143]

On 20 January 1995, the Taliban overran the historic city of Ghazni, located 145 kilometres to the south west of Kabul. By March, the staunchly anti-Shiite Taliban had forged a temporary alliance with the Hizb-i-Wahdat in order to access West Kabul, which was controlled by the Shiite militia.[144] Nevertheless, later they started to disarm the Hizb-i-Wahdat forces. An attack by Masoud's units, however, compelled the Taliban to vacate this section of the city. In the course of the fighting, the Taliban abducted and murdered Abdul Ali Mazari, the leader of the Hizb-i-Wahdat, which added to the animosity of the Shiites towards the militia.

The Taliban had been successful in neutralising Hekmatyar's forces in Paktia, Paktika, Logar and Wardak provinces by mid-1995 and according to their Pakistani backers were in control of one-third of Afghanistan's territory. The US Embassy in Islamabad saw the militia as a 'hope for war-weary Afghans disgusted with the failure of national level leaders to compromise and the failure of local commanders to establish local security'.[145] The rapid advance of a religious militia, ostensibly composed of youthful students, indicated high-level military training, leading to the conclusion that the militia was being led and advised by regular army officers. Furthermore, the Taliban's resounding victories and Washington's benign attitude towards this 'traditionalist religious force', encouraged Pakistan to operationalise its long cherished plans for a Trans Afghan oil/gas pipeline.[146] This project, which aimed to bypass Iran, was seen in Islamabad as useful in rekindling US interest in Pakistan.[147]

Pakistani intervention in Afghanistan in backing the Pashtun Islamic forces did not escape the notice of Islamabad's neighbours, who became increasingly critical of Pakistani motives and conduct. This transformed the internal conflict in Afghanistan as regional powers Iran, Russia and India moved to counter the Taliban by enhancing their support to the beleaguered Rabbani-Masoud government. The greater role of regional powers in Afghanistan created the conditions for accentuating the war between 1996 and 2001. In this period, Afghanistan was transformed into the regional epicentre of crime, heroin production and international

terrorism. Moreover, the war-torn country became a pawn in Pakistani strategic ambitions and, therefore, Islamabad increased its involvement there in an effort to affect the outcome of the struggle for Afghanistan in its favour, thereby limiting Iranian and Indian influence. Subsequently, this conflict was to constitute an important aspect of the Afghan crisis in the years 1996–2001 and is surveyed in a more systematic manner in the next chapter.

Notes

1 For a discussion on the role of the early state see Henri J.M. Claussen, 'The Internal Dynamics of the Early State', *Current Anthropology*, Vol.25, No.4, August–October 1984, pp.365–379.
2 See Barnett R. Rubin, 'The Old Regime in Afghanistan: Recruitment and Training of a State Elite', *Central Asian Survey*, Vol.10, No.3, 1991, pp.73–100.
3 See Christopher Clapham, 'Degrees of Statehood', *Review of International Studies*, Vol.24, 1998, pp.143–157. Max Weber's oft-quoted definition of a state emphasises that the essential test for a state's existence is predicated on the criteria that whether or not its central government can lay claim to a monopoly of force in the territory under its jurisdiction. According to Weber an entity can be classified as a state if: a corporate group has compulsory jurisdiction, exercises continuous organization, and claims a monopoly of force over a territory and its population, including 'all action taking place in the area of its jurisdiction'. See Max Weber, *The Theory of Social and Economic Organization*, ed. by Talcott Parsons, New York: Free Press, 1964, p.156.
4 Gerald B. Helman and Stevan R. Ratner, 'Saving Failed States', *Foreign Policy*, Vol.89, Winter 1992–1993, pp.3–20. See also Amin Saikal, 'Dimensions of state disruption and international responses', *Third World Quarterly*, Vol.21, No.1, 2000, pp.39–49.
5 Robert H. Jackson, *Quasi-States: Sovereignty, International Relations and the Third World*, London: Cambridge University Press, 1990, p.22.
6 United Nations Commission on Human Rights, *Final Report on the Situation of Human Rights in Afghanistan submitted by Mr. Felix Ermacora, Special Rapporteur, in accordance with the Commission on Human Rights resolution 1992/68*, Geneva, 18 February 1993.
7 *Associated Press*, 5 May 1992. The position of the Prime Minister was left vacant for the Hizb-i-Islami, but was not occupied at this time.
8 See Alam Payind, 'Evolving Alternative Views on the Future of Afghanistan: An Afghan Perspective', *Asian Survey*, Vol.33, Issue 9, September 1993, pp.923–931.
9 For an extensive analysis of the evolution of the Afghan Islamic movement and the deep ideological and personality difference within it see David B. Edwards, *Before Taliban: Genealogies of The Afghan Jihad*, Berkeley: University of California Press, 2002.
10 Anthony Davis, 'Afghanistan – past, present and future', *Jane's Intelligence Review*, Vol.8, No.4, April 1996. p.182.
11 See Mountstuart Elphinstone, *Account of the Kingdom of Caubal*, London, 1815. Reprint Karachi: Oxford University Press (OUP), 1972, p.253. Elphinstone was mainly referring to the Pashtuns, as they were the main group he encountered on his journey from the North West Frontier of India to Kabul.
12 Abdul Rashid Dostum's speech to the inaugural convention of his National Islamic Movement of Afghanistan for his opposition to Pashtun hegemony on June 4, 1992.
13 See David C. Isby, 'Afghanistan–Civil War Next', *Janes Intelligence Review*, October 1992, p.365.

14 Barnett R. Rubin, 'Political Elites in Afghanistan: Rentier State Building, Rentier State Wrecking', *International Journal of Middle Eastern Studies*, Vol.24, 1992, p.94.
15 See Michael Burton, Richard Gunther, and John Higley, 'Introduction: Elite transformations and democratic regimes', in John Higley and Richard Gunther, (eds), *Elites and Democratic Consolidation in Latin America and Southern Europe*, London: Cambridge University Press, 1992, p.10.
16 Interview with a former Foreign Minister of Pakistan, Islamabad, 23 April 1997.
17 'Tribal Turmoil', *The Times*, London, April 27, 1992.
18 According to the Peshawar Accords, Rabbani was to serve as President for four months and then convene a Commission for the transfer of power that would convene for two months to elect a President, an interim constitution and parliament. However, the Commission known as *Shura Ahl-e-Hal Wal Aqd* (Council of Solution and Pact) selected by Professor Rabbani was termed as fraudulent by five out of nine Mujahideen groupings. They refused to accept its extension of Rabbani's term as President on the grounds that he was the only candidate for Presidency and that he had deliberately stacked the *Shura* with his own men. The UN Special Rapporteur on Afghanistan acknowledged some of the allegations as genuine. See *Final Report on the Situation of Human Rights in Afghanistan* submitted by Mr. Felix Ermacora, Special Rapporteur on Afghanistan, 1992/68, Geneva, 18 February 1993.
19 Interview with a former ISI Brigadier, Islamabad, 22 August 1999.
20 Interviews with several prominent officials responsible for Pakistan's relations with Afghanistan. Islamabad, August–October 2000.
21 *Agence France Press*, 11 May 1992.
22 As noted by Charles Lindholm, a chequerboard pattern of alliances divides 'each Pathan group into two fluid parties ... internal rivalry is strong in this basically egalitarian structure, as groups of kinsmen manoeuvre for the meagre status positions available and for their share in the resource base'. See Charles Lindholm, *Frontier Perspectives: Essays in Comparative Anthropology*, Karachi: OUP, 1996, p.12. See also Frederik Barth, 'Segmentary Opposition and the Theory of Games: A Study of Pathan Organization', *Journal of the Royal Anthropological Institute*, Vol.89, 1959, pp.5–22.
23 *Reuters*, 13 July 1992.
24 *Reuters*, 14 June 1992.
25 UNDP, *Human Development Report, 1993*, New York: Oxford University Press, New York, 1993; *World Bank Development Report*, 1992.
26 See Lester W. Grau and Michael A. Gress, *The Russian General Staff. The Soviet–Afghan War: How a Superpower Fought and Lost*, University of Kansas, 2002, p.5; Interviews with prominent Afghan exiles, Islamabad, 12 August 2000.
27 M. Hassan Kakar, *Afghanistan: The Soviet Invasion and the Afghan Response, 1979–1982*, p.294.
28 Rauf Kiasra, 'Shujaat says (General) Beg offered him massive funds', *The News*, 23 April 2003.
29 See Altaf Gauhar, 'How Intelligence Agencies Run our Politics', *The Nation*, 17 August 1997. Altaf Hussain Gauhar was Secretary Information during the later part of the Ayub period (1965–1969).
30 S.V.R. Nasr, 'Islam, the State and the Rise of Sectarian Militancy' in Christopher Jaffrelot (ed), *Pakistan: Nationalism without a Nation?* London: Zed Books, 2002.
31 These factions included *Sunni Tehrik* (Movement) of Karachi based Mawlana Saleem Qadri, *Minhajul Quran* and the *Tehrik-e-Tahfuz-e-Namoos-e-Resalat* (Movement for the Protection of the Sanctity of Prophethood) of Mawlana Tahirul Qadiri.
32 Farhat Haq, 'The Rise of the MQM in Pakistan: Politics of Ethnic Mobilization', *Asian Survey*, Vol.XXXV, No.11 (November 1995), pp.990–1004.

33 Jasjit Singh, 'The Army in Pakistan', in Jasjit Singh (ed). *Kargil 1999: Pakistan's Fourth War for Kashmir*, New Delhi: Knowledge World, 1999, p.42.
34 See Wayne Wilcox, 'Political role of the army in Pakistan: Some reflections', in S.P. Verma and V. Narain (eds), *Pakistan Political System in Crisis: Emergence of Bangladesh*, Jaipur: University of Rajasthan Press, 1972, p.35.
35 Beg has lately retreated from his exposition of this concept. He now acknowledges that this concept had 'no military logic, nor does it conform to the operational policy of Pakistan, which is to defend its borders and defeat the enemy if he attempts to violate Pakistan's territory'. See General Mirza Aslam Beg 'Afghanistan turmoil and regional security imperatives' paper read at a conference held under the auspices of the Iranian Foreign Ministry in Tehran on 22 December 2002.
36 To an extent, the Pakistani military was a party to this conflict through its support for Gulbuddin Hekmatyar against his rival, Ahmad Shah Masoud.
37 The President appointed a caretaker administration under Mir Balkh Sher Mazari. However, the Supreme Court restored the Nawaz Sharif administration in May. The army again intervened and brokered a deal that led to the resignation of both the President and the Prime Minister on 19 July 1993.
38 General Asif Nawaz had suddenly died of a 'heart attack' in January 1993. However, his family alleged that he was poisoned by arsenic.
39 Hasan Askari Rizvi, *Military and Politics in Pakistan, 1947–1997*, p.277.
40 Dr. Qureshi was a serving Vice President of the International Monetary Fund (IMF).
41 Heavy reliance on external borrowing and unbridled defence expenditures had reached a point in 1993 where allocations for debt servicing and defence exceeded the total revenues of the state.
42 For an exposé of US foreign policy in the post-Cold War era, see Warren Christopher, *In the Stream of History: Shaping Foreign Policy for a New Era*, Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1998.
43 Mahmood Monshipouri and Amjad Samuel, 'Development and Democracy in Pakistan', *Asian Survey*, Vol.XXXV, No.11, November 1995, p.984.
44 *Reuters*, 5 December 1992.
45 Anthony Hyman, 'Moving out of Moscow's Orbit: The Outlook for Central Asia', *International Affairs*, Volume 69, Issue 2, April 1993, pp.288–304.
46 Rajan Menon, 'In the Shadow of the Bear: Security in Post-Soviet Central Asia', *International Security*, Volume 20, Issue 1, Summer, 1995, p.155.
47 Several thousand Arabs from Egypt, Yemen, Jordan, Saudi Arabia, Sudan, Kuwait, Syria and the Israeli occupied Palestinian territories retained their presence in Pakistan in the early 1990s. Apparently, the efforts of the Pakistani government to expel them were discreetly stymied by the ISI as the Arabs were needed for the Pakistani covert strategic agenda.
48 Paul Wilkinson, 'Al-Gamaa'a Al-Islamiya-Egypt and the Challenge of Islam', *Jane's Intelligence Review*, June 1993.
49 Interview with a member of the Pakistani Senate, Islamabad, 12 October 2000.
50 The Al Badr camp near Jalalabad and the Zhawar Killi complex near Khost were especially prominent in this connection.
51 See Yunas Samad, 'Kashmir and the Imagining of Pakistan', *Contemporary South Asia*, vol.4, no.1, 1995, pp.65–77.
52 See S.A. Mousavi, *The Hazaras of Afghanistan: An Historical, Cultural, Economic and Political Study*, London: Curzon Press, 1998, pp.196–199.
53 There is much about the massacre that remains unclear or contested, see William Maley, *The Afghanistan Wars*, London: Palgrave, 2002, pp.204–209.

54 See Gerald Bourke, 'Pakistan Brokers Afghan Peace Deal', *The Guardian*, 4 March 1993.
55 For a Pakistani perspective on the rise of the Taliban, see Kamal Matinuddin, *The Taliban Phenomenon 1994–1997*, Karachi: OUP, 1999.
56 Abdul Rashid Dostum visited Islamabad in 1994 and met with Pakistani intelligence officials. Interview with a middle-ranking official of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Islamabad, 12 September 1995.
57 See Hamid Hussain, 'The Ethnic Factor in Afghanistan', *Defence Journal* (Rawalpindi), March 2003. Prominent ex-PDPA functionaries including former Ministers of Defence and Civil Aviation, Muhammad Aslam Watanjar and Pacha Gul Wafadar were coopted in this venture respectively.
58 Interview of General Hamid Gul, *Reuters News*, 22 June 1992.
59 *Middle East Economic Digest*, 9 October 1992.
60 President Ali Akbar Hashemi Rafsanjani visited Pakistan in September 1992 and held extensive discussions with his Pakistani counterpart on the future of Afghanistan and the role of the Economic Cooperation Organization in boosting the economic links between the regional states.
61 See Robert Jervis, 'The Future of World Politics: Will it resemble the past?', *International Security*, Vol.16, No.3, Winter 1991–1992, p.31.
62 Ahmad Rashid, 'Afghanistan: A Loss of Trust. Hijacking embitters ties with Pakistan', *Far Eastern Economic Review*, 10 March 1994, p.25.
63 According to unpublished Pakistani Army estimates, more than 20% of all personnel in the Pakistan Army were Pashto-speakers in the 1990s. This information was obtained from discussions with several retired and serving army officers. The British imperial recruiting policy had been very narrow and at the time of partition 77% of the Pakistan Army came from three districts of the Punjab (Rawalpindi, Jhelum and Campbellpur now known as Attock) and two districts of NWFP (Mardan and Kohat). See S.P. Cohen, *The Pakistan Army*, Berkeley: University of California Press, 1984, p.44.
64 See Mehtab Ali Shah, *The Foreign Policy of Pakistan: Ethnic Impacts on Diplomacy*, London: I.B. Tauris, 1999, p.191.
65 See 'Afghanistan – External Influences', *Arab Press Service*, Vol.26, No.6, 20 December 1993.
66 Musa Khan Jalalzai, *Taliban, Amerika Aur Osama Bin Laden: Afghanistan ki Tarikhi Khanajangi Aur Siyasi Kashmakash Par Eik Mustanad Dastwaiz* (Urdu), (Afghanistan's Historical Civil War and Political Struggle. A Comprehensive Account), Lahore: Book Trust, 2000. See Appendix II., *Jabal Saraj Accord* (Literal Translation by S. Fida Yunas) p.272.
67 Interview with a leading member of the Jamaat-i-Islami, Islamabad, 12 November, 1997. A prominent member of Pakistan's main Shiite community verified this commonplace perception of the Iranians within the Pakistani Sunni Islamic groupings. Interview with Agha Murtaza Pooya, Islamabad, 30 August 2000.
68 On the rise of sectarianism in Pakistan see Muhammad Qasim Zaman, 'Sectarianism in Pakistan: The Radicalisation of Shii and Sunni Identities', *Modern Asian Studies*, Vol.32, No.3, 1998, pp.689–716.
69 Lieutenant-General (Retired) Syed Refaqat, 'Afghan Imbroglio: Then and Now', Dawn (Internet edition), October 31, 2001.
70 Mehtab Ali Shah, *The Foreign Policy of Pakistan*, p.192.
71 Moonis Ahmar, 'Pakistan and the Power struggle in Afghanistan', *Eurasian Studies*, Vol.3, No.3, Fall 1996, p.35.
72 The hijackers had taken a busload of Pakistani school children hostage and later taken

refuge in the Afghan embassy. The hijackers were demanding US$2 million and food assistance for their countrymen.

73 *Arab Press Service Organization*, 20 December, 1993.

74 Interview with a Pakistani official in the Ministry of Finance, Islamabad, 19 August, 2000. See also 'Pakistan–Afghanistan locked in trade dispute', *Reuters*, 6 April 1995.

75 *Far Eastern Economic Review*, 10 March 1994.

76 US intelligence sources disclosed that China gave substantial assistance to Pakistan to build its nuclear capability. Beijing's assistance ranged from providing nuclear materials, reactors and enrichment technology in addition to nuclear capable M-11 ballistic missiles. See D. Albright, F. Berkout and W. Walker, *Plutonium and Highly Enriched Uranium 1996: World Inventories, Capabilities and Policies*, New York: SIPRI/Oxford University Press, 1997, pp.166–167.

77 Ian Talbott, *Pakistan: A Modern History*, London: Hurst, 1998, p.153.

78 Remarks of Anthony Lake, Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs, 'From Containment to Enlargement – 21 September 1993'. *U.S. Department of State Despatch*, Vol.4, No.39, 1993, p.660. See also Anthony Lake, 'American Power and American diplomacy – 21 October 1994', *US Department of State Despatch*, Vol.5, No.46. 1994, p.767.

79 See Rosemary Forsythe, 'The Politics of Oil in the Caucasus and Central Asia', *Adelphi Paper, 300*, London: International Institute for Strategic Studies, 1996, pp.17–18.

80 See Geoffrey Kemp and Robert E. Harkavy, *Strategic Geography and the Changing Middle East*, Washington DC: Brookings, 1997, p.5. One of the foremost geopoliticians of imperial Britain, Sir Halford Mackinder, had come up with an imperialist geopolitical theme of controlling strategic landmasses in Asia in order to retain the European balance of power favourable to Britain. It was Mackinder who had identified Central Asia as the pivot area of history in terms of its importance through the centuries in the struggle for domination of the Eurasian landmass. For an exposition of geopolitical theory and the importance of Central Asia, see Halford Mackinder, 'The Geographical Pivot of History', *Geographical Journal*, Vol.23, No.4, April 1904. In the Washington elite, many still shared Mackinder's vision. See Zbigniew Brzezinski, *The Grand Chessboard – American Primacy and Its Geostrategic Imperatives*, New York: Basic Books, 1997. Brzezinski was a former teacher of the Clinton administration's top diplomat and later Secretary of State, Madeline Albright. He was also National Security Adviser to President Carter, 1977–1980.

81 See S.F. Starr, 'Power Failure: American Policy in the Caspian', *The National Interest*, No.47, Spring 1997, pp.20–31. For US defence planning visualising a possible conflict with Russia based on geopolitical rivalry, see Zalmay Khalilzad and David Ochmanik, 'Rethinking US Defence Planning', *Survival*, Vol.39, No.7, Spring, 1997, International Institute of Strategic Studies, London.

82 M.E. Ahrari, 'The Dynamics of the New Great Game in Muslim Central Asia', *Central Asian Survey*, Vol.13, No.4, 1994, pp.525–539.

83 Interview with a member of the Institute of Strategic Studies, Islamabad, 3 October 1999.

84 Warren Christopher quoted in Charles W. Kegley and Eugene R. Wittkopf, *American Foreign Policy: Pattern and Process*, fifth edition, New York: St. Martin's Press, 1996, p.546.

85 The Pakistan Army's Special Services Group and the US Green Berets regularly held exercises at a Pakistani military base in NWFP near Peshawar in 1993 and 1994. This base, located in the town of Cherat, serves as the headquarters of the SSG and had been crucial for covert operations targeting Afghanistan. See Salamat Ali, 'Pakistan: Commando confusion. US Green Berets stir the political pot', *Far Eastern Economic Review*, 4 March 1993. Also BBC, 'US–Pakistan Exercises – "Threat" to Indian Position', *BBC Monitoring Service: Asia–Pacific*, 6 January 1994.

86 Excerpts from a Defence Department's report published in the *New York Times*, 8 March 1992.

87 See Fawaz A. Gerges, *America and Political Islam: Clash of Cultures or Clash of Interests*, New York: University Press, 1999, pp.93–95.

88 Press Release of the Ministry of Information Government of Pakistan, Islamabad, April 15, 1995.

89 'Benazir takes initiative to attract US investment', *Dawn*, Karachi, 20 April 1995.

90 Martin Indyk's address at the Washington Institute for Near East Policy, May 18, 1993, parts of which are quoted in the *Middle East International*, No.452, June 11, 1993, pp.3–4.

91 See 'Pakistan's Trans Asian designs', SAPRA, New Delhi, October 1995. http://www.subcontinent.com/sapra/bulletin/95oct/si951001.html. Accessed 9/05/2003.

92 Murad Esenov, 'Turkmenistan and Central Asian Regional Security', *Central Asia and the Caucasus*, No.1 (7), 2001.

93 Ahmad Rashid, *The Resurgence of Central Asia: Islam or Nationalism?* London: Zed Books, 1994, pp.215–218. Uzbekistan is Central Asia's most populous state, but only third largest in area. Kazakhstan is about six times as big; and its Gross National Income is more than twice that of Uzbekistan.

94 Alexander's Gas and Oil connections. Company News: Central Asia, Volume 3, Issue #2-22-01-1998.

95 President Saparmurad Niyazov of Turkmenistan had hired the services of the former US Secretary of State, Alexander Haig, to lobby for Turkmenistan. Http://www.worldpress.org/specials/pp/pipeline_timeline.htm. Accessed 9/05/2003. On UNOCAL's behalf, another top former US functionary, Dr. Henry Kissinger, was reportedly promoting the US owned company's interest in the region.

96 Rifaat Hussain, 'On Central Asia's Trail', *The News*, Islamabad, September 17, 1997. For India's policy in Central Asia see Anita Inder Singh, 'India's relations with Russia and Central Asia', *International Affairs*, Volume 71, Issue 1, January 1995, pp.69–81.

97 The most popular work on this subject is by Ahmed Rashid, *Taliban: Islam, Oil and the New Great Game in Central Asia*, London: I.B. Tauris, 2000. Another journalistic version is by Michael Griffin, *Reaping the Whirlwind: The Taliban Movement in Afghanistan*, London: Pluto Press, 2001 and the rather brief study by M J. Gohari, *The Taliban: Ascent to Power*, New York: Oxford University Press, 2000. Lieutenant-General Kamal Matinuddin, *The Taliban Phenomenon, 1994–1997*, Karachi: Oxford, 1999, presents a Pakistani version, which not surprisingly, hardly touches upon Islamabad's involvement in this matter.

98 Interview with Sahibzada Yakub Khan, former Pakistani Foreign Minister, Islamabad, 8 September 1999. Interviews with other serving military officials also gave the impression that the paramount factor behind Pakistan's backing of the Taliban was to gain influence over Afghanistan in order to create a strategic rear against India. The importance of other factors such as energy extraction from Central Asia and gaining market access to the region is especially highlighted in Ahmad Rashid's work: *Taliban: Islam, Oil and the New Great Game in Central Asia*; and Michael Griffin's, *Reaping the Whirlwind: The Taliban Movement in Afghanistan*, also gives importance to these goals.

99 The remarks of Pakistan's Foreign Minister, Sardar Aseff Ahmad Ali quoted in Kamal Matinuddin, *The Taliban Phenomenon: Afghanistan 1994–1997*, Karachi: Oxford University Press, 1999, p.126.

100 See Amin Saikal, 'The Rabbani Government: 1992–1996', in William Maley (ed) *Fundamentalism Reborn? Afghanistan and the Taliban*, London: Hurst, 1998, p.39.

101 Kamal Matinuddin, *The Taliban Phenomenon*, pp.127–129.
102 Interview with a Colonel involved with ISI operations in Afghanistan between 1988 and 1990, Islamabad, 20 August, 2000.
103 Memorandum of Conversation, Karachi, December 8,1959, *Foreign Relations of the United States* (FRUS), *South and Southeast Asia, 1958–1960*, Vol.XV, Washington DC, 1992, p.783.
104 A theme evident in the discussions of top Pakistani functionaries with US officials during the 1950s and 1960s. See especially FRUS, *South Asia, 1955–1957*, Vol.VIII, Washington DC, 1992 see sections pertaining to *Pushtunistan* pp.165–233 and pp.237–293; and FRUS, *South Asia, 1961–1963*, Vol.XIX, Washington DC, 1996, pp.103–145 pertaining to discussions and policy outlook on Afghanistan.
105 Memorandum from Robert W. Komer of the National Security Council staff to the President's Special Assistant for National Security Affairs (Bundy), Washington, January 6, 1962. FRUS, *South Asia, 1961–1963*, Vol.XIX, p.179.
106 On the politics of Afghan refugees in Pakistan, see Fiona Terry, *Condemned to Repeat? The Politics of Humanitarian Action*, Ithaca: Cornell University Press, Ithaca, 1992.
107 See A.Z. Hilali, 'The Costs and Benefits of the Afghan War for Pakistan', *Contemporary South Asia*, Vol.11, No.3, 2002, pp.291–310.
108 Selected officers and personnel of the army were detached from regular duty to conduct operations inside Afghanistan also. See Robert G. Wirsing, *Pakistan's Security Under Zia, 1977–1988: The Policy Imperatives of a Peripheral Asian State*, New York: St. Martin's Press, 1991, pp.54–58.
109 See Peter Chalk, 'Pakistan's Role in the Kashmir Insurgency', *Janes Intelligence Review*, September 1, 2000.
110 Markaz Ad-Dawa-Wal Irshad, *Introduction* (Urdu), Lahore, n.d.
111 See Anders Fange, 'Afghanistan after April 1992: a struggle for state and ethnicity', *Central Asian Survey*, Vol.14, No.1, 1995, p.23.
112 A.N. Shulsky, *Silent Warfare*, Washington DC: Brassey's, 1993, pp.83–84.
113 Barret J. Riordan, 'State Sponsored Economic Deception and its Determinants', *Intelligence and National Security*, Vol.17, No.4, winter 2002, pp.1–30.
114 A former Additional Secretary in the Presidential Secretariat acknowledged the role of former ISI chiefs Lt-Generals Asad Durrani and Javed Ashraf Qazi in contributing to the emergence of this militia, Islamabad, 18 August 1999.
115 Anthony Davis, 'How the Taliban Became a Military Force', in William Maley (ed), *Fundamentalism Reborn: Afghanistan and the Taliban*, pp.43–71.
116 The role of Colonel Sultan Amir alias 'Imam' was extremely prominent in cultivating the southern Pashtun tribes. Imam later served as Pakistan's Consul General in Herat. See Steve Levine, 'Helping Hand', *Newsweek*, 14 October 1997.
117 See Ahmad Rashid, Taliban: *Islam, Oil and the New Great Game in Central Asia*, New York: I.B. Tauris, 2000.
118 Personal communication with Raja Ahsan Aziz, Assistant Professor of International Relations, Quaid-e-Azam University, Islamabad, 4 October 1999. Raja Ahsan worked with the Pakistan Government's Afghan Cell.
119 For an incisive discussion of the role of the clergy in fostering resistance to foreign intervention and defending traditional culture and traditions see Sensil Nawid, 'The State, the Clergy, and British Imperial Policy in Afghanistan During the 19th and Early 20th Centuries', *International Journal of Middle Eastern Studies*, Vol.29, 1997, pp.581–605.
120 Ashraf Ghani, 'Islam and State Building in a Tribal Society: Afghanistan, 1880–1901', *Modern Asian Studies*, Vol.12, No.2, 1978, pp.269–284.

121 Interview with a Pashtun religious scholar, Peshawar, 22 October 1999. It is believed that Mullah Omar had high regard for the Naqshbandiyya Sufi order. The leaders of the Sufi orders are regarded with honour by the people. They usually hold honorific titles like Sayyid, Hazrat, Shah, Mir or Akhundzada denoting noble ancestry. Some of these men are perceived to perform miraculous deeds (Karamat).
122 Ira M. Lapidus, *A History of Islamic Societies*, New York: Cambridge University Press, 1990, p.32.
123 After Peshawar, Karachi has the largest component of urban Pashtun population in Pakistan.
124 *The Nation*, Lahore, 25 July 2003.
125 Interview with a senior official working in the Presidential secretariat, Islamabad, 23 February 1995.
126 Osama had left Pakistan in 1989 but he maintained close ties with his Pakistani and Afghan sympathisers. See Peter Bergen, *Holy War Inc: Inside the Secret World of Osama bin Laden*, London: Weidenfeld and Nicolson, 2001 especially chapters 4 and 5.
127 Interview with a member of the Jamaat-i-Islami, Lahore, 3 October 2000.
128 Oliver Roy, *The Failure of Political Islam*; and John Mackay, *Globalisation and Insurgency*, Adelphi Paper 352, London: International Institute of Strategic Studies, 2002.
129 See Karl Marx, 'The 18th Brumaire of Louis Bonaparte', in D. McClellan (ed) *Karl Marx: Selected Writings*, London: Oxford University Press, 1977, pp.299–325. For a commentary see Tom Bottomore (ed) *A Dictionary of Marxist Thought*, London: Blackwell, 1983, p.292.
130 Martin Oppenheimer, *Urban Guerrilla*, London: Penguin, 1969, p.42.
131 See Oliver Roy, *The Failure of Political Islam*, Cambridge, Mass: Harvard University Press, 1994. Chapters 2 and 3.
132 Saad Eddin Ibrahim, 'Anatomy of Egypt's Militant Islamic Groups: Methodological Note and Preliminary Findings', *International Journal of Middle Eastern Studies*, Vol.12, 1980, p.427.
133 Robert E. Harkavy and Stephanie G. Neumann, *Warfare and the Third World*, New York: Palgrave, 2001, p.296. Arms and ammunition from Pakistan, Iran, Peoples Republic of China, Romania, Egypt, Saudi Arabia, United States and the United Kingdom in addition to those from the Soviet Union were reportedly available in Pakistani arms bazaars located in the tribal areas. See also *The Nation* (Lahore), 13 September 1994; Interview with Major-General in the Directorate of Military Operations, GHQ, Rawalpindi, 12 September 1995.
134 Mubashir Zaidi, *The Herald* (Karachi), December 2001, p.49.
135 The role of irregular formations in state formation is discussed in Diane E. Davis and Anthony W. Pereira (eds), *Irregular Armed Forces and their Role in Politics and State Formation*, London: Cambridge University Press, 2003.
136 Zafar Abbas, 'The Creeping Coup', *The Herald* monthly, Karachi, May 1999, p.32.
137 Giles Kepel (translated by Anthony F. Roberts), *Jihad: The Trail of Political Islam*, Cambridge, Massachusetts: the Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, 2002, p.227.
138 Interview with a senior member of the Pakistan Peoples Party, Islamabad, 24 August 2000.
139 See Ahmad Rashid, 'Pakistan and the Taliban', in William Maley (ed) *Fundmentalism Reborn: Afghanistan and the Taliban*, pp.74–87. Another view is that initially Babar was out ahead of the ISI in backing the Taliban while the ISI was reluctant to give up on Hekmatyar. Hence, it supposedly delayed its support for Mullah Omar.

140 According to the Taliban's version of its origins, Muhammad Omar, then a village Mullah, responded to the pleas for assistance in freeing two girls kidnapped and assaulted by a local militia commander in Kandahar. Omar responded by gathering a group of religious students or Talibs of the local madrassa and organised an attack on the commander that resulted in the girls' freedom and the subsequent execution of the commander.

141 Interview with an official of the Ministry of Information, Islamabad, 12 September 1999. According to US Consulate in Peshawar Mullah Naqib 'publicly supported the Taliban's action' by late October 1994. See US Consulate Peshawar, 'New Fighting and New Forces in Kandahar', 13 November 1994, Confidential, p.9 in *The Taliban File*. National Security Archive, Briefing Book No.37, September 11, 2003. Http://www.gwu.edu/~nsarchiv/NSAEBB/NSAEBB97/index2.htm Accessed 14/9/2003.

142 *The Taliban File*, NSA. See US Embassy (Islamabad), Cable, 'The Taliban – Who Knows What the Movement Means?' 28 November 1994, Confidential, p.5.

143 See Brian Cloughley, *A History of the Pakistan Army: wars and Insurrections*, Karachi: Oxford University Press, 2000, pp.394–397. The ISI and Afghan Islamic groups had large quantities of weaponry and ammunition stores stocked at specific locations along the Durand Line since the 1980s. According to US sources Pakistan Frontier Corps provided artillery cover for the militia's capture of this cache of arms in September 1994. US Embassy (Islamabad), Cable (Excised), 'Believed Pakistan is Backing the Taliban', 6 December 1994, Secret. *Taliban Files*, NSA.

144 Some Pakistani officials contend that the Taliban's alliance with Hizb-i-Wahdat was also approved by the ISI in a bid to neutralise Iranian support for the Rabbani administration. However, the anti-Shiite frenzy of some Taliban regular members could not be restrained, leading to the murder of Abdul Ali Mazari.

145 The Taliban were initially viewed with sympathy by some State Department functionaries, but they were decidedly in the minority before September 1996. See US Embassy (Islamabad), Cable, 'The Taliban – Who Knows What the Movement Means', 28 November 1994, *Taliban File*, NSA.

146 US Embassy (Islamabad), Cable, 'The Taliban – Who Knows What the Movement Means?' 28 November 1994, *Taliban File*, NSA.

147 Benazir Bhutto, in a meeting with US Congressmen on 18 February 1995, had pointed out that the Trans Afghan pipeline route would not only meet Pakistan's energy needs but 'provide an outlet for the Central Asian Republics other than via Iran and Russia' and would be beneficial for US business interests. See US Embassy (Islamabad), Cable, 'Senator Brown and Congressman Wilson Discuss Afghanistan with Pakistani Officials', 18 February 1995 (Confidential), *Taliban File*, NSA.

Chapter 6

Pakistan and the Taliban, 1996–2001

The rise of the Taliban added a new and hitherto unknown element in the struggle for dominance in post-Cold War Afghanistan. The addition of this militia to the violent and fractionalised Afghan polity sparked a remarkable intensity and ferocity in the conflict, making the Afghan crisis a focal point of Southwest Asian politics with occasional repercussions in the larger international arena. Pakistan's role consisted of organising and sponsoring a militia whose leadership largely was intimately associated with the Pakistani Islamic groups. By sponsoring the Taliban as a military force, Islamabad intended to transform Afghanistan into its client state and achieve its geostrategic and economic objectives, outmanoeuvring other regional states involved in the Afghan conflict.

The cumulative effect of the induction of the Taliban in the Afghan conflict sufficed to motivate Pakistan's rivals in the Afghan game, namely Iran, India and Russia, to arrive at an informal strategic understanding to bolster the anti-Taliban Northern Alliance led by the veteran Commander Ahmad Shah Masoud.[1] Between 1996 and 2001 Afghanistan became an epicentre of a complex regional rivalry played out amongst the leading powers of Southwest Asia for influence in Central and Southwestern Asia. In this connection, Pakistan remained the foremost regional power with the greatest influence in Afghanistan as a result of the remarkable success of its proxy, the Taliban, in checking the forces of the Rabbani–Masoud coalition. The Pakistani elite believed that its main superpower ally and patron, the United States, would acquiesce in Islamabad's strategy of backing the Taliban in view of Washington's geopolitical goals in the region that sought the containment of Iran and greater access to Central Asia.[2] It was envisaged that the Pakistani-sponsored Taliban could achieve these aims while remaining a compliant, 'non-political' Islamic force sympathetic to United States' interests.[3] The Pakistani establishment would be the principal channel through which the Taliban would conduct their interaction with the rest of the world. This, in a sense, would absolve Washington of its complicity in the rise of this militia. In the course of the next five years, the assumptions on which Pakistan formulated its Afghan policy were to prove false and the goals unattainable.

The chapter does not deal specifically with the aspects concerning the Taliban's military campaigns in Afghanistan – a subject adequately addressed elsewhere; however, the chapter concentrates on evaluation of Pakistani policy that influenced the events in Afghanistan.[4] The global, regional and domestic facets of the Afghan conflict are highlighted. In this context it analyses the role of Afghanistan in Pakistani security perceptions. Moreover, special attention is paid to the connection of the Taliban phenomenon with Pakistani domestic politics. Lastly, the chapter examines the policy of the United States vis-à-vis Pakistan and the Taliban within the South Asian regional context.

Pakistan's Security Perceptions and Afghanistan, 1996–1997

The protracted internecine conflict in Afghanistan between 1992–1995 and the increasingly assertive and pro-Iranian stance of the Rabbani administration had put serious constraints on Pakistan's policy in Afghanistan.[5] The Pakistani leadership found it increasingly difficult to realise it goals of gaining access to Central Asia and securing the much-heralded 'strategic depth' against India. Pakistan's two decades long involvement in Afghanistan had led to the perception within the Pakistani military elite that given the 'sacrifices' made by Pakistan on the behalf of the Afghans during their Jihad against the Soviets, Islamabad had the 'right' to have a friendly, subservient regime in Kabul.[6] Pakistani military commentators were particularly incensed that Afghan leaders such as Burhanuddin Rabbani who had sought 'shelter' in Pakistan could 'turn against their benefactors'.[7] Such views indicated that Pakistan had regarded Afghanistan as its potential client. The military elite, in fact, visualised the transformation of post-Cold War Afghanistan into a Pakistani-controlled entity in the mode of 'Sikkim or Bhutan'.[8]

Despite Benazir Bhutto's pronouncements regarding Pakistan's role as a moderate Islamic state, the military continued to regard the militant Islamic parties as a tool for furthering Pakistani interests in Afghanistan and Kashmir.[9] The Pakistani military saw themselves as the essential core, the nucleus of the Pakistani state. The civilian politicians were considered as 'anti-national', 'corrupt' and 'disloyal' and therefore needed to be supervised.[10] The military's enormous coercive capacity and an ever-present coup threat made it impossible for any civil administration to ignore the interests of this pivotal institution.

The Pakistan Army incorporates the features of a moderator, guardian and ruler army. These three types of traits elaborated by William Hale in his typology of military regimes are prominent in political armies.[11] Being a conservative force that evolved from the pre-independence British Indian army, its officers receive education and training that reinforces their commitment to safeguard the status quo in the society. Decades of military rule have led to the army elite seeing themselves as the final arbiters of the political process. Even the transition from the Sandhurst-educated generation of Westernised, elitist officers to the new generation of more parochial and supposedly more 'Islamic' oriented officers with rural and middle class roots has not altered this mindset.[12] The military's corporate interests and its disciplined chain of command offset any possibility of large-scale dissent or radicalisation. Direct control over the state apparatus has let it establish vast industrial and defence-related enterprises apart from allocating prime agricultural lands to its personnel.[13]

The military's emphasis on national security justified by a real or imaginary threat posed by hostile neighbours – India, Afghanistan and since the end of the Cold War, Iran – has fostered the development of a culture that regards dissent within the country as a threat to economic, political and social order. The overbearing interference of the army in the society has stifled the emergence of a civil society. In order to strengthen its power base within the society, the military has created several docile political groupings and Islamist parties through a mechanism of control based on funding and patronage. Moreover, authoritarian governance has required the enhancement of the vast intelligence apparatus comprising the ISI and the MI. The civilian intelligence agencies such as the Intelligence Bureau and the Federal Investigation Agency have over the years become subservient to the military's authority. The armed forces' grip on the political process, especially its relationship with the Jihadi groups between 1996 and 2001, was such that a former Prime Minister of Pakistan acknowledged the 'ISI to be a state within a state'.[14]

The external backing provided by Pakistan to Afghan Islamism and the subsequent defeat of Soviet forces in that country was seen by the Pakistani military as its 'finest hour' that had in a sense finally extricated the army from the humiliation suffered at the hands of India in 1971.[15] Pakistani control of Afghanistan was regarded as vital for the country's regional influence. In this connection, Pakistan saw any political solution to the Afghan conflict that weakened its proxy, whether in the form of Gulbuddin Hekmatyar or later the Taliban as detrimental to its interests. The Taliban's rapid success between 1995 and 1996 emboldened Islamabad to support the militia totally as it visualised that through this irregular armed formation it could finally eliminate what it saw as the anti-Pakistan 'Northern Alliance'.

As a matter of fact, the military elite's commitment to support the Taliban had become firmer after the Taliban's capture of Herat in September 1995 and the subsequent attack on Pakistan's embassy in Kabul by an enraged Afghan mob which blamed Islamabad for the attack on Herat. Herat was supposed to be vital for Pakistan, as control over this ancient city on Afghanistan's western border with Iran would realise Islamabad's ambition of opening trade and pipeline routes via the corridor linking western Afghanistan with Pakistani Baluchistan. As has now been established by several scholarly and journalistic works, the Pakistan military establishment directly assisted the Taliban's rise and subsequent capture of this region in Afghanistan between 1995 and 1996.[16]

The ISI encouraged moderate and pro-Western Pashtun Afghans residing in Pakistan such as Hamid Karzai, who had earlier served with Sibghatullah Mujadidi's government, to join the Taliban.[17] However, religious students educated in Pakistani Deobandi madrassas formed the core of the Taliban. The hundreds of 'rigorously policed' refugee camps in Baluchistan and NWFP controlled by the Pakistani Government had been the primary recruiting ground for the Mujahideen at that time.[18] The military with the cooperation of the Ministry of Interior was again successful in cultivating hundreds of Afghan Pashtun religious students to form the core of the Taliban from the same refugee camps. A CIA official involved with assisting the Afghan Islamists in Pakistan during the 1980s correctly observed that: 'the Pakistani border constituted a sort of psychological Yalu River, behind which the resistance could regroup in a relatively safe haven, and in the midst of which was found a sympathetic population, in the Pashtun-dominated Northwest Frontier Province'.[19] This time also Pakistan's NWFP served as the launching pad for the emergence of the Taliban militia.

The Taliban operation received substantial assistance from the Pakistan Army's XI Corps at Peshawar. In this connection, Cloughley notes that the arms supply source for the Taliban came from 'army depots'.[20] The XI Corps was the primary support and logistic base for the Taliban.[21] The Taliban's superior command, control, communication and intelligence (C3I) systems clearly demonstrated that professional military personnel were guiding the militia. The speed, mobility and the

tactics employed were not the hallmark of semi-literate madrassa students with rudimentary training in the use of small arms. Indeed, the Taliban emergence was ably assisted by the ISI and the MI. The Army's intelligence apparatus in connivance with the Military Operations Directorate of the General Staff coopted numerous army officers in providing crucial logistical support to the militia.[22] This gave military effectiveness to the tribal Pashtuns, who theretofore fought like a 'rabble' without an effective and disciplined leadership.[23]

In addition, hundreds of Pakistani retired and serving officers and non-commissioned personnel were attached to the ostensibly religious Taliban 'movement'. It was a replay of the 1980s anti-Soviet campaign but on a much lesser scale. The Saudi government along with the UAE were the main financiers of the operation while Pakistani Army officers provided most of the technical services for the Taliban including logistics, medical support, ordinance, combat planning and intelligence.[24] Pakistani servicemen dressed in Afghan clothing remained indistinguishable from the Taliban during the conduct of tactical and staff operations.[25]

Taking advantage of the Pashtun resentment against the Rabbani administration, the Taliban were successful in taking control of a major portion of the Pashtun-dominated southern and eastern Afghanistan between 1995 and 1996. According to reliable Pakistani sources, many local commanders were simply won over by the age-old Pashtun custom of switching loyalties at a specified price. The finances were disbursed by the Pakistani intelligence through the complex network of the religious parties in Pakistan that had supported the militia with men and ideological commitment such as the JUI and the JI.[26]

The Pashtun elite within the army and the bureaucracy visualised the Taliban as the most reliable pro-Pakistan element in the Afghan conflict. Their Punjabi counterparts concurred with these views and remained apprehensive of a possible Iranian and Indian influence over Afghanistan that was in their perception detrimental to Pakistan's geostrategic security calculations. Many of the middle-ranking officers of the military hailing from rural or lower middle class backgrounds had more pronounced sectarian or ethnic biases that reflected in their professional outlook. According to a noted Indian analyst, the psychological perceptions of the Punjabi–Pashtun military elite are rooted in the culture of the Punjab and Northwest Frontier region. He asserts that this culture supposedly inculcates an: 'unwillingness to accept defeat, transferring the responsibility for it to someone else, a strong urge to dominate, a certain recklessness and a deep desire for revenge. Some of the traits are represented by the Pakistan Army.'[27] Even some prominent Pakistani commentators have asserted that the excessive reliance on the intelligence and covert operations internally and externally has created a 'conspiratorial mindset' within the leadership of the Pakistan Army.[28]

Pakistan's strategy to impose a client regime in the guise of the Taliban was not an historically unusual development. Islamabad's forward policy in Afghanistan had many features in common with Britain's attempts to bring Kabul within its sphere of influence. The defence of the North West Frontier and the status of Afghanistan in the face of Russian threats were dominant themes in the geopolitical strategies of British India as pointed out in Chapter 1. In fact, the intelligence section within the Military Operations Directorate of the British Indian Army was the major source of

intelligence and strategic planning for policy formulation on Afghanistan during the colonial period.[29]

Britain attempted to influence politically and militarily events in Afghanistan from the region comprising modern day Pakistan intermittently for over a hundred years until 1947. Its forward policy aimed to perpetuate its control over Afghanistan which in turn could further London's influence in Russian-administered Central Asia while at the same time a Afghanistan linked to India acted as a buffer against perceived Russian expansion towards the sub-continent. Through a judicious mix of force, bribery and intrigue, Britain had been successful in replacing nearly all the Afghan Amirs from Shir Ali to Amanullah Khan that had shown a proclivity to exhibit independent traits. The British support for General Nadir Khan of the so-called *Musahiban* dynasty had proved decisive in overthrowing the Tajik potentate Habibullah II, also known as Bacha-i-Saqao in 1929. Nadir garnered his support from the Pashtun tribes in the Tribal agencies of the NWFP with British connivance.[30] Similarly, in 1994, the Taliban were able to get the trans-Durand Pashtun tribes on their side. This time the covert succour in the form of arms, finances and advice was rendered by Pakistan.

Security considerations were paramount in the evolution of British policy towards Afghanistan. Likewise, in the post-Colonial era, security imperatives were foremost in the minds of Pakistani policy makers when formulating a policy about Afghanistan. One of the factors General Zia had used to justify his regime's assistance to the Afghan Islamists was that the 'Soviets would destroy Pakistan if we did not act'.[31] The basis of this policy was based on fears of Russian expansionism towards the warm waters of the Indian Ocean, which was a recurrent theme in British imperial geostrategy of the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries.

In the Taliban, the military had seemingly created the ideal proxy force that would not only secure Pakistan's western borders but also fulfil 'the Ziast worldview of an expansion of Pakistan's frontiers to the Oxus River (the border between Afghanistan and Central Asia)'.[32] A 'Talibanised' Afghanistan would alter the geostrategic balance and the security architecture of the region where India had emerged as the preponderant power after the establishment of Bangladesh. By supporting Pashtun Islamists, Islamabad, as Saikal notes, aimed to create a 'trans-border ethnic enclave' run by Islamists that had little interest in Pashtun nationalism.[33]

Regional and International Implications of the 'Talibanisation' of Afghanistan

Pakistan considered its intervention in the Afghan conflict through operationalising the Taliban militia as the optimal solution to its goal of consolidating its influence in Afghanistan in the mid-1990s. In the Pakistani perception, an Afghanistan under Pakistan's tutelage could not only assist in enhancing US interest in the South and Central Asia but may, as well, transform Pakistan, once again, into Washington's key regional strategic partner in the post-Cold War era.

The US animosity towards the Shiite theocratic leadership in Iran certainly strengthened the Pakistani elites' ambition of making Pakistan the key to US involvement in Central Asia via Pakistani-influenced Afghanistan.[34] In the context of Afghanistan, the Pakistani elite conceived that the pro-Pakistan Taliban would

'serve the US policy of isolating Iran by creating a firmly Sunni buffer on Iran's border and potentially providing security for trade routes and pipelines that would break Iran's monopoly on Central Asia's southern trade routes'.[35] Hence, it can be inferred that the United States policy of obstinately adhering to the 'dual containment' of Iran and Iraq between 1996 and 1997 assisted the Pakistani elite in formulating their Afghan policy, taking into account Washington's strategic objectives in the region.[36]

The US had downgraded Afghanistan' importance in its regional goals after the end of the Cold War. However, Washington allowed Pakistan to pursue its agenda in that war-torn country in the belief that Islamabad's interests were not necessarily detrimental to the United States' long-term interests in South and Southwestern Asia. As a former Pakistani ambassador to the United States observed, the improvement in relations with Washington in the mid 1990s was because 'Pakistan and the US shared a number of goals, at the regional and global levels'.[37]

Pakistan had persisted in strengthening bilateral ties with the United States. The Pakistani political and military elites' portrayal of their country's moderate image and a desire to strengthen ties with the United States resulted in a one-time waiver of the Pressler amendment that allowed US$ 368 million in military hardware to be released that had been ordered before the 1990 aid cut-off.[38] Washington also declined to label Pakistan as sponsor of Terrorism despite evidence of Islamabad's complicity in assisting militant Islamic groups in Kashmir and Afghanistan.[39] Moreover, the US–Pakistani Defence Consultative Group on security issues was revived along with enhanced provision of military courses for Pakistan Army officers.* There was substantial US interest in cooperating with the Pakistani government in the energy sector domestically and in seeking avenues for transit of oil and gas pipelines from Central Asia to Pakistan for further exports to markets in South and Southeast Asia.

As for Pakistan, it had been emboldened by the Taliban's successes in ousting or coopting the fractious Pashtun warlords in the south and the east of Afghanistan. The Taliban's victories over the Rabbani-Masoud administration through the course of 1996 gave the militia greater political significance enabling Pakistan to propagate the militia internationally as an alternative system of power and influence in Afghanistan. Islamabad's pressure on the beleaguered Kabul administration forced President Rabbani to ally with his former archrivals Gulbuddin Hekmatyar and Abdul Rashid Dostum between March and June 1996. However, this did not deter the militia's advance. With secure logistical support from Pakistan, the Taliban had surrounded the Afghan capital by June and resorted to massive artillery barrages on the already partially destroyed city. President Rabbani's overtures to Pakistan for a negotiated settlement of the conflict through the mediation of the Afghan Islamic state's main regional ally, Iran proved futile.[40] Pakistan persistently apportioned the blame for the strife on the Rabbani-Masoud combine. Echoing the position of the Taliban, the Pakistani Foreign Minster Sardar Ahmad Asif Ali stressed that the 'prime responsibility' for restoring peace in Afghanistan lay with the 'Kabul regime'.[41]

The Taliban had by mid 1996 formed an autonomous territorial base linked to

*Although the International Military Education Training (IMET) program offered by the US military was not formally reinstated until 2002.

Pakistan in nearly all the Pashtun majority provinces adjacent to the Durand Line. The nominal continuation of the UN Special Representative for Afghanistan's mission to bring about a negotiated solution to the crisis did not affect Pakistan's policies significantly. Islamabad's connivance in facilitating the movement of thousands of Pakistani madrassa students from the Punjab, NWFP and Baluchistan to bolster the militia's ranks along with much-needed assistance in terms of food supply, petroleum and armaments provided the student militia with a comparatively firm foundation for developing its power and standing as an actor in Afghan and regional politics. In this context, the Pakistani elite particularly resented the allegedly 'massive Iranian military support for Kabul' that supposedly reflected Tehran's shift 'from playing the "Shia Card" to attempting to extend its influence over all Persian speaking Afghans'.[42] Thus, by raising exaggerated notions of Iranian expansionism with the US, Islamabad hoped to counter Iranian ambitions that sought 'a free hand in northern Afghanistan in order to bring influence into Tajikistan and, ultimately, China'.[43]

Less notice was taken at the time of the discreet change in Washington's outlook on the Afghan crisis. Pakistan's key patron, the United States virtually ignored the rapidly altering political landscape in Afghanistan as the result of the Taliban's rapid advances. In fact, the US still relied on Pakistan for developing a policy on Afghanistan. Washington's request to the Pakistani government to open direct negotiations with the Rabbani administration in May 1996 created the impression that it was just a passing episode.[44] The Clinton administration regarded the Rabbani administration as one of the 'warring factions' and stressed the need for a 'representative, broadly supported, central government'.[45] In a meeting during April 1996 with the Rabbani Administration's officials, the United States officials ignored their complaints concerning Pakistani interference in Afghan affairs and, in fact, took offence at Ahmad Shah Masoud's remark that Pakistan was 'as much to blame for the destruction of Afghanistan as the Soviets'.[46] Moreover, US Ambassador to Islamabad in a cable to the State Department regarding Assistant Secretary of State Robin Raphel's discussions with the 'Kabul Government officials' recorded an apparent astonishment over the Rabbani administration's 'self-righteousness' and an 'initial impulse on almost all questions ... to stand on its (highly questionable) sovereignty and legitimacy'.[47] This position, broadly speaking, articulated Islamabad's views regarding the 'lack of legitimacy' of the Rabbani administration owing to its largely 'Tajik' composition to the exclusion of the 'Pashtun majority'.[48]

Notwithstanding the positive statements emanating from the Pakistani Foreign Ministry regarding the Pakistan–Afghanistan talks in May, Islamabad continued to challenge the 'legitimacy' of the government in Kabul and in violation of Afghan sovereignty proceeded with the repair of the highway from Chaman (on the Pakistan–Afghanistan border) to Torghundi on the Afghan–Turkmenistan border without the express approval of Kabul.[49] As a mater of fact, the Afghan Trade Development Cell within the Ministry of Interior had already made an agreement with the Taliban to proceed with the project.[50]

Pakistan's sense of confidence in the Taliban got a renewed impetus when the militia captured Kabul on 26 September 1996. Prior to this, they entered Jalalabad, the capital of Nangarhar province, after the ISI reportedly 'bribed' the so-called Nangarhar Shura headed by Haji Abdul Qadeer and Yunis Khalis to hand over the

administration of this city to the Taliban.[51] Earlier, they had taken over Chagcharan, the capital of the central province of Ghor with the assistance of General Dostum and elements of the Shiite Hizb-i-Wahdat.[52] In the treacherous politics of Afghanistan, the Hizb-i-Wahdat had been temporarily compelled to join the Taliban because of Pakistani intelligence's machinations and bribery. Furthermore, large numbers of Shiite Hazaras were disillusioned with what they saw as Iran's lack of support for their movement and consequently this prompted their brief flirtation with the staunchly anti-Shiite Taliban.[53] In fact, the Taliban's initial 'successes', at least in the first years, were also possible due to the desire of the local population to see their local 'warlords' ousted. Until the Taliban ran into Masoud's forces, it did not have to fight a meaningful battle.

The Taliban capture of Kabul was greeted with much euphoria in the Sunni Islamic groups in Pakistan. The Pakistan government's then Interior Minister Naseerullah Babar reportedly justified Pakistan's crucial backing for the militia with the claim that 'our boys' (Taliban) were protecting Pakistani 'interests'.[54] Pakistan's diplomatic machinery especially its representative at the UN was instructed to persistently deny any Pakistani role in the militia's victories. The Foreign Ministry had the unenviable task of denying the ISI's comprehensive involvement with the Taliban. Consequently, some senior Pakistani diplomats felt very exasperated about regularly 'misinforming' the Iranians with whom Islamabad still superficially professed friendly relations, about Pakistan's non-interference in Afghanistan's domestic affairs.[55]

Iran was incensed by the Taliban's entry into Kabul that forced the increasingly pro-Iranian Rabbani administration's forces under Ahmad Shah Masoud to retreat to the Panjshir valley via the Shamali plains north of the city. Iranian President Rafsanjani commented that the Taliban's occupation of Kabul was 'a disaster and we strongly regret' this development.[56] In a similar vein, Iran's supreme leader, Ayatollah Sayyid Ali Khamenei said: 'In the neighbourhood of Iran, something is taking place in the name of Islam and a group whose knowledge of Islam is unknown has embarked on actions having nothing to do with Islam.'[57] In response to the Taliban's actions, Tehran increased its assistance to the Shiite Hizb-i-Wahdat now under Karim Khalili. This motivated this organization to again change sides, and back the anti-Taliban groups comprising forces of Rabbani, General Dostum and Gulbuddin Hekmatyar. Regionally, the Iranian regime's antagonism towards the virulently anti-Shiite Taliban brought it closer to the Russian Federation that viewed the militia's expansion northwards as inimical to its already waning influence in Central Asia. Moscow regarded the 'protracted conflict in Afghanistan ... [as] a real threat to the security of the southern CIS and directly' affecting Russian interests.[58] Thus, this compelled the Russian policymakers to seek cooperation with its 'traditional' partner India and Iran to devise a common approach vis-à-vis the Taliban.[59]

The unsettled security situation in Central Asia led Moscow to be fearful of an orthodox Sunni movement on the borders of this mainly Sunni region. Earlier, Moscow had complained to Pakistan and Saudi Arabia about the links of Chechen Islamism with Wahhabi groups in the Pakistan–Afghanistan area.[60] In these circumstances, the Russian elite preferred cooperation with a 'moderate' Shiite Iran as compared to the pro-Pakistan Taliban affiliated with Saudi Arabia. The

concurrence of Russian and Iranian views on the geopolitical developments in the region resulted in greater strategic and economic cooperation between the two states. In addition, India had also entered into an informal triangular regional security arrangement with Iran and Russia focussed on devising a common policy on Afghanistan. New Delhi viewed the Taliban as an extension of Pakistan's policy of negating Indian efforts to expand its politico-economic influence in the region. India perceived that the Taliban's rising power in Afghanistan would bolster cross-border incursions of Islamic insurgents fighting Indian forces in Jammu and Kashmir.

The Taliban's capture of Kabul on 27 September 1996 and their control of nearly all the Pashtun majority provinces of Afghanistan was seen as a 'positive development' by UNOCAL.[61] The UNOCAL Corporation and Delta Oil Company of Saudi Arabia had agreed in August 1996 to play a leading part in the multinational consortium that planned to build a natural gas pipeline from Turkmenistan to Pakistan via Afghanistan.[62] This effectively removed the Argentinean Company Bridas from competing for the project. Moreover, the United States government implicitly welcomed the Taliban control of large sections of Afghan territory including Kabul. The State Department's spokesman observed: 'the United States finds nothing objectionable in the policy statements of the new government, including its moves to impose Islamic law.'[63] The United States Assistant Secretary of State for South Asia Robin Raphael reportedly explained to a closed door UN session in November 1996: 'The Taliban control more than two thirds of the country, they are Afghan, they are indigenous, they have demonstrated staying power. The real source of their success has been the willingness of many Afghans, particularly Pashtuns, to tacitly trade unending fighting and chaos for a measure of peace and security, even with severe social restrictions. It is not in the interests of Afghanistan or any of us here that the Taliban be isolated.'[64] In addition, prominent US specialists on Afghanistan such as Zalmay Khalilzad actively supported a US re-engagement in Afghanistan in support of the Taliban. Khalizad emphasised that the Taliban did not 'practice the anti-US style of fundamentalism practiced in Iran'.[65] These views were almost identical to the Pakistani stance that presented the Taliban as an indigenous force capable of restoring order.

The United States' sympathetic response to the Taliban's success between 1996 and 1997 revealed that Washington gave a prominence to its geopolitical and economic interests in the region as opposed to its rhetoric of championing democratic governance and human rights globally. In fact, the United States went along with the Pakistani initiatives in this context. The Pakistani intelligence and military elite propagated the myth that the Taliban would bring about peace in Afghanistan resulting in regional stability. US Embassy officials in Islamabad concurred with this view. John C. Holzman, the US Deputy Chief of Mission in Pakistan perceived the Taliban as 'the most significant political and military force in Afghanistan' and asserted that life under the militia was 'not so bad and the people of Kandahar would be crazy not to prefer Taliban theocracy to factional warfare and rule by brigands, as existed in Kandahar from 1992–94'.[66] Available US government documentation indicates that the Clinton administration accepted these premises and gave acquiescence to Pakistan's 'Taliban' policy.[67] This discreet backing for the Taliban by Washington was observed by some US Congressmen in a hearing before a Congress Subcommittee on regional security in South Asia in 1999.[68]

The imperatives of political expediency compelled the Pakistani decision makers, particularly the military, to practically condone the Taliban's repressive and convoluted interpretation of Sunni Islam. The past is the ultimate utopia of contemporary Islamic fundamentalist groups. The Taliban's vision demanded an eradication of pre-Islamic cultural mores and symbols that acted as an obstacle to the realisation of a truly Islamic society based on what they thought existed in Medina during the lifetime of the Prophet Muhammad. Their rather eclectic version of Islam rejected the use of reason in implementing Islamic law and regarded all other Islamic sects as heretical. Most significantly, the militia's reactionary, repressive and tyrannical rule denied women right to work or education, discriminated against other ethnic groups and sects and imposed a medieval interpretation of Islam in the urban areas of Afghanistan that stifled the war-weary and impoverished population.

In November 1996, the Pakistani President Farooq Ahmad Leghari dismissed the government of Benazir Bhutto on charges of maladministration and corruption. The dismissal came with the connivance of the army. According to a Pakistani magazine Benazir's failure to approve UNOCAL's bid for the Turkmenistan–Afghanistan–Pakistan pipeline was 'one of the factors' in her removal.[69] The deposed Prime Minister later lamented her inability and powerlessness in restricting the military–bureaucratic establishments' hold over delineating Pakistan's 'national interests' that eventually resulted in its 'Taliban fixated policy' in the mid 1990s.[70] Before her dismissal, Benazir Bhutto had explicitly alleged 'the United States and Britain supplied weapons to the Taliban on money provided by Saudi Arabia'![71]

Parliamentary elections held in early 1997, under military supervision, again brought the Islamist-leaning Muhammad Nawaz Sharif and his Pakistan Muslim League (Nawaz) faction to power. The domestic political crisis within Pakistan did not impinge on the country's Afghan policy as the powerful state apparatus and its intelligence agencies maintained their consistent backing for the Taliban with the connivance of the conservative, ultra orthodox Sunni Pakistani parties.

The Taliban and Pakistan 1997–1999

From February 1997 to October 1999, despite the change of administration in Islamabad, the essence of Pakistani policy towards Afghanistan did not change. The army and the civilian political elite saw the continuing Taliban successes over the fragmented anti-Taliban coalition comprising Uzbek, Tajik, Hazara and Ismaili groups led by Ahmad Shah Masoud as a vindication of their Afghan agenda. This anti-Taliban grouping, of which Masoud's Shura-e-Nazar comprising Tajiks from the Panjshir valley formed the core, was named United Islamic Front for the Salvation of Afghanistan (UIFSA) in 1998. The UIFSA would eventually be left in control of the mainly Tajik-inhabited regions of northeastern Afghanistan by early 1999. Many senior officers of the Pakistan Army saw the 'success' of the Taliban as an achievement. In fact, this was the army's only tangible military victory since 1947. In their myopic vision, the Pakistani elite ignored the domestic and regional implications of backing an irregular Islamist militia comprising a motley assortment of Afghan, Arab and Pakistani factions with differing political agendas.

In the absence of any coherent civilian control over the military establishment, the nexus between the army and the Islamist groups became a major source of instability and aggravated sectarian conflict in Pakistan. The marked contradiction of a relatively secular military and political elite assisting the rise of an ultra-orthodox obscurantist militia essentially to obtain geostrategic goals was bound to accentuate the domestic societal contradictions and the complexities in the national political process.

The development of the Taliban was unquestionably dictated by the Pakistan Army's drive for undisputed hegemony in post-Cold War Afghanistan. It has already been noted that this goal was, in part, driven by the army's desire to seek strategic depth against India. Hence, Afghanistan under the Taliban was integrated into the South Asian security structure centred on the India–Pakistan rivalry. It would be erroneous to assume that the emergence of the Taliban was a unique effort on the part of the Pakistani military establishment. The Pakistan Army has had a long history of raising irregular forces to further its interests in South Asia. In the 1947–1948 India–Pakistan war, the Pakistani Army had inducted thousands of Pashtun tribal volunteers to fight the Indians in Kashmir. During the 1965 India–Pakistan conflict, hundreds of irregular Kashmiri Mujahids infiltrated across the Line of control in Kashmir to instigate a Kashmiri Muslim uprising in the vale of Kashmir. This covert plan entitled 'Operation Gibraltar' was a prelude to war with India.[72] Later the army's tactics and organizational skills in waging low-intensity warfare with irregular forces were perfected during its pivotal role in backing the anti-Soviet Islamic insurgency in Afghanistan from 1978 to 1992 and were to reach their culmination with the emergence of the Taliban. This capability boosted by massive US aid in terms of provision of light arms and ammunition led some Pakistani intelligence officials reportedly to boast that with assistance Pakistan received from the West in the 1980s it 'could have conducted operations on Mars ...'.[73]

In terms of Pakistani security perception, the Taliban did transform the geostrategic order in Southwest Asia. For the first time in its history, Pakistan was at the point of extending its influence right up to the reaches of the Amu Darya by May 1997, as the Taliban captured the major northern city of Mazar-e-Sharif. This event led Pakistan to accord formal recognition to the Taliban government headed by Mullah Omar who now called himself *Amir-ul-Momineen* or the Commander of the Faithful. Islamabad also persuaded the Taliban's other two key regional sponsors, Saudi Arabia and United Arab Emirates, to do likewise. Although the Taliban were driven out of Mazar-e-Sharif by late May after suffering heavy losses at the hands of the Uzbek General Abdul Malik and the Shiite Hizb-i-Wahdat, they still retained firm control of Herat, Kandahar and Kabul.[74]

The reversal at Mazar-e-Sharif did not prompt Pakistan to review its policy towards the Taliban. The militia continued to receive assistance in terms of men and weaponry from Pakistani territory. Thousands of Pakistani madrassa students hailing from the Punjab, NWFP and Baluchistan bolstered the Taliban forces in late 1997. Moreover, the Taliban's fighting capabilities were enhanced with the arrival of Osama Bin Laden from Sudan in May 1996. Bin Laden along with his multi-national Muslim followers was ensconced in Jalalabad by his old allies Jalaluddin Haqqani and Mawlawi Yunis Khalis. He was later transferred to Kandahar, the de facto capital of the Taliban. According to a US Defense Intelligence Agency's assessment

Bin Laden's 'Al Qaeda network was able to expand under the safe sanctuary extended by Taliban following Pakistan directives'.[75] Besides, in this period Saudi Arabia, through its intelligence chief Prince Turki, was along with Pakistan bankrolling the militia.

Osama Bin Laden, in spite of his animosity toward the Saudi royal family was tolerated by the ISI and the Saudi intelligence. His calls for Jihad against 'Hindu' India and his keenness to provide Arab volunteers for the ISI backed groups operating in Indian administered Kashmir made him a useful ally for elements in the Pakistan Army. His Al Qaeda organization based on orthodox Wahhabi Salafist philosophy was specifically oriented to combat what he termed as the global 'Crusader–Zionist alliance' spilling 'Muslim blood' in Palestine, Chechnya, Kashmir and Iraq.[76]

Furthermore, Osama had by now developed a much more radical interpretation of Islam that called for countering Western influence in the entire Islamic world. His teachings, in a way, resembled the anti-imperialist rhetoric of the Marxist oriented national libration movements that were active in the 'Third World' during the 1960s and 1970s. Osama gave religious cover to his advocacy of using terroristic violence to achieve this end. His appeals to conduct religiously inspired terroristic acts employed what Mark Juergenmeyer terms 'cosmic war' terminology that uses images of a global battle as a part of a device to psychologically empower his followers to believe that they are ordained by God to wage war against 'injustice' and 'evil'.[77]

Pakistani optimism about the Taliban as a loyal proxy was evident in Islamabad's portrayal of the militia in international forums as the legitimate government of Afghanistan despite the direct accusations of the United Nation's envoy Mahmoud Mestiri of 'Pakistan's interference' in Afghan affairs.[78] Islamabad refused to issue an invitation to the Rabbani government, which was still regarded by the UN as the legal government of Afghanistan, to attend the special OIC Session at Islamabad on 23 March 1997 to celebrate the fiftieth anniversary of the establishment of the Pakistani state. Most importantly, with the Taliban firmly in control of southern and western Afghanistan, Islamabad redoubled its efforts to initiate gas pipeline projects and development of communication infrastructure enabling it to reap the economic benefits from its hitherto Afghan success.[79] By the end of 1999, Pakistan had been successful in discreetly achieving its goal of having a client state in Afghanistan. A US DIA cable correctly expressed that the Taliban: 'had been created by Pakistan exploiting powerless Afghan fundamentalists individuals and factions by dangling in front of them the promise of an Islamic state moulded to their design specifications. This and cash encouraged enough recruits to cloak the Taliban with seemly impeccable Islamic credentials.'[80]

For all effective purposes the Taliban-controlled areas of Afghanistan were being seen as an appendage of Pakistan. Pakistan's telecommunications organization linked the still-functioning segments of the Afghan telecommunication system with the Pakistani network.[81] Almost the entire trade of these regions was carried through Pakistan territory. Most significantly, Taliban administered areas of Afghanistan developed strong links with Pakistani society especially with sections in the army and religious groupings in the Punjab and NWFP.

The Afghan Jihad and the parallel 'Islamisation' process undertaken by General

Zia contributed to turning some Pakistan Army officers into orthodox Islamists, but overall the army elite retained its secular orientation contrary to fears in the West of the Army's increased Islamisation. The attempted coup plan against the Benazir Bhutto administration by Major General Zaheer-ul-Islam Abbasi and Brigadier Mustansir Billah in September 1995 that sought to establish a 'Sunni Islamic state' had more to do with officers' disenchantment with Pakistan's Kashmir policy and their own grievances.[82] The allegiances of the coup makers, however, did indicate their sectarian bias and sympathies for Taliban-type Sunni neo-fundamentalism. Some of the civil participants in the conspiracy had linkages with the extremist Sunni grouping Sepah-i-Sahaba that was known for its anti-Shiite inclinations.

The Pakistan Army's Taliban-friendly policy created sectarian havoc at home and became a major cause of deterioration of relations with Shiite Iran. Sectarianism rose dramatically after 1994 with the emergence of the Taliban. The Taliban's genesis is associated with the rise of hundreds of madrassas in Pakistan during the 1980s and 1990s. Some of these madrassas were funded by conservative Gulf States and by local Pakistani Islamic parties, and had a traditional fixed curriculum based on Deobandi interpretation of Sunni Islam. The Deobandi madrassas at Akora Khattak, tribal areas of NWFP and Baluchistan were the *alma mater* of more than half of the Taliban leadership.

Social and economic factors along with the government's lack of attention in facilitating primary education contributed to the now oft-mentioned issue of 'Talbanisation' of Pakistan. Pakistan's dismal demographic reality, with a population growth rate of nearly 3 per cent, provided ample recruits for Islamic parties. The relatively little progress in improving human development, especially with regard to education where only one in two children aged 5–9 attends school, led madrassas run by often barely literate clergy to become a leading source of education for a vast proportion of the country's 71 per cent rural population.[83] With over 40 per cent of the country's approximately 135 million population living below the official poverty line in the mid 1990s, participation in spurious Jihadi ventures in Afghanistan and Kashmir became a source of employment for thousands of youth in the country.[84]

The spread of madrassa education created a cohort of religious zealots with an extremely restricted view of the world. Groups such as Sepah-i-Sahaba and Lashkar-e-Jhangvi that had emerged in the 1980s were primarily committed to a sectarian agenda to the detriment of other Islamic sects. These groups not only supplied cadres for Kashmir Jihad but also were most active in fighting along with the Taliban; and domestically they indulged in frequent massacres of Pakistani Shiites. Very few perpetrators of these acts were ever apprehended. The level of sectarian conflict in Pakistan reached alarming proportion and according to government figures 1,015 clashes occurred in the period 1994–1997.[85] These criminalised sectarian groups were implicated in attacks on Iranian consulates in Pakistan, and murder of diplomats and other government functionaries from 1990 to 1998.[86] Iranian pleas for action against the anti-Shiite groups were largely ignored. According to a report, the sponsoring of anti-Shiite sectarian groups by the ISI aimed to keep the 'rebellious Shia community' in check and at the same time effectively curtail perceived Iranian influence over Shiites.[87] On the other hand, sections of the media ascribed the growing sectarian murders to an alleged 'Indo–Zionist–American' conspiracy to weaken Pakistan.[88]

The cultivation of Sunni Islamists were an integral part of the Pakistani military's grand strategy in Afghanistan. In the words of a former Pakistan Army chief 'Afghanistan and Pakistan were two countries but one people ... and any future war will be our war, which gives the Pakistan Army added capability'.[89] An amalgam of fundamentalists covertly allied to the Pakistan Army was supposed to change the balance of power in South Asia. According to Mawlana Sami-ul Haq, the patron of Darul-Ulum Haqqaniya in Akora Khattak: 'We did not need the ISI; the ISI and the CIA needed us.'[90] A substantial number of serving army officers in the ISI during the mid-1990s had actively participated in the anti-Soviet operations in Afghanistan and in the process became sympathetic to the Salafi-Wahhabi worldview of many Arab and Pashtun Afghan Mujahideen. This added to their commitment to support the Taliban. The Taliban harboured the type of Islamic mores prevalent in the rural Pashtun villages in the NWFP and southern Afghanistan but this particular form of Islam was interpreted by the cadres of the militia who had lived most of their lives in refugee camps or madrassas.[91]

For Pakistan, the net effect of the creation of the Taliban was to deal a severe blow to Afghan irredentism within Pakistan as the pan-Islamic religious ethos of the Taliban subsumed Afghan national identity. The NWFP and southern and eastern regions of Afghanistan practically merged in terms of social, economic and political interaction with Pakistan. Peshawar and Quetta emerged as the hub of transnational Pashtun Islamism in a similar vein as Kabul had been once a beacon of Afghan nationalists in the 1950s and 1960s. The Pakistani sponsorship of Islamic militancy eroded Afghan nationalism into oblivion and facilitated the victory of tradition-bound Afghan Islamic leaders like Mullah Omar and his other cohorts such as Mullahs Mohammad Rabbani, Mohammad Ghous, Khairullah Khairkwa, Amir Khan Muttaqi and others who regarded Pakistan as their second home.[92] These senior Taliban leaders were well versed in Urdu and had spent most of their lives in Pakistan along with thousands of their other comrades. They were devoid of Afghan nationalism that permeated the earlier Afghan Islamists in the mould of Gulbuddin Hekmatyar. In fact, contrary to assertions by some authors, the Taliban leadership generally transcended traditional Pashtun tribalism and did not give much importance to the Ghilzai/ Durrani dichotomy.[93] For instance, Mullah Omar was a Hotak Ghilzai Pashtun while his two important commanders Mullah Khairkhwa and Muhammad Ghaus were Popalzai Durrani Pashtuns.[94] Paradoxically, the Taliban's indoctrination in Pashtun-administered madrassas in Pakistan that inculcated a spirit of orthodox Sunni Pan-Islamic brotherhood failed to erase the latent Pashtun chauvinism which regarded non-Pashtun Afghans as usurpers denying the Pashtuns their historic right to rule.[95]

The strong feeling of Pashtun ethnicity in spite of tribal fissures, inter-tribal conflict and clan rivalries symptomatic of Pashtun society was certainly evident in the Taliban's behaviour. A similar feeling persists especially amongst the Pashtun tribes residing in Pakistani territory across the Durand Line.[96] In the Pashtun majority areas, the Taliban's rule had been welcomed to an extent as it indicated restoration of Pashtun hegemony. In contrast to their rather mellow application of the Sharia in the southern and eastern Pashtun heartland of Afghanistan, the militia was particularly harsh in imposing its brand of the Islamic law on the majority non-Pashtun population of Kabul and other regions of the country. The rural Pashtun

hinterland had always been conservative and the traditionalist ulama historically held great sway on the populace as upholders of the Sharia interspersed with the Pashtunwali. The Pashtun Taliban viewed the Tajiks and other non-Pashtun groups as 'untrustworthy northerners unable to speak Pushto'.[97] As a result, the rural Pashtuns were not as traumatised by the Taliban's implementation of the Islamic law as the non-Pashtuns.

By the middle of 1998, Pakistan was on the verge of achieving its objectives in Afghanistan. The Taliban, through a series of large scale, well-coordinated military operations were able to seize significant portions of northeastern Afghanistan from the UIFSA. The speed and 'ferocity' of the Taliban's successes as noted by a DIA report had only been 'possible through the support of those who made them', that is, Pakistan.[98] By August 1998, the Taliban had defeated the forces of General Dostum and reoccupied the city of Mazar-e-Sharif.[99] According to an Indian official now 'the Pakistanis could see the lights of Termez!'[100]

The Taliban had earlier defeated the Shiite Hizb-e-Wahdat and took control of the mainly Shiite Hazara inhabited province of Bamian in central Afghanistan. In the course of these victories, the Taliban continued to receive aid in weapons, ammunition and tactical direction while planning military operations. Pakistani authorities gave unbridled access to fresh troops from Pakistani madrassas to replenish the militia's manpower.[101] The Pakistani Army reportedly seconded hundreds of 'retired' civil and military personnel to sustain the so-called Islamic Emirate of Afghanistan (IEA) headed by Mullah Muhammad Omar.[102] The mainstream Sunni Islamist parties in Pakistan disseminated the idea that the Taliban were bringing 'peace to Afghanistan'.[103] This distorted propaganda was in tandem with the Pakistani establishment's views.

Most importantly, the Saudi and UAE intelligence in concert with the ISI provided hundreds of pickup trucks armed with anti-aircraft cannon and heavy machine guns in addition to giving large amounts of money to win over many commanders in the fractious UIFSA coalition. The Taliban offensives were buttressed with the assistance of the large Arab contingent belonging to Osama Bin Laden's Al Qaeda organization.[104] The massive Pakistani military assistance buffered by Saudi financing enabled the Taliban to outmanoeuvre and put on the defensive the anti-Taliban UIFSA coalition under Ahmad Shah Masoud from late 1998 onwards.

UIFSA was a wobbly coalition of mainly non-Pashtun factions. It consisted of the oldest Islamist party of Afghanistan, Jamiat-i-Islami-i-Afghanistan, the Hizb-i-Wahdat-e-Islami led by Karim Khalili, Dostum's Junbish-e-Milli-e-Islami-e-Afghanistan, Harakat-e-Islami-e-Afghanistan run by Ayatollah Muhammad Asif Muhsini and the tiny Pashtun fundamentalist group Ittehad-e-Islami. Most of these groups had fought against one another in the early 1990s. With the exception of the Jamiat forces under Masoud, the chain of command and discipline of these groups remained weak. These factors mitigated against the possibility of Masoud taking large-scale offensive actions against the numerically-superior Taliban backed by Pakistan. The Pakistan Army through a well-established arms distribution system, developed with the advice of the CIA in the 1980s, was able to channel its supplies with relative efficiency to the Taliban. On the other hand, the factions under the UIFSA umbrella had different patrons among the regional states and this

subsequently led to rather disarticulated logistical arrangements. The arms and other logistic aid provided by Russia, Iran and India proved insufficient to change the strategic balance in favour of UIFSA. For example, Iran reportedly assisted the Shiite Hazaras and at the same time supplied arms to Masoud's forces through complicated routes via Tajikistan. This assistance reportedly remained intermittent and subject to its rather ambiguous relationship with Pakistan.[105]

Iran had covertly assisted the Shiite Hazaras and the Persian-speaking Tajiks against the Pakistani-supported Pashtun Islamists since the early 1990s. Despite assisting opposing factions in the Afghan conflict, Tehran and Islamabad continued to give proclamations on a routine basis regarding peace in Afghanistan and called for the need to establish a 'broad based government' in Kabul. In practice, however, Islamabad saw Iran's moves in Afghanistan as 'aggressive' and a threat to its influence in that country.[106] Both countries acknowledged the importance of the rather ineffective UN attempts to broker peace in Afghanistan while on the ground they persisted in assisting their respective clients in Afghanistan.[107] The Taliban occupation of Mazar-e-Sharif had resulted in the murder of ten Iranian diplomats stationed in that city by allegedly rogue elements of the militia on 9 August 1998. Iranian media and officialdom specifically accused Pakistan of complicity in this act. These allegations particularly soured Tehran-Islamabad ties. The capture of Mazar-e-Sharif was made possible by decisive Pakistani backing for the Taliban offensive which, according to a spokesman of Abdul Rashid Dostum, comprised the participation of some 1,500 Pakistani miliary personnel belonging to the elite Special Service Groups (SSG) backed up by Pakistani piloted air attacks from former Afghan air force planes.[108]

Despite Iranian denunciation of the murders of its diplomats and condemnation of Pakistan's support for the Taliban, the 'moderate' government of President Khatami remained remarkably restrained in its reaction. Iran's massing of some 200,000 troops along its eastern border with Afghanistan for conducting punitive actions against the Taliban was not taken seriously by Islamabad. The Pakistani policy makers remained confident that Iran's 'toothless' army might not be able to 'punish' the Taliban backed by a nuclear-armed Pakistan.[109]

Indeed, Pakistan's nuclear tests, conducted on 28 May 1998, in response to the Indian tests of 12 May 1998, resulted in Islamabad being more assertive in Afghanistan. In its post-nuclear geostrategic perception, Pakistan had achieved an effective deterrent against India that had led to 'strategic equality' with its giant neighbour in the east.[110] The acquisition of nuclear weapons stimulated a debate within the policy-making circles regarding the nature of the future relationship with Iran. Some reportedly argued that the nuclear tests had given Pakistan a strategic depth, in the sense that chances of a full-scale war with India were less probable, and therefore maintenance of close ties with Tehran could be less of a priority than it had been in the past.[111] This contributed to Islamabad's lack of apprehension regarding what turned out to be a meaningless show of force by Tehran on the Iran–Afghanistan border. Islamabad persisted in assisting the Taliban in what Anthony Davis correctly observed 'a winner takes all strategy aimed to present the region with a fait accompli'.[112]

Iran–Pakistan relations declined to a historic low towards the end of 1998 because of growing sectarianism within Pakistan and the Taliban massacres of thousands of

Shiite Afghans in Bamian and Mazar-e-Sharif. Except for a few critical noises at the UN, the United States failed to denounce the atrocities that ranked as a form of 'ethnic cleansing'.[113] The Taliban committed widespread human rights violations including forced deportations, massacres, torture and persecution of ethnic minorities plus destruction of Afghanistan's pre-Islamic cultural heritage with the complicity of Pakistani intelligence apparatus, yet these actions remained largely unnoticed by the international community.[114]

Pakistan tried to convince the US and other Western nations that the Taliban and the Kashmiri 'freedom fighters' were not antagonistic to their interests.[115] However, the Taliban's widespread abuse of human rights and blatantly discriminatory policies against women compelled the US Secretary of State, Madeleine Albright, to term the militia's policies towards women as 'despicable'.[116] Nevertheless, this did not prevent elements within the US government from remaining in touch with the Taliban and even allowing a Taliban delegation to meet UNOCAL officials in Houston, Texas, in late 1997.[117] Furthermore, the Saudi intelligence service, which had an extremely close relationship with the US intelligence apparatus, persisted in financing the Taliban's Islamic Emirate of Afghanistan with the knowledge of the United States.

Apart from Saudi assistance, the Taliban developed complex economic links with the Pashtun Pakistani and Afghan 'Bazaari' or trader networks in NWFP and Baluchistan.[118] The participation of these traders in illicit drug trade provided the Taliban with liquid foreign exchange reserves. In addition, substantial income smuggling generated from Afghan Transit Trade Agreement (ATTA) on both sides of the Durand Line supplemented the Taliban's revenues.[119] In 1999, Afghanistan produced more than 4,600 metric tons of opium accounting for 75 per cent of global opium production for that year.[120] The large-scale disruption of agricultural activities due to continual warfare made opium the most convenient and easily grown cash crop for many Afghan farmers. This along with the destruction of the social, economic and political structures of the country made Afghan territory a haven for criminal groups smuggling drugs to Europe and North America via clandestine routes through Iran and Central Asia. Even the Taliban's opponents in the UIFSA were supposedly deriving incomes from smuggling and export of precious minerals. In a retort to Taliban's illicit activities, Pakistani sources propagated the view that Ahmad Shah Masoud's Shura-e-Nazar also relied on narcotics export and gem trade to finance their war effort.[121]

The Taliban had become an integral part of the military's geostrategic vision by 1998. Taliban-controlled areas were seen as a sort of de facto extension of Pakistani territory. In this connection, ISI established clandestine training camps at Kabul, Jalalabad, Kandahar, Khost and other areas of Afghanistan adjacent to the Pakistani border that imparted training in the fundamentals of guerrilla warfare to a host of Sunni Islamic groups involved in the insurgency in Kashmir such as: Laskhar-e-Tayyiba (LeT), Harakat-ul-Mujahideen, Hizb-ul-Mujahideen and Jaish Muhammad. Moreover, militants from Chechnya, Central Asia, Arab states and Southeast Asia received training in some of these camps. A large complex known as Al Badr camp at Zhawar Killi near Khost had been serving the training needs of Sunni Islamic militants since the ISI and the CIA developed it in the 1980s.[122] Several other sites including the headquarters of the former Afghan army's seventh infantry division at

Rishkor near Kabul reportedly served as an office cum training centre for Pakistani military instructors attached to the Taliban.[123] The training centres also catered to the requirements of the Arab fighters associated with Osama Bin Laden.

The United States had sought Osama Bin Laden following his implication in various terrorist attacks against US targets after 1991.[124] Washington accelerated its efforts to apprehend the Saudi dissident after the 1993 World Trade Centre bombing in which Osama's Pakistani follower, Ramzi Ahmad Yousaf was involved. The Pakistan government handed over Ramzi Yousaf to the US in 1995. In spite of Osama's complicity in sponsoring international terrorism, the Pakistani Deobandi Islamist groups and affiliated factions held Osama in high esteem.

In February 1998, Osama Bin Laden was instrumental in organising the 'World Islamic Front for Jihad against Crusaders and Jews' comprising elements from his Arab followers and a mishmash of fundamentalists from Pakistan and Afghanistan. He justified his appeal for Jihad, which was specifically targeted against the US and its allies, by citing three main reasons: First, the presence of US troops on the 'sacred' soil of Saudi Arabia; Second, US policy towards Iraq, and Third; US support for the State of Israel.[125] These actions, along with the Taliban's increasingly symbiotic relationship with their 'guest' Osama Bin Laden, prompted a US policy review regarding Afghanistan. The bombing of the US embassies in Kenya and Tanzania in August 1998 provided the reason for the Clinton administration to launch retaliatory attack on Bin Laden's terrorist camps at Khost, Jalalabad and Kandahar. These attacks signalled the hardening of the American stance towards the Taliban.

The US military action motivated UNOCAL to withdraw from the CentGas pipeline consortium on the grounds of the Taliban's appalling human rights record and 'treatment of women'.[126] Notwithstanding Washington's policy review on Afghanistan, the Saudi government continued to assist the Taliban regime through Pakistan by providing substantial quantity of oil for the Taliban-controlled areas.[127] It appeared that the US still hoped to work with the Taliban and it thus differentiated between the militia and the Al Qaeda network of Osama Bin Laden. A US Under Secretary of State, Strobe Talbott, held a meeting with several Taliban representatives in February 1999 at Islamabad in order to convince Mullah Omar to hand over Bin Laden. According to some observers US representatives even gave a 'hint' of recognising the Taliban as the legitimate government of Afghanistan if the Bin Laden problem was resolved.[128]

The period between August 1998 and May 1999, when the Pakistan Army launched its incursion into the Kargil sector of the disputed Line of Control (LOC) by supporting irregular Kashmiri and Afghan militants, marked an unstable equilibrium in the Afghan conflict. The operational plan of the Kargil incursion closely resembled Pakistani strategy in Afghanistan.[129] Irregular Islamist groups belonging to the various Deobandi parties were infiltrated across the LOC backed up by elements of the paramilitary personnel of the Northern Light Infantry (NLI) dressed in civilian clothes. Indian sources presented credible evidence of the involvement of regular Pakistani soldiers in the conflict.[130]

The incursion was contained by the Indian Army and US pressure on Pakistan led to a cease-fire in July 1999. With respect to Afghanistan, Pakistani policy continued to be based on sustaining the Taliban irrespective of the 'proxy' mini-war being

waged in the higher reaches of the Himalayas.[131] Pakistan's insistence on recognition of the Taliban did not shake irrespective of the growing discomfiture of Afghanistan's other neighbours – Iran, the Central Asian Republics and India. At the official level, China was the only state that did not pursue an overtly hostile policy towards the Taliban owing to its close security ties with Pakistan.[132] For Beijing, the propping up the Pakistani military, gave it a strong counterpoise against its main rival in Asia, India.

The Afghan crisis would enter a new phase by mid-1999. The domestic turmoil in Pakistan and the evolution of a clearer policy emerging from Washington, would lead to vigorous Pakistani attempts to bring about an easing of tensions between the US and Taliban. This was a stance that proved to be futile.

The Lingering Afghan crisis and Pakistani Military Regime, 1999–2001

The Kargil conflict brought to the surface the brewing conflict and lack of trust between the civilian government of Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif and the generals. Sharif had been successful in removing the constitutional amendments introduced during the Zia era, which enabled an all-powerful president to dismiss the Prime Minister and the Parliament.[133] Moreover, Sharif asserted civil supremacy over the military by vetoing army chief General Jehangir Karamat's recommendation concerning the creation of a national security council. This along with other differences ended in General Karamat's resignation in October 1998. Lieutenant-General Pervez Musharraf replaced General Karamat as COAS. Musharraf, an Urdu-speaking Muhajir, was considered less of a threat to the government than a Punjabi or Pashtun general.[134]

General Musharraf opposed the Nawaz Sharif government's attempts for a rapprochement with India soon after his appointment. Later, his pivotal role in instigating the Kargil crisis along with concerns about the civil authorities meddling in army's 'internal affairs' aggravated the relationship between the Prime Minister and the COAS. According to a senior member of the Nawaz Sharif Cabinet 'the Prime Minister was not aware of the Kargil incursion' and was 'kept totally in the dark'.[135] This former Minister rightly lamented the powerlessness of the 'elected' civil administration and noted that even if the Prime Minister wanted to curtail any of the army's actions, he was unable to do so on account of the military's control over the country's national security policy.[136] Before his removal, Nawaz Sharif came under substantial pressure from the Clinton administration over the Taliban's association with Osama Bin Laden and the existence of terrorist camps on Taliban-controlled territory.[137] Sharif tried to get the UAE and Saudi Arabia, two states that recognised the Taliban, to influence the militia's increasingly obstinate leader, Mullah Omar to assist in curbing the cross-border activities of Pakistani anti-Shiite sectarian groups based in Afghanistan.[138]

On 12 October 1999, the Pakistan Army carried out its third bloodless coup in the country's then 52-year-old chequered history by arresting the Prime Minister and declared a state of emergency.[139] The coup was ostensibly sparked by Sharif's orders to retire the incumbent COAS and replace him with the then Director-General of the ISI, Lieutenant-General Ziauddin Butt, a Sharif loyalist.[140] This motivated the

Commander of the army's important X Corps, Lieutenant-General Mahmud Ahmad and the Chief of the General Staff, Lieutenant-General Muhammad Aziz to depose the Sharif regime and install General Musharraf as the 'Chief Executive' of Pakistan.[141]

Significantly, Generals Musharraf, Aziz and Mahmud Ahmad had been the prime instigators of the Kargil venture and were regarded as staunch supporters of Pakistan's Afghanistan policy. These officers had been involved with Afghan Islamic groups since the 1980s when as middle-ranking personnel of the military they took active part in organising the Afghan Islamist infrastructure in Pakistan.[142] By late 1999, there was an growing frustration, especially amongst the civilian policymakers in Pakistan, that the Taliban leadership was increasingly ignoring some of the Nawaz Sharif administration's complaints regarding the use of Afghan territory by groups involved in criminal activities within Pakistan. However, the military still contended that the Taliban were Pakistan's most reliable proxy in Afghanistan. Consequently, the civilian administration's complaints were ignored.

A major factor behind the coup was the apprehension amongst senior officers that the civilian government was challenging the army's corporate interests and undermining its dominant role as an alternative system of power and influence. Nawaz Sharif's misplaced sense of power and assertion of his legal constitutional authority in attempting to remove the army chief brought to the surface the stark reminder that the army remained the paramount institution of the state that could not tolerate any lack of deference to its overwhelming control of the Pakistani state.

General Musharraf portrayed his regime as reformist and determined to deal with the staggering political and economic problems faced by Pakistan. Musharraf, who regarded himself as an admirer of the founder of the secular Turkish republic Mustapha Kemal 'Ataturk', emphasised the promotion of a moderate form of Islam and his commitment to democracy.[143] Initially, the military regime took some partial and ineffective measures to curb the activities of Islamic militants in order to show a moderate image to the international community.[144] Some militant Islamic groups were banned.[145] These gestures, designed primarily to appease the West and the United States in particular, remained rather hollow in practice as the army boosted its assistance to the ultra-orthodox religious militias in Afghanistan and Kashmir.[146] In fact, General Musharraf portrayed the Taliban as Pakistan's closest friends in Afghanistan. Musharraf emphasised that the 'Taliban ... control 95% of the territory (Afghanistan) and cannot be wished away ... we feel that the international community should engage with the Taliban'.[147] He, like General Zia, regarded Pakistan's 'national security' as best served by keeping the 'Afghan Pashtuns on Pakistan's side'.[148] This was not surprising. The Musharraf regime, whose roots of power were in the military establishment, was unlikely to bring about a major change in Pakistan's foreign and security policy. As in the Zia era, the political decision-making again became the sole prerogative of a relatively small army circle, comprising the COAS, the ISI and MI chiefs, the nine Corps commanders and few other important staff officers in the GHQ. The army's hierarchical command structure and appointment of military 'monitors' in all civil ministries effectively reduced whatever influence the Foreign Office had on important external policy issues. Pakistan's foreign policy had, indeed, become 'the foreign policy of an army'.[149]

The Musharraf regime pressed on with bolstering the Taliban even with the intensifying US apprehension about the presence of Osama Bin Laden in Kandahar – the Taliban's main stronghold in southern Afghanistan.[150] On 15 October, the UN Security Council under US pressure formed a committee to impose a limited air embargo on Afghanistan. Other measures also included curtailment of funds transfer and financial assets to the Taliban regime.[151] The UN measures proved ineffective, as they did not incline Islamabad to loosen its relationship and involvement with the Taliban. Thousands of Pakistani volunteers from a host of militant Sunni factions including the Sepah-i-Sahaba and the Tehrik-i-Nifaz-i-Shariat-i-Muhammadi (TNSM) persisted in crossing the Pakistan–Afghanistan border to fight with the Taliban in a so-called Jihad against what Mullah Omar termed the 'Shiite-Communist confederation' composed of the forces belonging to Ahmad Shah Masoud, General Dostum and the Hazara Hizb-i-Wahdat.[152] The purported 'confederation' included countries that the Taliban referred as *dar al Kuffar* (the land of the unbelievers) and *dar al Munafiqin* (the land of the hypocrites). In the Taliban *Weltanschauung*, Russia and India belonged to the first category while Iran was the foremost leader of the second.[153]

The Pakistani generals including Musharraf conceptualised a Talibanised Afghanistan as the army's great victory. To allay American concerns about the connection between elements of the Taliban and Al Qaeda, the military regime tried to devise a two-pronged strategy that depicted the Taliban as amenable to handing over Bin Laden while at the same time strengthening the militia's war making capacity and international image. In pursuance of the first plank of its strategy, Pakistan persisted in maintaining the theme that the Taliban were an 'indigenous movement' and the legitimate government of Afghanistan. The second plank of Islamabad's policy concentrated on improving US–Taliban relations. Pakistan was instrumental in arranging the meeting of an US Assistant Secretary of State, Karl Inderfurth with Taliban representatives led by Abdur Rahman Zahid in January 2000. American officials again met the Taliban Foreign Ministry representatives in Washington in September with Pakistan acting as an intermediary.[154] The ISI performed an important role in facilitating the negotiations. In this context, the ISI chief, Lieutenant-General Mahmud Ahmad acted as a go-between conveying several messages from Washington to Mullah Omar in Kandahar.[155] The meetings eventually resulted in the Taliban's acceptance to set up a special commission to investigate Bin Laden's responsibility for the 1998 US Embassy bombings in east Africa. However, the Taliban leader declined to hand over Osama. This decision was influenced by a spirit of Islamic solidarity and the norms of the *Pashtunwali*.[156] In the Pashtun tribal code, a guest or any supplicant seeking protection cannot be harmed or surrendered to the enemy. This custom, known as *melmestia*, is associated with the Pashtun code of honour (*nang* or *izzat*) emphasising hospitable behaviour for a guest as prescribed in the *Pashtunwali*.[157]

In addition, between May and October 2000, Pakistan escalated its assistance to the Taliban in a bid to expand the militia's operational reach to Ahmad Shah Masoud's stronghold centred at Taloqan in northeastern Afghanistan. The Taliban, helped by Pakistani piloted aircraft and regular troops in civilian attire, were successful in seizing Taloqan in June 2000.[158] The militia skilfully implemented pincer movements in the battle for Taloqan, indicating the presence of experienced

military planners.[159] These tactics were beyond the pale of a hotchpotch militia consisting of traditionalist Pashtun village clergy, former Pashtun Khalq cadres, Pakistani Islamist volunteers and Arab Jihadists.[160] The loss of Taloqan came as a severe blow to the Rabbani government as the city was its political headquarters and a key strategic supply route for UIFSA. UIFSA's forces were unable to hold back the Taliban forces, which outnumbered them substantially, and their combat operations meticulously planned by Pakistani advisors. The relatively minor Russian, Iranian and Indian assistance in providing armaments and small advisory teams to UIFSA failed to offset the large-scale Pakistani commitment to the Taliban in men and materials.[161]

The Taliban's rising fortunes in their war against UIFSA instilled confidence in Pakistan's military rulers. They concluded that finally the militia would be able to control all of Afghanistan, enabling Islamabad to emerge as the most important player in the geopolitics of Southwest Asia. In their naive view, the army's elite ignored the fact that the 'Talibanisation' of Afghanistan had turned that country into the epicentre of international terrorism. The weakly structured Taliban leadership and their connections with Pakistani Deobandi factions transformed Afghanistan into a safe haven for assorted groups of militants hailing from Chechnya to Indonesia. Taliban-administered Afghan territory hosted a plethora of Kashmiri Islamists, and militants from Central Asia and Chinese Xinjiang. The presence of radical Islamic groups such as the Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan (IMU) headed by Juma Namangani and the Hizb-ul-Tahrir movement particularly incensed the secular regimes of Uzbekistan, Tajikistan and Kyrgyzstan. The sanctuary provided by the Taliban to Central Asian Islamists committed to overthrowing the former Communist elite ruling their countries made Afghanistan a direct threat to the security of post Soviet political order in Central Asia.

The Pakistani elite, however, ignored the regional ramifications of their Afghan policy. On the contrary, General Musharraf after a visit to Iran, aimed at discussing the Afghan crisis in December 2000, presented the Taliban as the de jure government of Afghanistan. He publicly indicated to the Shiite clerics in Tehran that the Taliban were the main faction in Afghanistan and any settlement to end the conflict had to take into account 'that 90% of the ground is held by the Taliban and the other forces only hold 10%, and you have to accept that reality'.[162] The Pakistan Army seemed to give little importance to UN and other mediation in the conflict. Musharraf categorically stated that there were 'only four parties that need to get together – Iran, Pakistan, Taliban and the Northern Alliance. There is no need to include the Six-Plus Two or the Five-Plus Two or any other such (international) group. They should be cut out.'[163] This was a contrasting stance to Pakistan's policy on Kashmir, which specifically hinged on involving the UN and other great powers in the dispute.

Pakistani intelligence officials consistently stressed to foreign officials that the Taliban as an apolitical force were not inimical to US or the larger Western interests in the area. Yet, privately they acknowledged that the 'Taliban may be ignorant and barbaric but they are serving Pakistan's strategic objectives. They have now relieved us of garrisoning large combat forces on our western borders as was the case in the past.'[164] The military's approach towards dealing with US concerns pertaining to the Taliban and Osama Bin Laden nexus suggested a clear-cut duality. The military regime urged Washington to pursue a negotiated settlement with the Taliban over the

Osama issue as the Clinton administration tilted more toward resolving the problem through military means.[165] Pakistan seemed to be on the verge of persuading the US to deal with the Taliban and Osama Bin Laden as two separate issues by mid-2000. The Clinton administration had declined to include Afghanistan on the list of countries sponsoring terrorism in spite of the fact that Taliban-controlled territory served as a base for dozens of Islamic militant groups operating in the Caucasus, Central and South Asia.[166] The US Ambassador for Counter-Terrorism noted on 1 May, 2000 that while he did 'not believe (the Taliban) is hostile to the United States ... within the territory that they control, there are numerous terrorist organizations that directly threaten the United States, that directly undermine the security of the region and other parts of the world. And that is a problem, and it is an enormous problem for the Taliban that they have to address'.[167]

The Musharraf regime increased its advocacy for its fundamentalist clients in Afghanistan throughout the region. Pakistan even tried to persuade relatively secular Arab states like Syria, Lebanon and Jordan to 'engage with the Taliban'.[168] During a visit to Kazakhstan and Turkmenistan in November 2000, the Pakistani military dictator, General Musharraf insisted that direct negotiations should be held between the Taliban and the Kazakh government for the transit of Kazakh and Turkmen oil through Afghan territory as the militia was the legal government of Afghanistan.[169] Earlier, Pakistan had acted as a mediator between China and the Taliban. China, being Islamabad's closest strategic and military ally, had successfully gained contracts for rebuilding roads and telecommunications in Kandahar and Kabul.[170] This was happening at a period when the Taliban were accused of supporting Uighur separatists in Xinjiang.[171] However, the JUI leader Mawlana Fazulur Rahman refuted these allegations on behalf of the Taliban and alleged that the 'separatists' were, in fact, tools of a US conspiracy to subvert the Muslim majority of Xinjiang-Uighur region and create tension in Beijing–Islamabad ties.[172] Such allegations were reiterated by the Taliban Ambassador to Pakistan.[173]

Rising sectarianism, economic difficulties and the domestic political crisis had not influenced the military elite to review its Afghan policy until the advent of September 11, 2001. On the contrary, Musharraf and his fellow generals reportedly set up a task force under Lieutenant-General (retired) Hamid Gul to recommend the restructuring of the Taliban's administrative apparatus and to transform the ill-disciplined religious militia into a regular army.[174] The Commander of the army's Peshawar-based XI Corps, Lieutenant-General Ehsan-ul-Haq and General Hamid Gul were reportedly present at the Taliban army's first ceremonial parade at Kabul in August 2001.[175]

The coterie of generals who effectively ran Pakistan followed a consistent policy towards supporting the Taliban and remained apprehensive of any senior officer critical of this stance. In April 2001, the Junta reportedly transferred Lieutenant General Imtiaz Shaheen, Commander of XI Corps, for his opposition to Pakistani assistance to radical Islamists and the Taliban in particular.[176] This was against a background of increasingly pro-active US attempts to apprehend Osama Bin Laden.

According to US media, the CIA operatives had established contacts with the UIFSA's leading commander, Ahmad Shah Masoud, in mid-2000 in order to coordinate Washington's increasingly anti-Taliban policy despite the earlier conciliatory tone taken by the State Department.[177] With the coming of the

Republican Bush administration in January 2001, the US policy towards Afghanistan became more crystallised. The neo-conservative administration redoubled its attempts to undermine the Taliban by pressuring Russia, Iran, India and Pakistan to take concerted efforts to 'topple the Taliban regime'.[178] Moreover, the Taliban leaders' inflexibility over the Bin Laden problem became a severe constraint for Washington to deal with the Taliban militia notwithstanding Pakistan's growing intelligence cooperation with the US in the aftermath of the Republican incumbent moving in to the White House.[179]

The military junta in Islamabad still believed that it could squeeze some solution to the Osama issue that could placate its superpower ally while keeping the Pakistani proxy, the Taliban in power. Pakistan was, certainly, under intense pressure from Washington over the presence of Osama Bin Laden in Afghanistan as a 'guest' of Mullah Omar.[180] However, Islamabad continued with its delaying tactics as the Taliban were achieving rapid successes against the UIFSA forces holed up in northeastern Afghanistan. In early September 2001, the Taliban–Al Qaeda combine with the possible connivance of the ISI was successful in assassinating Ahmad Shah Masoud in his isolated base in northern Afghanistan.[181] A UIFSA statement categorically blamed the 'Pakistani ISI-Osama Taliban axis' for the assassination.[182] The assassination, it was hoped would drastically affect the command and control of the UIFSA enabling the Taliban to effectively destroy this grouping. However, the massive terrorist attacks on the Twin Towers in New York and the Pentagon on September 11, 2001 purportedly carried out by elements of Al Qaeda essentially dealt a deathblow to the Pakistani stratagem vis-à-vis Afghanistan.

Subsequent Developments after September 11, 2001

The September 11 attacks energised the Bush administration to take action against the Taliban-Al Qaeda combine. Washington gave the militia an ultimatum either to hand in Osama or face annihilation. The Taliban leadership rejected Washington's ultimatum. According to the Taliban Ambassador to Islamabad, Bin Laden could not be handed over to the Americans as this was an 'issue of faith ...'.[183] The Pakistan Army, being the main facilitator and patron of the Taliban, was faced with a stark choice. It could persist in assisting the Taliban or side with the US. Pakistan's arch foe, India, had already given its complete support for US military action in Afghanistan and offered Washington base facilities. A similar stance was taken by Russia and the Central Asian states. Even Washington's *bete noire* in the region, Iran, rather discreetly conveyed its willingness to assist the US.

The generals in Islamabad were cognisant of the fact that their country's geographical position, its links with the Pashtuns of Afghanistan and its comprehensive engagement with the Taliban military apparatus made Pakistan the most vital state in the entire region for any US success in Afghanistan. Woodward correctly notes that Pakistan was the 'linchpin for any strategy to isolate and eventually attack al Qaeda and the Taliban'.[184] Furthermore, the last-minute Pakistani mission headed by General Mahmud Ahmad in late September 2001 to get Mullah Omar to change his mind on retaining Osama Bin laden had failed. Actually, Mahmud did not really press Omar very hard, as he was instructed to do. In any case,

Omar gave no ground. In geopolitical terms, Musharraf and his colleagues realised that non-cooperation with the US on this issue would not only enhance Indian power but also in the longer run weaken the military's institutional interests and its hold over the state.[185] Their policy of backing Afghan Islamist forces for politic–strategic reasons had come full circle. From the onset of the 1990s, the army's use of Islamist forces had more to do with enhancing security of the Pakistani state rather than any deep ideological commitment to Islamic solidarity. The generals concluded that the utility of the Taliban had run its course; the militia was now expendable in order to safeguard the 'national' interest. Consequently, the military elite decided to give the United States 'unstinted' support in its 'War on Terrorism'.[186] There was a historic sense of *deja vu* in this decision. In 1979, the military allied Pakistan with the US to launch the twentieth century's greatest jihad and now in 2001 the military once more aligned itself with Washington to destroy the very forces which had emerged because of that jihad.

The Americans launched a sophisticated multi-pronged air and land assault against Afghanistan on 7 October 2001. The US military operations included the deployment of hundreds of Special Forces teams operating from bases in Pakistan, Uzbekistan, Tajikistan, and Kyrgyzstan. For the first time in history, the US military had presence in the heart of Asia. Moreover, the US enticed groups within UIFSA to join the assault by using the traditional Afghan method of buying loyalties with financial inducements.[187] The United States' global strategy for eliminating 'Terrorism' that evolved after September 11 had striking similarities with Washington's obsession of containing Marxism–Leninism in the later half of the twentieth century. In a strange twist of irony, Pakistan's military suddenly became instrumental, albeit reluctantly, in dismantling the infrastructure of the Taliban militia in whose creation it had played a pivotal role.[188]

The military under General Zia had transformed Pakistan into a 'frontline' state against Soviet expansionism and again in September 2001, General Musharraf declared Pakistan a 'frontline state against terrorism' and Islamic extremism. The army that had tolerated Osama's Al Qaeda as a useful by-product of its Afghan policy became its nemesis.[189] In fact, Pakistan gave the United States unsurpassed access to the use of its airspace, territory and coastal facilities for the attack on Afghanistan. According to the US Marine Corps Gazette of June 2002, the Coalition Naval Operations at Pasni (Pakistani Baluchistan), aimed at facilitating the transfer of military equipment to Kandahar, were the largest amphibious operations in size, duration and depth that the Marine Corps had conducted since the Korean War.[190] Moreover, a US Central Command report noted that US forces flew over 57,800 sorties either from the Pakistani airbases or from its air space besides utilising Pakistani army and naval bases in the period October 2001–January 2002.[191] Important Pashtun Afghan intelligence assets, associated with the CIA and ISI during the anti-Soviet Jihad, such as Hamid Karzai and Abdul Haq were also covertly sent into southern and eastern Afghanistan respectively from Pakistani territory to garner support from Pashtun tribes against the Taliban.[192]

The withdrawal of logistical, tactical and material support from the Taliban by Pakistan paved the way for the complete disintegration of the militia, proving the fact that it had essentially been held together by external assistance. Some Pakistani army officers and regular service men seconded to Taliban detachments in Kunduz

and Mazar-e-Sharif were reportedly allowed to be airlifted by the United States through a special air corridor for Pakistan Air Force planes to fly them out of Afghanistan.[193] This indicated the US resolve to keep the Musharraf regime from faltering as capture or deaths of army personnel may have incited elements within the military to undermine the regime. Islamabad's abandonment of the Taliban enabled the US and its UIFSA allies, of whom the leading faction was Masoud's Shura-e-Nazar led by Qasim Fahim, to capture Kabul with relative ease on November 14/15, 2001.[194] An intense US air campaign coupled with special forces operations in cooperation with the CIA's Special Operations Group (SOG) severely damaged the primitive command and control structure of the Taliban, eliminating any organised opposition.[195] Thousands of Pakistani religious students died in this assault while hundreds perished at the hands of factions constituting the UIFSA.[196] The Governor of the Punjab and a confidant of General Musharraf acknowledged that there were around 60–70,000 Pakistanis engaged with the Taliban before September 11, 2001.[197]

Musharraf's pleas to keep UIFSA forces, which Pakistan referred as the Northern Alliance, out of Kabul were ignored along with his concern for the lack of Pashtun representation in the new Afghan governmental dispensation that the US and its allies were trying to construct.[198] By early 2002, the US-led coalition and its partners in the UIFSA had taken over control of all of Afghanistan's urban centres. However, remnants of the Taliban and Al Qaeda continued to give sporadic opposition in the border regions between Afghanistan and Pakistan. It was even alleged by the Karzai administration's Interior Minister, Yunis Qanooni that elements in the ISI assisted Bin Laden to escape from eastern Afghanistan in December 2001.[199]

Pakistan's abrupt change of policy on Afghanistan was dictated by the sudden alteration of the regional strategic environment. In addition to this factor, sections in the military hoped that through supporting the US in Afghanistan they could motivate the US to resolve the Kashmir dispute. A realist perception based on an evaluation of rapidly changing power politics along with the concern for the preservation of the military's core interests domestically became the *casus belli* for Pakistan's participation in the 'War against Terror'. Furthermore, it would be erroneous to assume that Pakistan would be able to distance itself from the political developments in post-September 11, 2001 Afghanistan.

Once more Afghanistan's fate was decided in a foreign city. The Afghan interim administration presided over by Hamid Karzai was installed under the auspices of the US and the UN through hasty political consultations between various Afghan factions at Bonn in December 2001. In order to maintain its control over Kabul, the Karzai administration had to rely on the NATO-led International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) stationed in the Afghan capital. In addition, thousands of US troops operate in southern and eastern Afghanistan to root out the elements of the Taliban and Al Qaeda.[200]

The Karzai regime has been unable to extend its effective control over the Pashtun populated regions of Afghanistan adjacent to Pakistani border. In these semi-anarchic regions, a combination of Pashtun warlords, ex-Taliban and followers of Gulbuddin Hekmatyar challenge its authority and legitimacy on the grounds that the Karzai administration lacks Pashtun representation and is subservient to foreign powers. Ethnic biases and prejudices substantially aggravated and fostered by

foreign intervention for over two decades remain resilient. Pakistan has continued to propagate the theme that the Bonn process marginalised the Pashtuns.[201] Taking this cue from Islamabad, even the supposedly moderate and pro-Western Pashtun leaders such as Pir Sayed Ahmad Gaylani watched with suspicion the non-Pashtun hold over the Karzai regime. They resent its allegedly 'imbalanced' composition, which they regard as favouring non-Pashtuns.[202] In Pakistan, the former allies of the Taliban that formed government in the provinces of NWFP and Baluchistan with the alleged connivance of the military regime in late 2002 have continued to remain sympathetic to the Pashtuns of Afghanistan.[203]

No external country had been as deeply involved in Afghanistan as Pakistan was in the post-Cold War era. Pakistan's interference in Afghan affairs during the course of the 1990s transformed Afghanistan into a haven for terrorism, criminalised its society, and encouraged religious bigotry and conflict, in effect surpassing the destruction wrought by the Soviet Union. Islamabad's prolonged intervention in Afghan affairs intertwined the Pakistani Pashtuns' economic, political and social links with their ethnic kinsmen in Afghanistan to a significant extent. This has led to a coalescence of tribal and religious structures on both sides of the Durand line forging solidarity networks based on commonality of interests. Geopolitical realities added to these ethnic, cultural, religious and linguistic associations would certainly continue to make Pakistan an important actor in the vortex of Afghan politics.

Notes

1 Pakistani state functionaries popularised the term 'Northern Alliance' to denote Ahmad Shah Masoud's *Shura-e-Nazar-e-Shamali*. The *Shura-e-Nazar-e-Shamali* was a regionally based military and political structure founded by Ahmed Shah Masoud. Its core leaders hailed from the Panjshir valley, north of Kabul. However, later Masoud forged alliances with several Pashtun, Uzbek and Hazara factions therefore the term is not a correct appellation for the anti-Taliban forces.

2 Pakistan from the very onset of its policy of backing the Taliban wanted to 'engage' the US on the 'next steps' to be taken vis-à-vis the Pashtun militia. See US Embassy, Islamabad, Cable, 'A/S Raphel Discusses Afghanistan', 22 April 1996, p.2, *The Taliban File*, NSA.

3 Interview with a prominent ISI operative working with the Taliban administration in 1999, Islamabad, 28 September 1999.

4 See Ahmad Rashid, *Taliban: Islam, Oil and the New Great Game in Central Asia*, New York: I.B. Tauris, 2000; Neamatullah Nojumi, *The Rise of the Taliban in Afghanistan: Mass Mobilization, Civil War and the Future of the Region*, New York: Palgrave, 2002 and Larry P. Goodson, *Afghanistan's Endless War: State Failure, Regional Politics and the Rise of the Taliban*, Seattle: University of Washington Press, 2001.

5 During the Pakistani Foreign Minister's meeting with US officials, the Pakistani functionary echoed the military's perceptions and suggested closer US–Pakistani coordination on Afghanistan 'aimed at reducing the recent increase of foreign assistance' to the Kabul government 'from Moscow and Tehran'. See US Department of State Cable, 'Pak Foreign Minister Asks US Cooperation on Afghanistan', 21 February 1996, Confidential, p.2, *The Taliban File*, NSA.

6 See Selig Harrison, 'What's Next in Afghanistan', *The Center for International Policy's Asia Project Conference* 1-13-2001. http://www.ciponline.org/asia/Afghanconference 1-13-2001.htm. Accessed 17/06/2003.

7 Kamal Matinuddin, *The Taliban Phenomenon, Afghanistan 1994–1997*, Karachi: Oxford University Press, 2000, p.129.
8 Interview with Sahibzada Yakub Khan, former Foreign Minister of Pakistan, Islamabad, 6 September 1999. Sikkim and Bhutan are tiny Himalayan states bordered by India. Sikkim, bordered by Nepal, China and India, was incorporated in the Indian Union in 1975. Bhutan is an autonomous monarchy between China and India. However, its foreign relations are still under the influence of the Government of India. This arrangement, agreed by the two governments in 1948, was a continuation of the agreements Bhutan had with the British rulers of India regarding the conduct of its foreign relations.
9 See Fawaz Gerges, *America and Political Islam*, p.94.
10 Interview with a Lieutenant-General of the Pakistan Army, Rawalpindi, 21 September 1999.
11 According to Hale, a moderator or veto regime exercises veto power without formally taking over power. Guardian regimes take over direct power, but declare that they intend to hand over power after a limited period of rule. Lastly, ruler regimes stay in power for longer, and they exercise much wider political control. See William Hale, *Turkish Politics and the Military*, London and New York: Routledge, 1994.
12 Stephen P. Cohen, *The Pakistan Army*, 2nd edn, Karachi: Oxford University Press, 1998. Chapter 3.
13 See Husain Haqqani, *Beyond the Army: the Military and the Pakistan's Establishment*, Center for Strategic and International Studies Washington, DC 6 May 2002. Military personnel serve in various capacities throughout the state apparatus from heading civilian concerns such as Water and Power authorities to serving as vice-chancellors of universities. For the military's intrusion in the economic and industrial sector see Ayesha Siddiqa Agha, 'Power, Perks, Privileges: Military's Economic activities in Pakistan', The International Conference on *SOLDIERS IN BUSINESS, Military as an Economic actor*, Jakarta, October 17–19, 2000.
14 'Beware of the ISI', Bhutto warns US, 6 November 2001. rediff.com. http://www.rediff.com/us/2001/nov/09ny8.htm. Accessed 12/06/2003.
15 Interview with a former Foreign Minister of Pakistan, Islamabad, 8 October 1999. The Pakistani elite failed to realise that the 'Soviet defeat' was not of the Soviet forces as such, but of the Soviet political will to sustain the commitment. The distinction is important; if a war could never be won without defeating the enemy armed forces, Afghanistan would never have stood a chance against the British, let alone the Soviets, nor Vietnam a chance against the Americans.
16 Anthony Davis, 'How the Taliban Became a Military force', in William Maley (ed), *Fundamentalism Reborn: Afghanistan and the Taliban*, London: Hurst, 1998. Detailed discussion is also in Ahmad Rashid, *Taliban: Islam Oil and the New Great Game in Central Asia*, New York: I.B. Tauris, 2000.
17 Hamid Karzai briefly served with the Taliban as their proposed UN representative in 1996. According to a US Embassy Cable, Karzai was a 'largely marginalized' personality within Afghan factional politics of the time. See US Embassy (Islamabad), Cable, 'The Taliban – Who Knows What the Movement Means?' 28 November 1994. Confidential, p.8, *Taliban Files*, NSA.
18 *Afghan Refugees: Long term Burden for Pakistan*, Report 26, Washington DC: CIA, October 1982, Declassified 4/4/2001.
19 See Charles G. Cogan, 'Partners in time: The CIA and Afghanistan since 1979', *World Policy Journal*, 41, 1993, p.79.
20 Brian Cloughley, *The History of the Pakistan Army*, p.395.

21 Http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/world/pakistan/xi-corps.htm. Accessed 7/06/2003.
22 Incidentally, Pakistan's current military ruler, General Pervez Musharraf was then the Director General Military Operations at the GHQ while Lieutenant-General Muhammad Aziz Khan, an instigator of the 1999 coup, was heading the ISI's Afghan desk.
23 Interview with a Senior Research Fellow, Institute of Strategic Studies, Islamabad, 4 October 1999.
24 Interview with a former Director-General in the Ministry of Information, Islamabad, 22 August 1999. The Saudi Embassy in Islamabad was in touch with various leaders of the Deobandi Afghan and Pakistani Islamists who had association with several prominent Taliban leaders with the full knowledge of the Pakistani Government.
25 Interview with a Pakistani politician associated with the Pashtun nationalist Awami National Party, Peshawar, 18 September 1999.
26 Interview with a Jamaat-i-Islami official, Islamabad, 25 August 2000.
27 Jasgit Singh, 'Nothing Uniform About Them', *The Sunday Times of India* (New Delhi), 25 November 1999, p.17. See also Jasgit Singh, 'The Army in the Power Structure of Pakistan', *Strategic Analysis*, Vol.XVII, No.7 (October 1995).
28 Husain Haqqani, 'Beyond the Army: The Military and Pakistan's establishment', Center for Strategic and International Studies, Washington, DC, 6 May 2002.
29 See *British Intelligence on Afghanistan and its Frontiers, c. 1888–1946*. Secret and Confidential print from the British Government of India, London: IDC Publishers 2003.
30 See Mir Gholam Mohammad Ghobar, *Afghanistan in the Course of History* (Translation from Dari), Washington DC 1999, Vol.2, p.79.
31 Quoted in Eric S. Margolis, *War at the Top of the World*, p.42.
32 Mushahid Hussain, 'Whither Pakistan's Establishment?' *The Nation* (Lahore), 18 June 2002.
33 Amin Saikal, 'Afghanistan's Ethnic conflict', *Survival*, Vol.40, No.2, Summer 1998, pp.114–126.
34 In May 1996, U.S. Assistant Secretary of State for South Asian Affairs, Robin Raphel had clearly indicated in her meeting with Russian Deputy Foreign Minister Chernyshev that one of the key US objectives in the Central Asian region was facilitation of 'US business interests' in the area of oil and gas extraction for which stability in Afghanistan was essential. US Embassy (Moscow) Cable, 'A/S Raphel Consultations with Deputy FM Chernyshev', 13 May 1996, Confidential, p.3, *Taliban Files*, NSA.
35 See Barnett R. Rubin, 'Women and Pipelines: Afghanistan's Proxy War', *International Affairs*, Vol.73, No.2, 1997, p.285.
36 Gary Sick, 'Rethinking Dual Containment', *Survival*, Vol.40, No.11, Spring 1998, p.3. In 1996, the Republican Senator, Alphonse D' Amato, proposed a legislation-Iran-Libya Sanctions Act (ILSA) – which mandated US sanctions against any country investing more than $20 million in the Iranian oil and gas sectors. In the oil sector, this policy had first become operational when in 1995, a US Presidential Executive Order forced the Conoco oil company to withdraw from signing a US$1 billion contract with the National Iranian Oil Company (NIOC) to exploit the Persian Gulf Sirri gas field.
37 Maleeha Lodhi, 'The Pakistan–US Relationship', *Defence Journal*, April 1998.
38 This waiver is known as the Brown Amendment after the Republican Senator, Hank Brown, who introduced it in the US Senate in 1995.
39 See *Patterns of Global Terrorism*, Washington DC: Department of State (1996–2000). The US had put Pakistan on a so-called watch list of nations involved in allegedly sponsoring terrorism under Indian pressure between 1992 and 1993. The US had listed countries such as Sudan, Syria and Iran that had a much less comprehensive involvement

in sponsoring Islamic militancy than Pakistan. Under the Benazir Bhutto administration, Pakistan was removed from this list.

40 'Iran's Initiative to Normalize Pakistan–Afghanistan Relations', BBC World Service, 6 February 1996.

41 See Nasim Zehra, 'Pakistan–Afghanistan: Proxy war Tests Domestic Politics', *Inter Press Service*, 14 January 1996.

42 U.S. Department of State, Cable, 'Pakistan Foreign Minister Asks US Cooperation on Afghanistan', 21 February 1996, Confidential, p.4, *Taliban File*, NSA.

43 Ibid. p.4.

44 *Kyodo News Agency*, 'Pakistan, Afghanistan gain breakthrough in Talks,' 13 May 1996. During the talks, Kabul had agreed to compensate Pakistan for the damage to its diplomatic facilities incurred in September 1995 and it showed its willingness to allow Pakistan access to Central Asia through Afghan territory.

45 *US Department of State Despatch* 326, 'US Interests in and policy toward Afghanistan' (Statement by Robin L. Raphael, Assistant Secretary of State for South Asian Affairs), Vol.7, No.25, 17 June 1996.

46 U.S. Embassy (Islamabad) Cable, 'A/S Raphel Discusses Afghanistan,' 22 April 1996. Confidential, p.4, *Taliban File*, NSA.

47 U.S. Embassy, Islamabad (Cable), 'A/S Raphel Discusses Afghanistan', Confidential, p.4, *The Taliban File*, NSA.

48 Interview with a former Additional Secretary (Middle East) in Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Islamabad, 12 September 1999. See also remarks of Pakistan Foreign Minister Sardar Ahmad Asif Ali regarding President Rabbani's desire to 'conquer all' and the alleged illegitimacy of his regime that 'controls only 4 provinces and represents the 'Tajik minority'. US Department of State Cable, 'Pak Foreign Minster Asks US Cooperation on Afghanistan', 21 February 1996, Confidential, p.5, *Taliban File*, NSA.

49 See Kamal Matiuddin, *The Taliban Phenomenon, 1994–1997*, pp.129–135.

50 According to reliable source within the Pakistan government, the project could not be started due to the lack of funds on the part of Islamabad.

51 Interview with an ex-Afghan diplomat, Islamabad, 28 August 2000.

52 See Willem Vogelsang, *The Afghans*, Oxford: Blackwell Publishers, 2002, pp.327–329.

53 Interview with several Hazara refugees residing in Islamabad, September–October, 1999.

54 See Hamid Mir, 'Pipeline police in Afghanistan', *The Balochistan Post*, 13 September 2002. See also Dilp Hiro, *War Without End: The Rise of Islamic Terrorism and the Global Response*, London: Routledge, 2002, p.236.

55 Personal discussion with a senior Pakistani Foreign Ministry official dealing with Iran, Islamabad, 20 October 1996.

56 Ahmad Rashid, 'Nervous neighbours: Taliban victory forces regional realignment', *Far Eastern Economic Review*, 10 October 1996.

57 Speech of the Leader of the Islamic Republic of Iran on the developments in Afghanistan, *Islamic Republic News Agency* (IRNA), 20 October 1996.

58 *The Foreign Policy Concept of the Russian Federation*, approved by President of the Russian Federation, V. Putin, June 28 2000. p.9. Http://www.fas.org/nuke/giude/russia/doctrine/econcept.htm. Accessed 15/09/2003.

59 Ibid, p.8.

60 BBC World Service, 21 January 1996.

61 'Taliban Takeover of Afghanistan, Positive' – UNOCAL, *Reuters*, London, 1 October 1996.

62 Six international companies and the Government of Turkmenistan had formed an international pipeline consortium, Central Asia Gas Pipeline Limited (Centgas) to develop a natural gas pipeline that would link Turkmenistan's vast natural gas reserves with the growing markets of Pakistan and possibly India. UNOCAL and Delta oil of Saudi Arabia held nearly 85 percent interest in the Turkmenistan–Afghanistan–Pakistan pipeline.

63 *Voice of America*, 27 September 1996. The US State Department indicated that it wished to 'engage the new Taliban interim government at an early stage to: Demonstrate USG willingness to deal with them as the new authorities in Kabul ...' US Department of State, Cable, 'Dealing with the Taliban in Kabul', 28 September 1996, Confidential, pp.2–3, *Taliban File*, NSA.

64 The statement by Robin Raphael, US Assistant Secretary of State for South Asia, at a UN meeting on Afghanistan on 18 November 1996. Quoted in Peter Symonds, 'The Taliban, the US and the Resources of Central Asia', 24 October 2001. http://www.org/articles/2001/oct2001/tal1-o24_pm.shtml accessed 15/05/2003.

65 See *The Washington Post*, 13 August 1996. At that time Khalilzad was a paid consultant for the American UNOCAL Company. After the collapse of the Taliban regime in December 2001, the Bush Administration appointed Khalilzad as its special envoy for Afghanistan.

66 U.S. Embassy, Islamabad, Cable, 'Scence setter for your visit to Islamabad: Afghan Angle', 6/11/1997, Confidential, p.2, *The Taliban File, NSA*.

67 Interview with a former Foreign Minister of Pakistan, Islamabad, 30 September 2000. The Washington establishment knew that Pakistani support for the Taliban was extensive and included financial backing, food provision, on the ground military/intelligence advisers, and drafting of letters for the Taliban administration. U.S. Department of State Cable, 'Afghanistan: Taliban Rep Won't Seek UN Seat for now'. 13 December 1996, Confidential. *Taliban File*, NSA.

68 'Regional Security in South Asia', *Hearing Before the Subcommittee on Asia and Pacific of the Committee on International Relations*, House of Representatives, 20 October 1999. Washington DC: US Government Printing office: 2000. During the hearing Congressman Dana Rohrabacher asserted that the State Department withheld documents pertaining to Afghanistan between 1996 and 1997 as they may have revealed the State Department's support for the Taliban militia during this period.

69 *The Herald*, Karachi, June 1997.

70 Benazir Bhutto, 'Pakistan after the fall of Kabul', *The Nation* (Lahore), 9 December 2001.

71 See Anwar-ul-Haq Ahady, 'Saudi Arabia, Iran and the Conflict in Afghanistan', in William Maley (ed) *Fundamentalism Reborn, Afghanistan and the Taliban*, p.132. However, there is no concrete evidence that the US supplied weapons to the Taliban.

72 See Brian Cloughley, *A History of the Pakistan Army: Wars and Insurrections*, p.68.

73 Observation by General Ghulam Ahmad, an ISI Deputy Director General to Pamela Constable, *The Washington Post*, 15 February 2000.

74 General Abdul Malik Pehalwan had revolted against Abdul Rashid Dostum and allowed the Taliban's entry into this largely non-Pashtun city. General Abdul Malik had temporarily shifted his allegiance to the Taliban after reportedly receiving large amount of money from the ISI but later rejoined the anti-Taliban coalition on account of the Taliban's 'barbaric' behaviour.

75 Defense Intelligence Agency, Cable, 'IIR [Excised]/Veteran Afghanistan Traveler's Analysis of Al Qaeda and Taliban Exploitable weaknesses', 2 October 2001, Secret, p.7, *The Taliban File*, NSA.

76 *Bin Laden's Sermon for the Feast of the Sacrifice (Id al Adha)* broadcast on Al Jazeera TV on 22 February 2003. For a detailed account of Al Qaeda, see Rohan Gunaratna, *Inside Al Qaeda: Global Network of Terror*, Hurst and Company, London, 2002.

77 See Mark Juergenmeyer, *Terror in the Mind of God*, Berkeley: University of California Press, 2001, p.149.
78 Quoted in Kamal Matinuddin, *The Taliban Phenomenon, 1994–1997*, p.133.
79 'Pakistan, Afghanistan Approve Railway, Gas Pipeline Projects', *BBC Monitoring Summary of World Broadcasts*, 10 December 1996.
80 Defense Intelligence Agency, Cable, 'IIR[Excised]/Veteran Afghanistan Traveler's Analysis of Al Qaeda and Taliban Military, Political and Cultural Landscape and its Weaknesses', 2 October 2001, Secret, p.3, *The Taliban File*, NSA.
81 For details of the Pakistan's economic links with the Taliban, see Ahmad Rashid, *Taliban: Islam, Oil and the New Great Game in Central Asia*.
82 See Ian Talbot, *Pakistan: A Modern History*, p.341.
83 *Improving Human Development Outcomes in Pakistan, A Background Note*, Islamabad: World Bank, January, 2002.
84 *Poverty in Pakistan in the 1990s: An Interim Assessment*, Islamabad: World Bank, January 2002.
85 Figures quoted from Kapil Kak, 'Pakistan: A geopolitical appraisal', *Strategic Analysis*, Vol.XX, No.IV, November 1998, p.14.
86 In 1990, a member of the SSP murdered an Iranian Consul, Sadegh Ganji in Lahore. On 17 September 1997 five Iranian Air force cadets were murdered in Islamabad by Lashkar-e-Jhangvi and earlier in the year, the Iranian consulates in Lahore and Multan had been ransacked and this had resulted in the killing of an Iranian official.
87 Khalid Ahmed, 'When the state kills', *The Friday Times* (Lahore), 9 September 2001.
88 *The Muslim*, Islamabad, 1 October 1997. Editorials in other Pakistani newspapers also blamed foreign powers for instigating sectarian conflict in Pakistan.
89 *The Nation*, 17 December 1989.
90 Quoted in *Pakistan: Madrassa, Extremism and the Military*, International Crisis Group (ICG) Asia Report No.36, Islamabad, 29 July 2002, p.11.
91 See William Maley, 'Interpreting the Taliban', in William Maley (ed), *Fundamentalism Reborn? Afghanistan and the Taliban*, London: Hurst, 1998, pp.1–28.
92 A U.S. Defense Intelligence Agency assessment had noted that the Afghanistan was a 'country of diverse cultures and language with deep historical enmities between communities and individuals. There is no sense of national identity.' Defense Intelligence Agency, Cable, 'IIR [Excised]/Veteran Afghanistan Traveller's Analysis of Al Qaeda and Taliban Exploitable weaknesses', 2 October 2001, p.7, *The Taliban File*, NSA.
93 See Kristian Berg Harpviken, 'Transcending Traditionalism: The Emergence of Non-State Military Formations in Afghanistan', *Journal of Peace Research*, Vol.34, No.3, 1997, pp.271–287.
94 A prominent member of the Hotaki sub-tribe, Mir Wais conquered Isfahan in 1721.
95 Interviews with several Pakistani and Afghan Pashtuns in Peshawar, Islamabad and Karachi. September–October, 2000.
96 See Akbar S. Ahmed, *Resistance and Control in Pakistan*, London: Routledge, 1991 for exposition of interplay of tribal codes of honour with religion.
97 Defense Intelligence Agency, Cable, 'IIR [Excised]/Veteran Afghanistan Traveler's Analysis of Al Qaeda and Taliban Military, Political and Cultural Landscape and its Weakness', 2 October 2001, p.5, *The Taliban File*, NSA.
98 Defense Intelligence Agency, Cable, 'IIR [Excised]/Veteran Afghanistan Traveler's Analysis of Al Qaeda and Taliban Exploitable Weaknesses', 2 October 2001, p.7, *The Taliban File*, NSA.
99 General Dostum had fled Mazar-e-Sharif in May 1997 but returned in early 1998 to reclaim the control of the north.

100 Personal communication with a senior official of the Ministry of External Affairs, New Delhi, 23 August 2002. Termez is a town in Uzbekistan.
101 See 'Pakistan's Support of the Taliban', Human Rights Watch, New York, 2001. http://www.org/reports/2001/afghan2/Afghan0701-02.htm. Accessed 20/05/2003.
102 Interview with a former Additional Secretary serving in the President's Secretariat, Islamabad.
103 *Associated Press*, 23 August 1998.
104 Some of the Arab followers of Osama Bin Laden belonged to militant Islamic groups such as the Egyptian *Gamaa al Islamiyyia* and were responsible for bombing the Egyptian embassy in Islamabad in November 1995.
105 Interview with a Shiite Hazara activist, Islamabad, 18 August 2000.
106 See U.S. Embassy (Islamabad) Cable, 'Afghanistan: Observers Report Up-tick in Support for Anti Taliban Factions by Iran', 7 July 1997, Confidential. *Taliban Files*, NSA.
107 Pakistan had escalated its backing for the militia in early 1998 with increased supply of manpower to the militia. U.S. Consulate (Peshawar), Cable, 'Afghanistan: A Report of Pakistani Military assistance to the Taliban', 24 March 1998, Confidential, *Taliban File*, NSA
108 *Middle East International*, 21 August 1998, pp.13–14.
109 Interview with a former Pakistani military attaché to the Peoples Republic of China, Rawalpindi, 23 September 1999.
110 Farzana Shaikh, 'Pakistan's Nuclear Bomb: Beyond the Non-Proliferation Regime', *International Affairs*, Vol.78, No.1, 2002, pp.29–48. For a comprehensive account of the India centric nuclear strategy of Pakistan see Bhumitra Chakma, 'Road to Chagai: Pakistan's Nuclear Programme, Its Sources and Motivations', *Modern Asian Studies*, Vol.36, No.4, 2002, pp.871–912.
111 M.A. Niazi,'Pakistan Reviews its Iran Relationship', *The Nation*, Islamabad, December 3, 1998.
112 Anthony Davis, 'Taliban found lacking when nation building beckoned', *Janes Intelligence Review*, August, 1999, p.12.
113 The United States remained the most influential external power in Pakistan. It has had a historical record of condoning the actions of the Pakistan Army or Pakistani backed militias. For instance in 1971, the Pakistan Army and paramilitary militias created by it were responsible for widespread human rights violations in the former East Pakistan but the Nixon administration failed to 'denounce atrocities' committed by the Pakistani military regime. See US Consulate (Dacca) Cable, *Dissent from US Policy Toward East Pakistan*, 6 April 1971, Confidential. Source Record Group 59, Pol and Def. Pak-US Box 2535. US National Archives and Record Administration.
114 See Mark A Drumbl, 'The Taliban's "other" Crimes', *Third World Quarterly*, Vol.23, No.6, pp.1121–1131.
115 Personal communication from an army officer involved with the ISI operations in Afghanistan, Islamabad, 14 August 1999.
116 *Reuters*, 18 November 1997.
117 Peter Symonds, 'The Taliban, the US and the Resources of Central Asia', 24 October 2001. http://www.wsws.org/articles/2001/oct2001/tal1-24_prn.shml.
118 A US Embassy cable had observed that the militia enjoyed the support 'of the Bazaaris, whose commercial activities' had been 'hampered by highway toll booths' and arrogance of the local commanders. US Embassy, Islamabad, Cable, 'The Taliban – Who knows What the Movement Means.' 11 November 1994, confidential, p.4, *The Taliban File*, NSA.

119 For an excellent exposition of the nexus between the Taliban and drug smuggling see Barnett R. Rubin, 'The Political Economy of War and Peace in Afghanistan', *World Development* Vol.28, No.10, 2000, pp.1789–1803.
120 United Nations Office for Drug Control and Crime Prevention, *Up Date*, October, 1999, Vienna.
121 Interview with a Research Fellow, Institute of Strategic Studies, Islamabad, 29 September 1999.
122 See Afghanistan-militias. Global Security. org. http://www.globalsecurity.org./military/world/afghanistan/militia-fac.htm. Accessed 26 May 2003.
123 Most military facilities of the former Afghan army served as headquarters of the Taliban and the assorted militia groups attached with them. Some sites were named after historic Islamic figures or companions of the Prophet Muhammad like the Salman Farsi camp, Amir Muawia (the first Umayyad caliph and an individual reviled by the Shiites), Khalid Bin Waleed camp and so on.
124 In 1994 the Saudi government had revoked Bin Laden's Saudi citizenship. However, it is believed that the Saudi intelligence remained in touch with the Islamic militant up until 1998.
125 Thomas R. Mockaitis, 'Winning Hearts and Minds in the "War on Terror"', *Small Wars and Insurgencies*, Vol.14, Number 1, Spring 2003, pp.24–25.
126 UNOCAL News Release, 4 December 1998.
127 For an incisive analysis of Saudi Arabia's 'Islamic' foreign policy see Robert Baer, 'The Fall of the House of Saud', *The Atlantic Monthly*, May 2003. Baer cites that the quantity of oil supplied was worth US$2 million a day!
128 Jean Charles Brisard and Guillaume Dasquie, *Ben Laden: La Verite interdite*, Paris, 2002, pp.57–58.
129 In a telephonic conversation between General Musharraf and the Chief of General Staff, Lieutenant-General Muhammad Aziz, while the former was visiting China in May 1999, the Kargil intrusions were discussed. The conversation, intercepted by the Indian intelligence, gave the impression that the Kargil operation was planned at the highest level in the GHQ, and conducted with full participation of Pakistan Army regulars. See 'Nawaz and Kargil', *Indian Express*, 21 July 2001.
130 Salient features of Operations By Pakistan Army. http://indianairforce.nic.in/afkargil/pakistaninkargil.htm. Accessed 23 June 2003.
131 Pakistan continued to support Kashmiri 'freedom fighters' and utilised Afghan territory for training them. India's harsh measures to contain the insurgency added to the Kashmiri Muslim populace's alienation from New Delhi and Islamabad took advantage of this development. See *Human Rights Watch (HRW) Report, India*, New York, 2000.
132 Pakistan had continued to receive substantial military assistance from the PRC including advice on the development of solid propellant based medium to short range ballistic missiles. North Korea also reportedly provided material and technical advice in this area. See Foreign *Missile Developments and the Ballistic Missile Threat Through 2015*, Washington DC: National Intelligence Council, undated.
133 The army's guardian role was institutionalised in the so-called Eighth Amendment that allowed the President, assumed to be the army's candidate, to dismiss the Prime Minister and the Parliament.
134 Musharraf was appointed after superseding two more senior generals of the army. Moreover, he was regarded as a 'hardliner' on India and a backer of the pro-Taliban policy.
135 The interview was given by Chaudry Nisar Ali Khan, former Minister of Petroleum and Natural Resources in the Nawaz Government, *The Hindustan Times*, June 20, 2003.
136 Ibid.

137 Sharif had sent his brother Shahbaz Sharif and the ISI Chief to Washington to personally discuss with the officials of the Clinton administration the standoff with Musharraf and the policy on Afghanistan. See *The Nation*, 1 October 1999.
138 *The Nation*, 12 October 1999.
139 The military-dominated regime of Field Marshal Muhammad Ayub Khan (1958–1969) ended with the resignation of Ayub in March 1969. Ayub handed over power to the army chief, General Agha Muhammad Yahya Khan. In a sense this was not a coup but transfer of power from a military-controlled administration directly to the army.
140 Some Pakistani commentators even asserted that Nawaz Sharif's reservations about the military's backing for the Taliban contributed to the army takeover. Interview with a former ISI official, Islamabad, 18 October 1999.
141 On 12 October 1999, General Musharraf was not in Pakistan but was on his way back from a tour of Sri Lanka. For an account of the events that sparked the coup, see Gregory R. Copley, 'Pakistan Under Musharraf', *Defence and Foreign Affairs Strategic Policy*, Jan 2000.
142 Interview with a Major-General in the Pakistan Army, Rawalpindi, 21 October, 1999.
143 Speech by General Musharraf on 18 October, 1999 Address to the nation, *The Nation*, 19 October 1999. Musharraf's remarks on his admiration for Ataturk see, *The Nation*, Lahore, 16 October, 1999.
144 See *Pakistan: Madrassa, Extremism and the Military*, International Crisis Group, Report, June 2002.
145 General Musharraf banned the anti-Shia organization Lashkar-e-Jhagvi and the anti-Sunni organization Sipah-e-Mohammad on August 14, 2001. Later, the Sunni Sipah-i-Sahaba and the Shiite Tehrik-i-Nifaz-i-Jafaria were also banned. However, both the respective organizations continued to function with changed designations till November 2003.
146 A senior army official working in the GHQ observed that: 'we could handle the Americans' rather superficial concerns about democracy by appointing some civilians in a new set up controlled by the army.' Interview with a serving Major-General, Rawalpindi, 23 October 1999.
147 Sean P. Winchell, 'Pakistan's ISI: The Invisible Government', *International Journal of Intelligence and Counter Intelligence*, Vol.16, 2003, p.379.
148 Musharraf's interview to the BBC, 18 August 2000 cited in Ghada Hashem Talhami, 'Muslims, Islam and the Cold War', *Small Wars and Insurgencies*, Vol.14, No.1, Spring 2003, p.123.
149 Stephan P. Cohen, *The Pakistan Army* (1998 edition), p.172.
150 See Defense Intelligence Agency, Cable, 'IIR (Excised)/Veteran Afghanistan Traveller's Analysis of Al Qaeda and Taliban Exploitable Weaknesses', 2 October 2001, Secret. p.8, *Taliban File*, NSA.
151 See UN Security Council Resolution S/RES/1267, 1999.
152 Translation from an article published in Urdu in the pro-Taliban magazine *Zarb-e-Momin* (The Strike of a Believer), Karachi, May 1997. Apart from Jamiat-i-Ulama-i-Islam and the Sepah-i-Sahaba, the mainly Pashtun TNSM religious movement based in the Malakand Agency of NWFP gained considerable support in the region since its inception in 1994.
153 See Hafeez Malik, 'Taliban Rule and National Reconstruction in Afghanistan: Pakistan's Options', *Journal of South Asian and Middle Eastern Studies*, Vol.XXIV, No.1, Fall 2000.
154 *Time* magazine, September 29, 2000.
155 Tim Judah, 'The Taliban Papers', *Survival*, Vol.44, No.1, Spring 2002, p.70.

156 For the Pashtun tribe's religious and cultural reaction when confronted with foreign intrusions see Hugh Beattie, *Imperial Frontier: Tribe and the State in Waziristan*, London: Curzon, 2002.
157 See Elphinstone, *Account of the kingdom of Cabul*, p.79; Akbar S. Ahmed regards the Pashtunwali as primarily a code of honour, see A.S. Ahmed, *Pukhtun Economy and Society*, London: Routledge, 1980, p.91.
158 'Fuelling Afghanistan's War', *Human Rights Watch World Report 2001: Asia Overview*.
159 See *Dawn*, Karachi, 1 June 2000.
160 See Anthony Davis, 'How the Taliban Became a Military Force', in William Maley (ed), *Fundamentalism Reborn: Afghanistan and the Taliban*, London: Hurst, p.56.
161 See 'External Military Support to the United Front', *HRW World Report: Asia Overview*. http://www.hrw.org/backgrounder/asia/afghanistan/afghbk.htm. Accessed 29/10/2002.
162 *The Nation*, Lahore, 25 December 1999.
163 *Central Asia–Caucasus Analyst*, Johns Hopkins University, Baltimore, February 2000.The six plus two grouping was a UN initiative devised to find a solution to the Afghan crisis. It comprised six neighbouring states of Afghanistan: Pakistan, Iran. Turkmenistan, Uzbekistan, Tajikistan and China along with Russia and the United States.
164 Interview with a serving Lieutenant-Colonel attached with the ISI, Islamabad 24 August 2000.
165 Sydney Blumenthal, The *Clinton Wars: An Insiders Account of the White House Years*, New York: Farrar, Straus and Giroux, 2003, p.660.
166 In late 1999, the CIA had planned to infiltrate its own special operations team along with Pakistani commandos to capture Bin Laden but the coup in Pakistan had aborted this effort. See Bob Woodward, *Bush At War*, New York: Simon and Schuster, 2002, p.5.
167 Secretary of State, Madeline K. Albright and Michael Sheehan, Counter-Terrorism Coordinator, On the Record Briefing on the 1999 Annual *Patterns of Global Terrorism* Report, Washington DC: Department of State, May 1, 2000.
168 See Tim Judah, 'The Taliban Papers', *Survival*, Vol.44, No.1, Spring 2002, p.72.
169 *Eurasia Insight*, 5 December 2000.
170 See the speech of Said Rahmatullah Hashmi, Representative, Islamic Emirate of Afghanistan (Taliban) at the School of Advanced International Studies, Johns Hopkins University, 21 March 2001.
171 Ehsan Ahrari, 'China, Pakistan and the Taliban Syndrome', *Asian Survey*, Vol.XL, No.4, July/August 2000.
172 See *Takbir* (Urdu), Karachi, 16 October 1999.
173 According to the Taliban ambassador the Uighurs were supported by the US and Saudi Arabia as a part of a scheme to 'spoil Chinese relations with Pakistan and Afghanistan'. See Tim Judah, 'The Taliban Papers', p.74.
174 *Jane's Sentinel Security Assessment – South Asia*, 13 January 2003.
175 Ibid. p.4. According to this report Osama Bin Laden and his senior advisors were also present on this occasion.
176 See *Far Eastern Economic Review*, 26 April 2001.
177 An account of Masoud-CIA parleys is in *Vanity Fair*, February 2002.
178 *BBC World Service*, 18 September 2001. The BBC reporter George Arney revealed that US Officials had told a former Pakistani Foreign Secretary, Niaz Ahmad Naik, in mid July 2001 of plans for military action against the Taliban regime. Mr Naik said US officials conveyed to him the anti-Taliban plan at a UN Sponsored international contact group meeting on Afghanistan, which took place in Berlin. The US representative indicated Washington could take military action to capture Osama if the Saudi dissident was not handed over voluntarily.

179 Several members of the Bush administration including Secretary of State, Collin Powell had a good working relationship with key personalities in the Musharraf regime.
180 Lt-General Mahmud Ahmad. Director General of the ISI was in Washington on 11 September 2001 trying to convince the Bush administration about the good intentions of the Taliban towards the US. However, he spent most of his time hearing from US officials that he get the Taliban to yield on Bin Laden. According to an internet site run by the Canadian *Center for Research on Globalisation* titled: 'The Role of Pakistan's Military Intelligence in the September 11 Attacks', General Ahmad was allegedly a US approved 'appointee' and remained in close liaison with the CIA and the Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA)! Http://www.globalresearch.ca/articles/CHO111A.html. This information has not been corroborated. Accessed 23 April 2003.
181 A US Defense Intelligence Agency report observed 'Massoud had gained limited knowledge regarding the intentions of the Saudi Millionaire, Usama (Bin Laden) (UBL) and his terrorist organization to perform a terrorist act against the U.S.' Defense Intelligence Agency, Cable, 'IIR/[Excised]/Assassination of Massoud Related to 11 September 2001 Attack', 21 November 2001, Secret, pp.4–5, *The Taliban File*, NSA.
182 Statement released on September 14 quoted by *Reuters* 15 September 2001.
183 Comments of the Taliban Ambassador to Islamabad, Mullah Abdus Salam Zaeef published in the *Dawn*, Karachi, 19 October 2001. After the fall of the Taliban regime in November, Mullah Zaeef was handed over to the United States authorities by the Pakistani military!
184 Bob Woodward, *Bush At War*, p.58.
185 See Kamran Khan, 'GHQ in a Dilemma', *The News*, Islamabad, 14 September 2001.
186 *Hindustan Times*, 13 September 2001. Musharraf's backing for the Bush administration's action in Afghanistan once again made it possible for Pakistan to secure US economic assistance and access to weaponry as the US decided to lift the sanctions imposed on Pakistan by late 2001.
187 The Bush administration had reportedly put in place a US$125 million package for the northern alliance on 4 September 2001, a week before September 11. Bob Woodward, *Bush At War*, p.36.
188 The Taliban were reported to be receiving ammunition and fuel from Pakistan with the knowledge and connivance of the ISI until November 2001. See Bill Gertz, 'Pakistan sends supplies to Taliban', *The Washington Times*, 1 November, 2001.
189 Osama had been reportedly been treated for a medical condition in Pakistan under the supervision of the ISI. Interview with a lower level official of the Ministry of Interior, Islamabad, 25 August 2000. The French newspaper *Le Figaro* reported that Osama allegedly met CIA operatives in Dubai in July, 2001. *Le Figaro*, 1 November 2001.
190 Excerpts from a US Central Command Report published on a Pakistani website. Http://www.paknews.com/editorials.php?id=1&date1=2003-05-20. Accessed 25/5/2003.
191 Ibid. See also 'US flew 57,800 sorties from Pakistan', *The Washington Times*, 19 May 2003. US was also given use of over five airbases and other sites along the Pakistan–Afghanistan border to launch air and land operations against Al Qaeda and the Taliban. The most prominant bases were Islamabad (Chaklala), Dalbandin (Baluchistan), Shamsi (Baluchistan), Jacobabad (Sind) and Pasni (Baluchistan). *Airforces Monthly*, London, February 2002.
192 Karzai was later appointed as the head of the Afghan interim administration established under the auspices of the US and the UN. Karzai, a fluent Urdu speaker with residences in Quetta and Islamabad had been inducted as a Deputy Foreign Minister of the first

Mujahideen government under Sibghatullah Mujaddidi with the connivance of ISI and the CIA in 1992. See Kamran Khan, 'Karzai: a unique "US-Pak" candidate for Afghan leadership', *The News*, 6 December, 2001.

193 Seymour M. Hersh, 'The Getaway', *New Yorker*, December 2001; According to a reputed Indian daily 1000 regular servicemen were withdrawn in a day in late November 2001 from Kunduz and Mazar-e-Sharif with the assistance of elite SSG units. *Hindustan Times*, 22 November 2001.

194 Anthony Davis provides an excellent summary of the coordination of US bombing with United Front assaults on the ground in *Jane's Intelligence Review*, February 2002.

195 See Anthony H. Cordesman, 'The Lessons of Afghanistan: War fighting, Intelligence, Force Transformation, Counter proliferation, and Arms Control', Washington DC: *Center for Strategic and International Studies*, August 2002.

196 *The News*, 6 Jan 2002

197 *The News*, 27 April, 2002. Interview with Lieutenant-General Khalid Maqbool, Governor of the Punjab.

198 *BBC World Service*, 29 October 2001.

199 Sean P. Winchell, 'Pakistan's ISI: The Invisible Government', *International Journal of Intelligence and Counter Intelligence*, Vol.16, 2003, p.384.

200 These US forces come under the purview of the CENTCOM and comprise elements of US 101st Airborne Division, 10th Mountain Division plus a variety of Special Operations forces. The US forces receive logistical support from the network of US military bases established in the region after 11 September 2001. These bases are located in Uzbekistan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, and Pakistan.

201 Tariq Butt, 'Bonn conference lacks Pashtun representation', *The News*, 26 November 2001. See also Musharraf's remarks on the need for a 'broad based government in Kabul', *The News*, Islamabad, 27 November 2001.

202 Zahid Hussein, 'Spiralling into anarchy', *Newsline*, December 2001.

203 Muttahida Majlis-e-Amal (MMA) – or the United Action Forum is a coalition of mainly Sunni Islamist and traditionalist parties that banded together to contest the military-run 'elections' held in Pakistan in October 2002. The MMA backed the Taliban's rule in Afghanistan. The MMA includes JI and the JUI. According to reports, the rise of the MMA was backed by the military's intelligence apparatus in order to retain Pakistan's influence in post-Taliban Pashtun regions of Afghanistan. See Husain Haqqani, 'Keeping the Lid on Pakistan's Taliban', *Middle East Policy Brief*, Washington: DC: The Middle East Institute, 16 July 2003.

Chapter 7

Conclusion

The goal of this study has been to analyse Pakistan's role in the emergence of militant political Islamism in Afghanistan. The study has tried to indicate that Pakistan's involvement in the internal politics of contemporary Afghanistan was not a unique phenomenon taking into consideration the political and historical processes that have moulded the identity of the region. Foreign intervention has been a perennial scourge throughout Afghanistan's history and has substantially influenced in shaping the subsequent evolution of the Afghan entity.

This study has analysed the Pakistan–Afghanistan relationship from a politico-historical perspective. In fact, there continues to be a dearth of works dealing with Pakistan's relationship with Afghanistan over the last two decades. The present study has tried to fill this lacuna. The study has given specific emphasis to the historical aspect in order to demonstrate that many components of Pakistan's policy toward Afghanistan were a product of the colonial British legacy. It has attempted to demonstrate the linkages of the Afghan crisis with Pakistan's domestic politics and regional policies within the ambit of Cold War and post-Cold War power politics. It was the interaction amongst these elements that led Pakistan – a peripheral actor in Afghan politics during the early 1970s – to become the principal external power in Afghanistan by the mid-1990s. The rise of the Taliban phenomenon was, to a great extent, a direct consequence of this development.

Afghanistan's geographical contiguity, ethnic ties and political relationship with the Indian subcontinent for over three millennia profoundly affected the politics of northern India. At the height of Muslim rule over India in the seventeenth century, the regions of eastern and southern Afghanistan remained integral parts of the Mughal Empire. In fact, the Hindukush mountain range formed the geopolitical faultline delimiting the influence of the Mughal Empire from its Iranian and Central Asian rivals. The Mughal–Iranian confrontation over the control of the Afghan regions made the Pashtun tribes, living in the peripheral areas of two strong empires, realise their geostrategic importance. Switching loyalties proved lucrative for the Pashtuns; this trait would endure with the tribes until the present.

The collapse of the Mughal and the Iranian Safavid empires in the mid-eighteenth century paved the way for the emergence of an Afghan state under the Pashtun chieftain, Ahmad Shah Durrani. However, the nascent tribally-founded Afghan entity was not grounded upon the presumed existence of an Afghan nation, but was a confederation of proto-national ethnically based communities that owed their ultimate allegiance to their own community. The chaos and anarchy prevalent in late eighteenth century India, nevertheless, enabled Afghanistan to control vast tracts of northern India during this period.

The Indian sub-continent's transformation into a British colonial possession was to connect Afghanistan to the international relations system of the nineteenth

century, dominated by European imperial powers. The British, like their Mughal predecessors, saw the retention of Afghanistan within the Indian sphere of influence as vital to the security of their Indian empire. A perceived threat from Russian expansionism towards India enabled Britain to retain Afghanistan within its sphere of influence by adopting a two-pronged approach. On the one hand, Britain subsidised the Afghan government. On the other, it retained the military option to depose any recalcitrant Afghan ruler who tried to take Afghanistan out of British India's orbit.

By the end of the nineteenth century, Britain and Russia agreed to demarcate Afghanistan's borders that eventually resulted in both the powers accepting Afghanistan as a buffer state between their respective empires in Asia.[1] This resulted in the consolidation of a semi-autonomous Afghan state. This Afghan state remained an exceptional entity in the largely colonized South and Central Asian regions, and its rather tentative existence owed much to external support. The Pashtuns remained the dominant ethnic group in this entity and formed the ruling elite. British India's geostrategic interests led it to support Pashtun dominance and the extension of the Afghan rulers' authority into the non-Pashtun parts of the country.

Britain persisted in supporting a weak Pashtun-dominated Afghan entity in the first half of the twentieth century despite the fact that its delimitation of Afghanistan's border with India, also known as the Durand Line, in 1893 had cut the tribal Pashtun lands in half and sparked Afghan resentment. The British had devised this frontier as the maximum limit of their control in Northwestern India. The delineation of the Durand Line was predicated upon a regional security architecture that gave primacy to strategic concerns regarding the defence of India and essentially disregarded the repercussions of splitting Pashtun tribes with common ethnic, linguistic and kinship ties. The imposition of the Durand Line was to remain a contentious issue in Anglo-Afghan relations even when Afghanistan regained control over its foreign relations in 1919.

The existence of the Afghan state during the six decades following independence was based on a delicate balance of domestic and external forces. Britain and after the Second World War, the United States continued to visualise the necessity of maintaining an Afghan buffer between the USSR and the Indian sub-continent. However, the creation of Pakistan in 1947 ignited the latent Afghan objections over the status of the Pashtuns residing across the Durand Line. Kabul objected to the inclusion of the NWFP in the new state of Pakistan and raised the demand for self-determination for ethnic Pashtuns residing in this Pakistani province. Afghanistan's rulers supported the Pashtun nationalists in Pakistan and backed their demand for the formation of a hypothetical entity known as 'Pashtunistan' incorporating NWFP, Baluchistan and parts of Pakistani administered Kashmir. Kabul's insistence that either the Pashtun tribes be given autonomy or be allowed to reunite with Afghanistan – a Pashtun-style *Risorgimento* – undermined the already weak foundations of the multi-ethnic Pakistani state based on vague notions of Islamic nationalism.

The Pakistani decision-maker's attitudes and policies concerning Afghanistan became conditioned by apprehensions about the Afghan claims on Pakistan's territory. In a parody of the British policy towards Afghanistan that was governed by a persistent fear of Russian attack on India in the nineteenth century, the Pakistani

elite from the early 1950s also remained suspicious of a possible Soviet or Indian bid to subvert Pakistan by using a hostile Afghanistan as a surrogate to dismember the country.

Pakistan's British-educated political and military elite aligned the Pakistani state with the United States in the Cold War. By doing so, they hoped to counterbalance India, which was viewed as the most important threat to Pakistan's security and existence. Pakistan's rapid evolution as Washington's 'most allied ally' in South Asia complicated the security system of South Asia. The Anglo-American allies' backing for Pakistan over its dispute with Afghanistan seriously undermined Washington's goal of continuing with the traditional British policy of maintaining Afghanistan as a stable buffer between the USSR and the Indian sub-continent.

The West's reluctance to assist Afghanistan and the Afghan elites' inability to woo the Anglo-American decision-makers towards pressuring Pakistan over the Pashtunistan dispute became an important factor for Afghanistan to enhance its economic and military ties with the Soviet Union. Moreover, Kabul's friendly ties with New Delhi aroused bitter consternation within the Pakistani elite, as it feared that in any confrontation with India, Afghanistan could serve Indian geostrategic interests by possibly threatening Pakistan's western borders. Most significantly, Afghanistan's refusal to accept the Durand Line remained a serious domestic concern for the Pakistani elite. The fear of Afghan interference in the provinces of NWFP and Baluchistan raised the spectre of an ethno-national secessionist challenge, aided and abetted by Afghanistan, to the Punjabi dominated Pakistani state.

The overthrow of the Afghan monarchy in a bloodless coup in July 1973 had a detrimental effect on Pakistan–Afghanistan relations. The new republican regime, headed by the deposed King's cousin and former Prime Minister, Sardar Muhammad Daud Khan, pursued the Pashtunistan issue with fervent zeal. Daud, an ardent nationalist, was emotionally attached to the Pashtunistan cause and from 1973 to 1975 his government openly assisted the Pashtun and Baluchi ethno-nationalist groupings in Pakistan.

In riposte to Afghan-backed ethno-nationalism, the civilian regime of Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto in Pakistan initiated a covert strategy of supporting the nascent anti-Daud Afghan Islamic movement on a *quid pro quo* basis. The Afghan Islamists had little interest in the Pashtunistan issue or the legality of the Durand Line and in this sense, they were ideal instruments for the Pakistani elite to be used against Afghanistan's championing of ethnic irredentism in NWFP and Baluchistan. The Bhutto regime, however, had decided to halt Pakistan's backing of the Afghan Islamists in 1976 due to the growing rapprochement between Pakistan and Afghanistan that was facilitated by Kabul's tilt towards the West. The improvement in Kabul-Islamabad relations was not disrupted by the military *coup d'état* led by the Pakistan army's chief, General Muhammad Zia-ul-Haq that had deposed the Bhutto regime in July 1977.

The emerging Pakistan–Afghanistan rapprochement proved short-lived. Elements of the Soviet-trained Afghan army led by the elements of the pro-Soviet PDPA murdered President Daud in a bloody *coup d'état* in April 1978. The leaders of the April coup, Nur Muhammad Taraki and Hafizullah Amin, both Ghilzai Pashtuns, once again reignited the Afghan claims on Pakistani territory and support for fellow Pashtuns in Pakistan. Domestically, the PDPA's attempts to ameliorate the economic

inequities and appalling living standards of a vast majority of Afghanistan's citizens through implanting Soviet-style socialist reforms stoked violent opposition from the traditional clergy and the land owning groups.

The April coup had come at a time when the military regime in Pakistan was facing strident opposition from pro-Bhutto groups and other secular parties. In order to stem this opposition, the military sought to forge an alliance with Pakistan's hitherto small religious groups to legitimise its rule. In the context of Afghanistan, the coming to power of a pro-Soviet regime in Kabul was seen as a geostrategic catastrophe for the Pakistani state from the military's vantage point. Indeed, the April coup had ushered in a fundamental transformation in the geopolitics of the region. Afghanistan's status as a buffer between the USSR and the Indian sub-continent had ended. The Pakistani military elite, driven by the geopolitical thinking of their British predecessors, feared further Soviet moves towards Pakistan if the Afghan regime consolidated its hold within the country.

The Zia regime's apprehensions about the socialist takeover in Kabul became inextricably linked with its domestic concerns. It perceived that a leftist regime in Kabul might radicalise Pakistani domestic polity where Bhutto's socialist populism still had considerable resonance. A socialist transformation in Afghanistan could not only incite Pashtun nationalism but might become a magnet for challenging an elitist social order dominated by semi-feudal landlords and urban business interests backed by a conservative military–bureaucratic establishment. Thus, internal security considerations along with Afghanistan's revival of challenging the status of Pakistani Pashtuns led to the formulation of a Pakistani forward policy vis-à-vis the PDPA regime.

On the platform of 'Islamic brotherhood', the Zia regime initiated a covert operation to assist the Afghan Islamic groupings opposed to the PDPA regime from mid-1978. This stance also offered the military an opportunity to close the persistent Afghan claims to Pakistani territory by backing a disparate group of Afghan Islamists beholden to Pakistan for their existence. The Afghan Islamises' cause was greatly assisted by the repressive and inept countermeasures of the PDPA regime that accelerated an influx of Afghan refugees into Pakistan. Pakistan's destabilisation campaign and widespread internal opposition against the increasingly unpopular and fractious PDPA regime prompted the Soviet Union to intervene militarily in Afghanistan to prop up its collapsing ally in December 1979.

The Soviet intervention strengthened the Zia regime as it manipulated this external crisis to consolidate the military's grip over the state apparatus. The Pakistani decision-making elite, composed of military personnel and bureaucrats, formulated its policies on a state centred conception of national security that gave foremost importance to physical threats to the state. Owing to the military's unpopular and precarious hold over a country riven with ethnic conflagration, sectarian discord, over-population and absence of institutionalised democratic framework, external threats served to bolster regime security by diverting the domestic opposition from internal political concerns. In this connection, the Zia regime's backing for Afghan Islamism was closely associated with its domestic 'Islamisation' drive and encouragement to the pro-military Pakistani Islamist groups. This policy helped in undercutting the efforts of secularly oriented parties to pose a serious threat against the military government. In addition, the military's

dominance over the Pakistani body politic was enhanced by large-scale infusion of US financial and military assistance in view of Pakistan's role as a 'frontline' state against Soviet expansionism.

Pakistan's role in fomenting Islamist guerrilla insurgency in Afghanistan in the 1980s led to the creation of an intricate nexus between the Pakistani military and the Sunni Islamist groups with their mainly Pashtun Afghan counterparts. This policy not only gave impetus to the growth of various militant Islamic groups such as Osama Bin Laden's Al Qaeda in the larger Islamic world, but also fundamentally undermined the already weak sense of national identity within Afghanistan.

In February 1989, Soviet troops withdrew from Afghanistan. After clinging to power for more than three years, the Soviet sponsored regime led by Muhammad Najibullah collapsed in the aftermath of the dissolution of the Soviet Union in April 1992. More than a decade of persistent conflict had ravaged Afghanistan's social, cultural and economic structures and loss of external patronage turned the Afghan state into an empty shell. More significantly, the war had profound impact on inter-ethnic relationships within the country. PDPA's cooptive policies with regard to non-Pashtun ethnic groups and the corresponding emergence of non-Pashtun armed anti-Soviet groups effectively challenged the traditional Pashtun hegemony over the political process. It was against this background and in the absence of a central authority that Afghanistan faced bitter power struggles amongst the former Mujahideen leaders in which ethnic and sectarian factors figured prominently.

The Pakistani military elite, owing to its decisive role in providing sanctuary and base of operations for the Afghan Islamic groups, envisioned that a post-Soviet Afghanistan would be a natural ally of Pakistan. According to the Pakistani military elite's perception, the 'victory' of the Afghan Mujahideen was essentially due to Pakistan's support. This success, in fact, emboldened the Army to apply the Afghan strategy of backing low-intensity guerrilla warfare to the insurgency in Indian-administered Kashmir from 1990 onwards. Moreover, the military's higher echelons believed that by 'defeating' the Soviet Army they had redeemed the military's honour after the humiliation suffered at the hands of India in 1971. It was assumed that Pakistan's assistance to the leadership of the Afghan Islamic opposition had enabled Islamabad to cultivate an Afghan political clientele that would serve to shape a subservient Afghan government and thereby assure Pakistani hegemony through a patron-client relationship. The Pakistani military officers believed that Afghan Islamic leaders should behave as Pakistani surrogates.[2]

In the absence of a clear US policy to tackle the problems of post-Soviet Afghanistan, Pakistan remained the most influential power in Afghanistan during the 1990s, having ties with nearly all the major Afghan Mujahideen leaders. This had enabled Pakistani Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif to broker the Peshawar Accords in April 1992 that outlined a rudimentary political arrangement for power sharing between the feuding Afghan Islamic factions. As stipulated under the Peshawar Accords, Ustad Burhanuddin Rabbani assumed the Presidency of the Islamic State of Afghanistan in June 1992. Earlier, the Najibullah regime had been brought down by a coalition of non-Pashtun forces led by Rabbani's ally Ahmad Shah Masoud, effectively sidelining Gulbuddin Hekmatyar, a Pashtun and Pakistan's chosen Afghan leader. Masoud's actions were seen as undermining Pakistan's long-term objectives in Afghanistan.

Policy is, to a certain degree, beholden to its past and Pakistan's policy toward Afghanistan was not an exception. Like the British colonial administrators of India, the Pakistani civil and military elite conceived their Afghan policy by giving priority to strategic and security imperatives. With the dissolution of the Soviet Union, the balance of power in South Asia was completely altered. Post-Cold War Afghanistan offered Pakistan an ideal opportunity to fill the power vacuum created by the demise of the Soviet Union. The military that continued to have the decisive influence on matters of national security visualised control over Afghanistan as essential for providing Pakistan with 'strategic depth' in any future war with India. A weak Afghanistan ruled by Pashtun Islamists aligned with Pakistan would also give Islamabad unbridled access to the newly independent Central Asian republics of the defunct Soviet Union. Furthermore, an Afghanistan under Pakistani hegemony could serve as a deterrent to the re-emergence of Pashtun ethno-nationalism. Pakistan's influence over de-tribalised Afghan Pashtun Islamists educated in Saudi-funded madrassas could serve Islamabad's strategic goals while remaining loyal to their Pakistani benefactors.

By the mid 1990s, it had become clear to the decision-makers in Islamabad that the Rabbani–Masoud administration in Kabul would not accept Pakistani hegemony. The Rabbani administration's friendly ties with India and Iran particularly irked Islamabad. Consequently, Pakistan initiated to subvert the Rabbani administration. It denounced its pro-India leanings and regarded it as an obstacle to Pakistan's ambitions in the region. Taking advantage of the political chaos and Pashtun resentment against the allegedly 'Tajik' dominated regime in Kabul, Pakistani intelligence again utilised its vast influence in the Pashtun Islamic groups to forge the Taliban militia as a counter to the Rabbani–Masoud combine. In addition, Islamabad encouraged the US to assist in this strategy as the fervently anti-Shiite Taliban could serve Washington's goal of containing Iranian influence in Southwest and Central Asia. From a geoeconomic angle, a Taliban-controlled Afghanistan linked to Washington's closest ally in South Asia could serve in realising US energy companies' goal of tapping the vast resources of Central Asia.

The Taliban, relying on comprehensive Pakistani military assistance were able to occupy large parts of Afghanistan between 1994 and 2001. Pakistan's involvement in facilitating the rise of the Taliban intertwined the interests of Pakistani militant Islamist groups with this Pashtun militia in its struggle for the control of Afghanistan. This made the porous Durand Line irrelevant due to the growth of strong economic, political and ideological interaction between Pakistani Islamic groups and their Afghan allies. Such a pro-active Pakistani policy in relation to Afghanistan was partly encouraged by the ambiguous and vague US stance on the Taliban.[3]

Ironically, the *Talibanisation* of Afghanistan led Pakistan to become the foremost supporter of the Pashtun Islamists in Afghanistan in a complete reversal of its pre-1978 disposition. Large-scale movement of Islamist groups with the connivance of the Pakistani authorities strengthened the transnational links of Afghan Pashtun Islamists with their Pakistani counterparts. Afghanistan under the rule of the semi-literate Taliban provided the Pakistani military with an ideal cover to deny its involvement in conducting a covert strategy of waging war by proxies in Afghanistan and Kashmir. A triangular symbiotic relationship emerged between the

Pakistani military, the Taliban and the Pakistani Islamists centred on the presumption that this nexus enhanced the security interests of Pakistan especially in its zero-sum rivalry with India. This also meant that the Pakistani military intelligence tolerated the presence of various militant Islamic groups ranging from Al Qaeda to militant Islamists from Central Asia, Kashmir and even Southeast Asia in the Taliban-controlled areas of Afghanistan.

The pursuit of creating a surrogate government in Afghanistan during the 1990s exacted a heavy price within Pakistan in the form of sectarian conflict, growth of Islamic radicalism and economic difficulties. However, the military perceived this as an acceptable outcome as long as they were successful in getting the upper hand in the Afghan conflict by keeping' Pakistan's main regional rivals, the Russian Federation, Iran and India, on the defensive.

Pakistan's involvement in fomenting Islamic militancy in Afghanistan was dictated by the interests of *Realpolitik*. This is not to deny the fact that the country's decision-making elite was also influenced by a socio-cultural and ideational mindset associated with Pakistan's 'Islamic identity'. However, in practice, power politics and the imperatives concerning the security of the Pakistani state were more influential in determining the final outcomes. The Zia regime and later successive military-backed governments in the 1990s persisted in securing control of Afghanistan to bolster Pakistan's security in the prevailing post-Cold War South Asian security structure dominated by India. In this regard, the realist power politics paradigm and its neorealist subset emphasising impact of international relations structure on states' behaviour seem to be the prime motivator of Pakistan's foreign policy. For both these forms of realism, the primary political units are states and as this study has tried to analyse it was the Pakistani state that became instrumental in instigating Islamic neo-fundamentalist groups in Afghanistan to implement its multifaceted strategic agenda. Thucydides's notion of 'fear, honour and interests' in the formulation of a state's external relations could as well apply to Pakistan.[4] However, the formulation of Pakistani Afghan policy, which was to a large degree based on raw power calculations, cannot be analysed without delving into the nature of the Pakistani state, the conservative power structure and the intertwined historical legacy of the Pakistan-Afghanistan region.

In effect, the evolution of Pakistan's policies towards Afghanistan that resulted in the rise of Islamic militancy in the country during the last two decades cannot be adequately addressed without examining the unique nature of the military-dominated Pakistani state. The acute security paranoia of Pakistan's military-bureaucratic elite based on a fear of Indian and Afghan threats to the territorial integrity of the country coupled with fissiparous domestic body politic played an important role in Pakistan's support for radical Sunni Islamist groups in Afghanistan. The hierarchical and authoritarian decision making mechanism of the military precluded any domestic debate over its Afghanistan policy. The anti-Soviet Jihad (1979–1991) and the resulting US role in strengthening the military establishment solidified the army's grip over the state to such an extent that the civil elite became largely irrelevant in the formulation of Pakistani national security objectives. The military regarded itself as the guardian of the state. Its core interests were seen as inseparable from the Pakistani state.

The abrupt change of Pakistani policy on Afghanistan was predictable. In the

wake of 11 September 2001 terrorist attacks, when confronted with the Bush administration's ultimatum to support its action against the Taliban-Al Qaeda nexus, the military decided to give total cooperation to the United States. When faced with a threat to its institutional interests and regional strategic influence, the military elite pragmatically made a turn-around in its Afghan policy by abandoning the Taliban – a force that had been to a great extent created by it. The Musharraf regime's turn-around was again motivated by a fear of possible geopolitical changes in the balance of power in South Asia that might have arisen by a possible enhanced Indian–US strategic alliance in the absence of Pakistani cooperation. Such an eventuality would have dramatically weakened Pakistani security. In the military's perception, Islamabad outmanoeuvred New Delhi by becoming a 'frontline' state against 'terrorism'.[5] This denied India, in the Pakistani elites' perception, an opportunity to be Washington's leading partner in the 'War against Terror'. Moreover, the lack of support from its traditional Asian ally, the PRC, further prompted the Pakistani military to enter a 'special relationship' with its traditional patron, the United States.[6]

The military's pivotal role in assisting the US in toppling the Taliban and Al Qaeda network was acknowledged by the Bush administration. According to a top functionary in the US Defense Department, Washington could not have achieved its goals 'without the support of Pakistan'.[7] By cooperating with Washington in Afghanistan, the Pakistani military essentially regained its position as the United States' closest ally in the wider Islamic world as was the case during the Cold War. Its backing of the Anglo-American occupation of Iraq and intelligence-sharing on Iran enhanced the military's links with the US establishment.[8]

Notwithstanding the renewed US–Pakistani engagement in Afghanistan, the transnational links woven between Pakistani and Afghan Pashtuns premised on religious and ethnic commonality are difficult to break. Islamabad's Pashtun-centric policy resulted in regarding the non-Pashtuns united under the umbrella of Northern Alliance as potential enemies since the late 1980s. Paradoxically, the Northern Alliance, against which Pakistan-backed Pashtun Islamists had fought a war from 1994 to 2001, gained considerable political influence in the Transitional Afghan Administration set up under US/UN tutelage in December 2001. This development reversed the gains that Pakistan had made in Afghanistan through the Taliban. Despite recognising the Transitional Afghan Administration, the Pakistani military perceived this body as lacking Pashtun representation and ineffective in extending its writ beyond Kabul.[9] Furthermore, the military perceived the post-Taliban Afghan administration's proclivity to develop ties with India as detrimental to Pakistan's interests. On the other hand, the alleged marginalisation of Pashtuns in Afghanistan and the Pakistani military's abandonment of the Taliban has created a sense of disaffection and alienation amongst a significant proportion of the Pashtun population on both sides of the Durand Line. Such sentiments would not only continue to have political and social reverberations within the nearly 17 million-strong Pashtun population in the NWFP and Baluchistan but will also certainly affect Pakistan's policy towards Afghanistan in the near future.

By early 2004, the Musharraf regime had turned Pakistan into Washington's main strategic partner in the so-called 'War on Terror'. The Pakistan Army's actions against Al Qaeda suspects and their backers in the North West Frontier Province's tribal areas under US pressure led to a growing resentment against the Musharraf regime in these Pashtun inhabited regions. However, the Pakistan Army's military operations against its one-time Islamist allies in coordination with US forces have earned it the Bush administration's plaudits. In March 2004, the Bush administration rewarded the military-dominated Musharraf regime by announcing that the United States had designated Pakistan as a 'major non-NATO ally' (MNNA). This status entitles Pakistan to a number of concessions including access to sophisticated military equipment and technology. Pakistan is now ranked with Israel and Egypt as Washington's major military partners in the Middle East and South Asian regions. These developments are bound to have far-reaching implications on the geopolitics and the strategic balance in South and Southwest Asia. It seems that the Washington had once again opted to strengthen the army in Pakistan while ignoring the erosion of democracy, widespread abuse of human rights and constitutional order in that country.

The intricacies of the Pakistan–Afghanistan relationship would certainly continue to be influenced by the course of US policies in the region. The success of operation *Enduring Freedom* made the US the leading extra-regional power in West, Central and South Asia. It remains to be seen whether this is a momentary episode or a long-term development. Nevertheless, with bases in Central Asia, Afghanistan and Pakistan, Washington is in a position to compete with powers like Russia and China for supremacy in the region. However, the focus of US and the West remains targeted at combating 'terrorism' and therefore only piecemeal attention has been given to mass poverty, economic stagnation and alienation of a vast majority of the population from the governing elites in the region. Unaddressed, these issues will continue to foster political, ethnic, ideological, and religious extremism, along with the violence that often accompanies it.

In the aftermath of September 11, the US-led NATO coalition became the dominant power in Afghan politics. Afghanistan's sovereignty and freedom of action, which it possessed before the tragic events of April 1978, is still proscribed. The attempt to rebuild an Afghan state with the overt presence of foreign troops and advisors would be a daunting task in view of the historic tendency of Afghans to resist external intrusions in their domain. The experience of the defunct Soviet Union (1978–1991) and later Pakistan (1994–2001) leaves little scope to make predictions on the outcome of this latest venture by foreign powers to create a client Afghan state.

In Pakistan itself, decades of authoritarian rule backed by military coercion have eroded the vestiges of civil institutions and governance based on the rule of law and parliamentary supremacy. The weakening of civil society has brought the power of the state as represented by the army in direct confrontation with the citizenry. In the words of Barry Buzan, the threats to such states are not territorial but are political which undermine the 'organisational stability of the state, the system of government and the ideology which gives it legitimacy'.[10] Military security has to be anchored on economic prosperity, social cohesion and political stability. From the standpoint of contemporary Pakistan these three dimensions appear to be unachievable in the foreseeable future. The military's suffocating hold on the state and the consequent socio-political ramifications ensure that the internal political dynamics of Pakistani politics would continue to impact on the country's external relations especially in the context of its two immediate neighbours: Afghanistan and India.

Pakistan's withdrawal of support for the Taliban in the post-September 11 period marked the end of an important phase in the history of the Afghan crisis, but unfortunately it does not signify the conclusion, or even the attenuation of the struggle for Afghanistan. The conflict over the future of Afghanistan continues, and so does the contest for political influence in the new Afghan state whose edifice is still in the process of creation. The ethnic and religious links of large proportion of Afghanistan's population with the neighbouring states along with the geostrategic interests of regional and extra-regional powers ensure that the contest for paramountcy over that country would continue. This makes one acutely conscious of the ephemeral nature of the power struggles and victories in the historically volatile and unpredictable context of the Afghan crisis.

Notes

1 According to the British Viceroy of India, Lord Curzon: 'We wanted buffer states between ourselves and Russia-Tibet, China, Turkestan, Afghanistan, Persia. But we could not see those states crushed out of existence, and the buffer reduced to the thinness of a wafer without a word.' Curzon to Lord Lansdowne, 15 June 1901, Lansdowne papers cited in Rose Louis Greaves, 'British Policy in Persia, 1892–1903', University of London: *Bulletin of the School of Oriental and African Studies*, Vol.28, Issue 1, 1965, p.56.

2 General Zia, in a retort to Hekmatyar's defiance of Pakistan during the Jihad reportedly commented that: 'Gulbaddin must be clearly warned that it was Pakistan who made him an Afghan leader and it is Pakistan who can equally destroy him if he continues to misbehave.' Muhammad Yousaf, *Silent Soldier*, Lahore: Jang Publications, 1992, p.161.

3 As late as March 2001, the Bush administration's officials continued to hold dialogue on bilateral ties with the Taliban representatives. See Kenneth Katzman, 'Afghanistan: Current Issues and U.S. Policy', CRS Report for Congress, Washington DC: *Congressional Research Service*, 13 June 2003.

4 Robert B. Strassler (ed), *The Landmark Thucydides: A comprehensive Guide to the Peloponnesian War*, New York: Free Press, 1996, p.43.

5 K. Alan Kronstadt, 'Pakistan–US Anti-Terrorism Cooperation', Washington DC: *Congressional Research Service*, 28 March 2003.

6 See excerpts from meeting between General Musharraf and US President George W. Bush, *Times of India*, 25 June 2003.

7 Statement by US Deputy Secretary of Defense, Paul Wolfowitz, 30 September 2002, Washington DC: *Defenselink*, 30 September 2002.

8 See 'Pakistan promises cooperation with IAEA', *The Nation*, 11 February 2004.

9 'Karzai saddened by Musharraf's remarks', *The News*, 8 July 2003.

10 Barry Buzan, 'New Patterns of Global Security in the Twenty First Century', *International Affairs* (London), Vol.61, No.3, 1991, p.433.

Appendix A

Interservices Intelligence Directorate

The Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI) Directorate of the Pakistani military is one of the most powerful governmental institutions of the country. For over three decades, it has played a pivotal role in implementing the internal and external policies of the various military dominated regimes that have come to power in Pakistan. In fact, the ISI has been a wellspring of power and influence in Pakistani politics. It remains one of the most well organised and effective intelligence agencies of the Third World.

A British army officer, Major-General R. Cawthorne, then Deputy Chief of Staff of the Pakistan Army, founded the ISI in 1948. Originally, General Cawthorne had conceived the ISI as part of the military establishment, in an effort to combine and coordinate intelligence outfits of the army, air force and navy. However, as the army emerged as a politically influential institution in the Pakistani body politic, the ISI correspondingly evolved into a monolithic entity, overseeing both the internal and external intelligence operations. Under the military regime of General Ayub Khan (1958–1969), the ISI not only developed as the country's primary external intelligence body but also became involved in monitoring domestic politics in order to sustain military rule in Pakistan. The ISI's operational ability expanded exponentially with the assistance of the United States' intelligence establishment during the Afghan War.

The Pakistani military elite has utilised the ISI as a tool of governance. The generals have manipulated domestic politics through this intelligence agency by ensuring that military-friendly politicians were elected to parliament during the so-called democratic periods of rule in Pakistan especially during the 1990s. The Zia regime (1977–1988) used this agency to encourage Islamic parties, such as the JI and the JUI, to counter domestic opposition to military rule and at the same time undermine the mainstream political parties. Moreover, the rise of ethnic and sectarian militancy in Pakistan is also partly attributed to the role of the ISI in fomenting divisive politics in order to curtail the rise of cohesive political challenge to the army's hold over the state. In effect, the Zia regime virtually transformed the ISI into a political instrument for eliminating internal opposition and promoting Islamic militancy in Afghanistan and India. It is even alleged that the ISI was used to assassinate the Zia regime's opponents including one of the two brothers of the former Pakistani Prime Minster, Benazir Bhutto.[1]

The ISI's importance within the Pakistani military establishment can be gauged from the fact that several of the prominent members of the military regime that came to power in Pakistan in October 1999 had served in this organization. The top echelons of the Junta, including General Pervez Musharraf (appointed himself President in June 2001) and Mohammad Aziz (Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff Committee), had served with this organization at an operational level during the Afghan War.

The ISI is responsible for the collection of foreign and domestic intelligence; co-ordination of intelligence functions of the three military services; surveillance over its cadre, foreigners, the media, politically active segments of the Pakistani society, diplomats of other countries accredited to Pakistan and Pakistani diplomats serving abroad; interception and monitoring of communications; and the conduct of covert offensive operations. Nearly all the upper and middle rung officers of the ISI are serving military officers. The ISI is reported to have more than 10,000 officers and staff that do not include informants and assets.[2] However, some observers suggest that the ISI may have up to 150,000 operatives and a budget running over US$ 1 billion![3]

The ISI is headed by a Director-General, who is usually an army officer of the rank of Lieutenant-General. Theoretically, the ISI DG reports to the Prime Minister. However, owing to the military's control over the political process, the DG ISI in practice reports directly to the Chief of the Army Staff (COAS). The DG ISI is assisted by three Deputy Directors-General (usually holding the rank of Major-General/Rear-Admiral/Air Vice Marshal) heading the agency's political, external and administrative divisions that are divided into various sections. The sections are subject to change and merger according to the priorities of the time.

The ISI was organized into six to eight sections in the mid 1990s that were:

1 *Joint Intelligence North (JIN)* This section was reportedly responsible for backing the Taliban in Afghanistan and the Kashmir insurgency.
2 *Joint Intelligence Bureau (JIB)* Responsible for open sources and human intelligence collection locally and abroad. The section's *Political Wing* deals with domestic matters pertaining to political parties, students unions and other issues. In the past JIB has coordinated its operations with the Military Intelligence (MI) and the rather ineffective civilian Intelligence Bureau (IB).
3 *Joint Counter-Intelligence Bureau (JCIB)* Tasked with counter intelligence activities internally and abroad. Domestic surveillance of diplomats. Externally, it monitors Pakistani diplomats abroad. The Bureau conducts intelligence operations in the Arab states, Iran and other regions of Asia.
4 *Joint Signals Intelligence Bureau (JSIB)* In charge of all communications intelligence.
5 *Joint Intelligence Miscellaneous (JIM)* Conducts espionage in foreign countries, including offensive intelligence operations.
6 *Joint Intelligence X (JIX)* Administration, coordination with other sections, preparation of intelligence estimates and accounts.
7 *Joint Intelligence Technical (JIT)* Collects all technical intelligence and other communications intelligence for research and development.
8 *Special Wing* administers the Defence services intelligence training facilities and liaises with foreign intelligence agencies.

In addition to these, the ISI has a substantial large explosives and chemical warfare section.

The ISI operated a separate *Afghanistan Cell* from 1970s to the early 1990s. The Afghan Cell was responsible for the induction and training of the Afghan mujahideen based in refugee camps in Pakistan. The Afghan Cell was run in



Figure A.1 ISI organizational chart

coordination with the CIA in the 1980s. It planned and coordinated the Afghan jihad, which was one of the biggest covert operations of the twentieth century. The ISI not only provided advice and support for the Mujahideen but also bolstered their efforts by including personnel of the Army's Special Services Group (SSG) to help guide the operations in Afghanistan. However, it is not known whether the Afghan Cell was merged with the Joint Intelligence North (JIN) in the mid-1990s.

The ISI has maintained firm links with the US intelligence establishment over the past few decades. Moreover, the organization has worked cooperatively with the Saudi and Chinese intelligence services in subverting Afghanistan from 1978 to 2001. Before the Iranian revolution, the ISI had close links with the Iranian SAVAK and the J-2 Section of the Iranian military intelligence besides having interaction with the Turkish intelligence establishment, due to the membership of Iran and Turkey in the CENTO alliance system.[4] Intelligence cooperation with Turkey has continued but coordination with Iran has been intermittent and subject to the vagaries of the post-1979 Iran–Pakistan relations.

Notes

1 See *Jane's International Security News*. 1 October 2001. http://www.janes.com/security/international_security/news/misc/janes011001_1_n.shtml. Accessed 15/12/2002.
2 *Federation of American Scientists*. http://www.fas.org/irp/world/pakistan/isi/. Accessed 9/10/2002.
3 Iris Makklar, *Our Woman in Kabul*, Sydney: Bantam, 2003, p.123.
4 See Syed A.I. Tirmizi, *Profiles of Intelligence*, Lahore: Combined Printers, 1995, p.243.

Appendix B

Peshawar Accord (April 1992)

Literal Translation of Original Dari Text

Salutation and peace be upon the Great Messenger of Allah and his Progeny and Companions. And after that:

The structure and process for the provisional period of the Islamic State of Afghanistan was formed as under:

1 It was decided that a 51-person body, headed by Hazrat Sahib Sibghatullah Mujaddidi would go inside Afghanistan so that they could take over power from present rulers of Kabul, completely and without any terms and conditions during a two-month period. The head of this body will also represent the Presidentship of the State during these two months. After this period, this body will remain as Interim Islamic Council, along with the Transitional State and its Chairmanship will be held by Hazrat Sahib. The period of this Council will also be for (4) months.
2 It was decided that Professor Rabbani would remain as the President of the Transitional Islamic State of Afghanistan and the head of the Leadership Council for (4) months. He will commence his work officially at the time when two months of the transfer of power will have elapsed.
3 The above-mentioned period will not be extended even by a day.
4 The Prime Minister and other members of the Cabinet will be appointed from the second grade members of the Tanzeemat, at the discretion of the heads of the Tanzeemat.
5 The Prime Ministership was assigned to the Hizb-e-Islami, Afghanistan.
6 The Deputy Prime Ministership and the Ministry of Interior, to Ittehad-e-Islami, Afghanistan.
7 The Deputy Prime Ministership and the Ministry of Education, to Hizb-e-Islami of Maulvi Khalis.
8 The Deputy Prime Ministership and Ministry of Foreign Affairs were assigned to the National Islamic Front.
9 The Ministry of Defence to Jamiat-e-Islami, Afghanistan.
10 The Supreme Court to Harkat-e-Inqilab-e-Islami Organization.
11 It was decided that the Leadership Council, in addition to making the division of appointments in the Ministries, will also determine Ministries for Hizb-e-Wahdat, Shoora-e-Etelaf (Council of Coalition) Maulvi Mansoor and other brothers.
12 The total period of this process will be six months. As regards the Transitional Government, the Islamic Council will make a unanimous decision. The period of this Transitional Government will be two (2) years.

Glossary

Some Arabic, Persian and Urdu Words Used in the Text

ahl al-hal wal-aqd	Those who unbind and bind; reference to those who consult to manage the affairs of the Islamic community, that is, the ulama.
adl	Justice.
alim	Singular of ulama.
bidaa	Innovation.
darul harb	Abode of war.
darul Kufr	Abode of blasphemy.
dawah	Invitation to Islam. It suggests a proselytical posture that reinforces Islamicity.
din	Religion.
fiqh	Islamic jurisprudence.
hadith	Saying attributed to the Prophet Muhammad.
hizb	Party.
ijtihad	Independent judgement in the interpretation of Islamic law.
jamaat	Party or social organisation.
jihad	Holy war (Jihad al Kubra); striving in the path of God; Jihad-i-Sugradefence of Islam against physical enemies.
kafir	Unbeliever (in Islam).
karamat	Special spiritual powers.
lashkar	A war party.
madrassa	Traditional religious seminary.
mawlana	Title for those learned in the Islamic science and law.
pir	Sufi master.
riba	Usury (forbidden in Islamic law).
sardar	Honorific title for the head of a sub tribe or clan.
sayyids	Descendents of the Prophet Muhammad through the progeny of his daughter, Fatimah.
sharia	The corpus of laws that governs Muslim personal and social life.
shiite or shii	The followers of a branch of Islam who believe that the spiritual and political leadership of the Islamic community should have remained within the household of the Prophet Muhammad through his cousin and son-in-law Ali ibn Abi Talib. The Shiites do not recognize the first three successors of the Prophet as legitimate, as opposed to the Sunnis.
shura	A consultative body.

sunni	The people who follow the Sunnah (custom) of the Prophet. The largest group of Muslims who recognise the first four successors (including Ali ibn Abi Talib) of the Prophet Muhammad as legal and do not attribute any special religious function to them.
tabligh	Islamic missionary work.
ulama	Those educated in Islamic law.
ummah	The Islamic community.
ustad	Master.

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India Office Records.
L/PO: Secretary of State for India: Private Office Papers.
L/P&S Record Pertaining to Political and Secret Department Records.
L/WS: India Office: War Staff Papers c 1921–1950.
R/1: India: Crown Representative: Political Department Indian State Records.
R/3: India: Viceroy's Private Office Papers and other Government Records.
R/12: Afghanistan: Kabul Legation Records 1923–1948.
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